Combined Summary and Conclusions: (Volume II)
Table of Contents
Review of Basic Fundamental Principles
Adding to the extensive amount of evidence already presented, the following re-examines and summarizes the most important concepts and basic principles that are central to the existence and perpetuation of dispossessed sovereignty. This includes the essential qualities necessary for civilization, prescription, sovereignty, and natural law. It also provides a few recommendations for consideration to help preserve a just society.
Legally, man has the lawful and proper right, even the encouraged entitlement, to make laws to benefit mankind and society. However, what makes a law legitimate or not depends on whether the law is in harmony with natural law. Natural law is the highest law on earth since it exemplifies right reason. Some examples will make this clear:
A colonel in the military has the authority to make commands and laws that majors, lieutenants, and privates must obey and follow. There is a legal relationship between them since they each have placed themselves under a Military Code and the Articles of War which require them to obey all lawful orders of a superior officer. However, a private in the American army is not required to obey the orders of a colonel from the German army as there is no legal relationship between them. . . .
A king has the authority to give laws and commands which his subjects must follow because of their relationship to the king as subjects of his kingdom. The king has control over the land and also provides protection for the people of his kingdom, creating a legal relationship between him and the subject. . . .
A king cannot make people of another land or kingdom subject to his laws. A general from England cannot give commands to a buck private in the American army because there is no common relationship between them. The president of General Motor has no authority to make rules for an employee of Joe’s auto body shop. In each case there is no relationship between to the two parties. . . . .
[For another example an] employer has authority to make such rules not because it has more wealth and assets than the employee, but because the employee has entered into a legal agreement with that employer.
[Similarly a] parent has authority over the child because of the relationship that exists between them. But that same parent does not have authority to prescribe rules of conduct for another child as no legal relationship exists between them. The superior strength and knowledge of that parent does not give him the right to make law for any child he thinks needs correction but his own.
. . . True lawful authority is not derived from force or power or wealth, but from a legal relationship between the two parties involved. When laws exist because of force or power, it is despotism or tyranny, not authoritative law. Man despotic governments have existed throughout history because “might makes right.” Force and power are not a substitute for a lawful relationship.
The above requirements for lawful authority are the basis for both external sovereignty, which is independence from the meddling of others, and internal sovereignty, which is the legitimate right to rule within a specific territory.
Force cannot make a law that is in violation of nature or reason into a true and rightful law. Such a law cannot be anything but unlawful and wrong. Hence, ". . . a human law, directly contrary to the law of God, would be a nullity." In other words, counterfeiters who make royal or sovereign claims that contradict prescriptive law are in violation of natural law. Therefore, their claims are null and void or empty of any truth and validity.
Prescription is a core issue for deposed sovereignty. It is the only law that provides for the continued legal right to govern for an illegally dispossessed royal House or exiled government.
Sovereignty: the Most Important Secular Right
"Sovereignty is one of the foremost institutions of our world." Even with the attacks upon it in more recent years:
. . . the sovereign state has proven a remarkably robust form of authority, enjoying over 350 years of staying power and expanding outward to become the only form of polity in history ever to cover the land surface of the globe.
Even "the reshaping of sovereignty by human rights has left states today no less sovereign than they were fifty, a hundred, or three hundred and fifty years ago." Throughout all modern history ". . . the basic elements [of sovereignty] remain constant . . . Those premises have remained unchanged [consistent and stable] down to the present day." That is:
What is stable and continuous over the entire history of sovereignty is the idea that a sovereign government is an authority that is supreme over all other authorities in the same territorial jurisdiction [which is internal sovereignty], and is independent of all foreign authorities [which is external sovereignty].
Simply put, since ". . . nothing can be accomplished without good public order, political stability and unity," national sovereignty becomes far more important than any other single factor in preserving basic human rights. Sovereign governments are, after all, the most powerful players in the world system. Diminish them and you cripple the power of the very people who can change things and make things better for their people. Hence, there is in existence ". . . an enormously elaborate body of national and international law that secures the exclusive territory and sovereignty of the national state within and outside its jurisdiction."
Meddling into another country’s affairs, even for humanitarian reasons, has in the past caused more harm than good. For example:
In the last decade of the 20th century, the country that considered itself "a knight in shining armour for human rights" has started 40 wars to punish countries which did not comply with its "values." In their wars of aggression, international forces have not hesitated to use every means of war, some even banned by the UN, in the name of defending human rights.
In other words, "A violation of national sovereignty means trampling upon the human rights of the entire people in that country." The action is often deeply resented. Civil behavior and cultural balance are not generally created by an unwelcome and despised occupation. ". . . In the current world, there are more than 200 countries and territories and thousands of different ethnic groups who follow different religions and have different cultural traditions." Bullying by the great and powerful countries of the world is a violation of the basic right that each country has to independently rule itself.
Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom [for both individuals and nations]. . . . We may affirm that the theory which says "human rights rank above State sovereignty" is completely wrong. It even contains ill political intentions and justifies international warlike and reactionary forces [or] aggressive policies. Therefore, that theory cannot stand firm before reasonable countries who conform to the international laws of peace and justice in the world. The theory which says "human rights rank above State sovereignty" will certainly be ignored by history and reality.
The relatively new concept of jus cogens, literally defined in Latin as compelling law, puts non-aggression as one of the highest laws on earth. The justification to break this law has been dealt with in the sections entitled, "Condemnation of Revolution," "Legitimate Right to Resist Tyranny," and "The Legitimate Provisional Government resulting from the Exercise of the Right of Resistance" in Chapter VI of Volume I.
It simply is not true that "a strong claim of sovereignty by a state that is committing human rights abuses will not be respected by the international community." For all human rights other than genocide – that is, to repeat, for virtually all human rights – states still retain ultimate enforcement authority. They can and do advance strong claims of sovereignty. And those claims are accepted, however, reluctantly, by other states and the international community.
"On the whole, the right of intervention has been discredited in international law . . . [however] interference to prevent effusion of blood, or put an end to a state of anarchy from which the interests of other nations necessarily suffer, has . . . been justified. . . ." The problem is, when sovereignty is breached and violated by the powerful, even for humanitarian purposes, it is often a short-sighted venture that ultimately backfires and hurts a lot of people. A profound reverence and respect for natural law is the kindest, wisest, and most beneficial thing there is in this world for both individuals and nations. Sovereignty must be respected:
Those who have sought to create international systems on bases other than the sovereign state B such as Napoleon, Stalin and Hitler B have had their enterprises de-legitimized. . . . None of these empire-builders generated much international support precisely because they wanted to destroy the Westphalian states system and replace it with structures that denied the principle of sovereignty.
The Nazi leadership thought in terms of races rather than states, of space rather than bounded territories, of expanding power rather than legal domination. . . .
The model for Nazi rule was not the legally defined authority of the sovereign state, but the unrestricted power of the colony and the concentration camp. . . . The Second World War, like the First, ended with the [obviously] apparent triumph of the sovereign state.
The enemies of sovereignty – those who want to dominate the world -- and declare that "the end justifies the means," often portray sovereignty as inferior. But to any reasonable person, "The concept of sovereignty cannot reasonably be blamed . . . for the world’s horrors and imperfections."
Politicians and pundits [learned scholars] had learned, after a decade of rhetoric about "global governance" and a "post-sovereign world," that sovereignty was, after all, an indispensable concept.
Nevertheless, sovereignty still has its enemies. Grotius taught that sovereignty is so important that it is "the vital breath," "the key-stone of the fabric of society," and "the very soul of all [effective] government." Sovereignty is the most important entity to protect freedom and individual liberty. It is what binds us and makes freedom possible. Without law and order, everything of value and worth disappears as civilization dwindles. In short:
. . . The State is . . . to society as form is to matter, for the form by its nature preserves the matter, and, as philosophers have shown, the two are inseparable. For a state is inconceivable without a society, while a society without a state is well nigh impossible, owing to the aggressive propensities of men which require a restraint.
"Sovereignty is therefore peculiar to man, suited to his nature and indispensable to his existence."
The internal right of sovereignty is where supremacy actually rules to the benefit of mankind. As such, ". . . internal sovereignty is superior to . . . external sovereignty," because it is supreme where it really counts the most in the midst of the people. The internal right to rule is absolute in law, but, in practice, it is highly limited, flexible, and resilient. This is one of the reasons that ". . . it retains vitality in international use, and remains the cornerstone of international law;" it has served as such since the beginning of recorded history.
"Externally, no single meaning of sovereignty exists . . . ," which creates problems, criticisms, and serious debates among politicians, international lawyers, jurists, scholars, and especially those who seek to establish a coercive and all-powerful global government to dominate the earth. Nevertheless, perhaps external sovereignty is best defined as the expectation for nations to respect the independent rights of other nations.
Lumping external and internal sovereignty together promotes misunderstandings. Inside the borders or territory of the state, ". . . sovereignty can be generally defined with little controversy [or argument] as the ability to have supreme authority within a defined territory. . . ."
Internal de jure non-territorial sovereignty is the only sovereignty owned or possessed by deposed monarchs and governments-in-exile. Royalty and royal status is a special unique manifestation of that sovereignty that only an independent kingdom or sovereign principality can enjoy. ". . . The ‘royal prerogative’ [is] the sovereign right to authority held uniquely by the monarch." That is, kingly authority is nothing more or less than innate powers that have always existed in sovereignty, but it is expressed in a special way because a monarch is in his or her person the embodiment and personification of the majesty and glory of that sovereignty. However:
In modern times, the kingly power often represents only a limited measure of [de facto] sovereignty, various constitutional checks being in operation in different countries to control [and curtail] the royal prerogative.
The royal prerogative of granting noble titles, honors and knighthoods are deeply rooted in the concept of sovereignty. In fact, they form an authentic privilege, which cannot exist outside of this supreme right to rule. Take sovereignty away, as is rightfully done in extinctive prescription, and there is no longer any royal prerogative or privilege left.
The other point of major focus in this work has been an examination of justice, right thinking, and natural law. But this returns one to sovereignty because sovereignty is the authority and mechanism to provide for highest forms of freedom, justice and human rights. It is also what protects nations and people from world domination. Thus, "in international law, sovereignty is of paramount importance and is the ultimate question in determining the survival of [freedom and the rights of] nation[s]." Hence, "the importance of the doctrine of sovereignty can hardly be overrated." It is ". . . the very pillar of international society. . . ." It has also stood the test of time, is upheld as the first principle of international law, and is at the very heart of all national governments. In other words, ". . . Sovereignty is not to be compared with other things; it so far surpasses them in the nobleness of its end, and the dignity of its nature." It ". . . excels [and] surpasses [almost all other things] . . . in terms of worth."
However, this power that can be used so benevolently can also be severely abused creating tyranny. The point is:
Liberty does not flourish because men have natural rights or because they revolt if their rulers push them too far; it flourishes because power is so distributed and so organized that whoever is tempted to abuse it finds legal restraints in his way.
Checks and balances of power are protective and necessary for freedom to survive and thrive in any nation. In addition, a nation can be no stronger than its people and therefore no greater than the quality of its families. These are the building blocks of society. Strong families produce strong nations. Therefore whatever strengthens and enriches families strengthens and enriches society, because the children of today become the leaders of tomorrow.
Sovereignty, which is the highest secular right on earth, was originally built on the authority of families and parents, and it is confirmed by the fifth commandment. "Honor they father and mother, as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee. . . ." (Deuteronomy 5:16) Thus, it is no surprise that "The King’s authority was very nearly the same as that exercised by the head of a family, and thus patriarchal and royal power are very closely related in their origin." The principle of family is bound to the concept of nationhood. "The State is a large family, composed of all of the private families, and the Prince is the father of all the fathers." Thus, "The principle of the royal power is therefore a family one: the King [being] the head of the [families]." Family and the concept of ownership have their origins in natural law, which is the most important international law on earth. Sovereignty is a central part of the higher law. In fact, the foundation of all legal, non-territorial sovereignty, the chief subject of this book, whether for a deposed monarchy or a legitimate government-in-exile, revolves around this foremost reality.
Prescription: the Most Important Law of Dispossessed Sovereignty
Dynastic rights are by definition the supreme governing rights owned by a royal family whether that family is presently reigning or deposed. That is, "A royal dynasty . . . [is] characterized [that is, identified] by its right [or entitlement] to rule a kingdom [or principality]." The right to rule is sovereignty -- the supreme governing title. It is inseparable from the dynastic rights of a royal house.
The . . . question is, whether majesty [regal dynastic rights] acquired can be forfeited. . . . To forfeit anything is to lose the right unto it [not just] to lose the possession [that is, be deposed, but to lose everything]. [Since one may] lose his possession, and yet retain his right [as a dispossessed dynasty], . . . the question is . . . whether they may forfeit . . . [the kingdom’s rights] and that justly. [Answer:] . . . whosoever is given [the right to rule] and held upon condition [which is true for all monarchies worldwide], that may be lost and forfeited . . . . A right once forfeited falls [either back] to the party who gave it [or is obtained by the new government according to prescriptive law]. . . . [The answer is] it’s certain that sovereigns . . . may forfeit. [Again] such . . . sovereigns . . . may and do forfeit [all their royal rights, distinctions and entitlements].
