Chapter Four: (Volume II)
EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL RIGHTS
Chapter Table of Contents
Sovereign Equality: Royal Status and Monarchy
The titles of "emperor," and "king," are accounted the most dignified. But the name of the dignity [count, prince, baron, lord] under which a royal individual governs a territory, is immaterial. His sovereign independence of [royal] power is not vitiated by the modesty of his title. 
That is, a person might only be a count or countess, but his or her royal rights entitle him to a throne, even if it is a very small one.
He who exercises imperial [that is, the sovereign] prerogative, is a sovereign, equal to other kings, whatever may be his or their title [be he prince, lord, duke, count or a baron]. He enjoys regal dignity. It is not the shape of a crown, or the value of its jewels, or the formal style attached to a name, or the size of a dominion, or the large extent of political power, which constitutes sovereignty.
In other words, "all sovereigns are equal, not of course in power, but in rank." For example, the ". . . native Princes [of India] . . . claims to sovereignty were . . . [legally and lawfully] equal to those of the reigning monarchs of Europe. . . ." "If the pope [or some other monarch] is sovereign, whether his state [is] . . . great or small, he is, as a prince, the [legal] equal of the emperor of the French or the emperor of Austria. . . ." Sovereign equality under the law was a part of the Treaty of Westphalia and is enshrined in the charter of the United Nations as a law.
Certainly not all nation-states are equal in their capabilities, but the formal equality of sovereignty means that they are legally equal in term of their rights. . . .
". . . All sovereign princes, regardless of wealth or military might, enjoyed the same legal status -- to lead an independent existence." This independence legally extends to deposed sovereigns, provided that the proper protests are maintained. ". . . International law recognizes all monarchs [including dethroned monarchs] as equally sovereign. . . ." This is true because the deposed royals legitimately hold legal, non-territorial sovereignty. Legitimate claimants to an ancient throne, who have consistently maintained their rights, are de jure and genuine sovereigns; and, as such, are the sole heads of the government-in-exile of their usurped countries. As seen earlier in this work, under the rules of the Congress of Vienna, heads of former ruling Houses are of equal rank to ruling heads of state, as long as they have maintained their de jure territorial rights. This status is the highest secular office known on earth, and this explains such exalted prenominals as "His Majesty," "His Imperial Highness," "His Royal Highness," "His Serene, or Illustrious Highness," etc., because by international law, they are rightfully included among all those who hold this exceptional and most precious right. With this in mind, note that ". . . the smallest and least power nation [even a non-territorial one] . . . is the equal of the strongest. Whatever rights belong to one belongs to all. . . . " For ". . . a small republic is not less a sovereign state than the most powerful [and glorious] kingdom [or empire]," just like a "dwarf [or small man] is as much a man as a giant. . . ."
According to the dictionary, royalty always pertains to ". . . a king, queen, or other sovereign." These other sovereigns include any kind of sovereign prince, whatever they are called, sultan, shah, rajah, or emir, etc., and this exclusive group includes reigning or deposed monarchs. All sovereigns and all monarchs are royal no matter what their titles, high or low. They are all intrinsically royals, and so are the members of their immediate families if they are hereditary in nature.
For a historical example of the equality of sovereigns, consider the princes of the Holy Roman Empire. Those given the high title of a "prince of the Holy Roman Empire," who (1) held an immediate fief under the Emperor, (2) had the right to vote in the Imperial Diet, and (3) contributed to military support of the Empire were ". . . reckoned as ‘royalty’ in the sense of being treated as sovereigns, entitled to marry with reigning dynasties [as equals]."
There were two principal types of princes; those who had territory and sovereignty and those who were honorary, having the title but no lands or territories and no claim to sovereignty.
The sovereign rulers (prince or count) held ". . . superior territory rule and derivative, i.e. royal sovereign rights, over an immediate fief of the Empire." (emphasis added) That is:
. . . The [Holy Roman] Empire was never a proper monarchy such as France or England. . . . [The] princes . . . [held] comprehensive royal jurisdiction and royal rights, summarized as superiority, or Landesobrigkeit, over a defined territory. . . . Superiority . . . possessed by the princes [was] to exercise royal rights over such a defined territory and its inhabitants. No territory was ever without such jurisdiction and royal rights. . . . These territories and the royal rights and rights of jurisdiction inherent in them were conceded in perpetuo [which means in perpetuity or forever]. . . . They exercised plenitude potestatis [sovereignty or a fullness of power]. . . . For the princes were not vicarii [not deputies], civil servants or representative of the Emperor, but rulers in their own hereditary right.