"Dynastic rights [were not sacrosanct, therefore, they] were systematically violated in the numerous territorial exchanges of the period." In other words, ". . . Forfeitures of dynastic rights, were common events in those days [the 1800’s]. . . ." Some of these loses of royalty came about by the sale of all their entitlements. "A [proprietary] nation [kingdom or principality] is like a private estate: it may be bought and sold or exchanged. . . ." That is, throughout the Middle Ages, various ". . . empires . . . continued to base their rule on ancient dynastic rights arising from marriage, succession, purchase [buying the rights or by], conquest etc. . . ."
Loses of dynastic rights and the gaining of such rights can come in various ways. ". . . A legitimate sovereign, unjustly kept from his rights [being deposed], may lose those [deposed regal] rights [of dynasty], when a de facto government has been in peaceful [unprotested] possession of a certain length of time." If a family loses the right to rule as a dispossessed house, they lose all royal rights and privileges. At this point, the family becomes nothing more than any other family in the nation in which they dwell. They have illustrious ancestors, but no right to title, honor or distinction above any other citizen of the land. They are commoners like most others.
Since prescription is the only law that preserves dynastic rights, it becomes critical to the continuance of those entitlements in deposed royal Houses. Legitimacy for a royal House or exiled government turns on whether there has been full and complete compliance with the rules of prescription. This most significant law controls and governs non-territorial sovereignty. It has ". . . world-wide agreement as to its essential doctrines." And it is ". . . unquestionably, a central [or core] tenet of law." Some, in the 19th century, tried to discredit it, for:
It is true that some later writers on the Law of Nations have denied that the doctrine of Prescription has any place in the system of International Law. But their opinion is overwhelmed by authority [that is, by the most prominent experts in the field for it is] at variance with practice and usage, and [is] inconsistent with the reason of the thing.
In other words, the great majority of legal experts have always remained loyal to this law because it is rational or part of common sense, and it is a part of the higher law -- or laws of justice which promote peace worldwide. Now in the 21st century:
State practice, interpretive works, and decisions of international tribunals unanimously agree that long-continued possession and effective control, combined with declarations of sovereignty, eventually confers title by prescription.
The point is, the basic principles of justice and therefore prescription in general will never change or be altered. It is dependable and reliable, so much so that in a series of international arbitration hearings in the 19th century when prescription had a few enemies, it was stated that:
. . . [T]he permanent court of arbitration has never denied the principle of prescription, a principle well recognized in international law, and it is fair to believe it will never do so.
The reason for this is because prescription is part of the natural law of justice. It is most rewarding and beneficial to the dispossessed who care about their lawful sovereign privileges enough to keep them alive. In contrast, it is very punitive and harsh in its judgment of those who abandoned and neglect these rights.
In writing about how sovereign powers are terminated, Hugo Grotius declared that sovereign ". . . rights are extinguished by abandonment, for the reason that, when the desire ceases, ownership [or sovereignty] does not continue." That is, "In the relations of state to state . . . rights left unexercised are sooner or later lost."
If a sovereign and the dynasts of that sovereignty neglect or abandon these sovereign rights, these rights are forfeited by that House or exiled government. All of these sovereign rights are then transferred to the subsequent de facto government in possession of the land over which the sovereign once reigned. An occupying de facto government of a land does not become fully internally legitimate until all of these rights are transferred to it.
International law definitely recognizes the principle of "extinctive prescription," that is to say, loss of rights by a state [or deposed sovereign house] that fails to protest against the contravention of its rights.
Immemorial prescription . . . rests on the principle that a person who has enjoyed a right [the possessor], from time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, must be treated and regarded as if he had acquired such right, by means of some valid transaction which can no longer be proved. . . .
. . . [After a long lapse of time] material facts including means of ascertainment . . . are lost, or so obscured as to leave . . . the truth, reasonably in doubt . . . , [at this juncture] a basis for the [legal] presumption exists [against the negligent former sovereign entity]. . . . In Vattel’s phrase, "when by his own fault he [the former sovereign] has suffered matters to proceed to such a state that there would be danger of mistaking the truth," prescription operates and resolves such facts against [the former king or sovereign house for a failure to maintain their rights]. . . .
In such a situation, ". . . the right of the former owner of [sovereign] title is extinguished." Immemorial prescription of sovereignty, which is a complete loss of sovereign title with no hope of re-establishment, occurs in 100 years. This is well-established and generally agreed upon. However, many scholars and jurists also recognize ordinary prescription, which can occur in as little as 50 years of legal abandonment. Either way, the loss of sovereignty is inevitable for a deposed House unless it takes actions to preserve these sovereign rights.
This work has also shown that non-territorial sovereignty is alienable, forfeitable, and prescriptible:
(a) "A possessed right is alienable if it can be voluntarily given away, exchanged, or renounced," which is true of patrimonial and de jure sovereignty,
(b) "A possessed right is forfeitable if it can be lost involuntarily through negligence [or some serious criminal act] . . . ," and
(c) "A possessed right is prescriptible if it can [legally] be taken away . . . ," as is lawfully and rightfully done through both domestic and international prescription.
All three above ways of losing sovereignty for a royal House have been quite common in the history of mankind. Yet there are persons who promote the false idea that jur sanguinis or hereditary blood right cannot be terminated for a royal House. However:
It is absurd, in fact, and anti-Christian, to suppose that any right of superiority founded on mere natural descent [right of blood or jur sanguinis] is indefeasible. . . . They [a royal dynasty] may be discrowned and unkinged, for their crimes or those of their dynasty, and reduced, with their children, to the plain level of humanity.
Being reduced "to the plain level of humanity" means losing all family dynastic rights and becoming ordinary citizens with no more entitlements than any other family in the nation. Dynastic rights are not invulnerable to forfeiture and permanent dispossession on either a reigning or deposed regal family.
While prescription can and has legally destroyed sovereign rights in history, it can also act to preserve them. In truth, prescription is the only law available for maintaining the legal right of sovereignty. It is a timeless and universal rule for all ages of mankind and all kingdoms. Prescription justly mandates the legal existence and rights of non-territorial sovereignty; it demonstrate that de jure legal sovereignty can exist independently from a de facto sovereign that merely exercises control over a territory but does not have internal legal supremacy.
The following are aspects of prescription as it relates to sovereignty:
(1) Private law rights (or vested rights) are valid and legitimate, and they can be handed down from generation to generation. But, without sovereignty, they cannot own an order of chivalry, a royal title, or any such entitlements that belong exclusively to the supreme right to govern. If there were no such thing as de jure non-territorial sovereignty separate from reigning sovereignty over a territory, then there could be no such thing as a dethroned royal House or government-in-exile that still held sovereignty. History, natural law, and international law all demonstrate that non-territorial de jure sovereignty exists, and it is prescription that establishes and maintains the legal and lawful rights of the deposed.
(2) Only born persons have dynastic rights. That is, if a royal House neglects its sovereign rights for 100 years, then no direct future descendant can claim that these sovereign rights were still somehow preserved within the House by the royal prerogative passing to unborn future descendants.
Prescription is necessarily binding against persons unborn. For if the ancestor, through neglect, have lost his property [the sovereign prerogative], how can his posterity acquire it? They are thereby deprived of no right [because they held none]; for the accidental circumstance of descent cannot entitle them to claim, through their ancestors, that which their ancestors, at the time of their death, did not possess.
(3) There are no hereditary rights (jus sanguinis) that are preserved under prescription unless a land had a hereditary monarchial system when the royal House was overthrown. In some ancient nations, such as some Arab nations in history, the Byzantine Empire (until shortly before its fall), and ancient China (which had the legal principle of "the mandate of heaven"), there were no hereditary sovereign rights. If a sovereign was overthrown, that formerly royal family retained no regal rights at all. Therefore, there were no sovereign rights to pass on to future generations. Thus, for these lands, there is simply no modern royal House that survived and retained the fons honorum. Prescription cannot preserve sovereign rights that never existed in the first place.
In conclusion, prescription is the only real lawful mechanism for the perpetuation and maintenance of deposed royal claims and sovereign titles.
As has been demonstrated under the natural law, truly legitimate governments (monarchies and republics alike) possess an almost unassailable moral position as the embodiment of the natural constitution of their nations. These embodiments were established through the processes of natural law. Thus, it is not surprising that this irreproachable moral position is likewise confirmed in the doctrines of international law. The natural law, from which international law is derived, brands both the position of and the exercise of authority by a usurper as wrought with illegality:
Active and passive resistance against the usurper is not only a right, but a duty for all citizens. For the usurper is an invader and his lawless power is violence, not authority; should he by terrorism and duress force the people to consent externally to his rule, such a legitimation is invalid. His laws are not laws, but iniquities. The usurper is a foe of the respublica, and every one who acts against him acts in defense of the body politic.
Due to its derivation from both natural law and Christian revelation, the doctrines of international law support a legitimate de jure government on the moral proposition that might does not make right. An unjust external aggressor or violent proletarian revolutionaries acquire no moral right from victory in an unjust war or successful high treason. Since a usurper’s reign usually begins through an injustice, it is not for the general good that such should acquire de jure sovereignty through a mere lapse of time or diplomatic recognition from other governments. Therefore, the deposed monarchy or government maintains internal non-territorial de jure sovereignty. This is similar to other forms of property right. For example, a thief does not become the de jure owner through the lapse of time only. While the thief has de facto control over the property that he or she has stolen, it remains the legal and moral property of the original owner until that owner (or the later heirs) abandons all claims to the property. The doctrines of international law merely ratify in the legal sphere what moralists proclaim in the ethical realm. The ancient moral and legal truth that:
. . . If the Constitution be alter’d by an unjust Rebellion, the Liberty thus usurp’d so long continues unlawful, as the rightful Prince shall labour to reduce the Rebels to Obedience, or at least by solemn Declaration shall protest and preserve his Right over them [by the preserving side of prescription]; till by long Acquiescence [neglect] and Silence he may be presum’d to have given up his Claim [by extinctive prescription]
De jure non-territorial sovereignty is built on three main pillars that support each other. These three pillars are the law of nature, prescriptive legitimacy, and the perfect society. All three principles have been thoroughly covered in this study. But below is a synopsis of them.
To begin, a perfect society does not refer to a utopian type of culture or people. Instead, it is society that has three principles of rightful governance – independence, authority, and jurisdiction. All of these dimensions are necessary for sovereignty to exist in international law. However, in the case of a deposed monarch, government-in-exile, or their lawful successors, they are legally the embodiment and personification of these three dimensions, even if they are not organized as such. These dispossessed claimants are heads of state of legal governments, even if they are unrecognized externally by other currently-sovereign states.
The concepts of a perfect society are part of the natural governmental law of mankind. However, an organization may have independence, authority, and jurisdiction without actual sovereignty. Examples of these are churches (barring the Roman Catholic Church, which is sovereign as a tiny Vatican independent nation), a corporation, and even some social clubs. But sovereignty requires these elements plus the right to reign.
Prescription is the justice that comes from preserving dispossessed sovereignty for those who value it and have taken action to keep it by continuing to use the title and arms of the deposed sovereign entity.
The [grand royal] arms of a state are emblems of the dignity and the possession of its territories, or of its right to them [if they are deposed]; for sometimes the state bears both the title and arms of countries which it is not in possession of. This is partly to keep up a claim to them, and partly in memorial of former possession. (emphasis added)
Failure to safeguard, retain and perpetuate the protest of using title and arms of the kingdom or principality results in the justice that strips sovereignty from the neglectful who discard such rights through acquiescence over a long period of time. Jean Bodin (1530 – 1596) is famous for demonstrating that sovereignty is absolute and inalienable, except ". . . after [an undisputed, uncontested or unprotested] possession of one hundred years . . . [the rights] of [deposed] Kingdoms are transferred." (emphasis added)
. . . Patently, prescriptive title is a legally valid acquisition mode involving the equitable concept of preclusion [to legally exclude, bar, or prevent rebuttal or reversal] where an affected State [or a reigning or deposed prince] fails to protest.
In other words, 100 years of careless indifference, where there was flagrant dereliction involved or the failure to make the required protests and/or use royal exalted titles and arms, the symbols of their sovereignty, results in a complete and total loss of those rights. "For time runs against the indolent and those who are careless of their right[s]." In other words:
The inert, the incautious, the negligent . . . are punished in the injury they do to themselves by the loss of their interests and their rights through usucapio and prescription.
King Saul of ancient Israel (approximately 1079-1007 BC) was put on the throne by direct divine revelation. He and his posterity were among the very few who had a divine right to the throne of their people forever, but both he and his posterity lost this divine right through their later unworthy actions. Obviously, even a divine right monarchy created by direct revelation can be forfeited and lost forever. Natural law, in contrast, gives us legitimate kings through prescription rather than by direct revelation. If even a true divine right of kings’ royal House created by direct revelation can by forfeited, how much easier can a prescriptive royal House be lost after 100 years of willful dereliction, desertion, or neglect?