However, not only was ". . . the German prince and his children counted as royalty," but the dispossessed or ". . . mediatized princes were [also] . . . regarded as royalty." As demonstrated early in this work, Act 9, Article 14(a) of Final Act of the Congress of Vienna of June 8, 1815, declared that:
The houses of the mediatised princes and counts are nevertheless to rank equally with the high nobility of Germany [the royal houses], and are to retain the same privileges of birthright with the sovereign houses (Ebenbütrtigkeit,) as they have hitherto enjoyed.
What this meant was legal or de jure equality.
Of these rights . . . the most valued is that of Ebenbütrtigkeit (equality of birth), which, for purposes of matrimonial alliance, ranks the mediatized princes with the royal houses of Europe.
In addition, after August of 1806, when Emperor Franz II laid down the crown of the Holy Roman Empire, "All Imperial Estates, which were not mediatized, received . . . unlimited sovereignty." They owed allegiance to no suzerain or higher authority above their own.
In other words:
The sovereigns of the Confederation, freed from all their ancient ties of feudality not only as reigning princes but as private individuals, are in all respects the equals in rank of the other monarchs of Europe.
If these houses, being equal to all the other royal monarchs, continued to maintained their rights through the years to the present time, even though they were deposed, they are still royal and still sovereign. The point is, whether deposed or regnant, large or small, high titled or not, they equally and legitimately hold the title of being royals. This is because they hold the highest and greatest of all secular honors – the supreme right of sovereignty.
". . . With the discovery of Roman law in the 12th century came the maxim rex in regno suo imperator est, that is, a king is emperor in his own kingdom." In other words, a king is the equal of an emperor. "Within determined territories, princes acted like kings in their own realms. Their principalities were 'statelets,'" that is, small independent sovereign states or nations. As seen above, sovereign princes are the equals of kings and, as such, are the equals of emperors. "Each prince or king became an emperor in his own realm." ". . . It would [of course] be ridiculous for a petty [that is, a territory of small size or stature on the world stage] prince to take the title of king, and assume the style of 'Majesty' . . . ," even though they are legally equal to the rulers of large kingdoms. The right of being equal before the law is inviolate according to some of the most important treaties of all time (the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions). Inviolate is defined as being indestructible; that is, it cannot be violated.
All sovereigns, whether reigning or non-territorial, hold the legal right to be equal. Thus:
Just as the mouse is as much numbered among animals as is the elephant, so the [the small government] is just as much a commonwealth [or a nation] as a great empire. The principality of Ragusa, which is one of the smallest in Europe [at that time in history], is no less a commonwealth [or nation] than the empires of the Turks and the Tartars, which are among the greatest [or largest] in the world.
Nevertheless, lawful entitlement is not the same thing as the ability and power to utilize those great privileges. Large nations usually have more resources and therefore have more power, even though they are legally equal to all other nations. Sovereigns also differ greatly within their own nations; some are absolute monarchs with no real counterweights in authority. Other sovereigns have authority that is constricted by a legislature, constitution, or other authority. In the extreme, there are deposed monarchs with legal equality to the other sovereigns but have no actual de facto authority. Those who are dispossessed of their territory only have de facto authority in a dormant or inactive form. That is, they cannot command the nation and legislate (jus imperium), nor can they enforce their commands (jus gladii). But they can honor others (jus honorum) and/or be honored in their de jure capacity. They are the rightful and authentic claimants to sovereignty, and some have ancient rights (jus majestatis) if they have preserved their rights. These royals remain de jure and rightful sovereigns with an international legal status equal as other heads of state or any other reigning sovereign.
However, they are also private citizens:
. . . The sovereign of a country in which a deposed prince took refuge, might accord to him what national privileges he pleased, yet that he could not accord to him international privileges, which belong to those who have summum imperium [full executive command and control of a nation], and not [merely] to a titular prince who in the eye of international law is regarded as a private person [in terms of power]. . . . Such [a] titular prince was in fact a subject -- suhditus temporarius [that is, a temporary subject or citizen] -- of the sovereign [or nation in which the prince resides in exile or in situ].