Cicero [the great law giver of Rome] denies that antiquated claims have any force; what force then has this claim of Giraldus for his [ancient Irish] prince, grounded as it is on an event a thousand and a-half years old? So many years have not elapsed since Gaul, Spain and Britain were wrested from the Romans. Yet, if the Romans were now to claim dominion over those countries, because they were once their territories, they would be answered at once by ridicule and the sword. . . . One hundred years prescription . . . justified an heir in retaining a crown which had been unjustly seized. The title of Gurguntius (if such a man ever existed) to the crown of Ireland, is so antiquated, that it is utterly valueless. A claim once annulled by lapse of time never revives. . . . (emphasis added)
However, such a royal claim could have survived if it was kept current by protest and the constant and unwavering use of titles, because loss through prescription ". . . has no foundation [it cannot succeed] if the proprietor has not really neglected his right." In summary, Vattel declared:
Prescription is the exclusion [or end] of all pretensions to a [dynastic or other sovereign] right [to a lost throne or right to rule], -- an exclusion [a termination] founded on the length of time during which that right has been neglected; or, according to Wolf’s definition, it is the loss of an inherent right [such as its fons honorum or any of the other sovereign rights] by virtue of a presumed consent. This definition, too, is just; that is, it explains how a right [that a fallen royal house] may be forfeited by long neglect. . . .
The following puts it another way:
The general consent of mankind has established the principle that long and uninterrupted possession by one nation excludes the claim of every other. Whether this general consent be considered as an implied contract or as positive law, all nations are equally bound by it. . . . (emphasis added)
This law was recognized as being so profoundly important that "Prescription is . . . indispensable to international law, if we wish to avoid interminable disputes about the formation and existence of all States." (emphasis added) ". . . Imprescriptible [the opposite of prescription] would unsettle the order and security of the civilized world, that it would encourage the putting forward of ambitious and aggressive schemes . . ." for outdated, stale and unlawful claims that have already been terminated by the passage of time and neglect. In summary of this point:
All considerations of general Utility, impress strongly on us the importance, and in fact the necessity, of admitting the doctrine of Prescription as fully in International Law as it is recognized in Municipal Law. "The same reason of the thing," which this principle imparts into the civil jurisdiction of every country, in order to quiet possession, to give security to property, to stop litigation, and to prevent a condition of chronic bad feeling and hostility between individuals, is equally powerful to introduce this principle, for the same purposes, into the jurisprudence which regulates the intercourse of one society with another. This will appear more manifest when it is remembered that "War represents between States [what] litigation [means] between individuals." These last are Sir R. Phillimore's words.
. . . And this, the public peace and tranquility of the whole world make necessary: which general peace . . . is the great end of society and government, to which [all] inferior motives and rules are to give place. (emphasis added)
By these same important natural law principles, rights may be maintained indefinitely if the deposed House dynasts publically continue to protest the usurpation or consistently use their regal titles and arms as incontrovertible public evidence that they have never given up their claims. If a deposed royal House does this, they lose ". . . only the actual possession . . . and consequently preserves the right to do everything not implied by possession." In other words, the House has only lost de facto possession of the territory to the successor government, but the same House retains the de jure sovereignty. The banished monarchs, and their successors, retain their sovereignty, royalty, regal rights, and the majesty and the glory of their ancient kingdoms in international law simply by keeping these rights alive. Prescription ". . . is certainly agreeable . . . to the [basic] fundamental principles of justice."
Most current governments originated through some act of usurpation, but these very governments now hold a valid and complete right to rule. This is because many dispossessed sovereign Houses have forfeited their claims through the years. Textor made it clear that, ". . . Prescription [is] required for [legitimately] acquiring a Kingdom or territory or province." (emphasis added)
. . . Usurped rule can become legitimate rule . . . by prescription and acquisition of the rule to rule from the former ruler, if this former ruler has not exercised his rule effectively [that is, he or she failed to protect it] or can otherwise be presumed to have abandoned it.
All national governments that hold a current valid right to rule have obtained this right through prescription. Prescription is one of the most fundamental and basic rights on earth, and ". . . this kind of prescription . . . is of great importance in international law. . . ."  In describing the English throne in the early 1700s, the following citation expresses the fact that there is a constitutional connection between some of the most important and vital values of all mankind:
If the most Hereditary Family in the world, hath not a true right [and title] of inheritance; if prescription of nine hundred years is nothing against new possessors [usurpers or robbers of governments], there is surely no right to government at all, nor any right of inheritance, Public or Private; but everything is every Man’s, and Right, Prescription and Property, are sounds without significance.
. . . Is it to be wondered at, that mankind should reverence authority founded in prescription, when they observe that it is [actually] prescription which confers the title to almost every thing else. . . . Upon what other foundation stands any man’s right to his estate [or property]?
"All property is founded in adverse possession ripened by prescription [into full title]." Put another way, all real property in history has had faulty title at some point in history, but prescription cleanses this title and perfects it over time. "If prescription be once shaken, no species of property [nor any right] is secure. . . ." It is a fundamental law. "[Right and good] will stand as long as prescriptive law endures. . . ." If society does not uphold prescription, all the basics of what is just and true in society is in serious jeopardy. Great care must be taken to deeply value, cherish, and treasure what is most good in life.
Hereditary rights, royal [governmental] prerogatives, are valueless as guarantees of prolonged existence and prosperity as a nation. Righteousness alone protects and preserves governments from overthrow and peoples from extinction.
Prescription also accounts for sovereigns gaining proper title throughout history. For example, ". . . you can hardly point out in Europe a single kingdom which was not originally acquired by injustice." Prescription, being part of the natural law, can heal all such breaches and create a new and legitimate government that is based on the laws of nature and sound reasoning.
The original group of European States [in fact, all countries on earth] . . . could, as a general rule, put forward no higher title [to rule] than prescription to the territories of which they have been immemorially possessed.
In other words, ". . . Prescription . . . mellows into legality governments that were violent [and/or were overthrown by treason or other illegal means] in their commencement." That is, "even though a territory may have been originally acquired by fraud or violence, its long and continuous possession redeems [perfects] the title." This presumes, of course, that the former sovereign does not challenge the usurping government, thereby allowing prescription to cure the usurping government’s originally defective title. If prescription did not exist, ". . . there would be no end to the disputes about kingdoms [countries] and their territories. . . ."
Titles to territories must of necessity not be problematic, questionable or shaky. The solidarity of nations is too important to world peace and prosperity to operate in any other way. Therefore, as Grotius declared, ". . . The title of nations . . . cannot be questioned or disputed at any time” without fostering great danger to human life, and the stability and peace of nations. This is one of the great purposes of prescription as well as to protect the rights of the illegally vanquished who continually maintain their right and entitlement to rule through protest and/or continue to use their exalted titles and arms.
Natural laws exist to bring justice to a people. The genius of prescription is that it stabilizes and validates the sovereignties of countries that otherwise would have defective titles. Prescription ". . . is the legitimization of a doubtful title. . . ." That is, the usurper can become legitimate through time.
The following is an example where the world powers in the 19th century reinstated a number of deposed sovereign Houses that had retained their de jure sovereignty:
When the Congress of Vienna, 1814 - 1815, attempted to restore the 18th century ruling class [after Napoleon was finally defeated], it was done in the name of legitimacy. . . . [That is] sovereignty cannot [rightfully] be obtained by an act of conquest.
It was not just in the 20th century that rightful conquest was fully and completely condemned and overruled as a legitimate means of acquiring territory. Europe had just suffered a devastating fight for freedom from Napoleonic travesties and wrongs in violation of sovereign rights. The Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) made treaties in an attempt to heal and mend these horrific wounds and to balance the powers of Europe in the hope of preventing any further wars and disputes. Their ethical foundation or principles for this valiant effort to enforce what was morally right were the most basic fundamental concepts of sovereignty and legitimacy through the justice of the ancient rules of prescription.
Prince Talleyrand, one of the most important diplomats in the Congress of Vienna, explained that, "A prince who attributes to himself the sovereignty of a conquered country that has not been ceded to him, usurps it." In other words, he has committed a great crime. Neither can:
the sovereign [prince or king], who enters by conquest into a country which he has ceded [or previously given away], cannot again become sovereign of that country, any more than a private owner can seize upon property he has already disposed of [or sold].
Might does not make right. Either way, such a monarch would be a usurper, not a rightful or legitimate monarch over the land. This is because a change of sovereignty under occupation can come ". . . only from a subsequent treaty of cession or from prescriptive possession. . . ." In other words, only ". . . the actual exercise of sovereign rights over a period of time [by prescriptive rules] is allowed to cure a defect in title [in international law without a formal cession or an official renunciation completed by the former ruler]." In other words, prescription can operate without judicial decree. Time and acquiescence, on the part of the former ruler, transfers full title on a permanent basis. Not only scholars, but great national courts like the U. S. Supreme Court affirmed these truths as the following two citations attest:
It is a principle of public [international] law, universally recognized, that long acquiescence in the possession of territory and in the exercise of dominion and sovereignty over it, is conclusive of the nation's title and rightful authority. (emphasis added)
Possession for a great many (more than one hundred) years becomes a rightful one by prescription, even if it had begun in wrong and injustice. The acquiescence of the adjoining State for such a lapse of time would be conclusive evidence that she assented to the possession thus held and had determined to relinquish her claim. (emphasis added)
As a review, although on rivers, the following describes and summaries well the right of prescriptive transfer:
A long and undisputed possession establishes the Right of a Nation, otherwise there could be no peace, no stability between them. . . . Thus, when from time immemorial a Nation has without contradiction exercised the Sovereignty . . . nobody can dispute with that Nation the supreme dominion. . . .
. . . Prescription is a [natural law] means of preserving public order; a restoration in certain cases of the original mode of acquiring property . . . which derives all its force from the necessity of settling differences which otherwise would never end.
"The great benefit of prescription is that it cuts off numbers of [what could be very serious] disputes," that might end in war, because the problem is already legally solved, established and settled on a lawful and just basis, after one hundred years of neglect for "immemorial prescription" and as short as 50 years or less for "ordinary prescription."
Toullier, in his "Civil Law," says: "In order that the question of proprietorship may not remain too long unsettled, and thereby injure the public welfare, disturbing the peace of families and the stability of social transactions, the law has fixed a time when all claims shall be cancelled, and possession [the possessor] shall regain its ancient prerogative through its transformation into [ownership of the] property [by the possessor]."
Thus, "prescription is as binding upon nations, as on individuals." Therefore, there is not ". . . any [legitimate] reason, why the same [just] rule [of preservation and forfeiture] may not take place between sovereign princes, and independent states, as between individuals" to safeguard and protect society from endless disputes and wars. (emphasis added) Natural law states that deposed princely or royal sovereignty is a subject of prescriptive law as much as any lawful republican government-in-exile is subject to the dominion of prescription.
As seen above, prescription either creates the loss of rights and permanent forfeiture or it preserves intact internal non-territorial sovereignty and royal privileges.
On the protective side of prescription, Edmund Burke reiterated the important point that a:
. . . king does not lose his quality [that is, his sovereignty] merely by the loss of his kingdom. If he is stripped of it unjustly by a usurper, or by rebels [or by any action unauthorized by the sovereign himself or herself], he preserves his rights. . . .
". . . A Prince, unjustly deposed . . . hath still a Right to his Kingdom. . . ." This right continues on through the generaltions in the dispossessed royal house, because the law of, ". . . prescription hath power to ratify and confirm [in other words, perpetuate the validity and legality of the] the titles both of Princes and of private men." In other words, "De jure rights are not annulled by de facto conditions." What is illegal and unlawful cannot ever become de jure and authentic unless the right holder permanently and juridically forfeits the right to internal sovereignty under the recognized and established provisions of public international law.
In sum, prescription appears as the rational basis . . . [of] law in all legal systems and its application in every juridical order is dictated by a sense of justice and equity common to civilized mankind and indeed by necessity. . . . In every case . . . conformity with the principle [of prescription] is regarded as bringing about substantive justice, while departure therefrom works injustice [and harm]. Indeed, [prescription] is characteristic of the general principles of law and of their essence . . . their binding character is derived not so much as from extrinsic [outside] authority but rather from their inherent [or innate] value [and worth] for they are the paths which civilized mankind has learned in its long experience in the municipal sphere to be those leading to justice and which it would perforce [of necessity] have to follow if it wished to establish Law and Justice among Nations.
The international United States/Venezuela Claims Commission of 1885 made clear that prescription is a ". . . universally recognized principle. . . ." and ". . . equally obligatory upon every tribunal seeking to administer justice." The importance of prescription is monumental. "The doctrine of Immemorial Prescription is, from [its] very necessity . . . indispensable. . . ." Therefore, one finds it as an underpinning of international law. "It may safely be maintained that the existence of immemorial possession [immemorial prescription] in international law has gained general acceptance among writers."
The overwhelming volume of support for prescription, as demonstrated in the numerous quotes and citations in this book, proclaims it as the universal law for all times and all people.
Reflecting on its contribution to mankind, Edmund Burke declared that, "Prescription is the most solid of all titles." Because it is a part of the "Necessary Law of Nations," it:
. . . is immutable, and the obligations that arise from it necessary and indispensable, nations can neither make any changes in it by their conventions, dispense with it in their own conduct, nor reciprocally release each other from the observance of it.