Even though a deposed monarch, or government-in-exile, is under the regulations in whatever country in which they are denominated, they are still legally sovereign and still have profound rights and authority. (See the sub-chapter "The Extensive Legal Authority of Deposed Monarchs" in this chapter)
International Personality Rights of Non-Territorial Sovereigns
In the course of history, disputes over hereditary successions has led to great destruction, such as, the Hundred Year between England and France; the War of the Spanish Succession, the War of the Austrian Succession, the 1690, 1715, and 1745 Jacobite Risings in Ireland, Scotland, and England, the Carlist Wars of the nineteenth century in Spain, the similar Miguelist Wars in Portugal, and the 1866 War over the succession to Schleswig-Holstein being the most familiar. These international wars, therefore, became matters of great concern.
The princes of sovereign houses became "international public persons," not mere private citizens under domestic law, but sovereigns holding supreme influence and power impacting other nations. They possessed the right of succession to the most important subjects of international law i.e., the State. The relations of princes and their decisions, including serious impact of dynastic marriages, were of such import that the law of nations centered around them as the most important international actors.
". . . States . . . alone are vested with international personality. . . ." And inasmuch as the sovereign is the personification and embodiment of the State, he is a subject of international law as a public individual. In other words, "The person of the prince is necessarily identified with the State itself. Hence . . . the terms sovereign and State [are used] as synonymous." However:
Only sovereign States [or sovereign princes] are legal subjects of international law in the fullest sense. International law does recognize other legal subjects, such as international organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Vatican and soldiers who are directly bound by the international law of war, however they are only the bearers of rights and obligations under international law in a restricted sense. States [or sovereign princes] on the other hand, are not merely passive bearers of rights and obligations under international law, they can by bilateral and multilateral treaties also actually actively participate in the creation, amendment and development of international law.
"The term international personality is widely used to signal the capacity of an entity to act on the international plane." A deposed monarchy or legitimate exiled government can become "a party to a bilateral or international treaty" among other things. It is highly acknowledged that "only sovereign entities may negotiate and conclude treaties with other sovereign entities." Therefore, holding de jure or rightful sovereignty as they do, the head of a deposed royal House or an exiled government have this power, even though they have no control of the territory of their nation or kingdom:
Nevertheless, it is this government – and not the government of the occupying state – which is competent under competent international law to exercise, as organ of the occupied state, all the functions of a state in relation to other states, such as sending and receiving diplomatic envoys, concluding treaties, especially a peace treaty with the occupying state, directing the armed forces at its deposal in war against the occupying state. It may even exercise legislative, administrative and judicial functions. . . . All this in spite of the fact that the government in exile has lost control of the territory. . . .
Governments-in-exile and deposed monarchs, both before and during World War II, performed individual acts that would, by the constitution of the territory when they ruled, normally require the consent of an organ of government, such as a parliament. These acts were performed without this consent because the governmental organs were unavailable due to the usurper’s overthrow. Therefore, the consent of these organs were suspended, and the governments-in-exile and deposed monarchs acted lawfully without consent. This is because the governments-in-exile and deposed sovereigns retained the de jure authority. That is, they retained the legal right to rule and were still implicitly international persons despite their lack of territorial control. Consider the following:
The view that exiled governments were organs [and sovereigns] of the occupied States, acting on their behalf and on the basis of their own legal order, was forcefully and uniformly upheld by all judicial decision on the subject. (emphasis added)
The most important of these [examples demonstrating that a deposed sovereignty can be subjects of public international law] is the Papal Church, which, even after the loss of the Papal States, through the Italian Law of Guarantees of the 13th May 1871 is recognised as sovereign. . . . To this category of subjects of international law belong also dethroned sovereign princely Houses . . . as long as the princely House has not given up its claims, the question of its rights is left open [still intact or unforfeited], even when the actual head of state, who has come in its place, is recognised as the actual representative of the state in question. (emphasis added)
As seen earlier, under the rules of the Congress of Vienna, heads of formerly ruling Houses are legally equal to reigning or ruling heads of state. That is, a legitimate head of a royal House is a head of state, but he or she is the head of an exiled or deposed sovereign government rather than a currently reigning government. The non-reigning royal’s de jure rights are the same as a reigning royal, but his or her externally-recognized rights before the world community are obviously diminished. This is because the non-reigning royal has no current control or power over the territory his or her forefathers once ruled. But the non-reigning royal is still a rightful sovereign. The situation is similar to what has been established about sovereign protectorates under the law of nations. That is, they do not have an absolute fullness of external recognition, but they are fully internally sovereign.