". . . The title [of the possessor or subsequent government is] incontestable [or absolute] so that it cannot be the subject of future wars and conflicts." In other words, ". . . For practical purposes the [just] doctrine [of prescription] is necessary in order to prevent strife and give stability to titles."
This principle . . . is . . . a necessary element of the tranquility and happiness of nations, the most solid, or rather, the only guarantee of their [continuing] strength and duration. . . . That is the reason why it is sacred. . . .
"It cannot be seriously doubted. . . ." Its place of honor includes the fact, that it is the only valid law in existence to perpetuate and maintain the legitimate rights of both deposed and reigning sovereignty.
. . . [The fact is] most existing frontiers [on earth] are accepted by international law simply because they existed de facto for a long time. . . . It is therefore no paradox to say that prescription is the commonest of all titles to territory.
Nothing is more received amongst mankind, than that prescription and long usage should be deeded equivalent to mutual pacts [which means a formal bilateral agreement or treaty of cession].
It is solid chiefly because it is intimately connected with the ". . . basic values and principles of justice [fairness and equity that ring true in the hearts of all people]. . . ." Ultimately, only what is morally right is worthy for mankind to sustain and uphold. Under the law of nature and prescriptive rules, one can unveil the necessary historical facts to determine if a sovereign claim is authentic.
Having now made a detailed analysis of the theoretical basis for the functions of non-territorial and de jure sovereignty under international law, this study is entitled to draw conclusions and make recommendations therefrom. These recommendations will be set forth along two lines. The first recommendation is pragmatic, while the other recommendation is juridical. Both of these recommendations draw from the historical work of many legal jurists, but they have been updated for a modern audience.
The Diplomatic and Political Value of Non-Territorial and De Jure Sovereignty
The heads of royal Houses represent a very peculiar principle vis-à-vis their nation. They are the representative of both the nation and its founder. Often, there is a chain of legal title for the land that goes back to the remotest antiquity. Alternatively, the royal House acquired by prescription the lawful right to supremacy over the territory after military conquest and the passage of time without contestation. For one example of this, consider the inheritance of H.R.H. Prince Henri (VI), Count of Paris, who is a valid claimant to the throne of France. The claim is derived from the original Merovingian Frankish Dynasty in 420 A.D., and tradition carries it back much further than that. Prince Henri’s claim represents such a part of the national tradition that even the long republic following the monarchial tradition in France hasn’t shaken it. This is evidenced by the letter written by General Charles de Gaulle to the Count of Paris on the occasion of the marriage of the latter's son, Prince Henri, in 1957:
The life of your family is identified with the history of France. Everything you stand for at present is exemplary, and as far as your future and that of Prince Henri are concerned, they are integrated in the hopes of France.
Suffice it to say, these words are most unusual and profound coming from a man who held the highest republican position in France!
The same is evidenced by numerous past violent attacks in the former Soviet press and associated European Communist Bloc against their royal claimants. A Russian claimant, the Grand Duke Vladimir and his daughter, Maria, were the frequent subjects of virulent articles in Tass and other Soviet newspapers. Archduke Otto, when he was the chief of the Imperial House of Habsburg, was likewise the recipient of violent attacks in the Czechoslovakian and Hungarian communist press. The same was true of the claimants to other eastern European countries. The royal claimant to the ancient land of Georgia, Prince Peter Bagrationi-Gruzinski, was thrown into jail by the communists in that country. If these royals were not heavily intertwined with the honor and historical traditions of their respective lands, why were the communist presses so eager to repeatedly and systemically attack them?
It was also most curious that the communists had such a fascination with the insignia of royalty, which was in total contradiction to their supposed proletarian equalitarian theory. The Soviets proudly exhibited the Russian crown jewels at the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg. The Czechs did the same with the Bohemian crown jewels. In Hungary, the Communist regime was very keen to obtain the holy crown of St. Stephen from the United States.
In summary, even in the modern age, royal traditions are inseparably connected to the history of many nations. Deposed royal claimants and legitimate governments-in-exile often represent both the traditional principle of legitimacy and the modern principle of democratic legality under international law. Therefore, even in a republic, respecting a royal House that once ruled the land likely has diplomatic and political value. It demonstrates that a modern republic allows freedom of speech and political thought (that is, if the republic doesn’t retaliate against a royal’s legal protests of the usurpation of power from the House). Furthermore, when a republic respects a royal House, there is likely some portion of the populace that respects the historical continuation that the House represents. Therefore, political goodwill is created by favorable interaction.
(See the sub-section in Chapter V of entitled "Value Analysis of Monarchy as a Form of Government" on the amazing value and worth that a royal house, under a constitution, can contribute to any modern government that values freedom, individual rights and human dignity).
Pacific, Diplomatic, and Conciliatory Missions Undertaken by the Holy See and the Sovereign Order of Malta
Traditionally, the Holy See has played an active role in arbitrating disputes between Christian states, thereby preserving peace. In modern times, there has been a dramatic revival of Papal peacemaking activity. Between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the beginning of World War I, there were 172 cases of Papal arbitration. Furthermore, between 1870 and 1914, there were 14 Papal interventions to resolve international conflicts, of which 12 were successful. By reason of its divine origin and mandate, its supra-national character and sovereign independence, the Holy See is eminently suited to fulfill the functions of international arbitration, conciliation, and judicial settlement. Indeed, in Article 24 of the Latern Treaty establishing the 107.8 acre Vatican City State, the Holy See specifically declares that it ". . . will remain extraneous to all temporal disputes between nations . . . unless the contending parties make a concordant appeal to its mission of peace" and ". . . reserves the right in every case to exercise its moral and spiritual power."
An excellent example of this was the Papal Arbitration in 1889 of a serious dispute between Spain and Germany over the Carolina Islands in the Pacific. Bismarck, a Lutheran and the leader of predominantly Protestant Germany, suggested that the Holy See arbitrate the dispute. The Holy See did so in a manner that was acceptable to both parties and worked out an excellent compromise that settled the dispute to the complete satisfaction of both.
The role of the Holy See in the settlement of international disputes is not merely to adjudicate the legal rights of the parties but to seek a genuine reconciliation. The Holy See knows that the mere measure of legal rights is not enough to establish a lasting peace between nations. The latter takes genuine brotherhood. Therefore, a papal adjudication of a dispute goes beyond the surface legal problem and attempts to discover a basis for a lasting mutually acceptable compromise. In this, the Holy See acts as peace-maker as well as judge. Hence, arbitration by the pope is "justice plus." For states genuinely seeking reconciliation and understanding between their peoples, no finer international tribunal could be found than the Holy See.
Apart from its judicial capacity, the Holy See is also active in many other ways to promote peace and justice throughout the world. A significant action of the Holy See in this respect was the 1967 establishment of the Pontifical Commission for Peace and Justice. This evolved out of the Vatican II Apostolic Constitution Gaudium et Spes on the problem of global social justice and injustice. The papal encyclical Populorm Progressio on assistance to underdeveloped nations is the Commission's charter. The Commission is an advisory and fact-finding body. It seeks the implementation of the papal social encyclicals throughout the world to promote peace and justice. It also works in close ecumenical contact with the Protestant World Council of Churches in a joint committee on Society, Development and Peace (SODEPAX). It has close contact with Catholic religious orders to promote social justice, and its efforts have led the bishops of over 40 countries to establish national commissions on peace and justice.
The Commission is a particularly suitable body to help promote international justice and peace on a world scale due to the prestige of the Holy See and the Pope, personally. It would be very useful to encourage conformity to international law in Catholic countries where a secular international organization might not have as much influence. As a direct organization of the Holy See, the Commission's activities should be entitled to extraterritoriality, and its officials should receive the protection of diplomatic immunity as a derivative of the former's non-territorial sovereignty. In sum, it should be entitled to the same prerogatives that any component organization of the U.N. is entitled to.
In addition, the Sovereign Order of Malta is itself an international organization that is devoted to international relief, assistance, and aid. As a result of its non- territorial sovereignty, its officials and institutions should be accorded diplomatic immunity and extra-territoriality.
As its diplomatic service is composed of very distinguished statesmen, it has a unique opportunity to perform many valuable diplomatic and conciliatory missions. The SMOM's lack of any political objectives makes its diplomatic agents particularly suited for accomplishing delicate missions. There are two areas that come readily to mind: (1) maintaining low-profile diplomatic contact between ideological and political combatants; (2) encouraging the implementation of the papal social encyclicals in Catholic nations having problems with social injustice.
The Christian values and innate decency of chivalry are very much needed for the Christian reconstruction of the international order, the achievement of justice between nations, and, hence, for the foundations of a lasting world peace. May it not be observed that much of the failure to achieve these goals is precisely due to a lack of chivalry between nations and their leaders? The noble social encyclicals of His Holiness, Paul VI, calls for nations to be chivalric in their mutual dealings to build a world rooted in justice where peace can flourish. As a knightly order par excellence, the SMOM has a unique opportunity to use its international influence, especially among Catholic nations, to achieve the rebuilding of the international order in accordance with the chivalric principles proclaimed by His Holiness.
Admission of the Holy See and the Sovereign Order of Malta into the United Nations pursuant to their International Missions
As demonstrated earlier, the sovereignty of the Holy See and the SMOM is horizontal to that of the vertical or geographical sovereignty of the territorial states. They are in the world but not of it as it were. Both are intimately involved in the international arena. They exchange ambassadors with states and negotiate treaties and concordats with them.
With respect to the latter, the Holy See often makes valuable concessions to the state with respect to the appointment, or political clearance, of bishops. The state is not naturally entitled to this. Likewise, the concordats also provide for financial arrangements between Church and state. These are not illegitimate raids on the public treasury of states. In almost all cases, these arrangements stem from a previous confiscation of Church property by the state. The financial support is merely compensation for a past theft. The Church is entitled to this in the sense of strict justice. However, it is well-known that states often unilaterally abrogate these solemn treaties.
Unfortunately, at present, neither the Holy See nor the SMOM have any means of enforcing their treaty rights in international courts or by action before international organizations. Both are denied standing before such bodies by the interpretation of the term "state." Under current positivist interpretations, only an entity possessing territory can qualify as a "state." This leaves two of the oldest international actors without a voice in international bodies or a remedy in the international courts.
The analysis of both entities in this study establishes beyond doubt that they are "perfect" societies. As such, they are the exact juridical equivalent of a State. They exercise the same international prerogatives and duties as a State. They have the capacity for meeting and fulfilling the international obligations that they undertake. In this respect, their record for keeping treaties is far better than that of any state. Their lack of territoriality is more than compensated by (1) the extraterritoriality of their institutions, vehicles, and airplanes, and diplomatic immunity of their officials and (2) the fact that their sovereign purpose, being vertical to the territorial mission of states and extending to all the world, does not need territory for its accomplishment. Their lack of military forces, besides being a salutary example to the world, is in keeping with the policies of many new states not to maintain armed forces, as well as with the policy of the U.N. to resolve disputes by arbitration, conciliation, and mutual international action. In this respect, papal excommunication and interdict provides as effective a sanction as military forces, while the Sovereign Order has great influence among the leadership of most Catholic nations.
In essence, their lack of a territorial base in no way affects their ability to act in the international sphere, to have and perform international duties and responsibilities, and to fulfill the ordinary obligation of states.
Their establishment as "perfect" societies proves that they are in fact "states" in both the juridical (sovereign authority) and pragmatic (organizational ability to perform state functions) sense of the term. Even in terms of profane power politics, both are more powerful in this respect than many of the new states admitted into the U.N. Therefore, there is no reason why international law should discriminate between these perfect societies and other states. They are vertical states with sovereign jurisdiction and authority coextensive with the world. Accordingly, they should receive the exact same treatment that any other state is entitled to receive.
Specifically, the term "state" in reference to admission requirements into international organizations, and for standing before International courts, should be interpreted to include perfect societies.
Both should thereupon be admitted as full members into the United Nations and given full standing before international courts. Both should likewise be entitled to diplomatic recognition by other states (that is, for states that do not already recognize them) composing these bodies and to exchange diplomatic agents with the same. Finally, nominees by both should be eligible for membership in international courts and bodies in the same manner that the nominees of other states are. In sum, they should be entitled to the exact position in international law as that possessed by any other State.
Both have a great contribution to make to the preservation of world peace as well as to international social and economic development. The liberation of these from the colonialist philosophy of positivism in international law would enable their contributions and their salutary influence to be far more effective in promoting a just international world order. Recent Popes have done more than any other single person or institution to achieve international reconciliation and peace. In addition, the Sovereign Order extends its vast charitable relief and war aid in every part of the world to all, irrespective of religion and ideology. The time has come to set aside the positivist legal philosophies and recognize the natural law as the philosophical base of international law. Consequently, the Holy See and the Sovereign Order of Malta should be full members of the international concert.
Promulgation of International Statutes Governing Non-Territorial and De Jure Sovereignty
In order to promote the laws that relate to non-territorial sovereignty, it is recommended that an international legal regime, an organization composed of a framework of legal rules and principles to govern its operation, be established to clearly and unequivocally define the status and prerogatives of non-territorial and de jure sovereignty. It would seem that such a legal regime or organization would be more easily established by a convention of interested states. Such an organization would greatly assist legitimate non-territorial sovereigns. The state-parties could likewise sponsor the sovereign entities for admission to international organizations and provide increased recognition. The following are recommended to help ensure that "right makes right" and "right reasoning" makes the laws.
A New Moral Policy toward Non-Territorial Sovereignty
A number of fully sovereign island nations in the Pacific may suffer complete ruin and become uninhabitable in future generations. Predictions for rising sea levels may erode their territories and threaten their very existence. It is entirely conceivable that some low-lying nations like Nauru, Tuvalu, Kiribati, the Maldives, and the Marshall Islands could vanish completely and leave their inhabitants without a country. The question is, what about the right to rule in these nations? This kind of problem has never been legally addressed before. Deterritorialized nations could become a serious problem in the next 30 – 100 years. Prescription does not directly cover this kind of problem, but perfect society principles could be applied. For example, this book shows that there is a great deal of legal precedence for the loss of de facto sovereignty without the loss of non-territorial de jure sovereignty.
There is no valid reason that these countries could not establish permanent governments-in-exile and continue to benefit their people. For example, they could maintain any sovereign resources that still remained, such as fishing and mining rights. International law is not a static entity. It can and should change to meet the different circumstances that materialize. Non-territorial sovereignty should become more officially recognized and universally accepted as rightful and lawful. After all, ". . . it is absolutely possible for a non-territorial sovereign state to exist in the world without holding a single piece of land. . . ." Grotius observed:
There are commonly two things which are subject to sovereignty (Imperium); first, persons which alone sometimes suffice, as an army of men, women and children seeking new plantations; secondly, lands, which are called territory.
Therefore, there is some significant support for this kind of non-territorial sovereignty.
The following are reasonable recommendations to give appropriate recognition and acknowledgment where such recognition is properly due. Otherwise, law and practice is not in full accord with a just and equitable society.
A. Exiled and/or deposed sovereign royal Houses that are hereditary and legitimate may claim, as the representatives of the founders of their respective nations, the following prerogatives:
(1) The legal regime or rights established by the Bundus Act of the Congress of Vienna (1815) for the mediatized princes of the former Holy Roman Empire that were deprived of their territorial sovereignty from the political settlement accomplished thereunder. This legal regime should defend and perpetuate: (i) preservation of the tradition of that House as royal and sovereign; (ii) conservation of such properties as may be needed to preserve that tradition. The host nation may justly request the House concerned to refrain from any political activities contrary to Jinternational law. This does not include: (1) non-political formalities respecting the past traditions of the House with the right to confer honors or create honors; or (2) contact with interested fellow-citizens seeking restoration through normal, democratic constitutional means.
(2) The full protection of the Human Rights specified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights.
(3) The legal, property, and human rights specified for all citizens of the country in the constitution of the succeeding government. They should not be subject to any regime of exceptional legislation that discriminates against them in a manner contrary to other citizens. Nor shall they be subject to exile or confiscation of private property based merely on their former status.
(4) The deposed regal House should be allowed and permitted, even encouraged, to use their exalted titles and the symbols of sovereignty over their former kingdoms or principalities. They should thus be recognized in the full dignity and majesty of their rightful non-territorial sovereignty. This will help them to maintain and perpetuate their royal prerogatives under international law.
(5) Royal non-territorial sovereigns should be acknowledged as having the legal right to organize a government-in-exile at any time for they have the de jure authority to do so.
(B) A non-territorial sovereign entity, including a deterritorialized nation, operating a government-in-exile should be considered to be a non-territorial State within the meaning of international law. Thus, it should be entitled to the full privileges and prerequisites thereof upon the demonstration that it possesses the essential elements of a perfect society on a de jure basis, that of (1) Independence, (2) Authority, and (3) Jurisdiction
(1) The demonstration of the existence of a non-territorial sovereign entity as a perfect society should be accomplished by the acknowledgement that the entity has bilateral diplomatic relations with at least one State. Fulfillment of these conditions could be determined by a private accredited non-political organization upon the voluntary application of the interested non-territorial sovereign entity.
(2) In keeping with their non-territorial status, such sovereign perfect societies will be considered to be permanently neutralized and will remain extraneous to all temporal disputes between nations.
(3) Such an entity should also enjoy the same basic rights as specified in Section A if they are deposed royal Houses. If not, and they are legitimate exiled governments, they should be acknowledged to have all the sovereign rights of government not considered to be the exclusive domain right of a monarchy or royal House.
(C) A government coming to power by the overthrow of the previously established government should not be considered to be legitimate for the purposes of international law, unless such a government can establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the overthrow was the result of a legitimate resistance to oppression and tyranny. Otherwise, it must be considered to be invalid. Tyranny is a violation of such magnitude that it can justify an organized and coordinated rebellion as long as law and order and innocent lives are safeguarded in the process. That is, two wrongs do not make a right. Civil war is not advocated unless it is waged intelligently. (See "Legitimate Right of Resistance to Tyranny" and "The Legitimate Provisional Government Resulting from the Exercise of the Right of Resistance" in Chapter VI of Volume I).
Tyranny brings ignorance and brutality along with it. It degrades men from their just rank into the class of brutes. It dampens their spirits. It suppresses the arts [and creativity]. It extinguishes every spark of noble ardor and generosity in the breasts of those who are enslaved by it. It makes natural sound and great minds feeble and little; it triumphs over the ruins of virtue and humanity.
Tyranny is the downfall of all great nations throughout the history of mankind. It should be intelligently and lawfully fought against as an enemy of everything noble and good. Tyranny may be judicially and legitimately established by proof of the following elements before an international tribunal:
(1) A government conducted for the enrichment or aggrandizement of the alleged tyrannical interests that is contrary to the common good and best interests of the whole nation,
(2) Injury to the multitude resulting from the alleged tyrannical conduct of government. For example, the suppression of religious freedom, including the enactment of laws or practices restricting the growth and free exercise of the ministry, or the countermanding of the law of natural rights of freedom to enjoy life, liberty, and property, including rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, shall be considered to be prima facie evidence of injury to the multitude.
(3) Denial of justice by the alleged tyrannical government. Denial of justice shall include (a) enactment of a legal code that is contrary to the natural law and the human rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (b) abolition of the natural law human rights of its citizens as evidenced in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (c) the perversion of justice in the municipal courts, especially where such courts operate to perpetuate the interests of the alleged tyranny.
(4) Widespread mistreatment of the citizens by the alleged tyrannical government. This shall include (a) the economic exploitation of citizens for the benefit of the alleged tyrannical interests (legalized theft); (b) the denial of an adequate standard of living and education suitable to the economic position of the country; (c) genocide or discrimination practiced against any segment of its citizens, including the denial of legal personality or status to any person under its protection.
(5) Gross inequity of the leadership of the alleged tyrannical government coupled with judicial notice of the inability to remove that leadership through ordinary constitutional means. Government by a totalitarian political party shall constitute prima facie evidence of inequity.
(D) Judicial determination of the existence of a tyranny should be made by the International Court of Justice or some other non-political agency set up to make such determinations or recommendations upon the motion of (a) either of the competitive governments of the country concerned; (b) an international organization; or (c) another State having such a legitimate interest in the State in question so as to warrant a determination. In the last case, the Court or an accredited body of experts could rule on the legitimacy of such interest before proceeding with the determination.
(E) A legitimate deposed government overthrown when the existence of a tyranny has not been previously judicially established shall be considered the rightful government of the country concerned, entitled to full de jure status in international law, including the representation of that country in international organizations and entitlement to its assets and materials located outside the country, so long as it actively contests through diplomatic protest or other recognized means, such as, the use of sovereign titles and national symbols, the usurpation of that country. The usurping government is limited to the rights of an occupying belligerent under international law.
(F) A provisional government formed to resist the judicially-established tyranny may acquire de jure status, including the prerogatives enumerated in section (F), upon motion to the International Court of Justice joined by either an international organization or other States prepared to recognize it. The International Court of Justice or authorized body could award de jure status on the basis of the following criteria:
(a) Judicial establishment of a tyranny in accordance with Section (D).
(b) Satisfaction that the provisional government has the adherence of a significant number of refugees from the tyranny.
(c) Satisfaction that the provisional government has the capacity to establish active resistance, military or otherwise, to the tyranny.
(d) Satisfaction that the objectives of the provisional government are democratic and in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(G) Because the various States would be alarmed at the prospect of officially declaring a long deposed monarchy or former government as the rightful and legitimate rulers of their land, it is recommended that an accrediting agency of experts be established to operate by voluntary consent, as do international courts, to do the detailed and integrated research necessary to determine if a claim is valid; this determination must not change any already established government, but the agency is merely to identify what is lawful according to the underlying principles of the law of nations. This organization, private or otherwise, would have to be endowed with immunity for its decisions and be independent of all political influence so that all decisions are based on the rule of law. There must be a checks-and-balances system to provide quality assurance as well as an appeal process to ensure that the rules of evidence and just principles are applied. For accountability purposes, records of all proceedings, investigations, and findings would require the supervision of a separate, non-political accrediting association. This would help guarantee that high standards are always upheld.
The legal criteria to arrive at any decision regarding non-territorial sovereignty would be the principles and rules of prescription. These principles and rules would be upheld as binding and obligatory natural law requirements. After all, there is ". . . world-wide agreement as to its essential doctrines." And prescription is ". . . unquestionably, a central tenet of law."
Unstable situations, such as when governments are overthrown, are a threat to all mankind’s safety and security. Therefore, decisions pertaining to sovereign rights must ultimately be final and sure. This is why natural law must be used.
The natural law acknowledges the legitimate claims of deposed governments, but it does not recognize imposters. Therefore, unjustly deposed rulers that have continued and perpetuated their rights are morally, ethically, and legally full and complete sovereigns without territory and should be recognized as lawfully having one of the greatest of all honors, even though they are never restored to their rightful place as active rulers over their former lands.
In sum, since undeniable sovereign legal claims are valid, they should, at the very least, be given proper acknowledgment, even if restoration is absolutely out of the question. No dispossessed former monarch or ruler, no matter how flawless and perfect their claim, should ethically and morally be restored to modern de facto power without the consent of the people. ". . . A title . . . acquired by prescription is only good internationally, and does not bar any right which the inhabitants of [an] appropriated territory may have. . . ." Everything must be done cooperatively and by mutual consent for it to not violate what is ethically and morally right. Even in ancient times, once the biblical David was the Lord’s anointed king, he was only the de jure non-territorial monarch for many years in the land of Israel. He did not become the de facto king and actually rule until the people accepted him, because armed conflict is to be avoided where possible for the good and benefit of all people.
All of the above ideals and principles are based on the natural law of honest, intelligent reasoning. None of the above suggestions for positive change are an endorsement of world government or global rule as this would ruin the natural checks-and-balances that is so critical to preserving the freedom of all people. If done right, there is a protective quality in having different nations and governments with each sovereign entity protected from the meddling of others. This is in strict harmony with the nature of man. Global sovereignty is a subversive idea. Pope XV insightfully wrote:
The advent of a universal republic [or world government], which is longed for by all the worst elements of disorder, and confidently expected by them, is an idea which is ripe for execution. From this Republic, based on the principles of absolute equality of men and community of possessions, would be banished all national distinctions, nor in it would the authority of a father over his children, or of the public power over citizens, or of God over human society, be any longer acknowledged. If these ideas are put into practice, there will inevitably follow a reign of unheard of terror. (emphasis added)
The point is:
No matter what form a world government with centralized power over the whole globe might assume, the very notion of one sovereign force ruling the whole earth, holding the [dangerous] monopoly over all means of violence, unchecked and uncontrolled by other sovereign powers, is not only a forbidding nightmare of tyranny, it would be the end of all political life as we know it.
Senator Jesse Helms (1921 - 2008), in his classic address to the United Nations in January of 2000, stated:
In his 1962 classic, Capitalism and Freedom, the Nobel-prize winning economist Milton Friedman rightly declared:
Government power must be dispersed. If government is to exercise power, better in the county [locally] than in the [regional] state, better in the state than in [the whole country]. [Because] if I do not like what my local community does, I can move to another local community . . . [and] if I do not like what my state does, I can move to another. [But] if I do not like what Washington [or the whole country] imposes, I have few alternatives. . . .
Senator Helms then asked, "Where do we go when we don't like the 'laws' of the world?" In other words, where is freedom in such a world? Hence, he concluded that, "The sovereignty of nations must be respected [as a safeguard of person freedom]." Otherwise, world tyranny and oppression will take over, and the uniqueness of man having the right of self-determination and the enjoyment of his own culture is ruined and smothered by world bureaucrats and their senseless and unending regulations that strangle progress rather than promote freedom.
International law, when it is rightful and productive of good, is derived and built upon the foundation of the following three basic postulates:
1. There is a determinable and knowable law of nature.
2. Each nation-state is territorially or internally sovereign and independent of all other states.
3. Natural law, built on justice and virtue, is binding and obligatory on nation-states in their relationships with each other.
The following sub-chapter will elaborate on the natural law principles and how they are vitally important to the future.
Natural Law, Monarchy, and Prescription
Limited monarchy is an innate or integral part of the nature of man. ". . . All kinds of organizations are essentially monarchical." It is in all nations as well as in the private sector in companies, hospitals, schools, universities, churches, and families. It is the "rule of one" that tends to prevail in all the earth. "Whether you call him Monarch, Pope, Dictator, President or Prime Minister is immaterial. In practice he is [a] King." Ultimately having one person as a decision-maker is something that seems deeply-rooted within us and is thus a part of the law of nature. We cannot ever totally get away from it. In fact, the word monarchy is from the ancient Greek monos archein, which means one ruler. There is an unexplained mystique about royalty and nobility that still lingers beyond the days of its former glory. Thrones, crowns, scepters, and regal majesty continue to have an alluring power today that still stirs the imagination of man.
No system of government is perfect, because man is not perfect. But history and modern political science tells us an important truth for the benefit of all people and good governance. Samuel Rutherford in 1644 concluded in his book, The Law and the Prince, which was regarded as a masterwork of political thinking, that limited or constitutional monarchy was the best of all worlds. Nothing is ultimately more advanced because it protectively combines several types of government. He wrote that:
Every government hath something wherein it is best; monarchy is honourable and glorious-like before men; aristocracy, for counsel, is surest; democracy for liberty, and possibly for riches and gain, is best."
Therefore, he decided in his chapter on "Whether Monarchy Be the Best of Governments" that:
A limited and mixed monarchy, such as is in Scotland and England, seems to me the best government, when parliaments, with the king, have the good of all the three. This government hath glory, order, unity, from a monarch; from the government of the most and wisest, it hath safety of counsel, stability, strength; from the influence of the commons, it hath liberty, privileges, promptitude of obedience.
He considered that it is easier to "fear, love, obey, and serve one than many." In other words, he advocated having a monarchy with two legislative houses. But his ideas were much older than the 17th Century. As stated before, some of the greatest thinkers of ancient times (Plato, Aristotle, Tacitus, Polybius, and Cicero) all stressed the supremacy of having the following mix: monarchy -- a royal family, aristocracy -- a nobility, and the common man -- a representative democracy representing the masses. According to their views, a combination of all three was the very best form of government ever devised in human scale. Aristotle categorized and studied:
. . . 158 different styles of government in Greece and reported that the best form of government was a monarchy that ruled with the input of fair-minded aristocrats who were strongly influenced by the masses.
Cicero declared in his "constitutionalism" chapter that limited monarchy is "the most splendid available." He stated "a form of government which is an equal mixture of the three good forms is [vastly] superior to any of them by itself." Why? Limited monarchy is the best because it has more vital checks and balances than any other.
As long as [monarchy] was a living force the wars between political units were of a relative and restricted nature – Kabinettskriege, as the Germans say. Between 1100 and 1866 A. D. no Christian kingdom was eliminated permanently from the map. . . . No monarchy was dispossessed, and the price to be paid for military defeat was merely a city, a county, a province.
Generally, the wars waged by democracies have been much more punitive, violent, and devastating to the whole world. Constitutional monarchy, in general, has produced more of the most prosperous and eminently respected nations on earth than any other.
. . . [Constitutional] Monarchies have excellent records of democracy and preserving freedom. . . . Most countries which have switched from a parliamentary to a presidential system, including most former British territories in Africa, have gone on to severely restrict political freedoms soon afterwards. . . . Parliamentary systems are more stable, more effective, and better able to preserve freedom than executive presidencies, and some of the best examples of effective parliamentary democracies are constitutional monarchies. . . . Better governance is only one advantage of restoring the monarchy. . . .
Titus Livy (59 BC-17 AD), in his The History of Rome from its Foundation, concluded that "Monarchy [is] the noblest thing in heaven or on earth. . . ." There are many benefits to monarchy. Adam Clark (1762 – 1832), a widely quoted and universally prominent theologian, concluded from his extensive research that limited monarch or ". . . kingly government, properly understood, is a good of the first magnitude to the civil happiness of mankind."
However, there is an important warning to modern constitutional monarchs:
The job of maintaining authority is the task of politicians whose careers are transitory. If a monarch also becomes engaged in this work, his career [as king or prince] is likely to be transitory, too.
This same principle severely damaged the French monarchy:
Starting with Louis XIV’s reign, but principally during those of Louis XV and Louis XVI, lost its status as a divine and perpetual institution by allowing itself to become involved in political and religious conflicts -- a process he calls the desacralization of the French monarchy.
Politics, which is a volatile field that arouses passions and fragments a people, should be left entirely to the politician. The wise monarch should rise above all politics.
Modern monarchs neither have nor need executive power. Integrity and continuity are their stock in trade. These qualities are becoming more precious.
Most of the [so-called] heroes who are being glamorized today are no longer noble, accomplished, humble, or righteous. From reports in books, magazines, and newspapers especially the youth sections we learn that they are lewd, obscene, immoral, avaricious, and in some cases even cruel. It is the very life-style . . . to [be avoided] that is paraded before our young people by their celebrated peers. To deflect the admiration of youth from these examples of ugly life, we must start young.
"Example is the school of mankind and they will learn at no other."
A monarch . . . faces a [much] higher responsibility than a professional politician; Prince [and later King] Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia told the [Constantian] Society in an interview . . . ‘The duty of a king or of a prince worthy of the name consists of remaining true, under all circumstances, to the noblest and most legitimate ideals of the nation to which he belongs.'
A king or sovereign prince ". . . is better placed than anyone in the country to encourage the transmission of traditional moral and ethical values: he is the symbol of tradition." Vattel declared, ". . . there is a dignity and decorum that particularly belong to the supreme rank," and it is ". . . the virtues which constitute the glory [and majesty] of princes."
He [the royal personage] cannot neglect them without degrading himself, and casting a stain upon the state. Everything that emanates from the throne ought to bear the character of purity, nobleness, and greatness.
Kingly power is not at empty name, nor is a prince adorned with the emblems of majesty, that he may idly preside over mankind; "he beareth not the sword in vain," (says the apostle Paul in his Epistle to the Romans, chapter xiii. v. 4.) "for he is the minister of God; a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil." And, in the language of the schools, princes have been entrusted with government by God, not simply, but on a condition inherent in, and inseparable from the trust, viz. that of protecting their subjects, guarding them against injuries, and maintaining public tranquility.
The sovereign is the soul of society, if he be not held in veneration by the people and his life placed in perfect security, the public peace, the prosperity, and the safety of the State are in continual danger. Hence, the very safety of the State demands necessarily that the person of the Prince be sacred and inviolable.
It is this view of kingly rule that alone can keep alive in a scoffing and licentious age the spirit of ancient loyalty, that spirit begotten of faith, combining in itself obedience, reverence, and love for the majesty of kings, which was at once a bond of social union, an incentive to noble daring, and a salt to purify the heart from its grosser tendencies, preserving it from all that is mean, selfish, and contemptible. Such was loyalty in the Ages of Faith, when men swore, and kept their oath.
C. S. Lewis, writing of those who would destroy monarchy, concluded, "Where men are forbidden to honour a king they honour millionaires, athletes or film stars instead: even famous prostitutes or gangsters.” He then used a food analogy. "Deny [society good] food and it will gobble poison."
Queen Mary of Great Britain in 1923 said it well when she said, "Remember that life is made up of loyalty: loyalty to your friends; loyalty to things beautiful and good; loyalty to the country in which you live; loyalty to your King; and above all, for this holds all other loyalties together, loyalty to God." The strength of any society depends on its loyalties and commitments. This is the heart of the matter. "No people can be great who have ceased to be virtuous."
All natural law principles, being just and rightful, are above all others in importance. They are far superior to the laws created by man. This point is illustrated in the underlying and all important question that had to be resolved in the Nuremburg trials of 1945 and 1946:
[These trials] established the principle that individuals may be legally punished, even by death, for obeying the laws of their country. Is there a higher law by which enacted valid positive laws may be judged, so that persons subject to such laws would be duty-bound to defy them?
This higher law is the law of nature, and it is being quietly revived by a number of philosophers and jurists who agree that relativism or situational ethics is utterly inconsistent with reality.
The law of nature . . . was . . . naturally implanted in men and to comprehend unchangeable and exact justice, universal in scope and self-evident to any individual exercising his 'right reason, ' or the moral faculty with which he was endowed.
However, if there is right reasoning, there is also wrong reasoning that is skewed and distorted. Blackstone wrote:
. . . It is still necessary to have recourse to reason; whose office it is to discover . . . what the law of nature directs in every circumstance of life. . . . If our reason were always, as in our first ancestor before his transgression, clear and perfect, unruffled by passions, unclouded by prejudice, unimpaired by disease or intemperance, the task would be pleasant and easy; we should need no other guide but this. But every man now finds the contrary in his own experience; that his reason is corrupt, and his understanding full of ignorance and error.
So how does one discover the real truth that can bring out the best in all people? Grotius ". . . held to the belief that within every man was a spark of the divine which enabled him to discover universally binding rules of conduct." This innate inborn sense of right and wrong is, in its essence, discovered, not created. It does not depend on the arbitrary whim or the will of man. In other words, right reasoning is behind the highest laws known to mankind.
People can discover the right way by one of two basic methods. The first is by "priori reasoning," which is truth derived by taking general principles known to be reliable and applying them to specific situations. The other way is to use "posteriori examination," which is discovering general principles from judicial history or observed legal events of the past. But "the only way to ascertain the duties which one nation owes another, is to enquire what reason dictates, that attribute which the Almighty has bestowed upon all mankind for the ultimate guide and director of their conduct." In other words, divine and lofty legal imperatives are deducible by natural reason and common sense. Always remember that "The law of nations, as well as the law of nature, is an obligation indispensable: the law of nations, as well as the law of nature, is of origin divine. . . . Universal, indispensable, and unchangeable. . . ."
Legally speaking, under natural law, the true and legitimate non-territorial sovereigns of today are the de jure rightful kings of the countries that have unjustly deposed them. They still hold the legal, ethical, and moral right to rule the territories of their ancestors and will continue to hold all the lawful internal and magnificent rights of majesty. This is in full harmony with the origin of all legitimate authority -- the law that ". . . is universally binding wherever men exist, [and] it cannot be set aside. . . ." It is universal. "Observance of the law of nature [which includes the rules and principles of prescription] . . . is binding upon all kings, even though they have made no promise."
As elaborated before, Vattel described this most important of all laws (the law of nature) as the "the Necessary Law of Nations." The importance of these laws can hardly be overestimated. They are not a part of the changing conventions of mankind; the latter are termed "temporary" or called "the Voluntary Law of Nations." Instead, natural law is universally binding on all.
The key principles and concepts discussed in this book are intrinsically fundamental to the virtues of all just and valid law. It describes what is not only legitimate but also what is morally and ethically right. Natural law is ultimately a law of freedom. Cicero, the well-known ancient Roman jurist and scholar, wrote the following on natural law:
For there is a true law: right reason. It is in conformity with nature, is diffused among all men, and is immutable and eternal; . . . [It is the] supreme law which existed through the ages, before the mention of any written law or established state. . . . Nor may any other law override it, nor may it be repealed as a whole or in part, nor have we power through Senate or people to free ourselves from it. . . . Nor is it one thing at Rome and another at Athens, one thing today and another tomorrow, but one eternal and unalterable law that binds all nations forever.
"[E]very treaty, every custom, which contravenes the injunctions or prohibitions of the Necessary law of nations, is unlawful."
Since this law is not subject to change and the obligations which it imposes are necessary and indispensable, Nations can not alter it by agreement, nor individually or mutually release themselves from it.
It is by the application of this principle that a distinction can be made between lawful and unlawful treaties or conventions and between customs which are innocent and reasonable and those which are unjust and deserving of condemnation.
"Only good law was real law, no matter whether human law-givers or judges recognized it or ignored it. . . ." In other words, natural law is the only true law of mankind. The following are a few examples of it:
(1) The right to protect oneself and one’s property,
(2) The responsibility to be honest and truthful,
(3) Not to kill, maim or hurt each other,
(4) To be loyal, faithful, and true to what is right and of positive good,
(5) To protect the rights of others’ religious beliefs that do not violate the rights of others or other natural law rinciples,
(6) Not to steal or covet, but to instead respect the property of others,
(7) When laws conflict or contradict with each other, the higher of the two laws is the law that should prevail,
(8) Natural law always involves the highest forms of justice, fairness, and equity.
However, one of the most important aspects of natural law is freedom, which does not exist without:
Life, faculties, production—in other words, individuality, liberty, property -- this is man. And in spite of the cunning of artful political leaders, these three gifts . . . precede all human legislation, and are superior to it. Life, liberty, and property do not exist because men have made laws. On the contrary, it was the fact that life, liberty, and property existed beforehand that caused men to make laws in the first place.
Natural Law existed before the ancient prophets, before Adam, and even before formation of the stars and the galaxy. It is eternal. "Natural Law is reality ... not illusion!" It is in the makeup of the universe and the inner nature and workings of man. "Those who deny this [reality] are enemies of truth [and] enemies of truth are enemies of mankind." The point is, "no one is immune to the effects of Natural Law." It has consequences. "We can no more change [natural law] than we can change the path of [the planet] Jupiter [in its course around the sun]!" "It doesn't make a bit of difference what we 'think' is fair or unfair. Natural Law is inescapable. Man's laws cannot change it!" We cannot legislate truth into fiction, light into darkness, or gravity into weightlessness. Truth is truth and it will remain that way to endless ages of all eternity. Reality cannot be changed, nor can it be reversed or transformed into something other than what it is. The truth must be discovered and intelligently reckoned with if our relationships with ourselves, others, and society in general is to be benevolent, healthy and worthwhile.
This is purpose behind all natural law. The rule of just laws creates a just society. It ". . . has two [main] functions: it limits government arbitrariness and power abuse, and it makes the government more rational and its policies more intelligent." In other words:
The end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom: for in all the states of created beings capable of laws, where there is no law, there is no freedom. . . .
. . . Without the rule of law as a limit, popular will [is] . . . corrupted by passions, emotions and short-term irrationalities. [In other words, it is corrupted by absurdities]. As such, [legal scholars] . . . demand [the] rule of law because it helps us to behave according to our long-term [best] interest[s] and [according to good] reason.
Throughout the ages, the essential element that distinguishes tyrannical regimes [of injustice and confusion] from just ones is the rule of law. So long as law is written and interpreted according to its plain meaning, the citizenry can have confidence that the law means what it says and will not be subject to the arbitrary will of those in power. By contrast, when law is either embodied in a person such that his whim or caprice is the law, or when written law is capable of any meaning desired by those who govern, tyranny reigns. . . .
It is so important that Margaret Thatcher declared that:
Our abiding commitment to the rule of law is the very bedrock of our civilization. It is what makes all else [that is good] possible. . . . [Just laws and a lawful society is what] stand[s] between civilization and barbarism.
Thus, it is only proper for us to deeply respect natural law, including the bedrock principles of justice, prescription and freedom.
 Charles A. Weisman, The Authority of Law, 1996, pp. 3-4.
 Ibid., p. 3.
 Ibid., p. 4.
 Ibid., p. 3: Borden vs. State, 11 Ark. 519 (1851).
 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty at the Millennium, 1999, p. 9.
 Daniel Philpott, "Usurping the Sovereignty or Sovereignty?," World Politics, A Quarterly Journal of International Relations, vol. 53, no. 1, January 2001, p. 310.
 Robert H. Jackson, Sovereignty: the Evolution of an Idea, 2007, p. 22.
 Ibid., p. 23.
 Zhu Majie, "Deng Xiaoping's Human Rights Theory," Cultural Impact on International Relations: Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change, vol. 20, Yu Xintian, ed., 2002, p. 87.
 Aykut Coban, "International Arbitration, Sovereignty and Environmental Protection: The Turkish Case," Proceedings of the 2001 Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change "Global Environmental Change and the Nation State," Frank Biermann, Rainer Brohm and Klaus Dingwerth, eds., Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, 2002, pp. 217–225.
 Nguyen Duc Thang, Nature of the theory human rights rank above state sovereignty; 2011: http://English.tapchicongsan.org.vin/Home/Theory-and-Realty/2007/200/Nature-of-the-theory-human-rights-rank-above-state-sovereignty.aspx, p. 3.
 Ibid., p. 1.
 Jack Donnelly, "State Sovereignty and Human Rights:" 2011: http://mysite.du.edu/~jdonnell/papers/hrsov%20v4a.htm.
 The Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 13, "International Law," 1902, p. 192.
 Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics, 2004, p. 118.
 James J. Sheehan, "The Problem of Sovereignty in European History," The American Historical Review, vol. 3, no. 1, February 2006, pp. 32-33.
 Thomas C. Heller and Abraham D. Sofaer, "Sovereignty: The Practioner’s Perspective," Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities, Stephen Krasner, ed., 2001, p. 26.
 Jeremy A. Rabkin, "Recalling the Case of Sovereignty," Chicago Journal of International Law, vol. 5, no. 2, January 2005, extract.
 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 21, no. 30 and chapter 9, no. 3.
 Ibn Khaldun, An Arab Philosophy of History: Selections from the Prolegomena of Ibn Khaldun of Tunis (1332-1406), Charles Philip Issawi, ed., 1987, p. 10.
 Ibid., p. 100.
 Raia Prokhovnik, Sovereignty: History and Theory, 2008, p. 123.
 Philip M. Nichols, "Integrated Sovereignty," 2008 Seminar Lecture: http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article =1002&context=philip_nichols.
 Turki Althunayan, Dealing with the Fragmented International Legal Environment, 2010, p. 97.
 Kurt Burch, "Constituting IPE and Modernity," Constituting International Political Economy, vol. 10, Kurt Burch and Robert Allen Denemark, eds., 1997, p. 28.
 William Chambers, Chambers's Encyclopædia, "KING," 1860, p. 796.
 Reference unknown.
 A. P. d’Enteves, National Law, 1970, p. 67.
 Yehuda Z. Blum, Historic Titles in International Law, 1965, p. 49.
 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 4, no. 11.
 Donald S. Lutz, "Sovereignty," The Oxford Companion to American Law, Kermit l. Hall, ed., 2002, p. 755.
 J. Plamenatz, Man and Society, vol. 1, 1963, p. 194.
 Frantz Funck-Brentano, The Old Regime of France, 1929, p. 145.
 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
 Ibid., p. 145.
 Lisa Joseph, "Dynastic Marriage in England, Castile and Aragon," Master’s Thesis, University of Adelaide, 2015, p. 8.
 George Lawson, Lawson: Politica Sacra Et Civilis, Conal Condren, ed., 1992, pp. 74-75.
 Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989, 1991, p. 92.
 Heinrich Heine [1797-1856], The Memoirs of Heinrich Heine, 1884, p. 41.
 "The Schleswig-Holstein Question," Spectator, vol. 30, no. 1532, November 7, 1857, p. 1161.
 Jennifer Jackson Preece, Minority Rights: Between Diversity and Community, 2005, p. 153.
 Charles P. Sherman, "Acquisitive Prescription: Its Existing World Uniformly," The Yale Law Journal, vol. 21, no. 2, December 1911, p. 147.
 Lord Robert Mantagu, "Art. 1. The Sovereignty in Modern States – The Count de Chambord and the Pope’s Civil Princedom," The Dublin Review, vol. 23, Nicholas Patrick Wiseman, ed., October 1874, p. 292.
 Ray Ibrahim, "The Doctrine of Laches in International Law," Virginia Law Review, vol. 83, no. 3, April 1997, p. 658.
 Robert Phillimore, Commentaries Upon International Law, vol 1, 1879, p. 361.
 Tom Flanagan, First Nations? Second Thoughts, 2nd ed., 2008, p. 61.
 Gentini Case, in Venezuelan Arbitrations, supra note 82, at 725.
 Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, vol. 3, part 2, chapter 9, no. 1.
 Theodore S. Woolsey, "Prescription," The Universal Cyclopaedia, vol. 9, Charles Kendall Adams, ed., 1900, p. 455.
 Leslie John Martin, International Propaganda: Its Legal and Diplomatic Control, 1958, p. 173.
 "The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law," British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 31, 1954, pp. 143, 171.
 John H. Williams [United States of America] v. Venezuela, Reports of International Arbitrary Awards, December 5, 1885, vol. 29, 2012, p. 291 and Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 141.
 Robert Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 21.
 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government, 1690, chapter 11: 2012: http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtr11.htm.
 “The New French Dynasty,” The Metropolitan: A Monthly Magazine, Devoted to Religion, Education, Literature and General Information, vol. 2, no. 1, February 1854, p. 41.
 John Penford Thomas, A Treatise of Universal Jurisprudence, 2nd ed., 1829, p. 162.
 Heinrich A. Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought, 1945, p. 474.
 Michael Canon Cronin, The Science of Ethics, vol. 2, 1929, p. 530.
 Samuel Freiherr von Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations: Eight Books, Basil Kennett, trans., Book 7, chapter 7, no. 5.
 Eobald Toze, The Present State of Europe: Exhibiting a View of the Natural and Civil History of the Several Countries and Kingdoms, vol. 1, Thomas Nugent, trans., 1770, pp. 36-37.
 John Lynch, Cambrensis Eversus, vol. 3, part 1, 1851, p. 43; Note: "Extinguishing the title of a sovereign de jure, unjustly dispossessed [that is, a dethroned monarch and his successors], and giving validity to that of an usurper, reigning de facto," over the kingdom or principality is legally accomplished by prescription under nature law. (Edward Smedley and Hugh James Rose, Encyclopaedia Metropolitana; or, Universal Dictionary of Knowledge, vol. 2, 1845, p. 714). "For by nature every possessor is presumed to be the owner of the thing, unless probable reasons exists to the contrary." (Christian Wolff, The Law of Nations Treated According to a Scientific Method, chapter 3, no. 361, 1974, p. 186) Dependable and continual use of royal titles, regalities and effective protest avert the loss of royal status and sovereign privileges.
 Ralph J. Gillis, Navigation Servitudes: Sources, Applications, Paradigms, 2007, p. 238.
 ". . . the legal institution of immemorial prescription or of time immemorial means that --- as has been recognized, especially with regard to sovereign rights -- a legal foundation is acknowledged for a legal exercise of right since the memory of man, that is, eighty to one hundred years, and has been actually uncontested, regardless of titular proof." (American Society of International Law, The American Journal of International Law, vol.15, 1921, p. 169). (emphasis added).
 Henry de Bracton, Henrici de Bracton de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae Libri Quinque, vol. 2, Sir Travers Twiss, ed., 1880, p. 123; Note: ". . . A Space of Time, which exceeds the Memory of Man [100 years], is in a moral Sense taken for Infinite [that is, as if from endless ages ago], therefore a Silence of so long a Continuance will ever be sufficient [to transfer title]. . . ." (Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Book 2, vol. 2 chapter 4, no. 7). "Prescription [on a sovereign level can be compared] . . . with the concept of limitation of action in private property law in that after a certain period of time action by the true owner became . . . [legally] barred [the claim on the land being inadmissible and unenforceable, such that] . . . the title itself is extinguished." (John O’Brien, International Law, 2001, p. 210). At this point, the possessor would achieve full sovereignty and ownership. Its rights would no longer be incomplete or partial.
 Giovanni Battista Vico, De universi juris uno principio et fine uno, 1721, p. 331.
 John Lynch and Matthew Kelly, Cambrensis Eversus, Seu Potius Historica Fides in Rebus Hibernicis Geraldo Cambrensi Abrogota, Matthew Kelly, trans. & ed., vol. 3, 1852, p. 11.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, number 142.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, chapter 11, nos. 140-141; Note: ". . . Even if the . . . sovereign had originally a perfectly sound [internal de jure] title, he will lose it if another State enters the territory and de facto exercises authority there for a sufficient period, and thus acquires a prescriptive right." (British Foreign Office, British Documents on Foreign Affairs: From 1940 through 1945, 1997, p. 109). ". . . For prescription to be effective the possession must be long-continued, undisturbed, and it must be unambiguously attributable to a claim to act as sovereign;" moreover, where the possession is adverse to the claim of a prior sovereign, "there must also be acquiescence on the part of the original sovereign." (Kent McNeal, "Sovereignty and the Aboriginal Nations and Rupert’s Land," Manitoba History, vol. 37, Spring/Summer 1999, p. 6 and Robert Yewdall Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 23).
 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, vol. 1, 1836, p. 206.
 Pradier-Foderé (1827-1904), a prominent French juirist and writer, as quoted in Case of Venezuela in the Question of Boundary Between Venezuela and British Guana, vol 2, 1898, p. 27; Note: "There can be no doubt that from one point of view the recognition of title, by prescription is as important in international law as it is in the municipal law of the several states." (Charles G. Fenwick, International Prescription, 4th ed., 1965, p. 421).
 Edward Shepherd Creasy, First Platform of International Law, 1876, p. 254.
 Ibid., p. 252.
 Ibid.; Note: "Prescription is as binding upon nations, as on individuals. Unjust force would be continually resorted to [because the claim would never be settled], if usucaption [prescription] did not justify the retention of rights [for the usurper] against those who have been for a long time quiet, and therefore submissive lookers-on [in other words, who acquiesced [gave up] in silence to the new government]." (John Penford Thomas, A Treatise of Universal Jurisprudence, 2nd ed., 1829, pp. 293-294).
 Guglielmo Ferrero, The Reconstruction of Europe, 1941, p. 140.
 T. B. Howell, compiler, A Complete Collection of State Trials [Charles I through Charles II (1625)], vol. 4, 1816, p. 830.
 Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, chapter 9, no. 24.
 Christoph A. Stumpf, The Grotian Theology of International Law, 2006, p. 189.
 Robert Yewdall Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International, 1963, p. 21.
 Author unknown, Treason Unmask'd; or, The Queen's Title, the Revolution, and the Hanover Succession, 1713, p. 14.
 William Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, 1793, p. 335.
 Michael McDonald, "Aboriginal Rights," Ethical Issues: Perspectives for Canadians, 3rd ed., Eldon Soifer, ed., p. 645.
 Edmund Burke, Edmund Burke, Appraisals and Applications, Daniel Ritchie, ed., 1990, p. 232; Note: ". . . Unless long possession identified a prescriptive right, no title to property or power could be secure." (Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France: A Critical Edition, J. C. D. Clark, ed., 2001, p. 160).
 Peter James Stanlis, Edmund Burke and the Natural Law, 2003, p. 79.
 W. H. Jellie, The Preacher's Complete Homiletical Commentary on the Book of Jeremiah, 1892, p. 421.
 John Lynch, Cambrensis Eversus, vol. 3, Matthew Kelly, ed. and trans., 1852, p. 43; Note: "If the various sovereigns of Europe were compelled to exhibit something better, and more pure, than prescriptive title to their crowns, we know not who could substantiate a claim, unsullied by either fraud, conquest, or usurpation." (Tobias George Smollett, "Summary of Politics," The Critical Review, or, Annals of Literature, fifth series, vol. 1, no. 7, June 1815, p. 723). Note also: "The title of almost all the nations of Europe to the territory now possessed by them . . . was originally derived from conquest." (Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, vol.1, 1836, pp. 206-207).
 Hannis Taylor, A Treatise on International Public Law, 1901, p. 284; Note: "If it were not for some such doctrine [that is, the rules and principles of prescription], the title [the right to rule] of many states to their territory would be jeopardized." (Malcolm Nathan Shaw, International Law, 5th ed., 2003, p. 426).
 William Edward Hartpole Lecky, The French Revolution, 1904, p. 215; Note: ". . . Territories illegitimately acquired, may sometimes, by passage of time, be transformed into legitimate domains -- a process traditionally termed ‘prescription.’" (Brian Slattery, "Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims," Osgood Law Journal, vol. 29, no. 4, note 4, 1991, p. 688).
 William L. Tung, International Law in an Organized World, 1968, p. 164.
 George Bowyer, Commentaries on Universal Public Law, 1854, p. 94.
 Hugo Grotius as quoted in Henry Wager Halleck, International Law: Or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War, 1861, p. 266.
 Malcolm Nathan Shaw, International Law, 5th ed., 2003, p. 426; Note: ". . . The majority of publicists [now much higher] admit that long-continuous and uninterrupted possession purges a title which may originally have been tainted with fraud or violence. This latter view, which is in accord with international [law and] practice, [and] is based upon the need of international order and stability." (Amos Shartle Hershey, The Essentials of International Public Law, 1918, p. 180). Note also: ". . . a title which may have been originally faulty, must of necessity become unimpeachable by great lapse of time. Hence, the greatest authorities agree, that national possession may be prescribed for when length of possession has been accompanied with those circumstances which raise a presumption of right." (Richard Wildman, "Institutes of International Law," The Law Library, vol. 68, April, May & June 1950, p.51).
 William Louis Neumann, Recognition of Governments in the Americas, 1947, p. 2.
 Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, prince de Bénévent, Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand, vol. 2, Duc de Broglie, ed., Raphael de Beaufort, trans., 1891, p. 164.
 Ibid., p. 162.
 Johnson’s Universal Cyclopedia: a New Edition, vol. 6, Charles Kendall Adams, ed., "Occupation," 1895, p, 267.
 Robert Yewdall Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 21.
 United States Supreme Court, Records and Briefs of the United States Supreme Court, vol. 217, 1908, pp. 392-393; Note: "Prescription is international law’s way of deciding when it is appropriate to draw a line under the untidiness of history. If a State has been in peaceful possession of a parcel of territory for sometime, it will be regarded as having acquired good title to that parcel unless its right to possession is challenged." (Vaughn Lowe, International Law, 2007, p. 145).
 Ibid., p 392.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, vol. 1, book 1, chapter 22, section 266, no. 4.
 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, What is Property?: An Inquiry Into the Principle of Right and of Government, vol. 1, Benj R. Tucker, trans., 1876, p. 99.
 Gloria Vivenza, Adam Smith and the Classics, 2002, p. 112.
 Op.cit., Pierre-Joseph Proudhon.
 John Penford Thomas, A Treatise of Universal Jurisprudence, 2nd ed, chapter 10, no. 11, 1829, pp. 293-294; Note: "Unjust force would be continually resorted to, if usucaption [prescription] did not justify the retention of rights against those who have been for a long time quiet, and therefore submissive [acquiescent or compliant] lookers on." (Ibid.).
 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 4, no. 3; Note: ". . . Regimes become acceptably legitimized by virtue of their long and uncontested establishment. The same principle appears to work retrospectively also. For, if monarchs who were in their own days judged to be usurpers succeed in establishing dynasties, then this achievement will be generally accepted as having conferred posthumous legitimation [on the king, who started the new ruling house]." (A Dictionary of Conservative and Libertarian Thought, Niles Ashford and Stephen Davis, ed., "Legitimacy," 2011).
 Edmund Burke, The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, vol. 4, 2007, p. 332.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 8, chapter 9, no. 9.
 George Buck, The History of the Life and Reign of Richard the Third, 1647, p. 144.
 Nancy Lenkeith, Dante and the Legend of Rome, 1952, p. 18.
 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 2006, p. 386.
 United States-Venezuela Claims Commission (1885) as quoted in Op.cit., Bin Cheng, p. 373 -- the Cadiz Case, International Arbitration, vol. 4, p. 4199.
 Robert Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, vol. 1, 2nd ed., 1871, p. 298.
 Yejuda Z. Blum, Historic Titles in International Law, 1965, pp. 16-17.
 Edmund Burke as quoted in Sir William Gurney Benham, Cassell’s Book of Quotations, Proverbs and Household Words, “Burke,” Speech, House of Commons, 1782, 1907, p. 41.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or Principles of the Law of Nature, Joseph Chitty ed., preliminaries, no. 9.
 Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest: the Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice, 1996, p. 26.
 Edwin Maxey, International Law with Illustrative Cases, 1906, p. 146.
 Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand, vol. 2, Duc De Broglie, ed., Angus Hall, trans., 1891, pp. 119-120.
 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 8th ed., note 101, 1866, p. 239.
 James Leslie Brierly, Brierly's Law of Nations: An Introduction to the Role of International Law in International Relations, 1963, p. 157 as quoted in Husain M. Al-Baharna, Iran’s Claim to Sovereignty over Bahrain and the Resolution of the Anglo-Iranian Dispute over Bahrain, 2008, p. 45.
 "A Justification of the Present War against the United Netherlands," The Harleian Miscellany: a Collection of Scarce, Curious, and Entertaining Pamphlets and Tracts, vol. 7, 1810, p. 595).
 Brian Slattery, "Aboriginal sovereignty and Imperial Claims," Osgoode Hall Law Journal, vol. 29, no. 4, note 18, p. 699.
 Samuel M. Osgood, French Royalism Under The Third and Fourth Republics, 1960, p. 210.
 John Eppstein, The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations, 1935, pp. 169-170.
 Rosemary Rayfuse, Life After Land, July 18, 2911; 2014: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/19/opinion/19rayfuse.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha212.
 Simon Shen, "Territorial Fragility and the Future of Tibet: Sub-sovereignty, Problems and Theoretical Solutions," Managing Fragile Regions: Method and Application, Rongxing Guo and Carla Freeman, eds., 2011, p. 72.
 Hugo Grotius as quoted in Sir Thomas Barclay, Encyclopædia of the Laws of England, vol. 13, "State," 2nd ed., 1908, p. 608.
 Jonathan Mayhew (1720-1766) quoted in Andrew Burstein , Sentimental Democracy, 1999, p. 24.
 If a claimant or pretender does not test out their claim through this established means, then the assumption can be made that their claim is so flawed or weak as to be considered utterly false, uaaceptable or the same thing as a counterfeit or imitation of what is real.
 Charles P. Sherman, "Acquisitive Prescription: It’s Existing World Uniformly," The Yale Law Journal, vol. 21, no. 2, December 1911, p. 147.
 Ray Ibrahim, "The Doctrine of Laches in International Law," Virginia Law Review, vol. 83, no. 3, April 1997, p. 658.
 Hannis Taylor, A Treatise on International Public Law, 1901, p. 265.
 Pope Benedict XV, Moto Proprio, Bonem San, July 25, 1920.
 Hannah Arendt, "Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World," The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, P. A. Shilpp, ed., 1957, pp. 81-82.
 Jesse Helms, "American Sovereignty and the UN," The National Interest on International Law and Order, R. James Woolsey, ed., 2003, pp. 90-91.
 Henry Maine, Ancient Law, 1970, p. 92.
 Ibid., p. 94.
 Ibid., pp. 92-108.
 David Starkey, "Does Monarchy Matter?," Arts and Humanities in Higher Education, vol. 4, no. 2, 2005, p. 215.
 Samuel Rutherford, Lex, Rex, or, The Law and the Prince, 1843, p. 192, Assert 3.
 Ibid., Assert 4.
 Unit 2: Classical Greece & Ancient Rome; 2011: http://replay.web.archive.org/20050213201219/http:/users.gloryroad.net/~cmonte/WHnotes2.html.
 Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Republica, Book 2, p. 42.
 Ibid., p. 39.
 Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Liberty or Equality: the Challenge of our Time, James P. Hughes, ed., 2007, p. 153.
 Quentin Langley, "Will Kostunica restore Yugoslavia’s monarchy?," San Francisco Chronicle, November 6, 2000.
 Titus Livy, The History of Rome from its Foundation, Book 2., de Sélincourt, trans., 1960, no pages
 Adam Clark, The Holy Bible containing Old and New Testaments the Tests printed from the Most Correct Copies of the present Authorized Translation, including the Marginal Writings and Parallel Texts with a Commentary and Critical Notes designed as a Help to a Better Understandingof the Sacred Writings, vol. 1, 1834, p. 689.
 Yash P. Ghai and Joe Contrell, Heads of State in the Pacific: a Legal and Constitutional Analysis, 1990, p. 14.
 David Skuy, Assassination, Politics and Miracles; French and the Royalist Reaction of 1820, p. 74.
 Editorial, The Times, 2nd August 1993 and The Constitutional Monarchy Association; 2011: http://www.monarchy.net/quotations.htm.
 Ezra Taft Benson, God, Family Country, p. 250.
 Edmund Burke quoted in John Adair, How to Grow Leaders: The Seven Key Principles of Effective Development, 2007, p. 160.
 The Constantian Society, The Introductory Statement; 2011: http://constantian.tripod.com/tcs_intro.html.
 Reference unknown.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 1, chapter 15, no. 188.
 British House of Commons, Report from Committees, vol. 14, 1851, p. 75.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 1, chapter 4, no. 50.
 John Healy, "Pope Leo XIII on the Origin of the Civil Power," The Irish Ecclesiastical Record, vol. 2, December 1881, p. 713.
 Walter Hooper, C.S. Lewis: A Complete Guide to His Life & Works, 1996.
 John Parker, The Queen: The New Biography, 1993, p. 84.
 Samuel Johnson, The Works of Samuel Johnson, vol. 2, 1816, p. 318.
 Howard P. Kainz, Natural Law: an Introduction and Re-examination, 2004, back cover.
 Ibid. and p. 133.
 Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations, 6th ed., 1992, p. 26.
 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1979, p. 41.
 Charles Edwards, "The Law of Nature in the Thought of Hugo Grotius," The Journal of Politics, vol. 32, no. 4, November 1970, p. 806.
 James Iredell, Charge to South Carolina Grand Jury, May 12, 1794, quoted in Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, supra note 3, 1989, p. 823.
 James Wilson, The Works of James Wilson, vol. 1, Robert Green McCloskey, ed., 1967, pp. 148-149.
 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Introduction by David J. Hill, 1901, p. 9.
 Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, vol. 3, part 2, chapter 3, no. 16(1).
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, "Preliminaries," no. 7-13, 21.
 American Church Union, New Oxford Review, vol. 68, 2001, p. 23.
 Op.cit., Emerich de Vattel, preliminaries, no. 9.
 Ibid., Introduction, nos. 8-9.
 Fritz Kern, Kingship and Lawin the Middle Ages, S. B. Chimes, trans., 1956, p. 156.
 Frederick Bastiat, The Law, , 1950, pp. 5-6.
 Paraphrased and altered from the article Frederick Graves, Natural Law, Jurusdictionary; 2015: https://www.howtowinincourt.com/frameset.cfm?mTitle=QNaturalLaw.
 Bo Li, Perspectives, vol. 1, no. 5; 2015: https://www.coursehero.com/file/7375653/What-Is-Rule-of-Law-Bo-Li.
 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, chapter 6, section 57, 1689.
 Op.cit, Bo Li.
 Johnathan Emord, Lawless Jurisprudence (June 29, 2015); 2015: http://www.newswithviews.com/Emord/jonathan400.htm)
 Margaret Thatcher, Follow the Leader, American Outlook, Spring 2000, p. 23.
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