That they cannot be full, perfect, and normal subjects of international law there is no doubt [because their external sovereignty is limited]. [But] it is inaccurate to maintain that they have no international position whatever. Once it is appreciated that it is not so much the possession of [external] sovereignty [or territory] which determined the possession of international personality but rather the possession of rights, duties and powers in international law, it is apparent that a [deposed] State which possesses some, but not all, of those rights, duties and powers, is nevertheless, an international person. In fact such [exiled] states often enjoy in many respects rights, and fulfill in other points duties, established by international law.
Hence, some members of dethroned princely or royal Houses have been explicitly recognized as subjects of public international law. For three examples, consider Prince Sigvard Bernadotte, Princess Caroline of Hanover (née of Monaco), and the former King of Greece, HM King Constantine II. What is accorded to one non-reigning royal, of course, is precedence for what is applicable to all legitimate deposed Houses. The head of a royal House is the personification and embodiment of all the sovereign rights and privileges of a government-in-exile. As quoted before on the legal competency and rightful jurisdiction of exiled governments, it is important to remember that:
They are true governments set up and organized to protect the interests of their nationals, and their powers with regard thereto are recognized and respected. . . . They exercise sovereign power, moreover, not only with respect to their nations, but also with respect to the vessels of their countries. . . . (emphasis added)
The international rights of deposed sovereignties are explicit as well as implicit in international law.
. . . Subjects other than [de facto or actual reigning] states can also act as subjects of public [international] law. . . . This is however not generally recognised in public law literature.
This aspect of public international law is a neglected or generally ignored area, but "[international] personality . . . is [recognized as] a flexible open ended concept that can mean different things in different circumstances." For example, "Today . . . international law is also a law for humanity: individual people [including deposed monarchs or their heirs] are international legal subjects."
Thus, dispossessed royals who have maintained their rights by prescription are subjects of international law, whether they are formally recognized as such or not. But, as seen earlier, outside political or external recognition is not the deciding factor as to whether a sovereign entity has true sovereignty or not.
How De Jure Internal Non-Territorial Sovereignty is Legally Preserved and Maintained
It is important to understand that there can be true sovereignty in a republic and other forms of non-royal governments, but you cannot have royalty without sovereignty. The subordination or complete dependence of royalty on either reigning or deposed sovereignty is of great importance in discerning genuine royal claims. All royal or grand rights come from the privileges of sovereignty. A king or sovereign prince is royal only because he or she holds these supreme rights. Without either reigning or non-reigning sovereignty, there is simply no royal House or royal person. However:
In all cases, were a dynasty was expelled from their territories [in other words, deposed or dispossessed] and their states incorporated into another state, the dynasty just lost their territory, but neither their status as a sovereign family nor their dynastic independence [or royal rights and privileges are lost].
Non-territorial sovereignty, the sovereignty of dispossessed monarchies and exiled governments, is built on the fundamental rules and principles of prescription. To throw out prescription, would be to throw out all deposed sovereignty; such that, no claim to royalty or exiled entitlements would have any right to exist. As discussed earlier in this book, prescription is the only law which preserves the rights of jus imperii, jus gladii, jus majestatis and jus honorum on a non-territorial basis. The false pretenders, who do not like prescription, because it exposes the invalidity of their claims, do not realize that prescription is the only law makes non-territorial sovereignty a legal reality.
We live in a very strange time. That is, while this book was being written, the statement can be made that never in the history of mankind has there been so many impersonators misrepresenting themselves as royalty -- calling themselves "His or Her Imperial and Royal Highness," and putting on airs (at least on the internet), yet they have no sovereignty and nothing authentic about them. The following sub-sections review and add additional information on prescription, which is essential if one is to identify what is real from what is, in fact, a skillful falsehood.
The reader will find that it is necessary to repeat the concepts from earlier chapters in this work, so that additional objective evidence is can be provided to ensure that these doctrines are fully understood and recognized. Since the forfeiture of royal rights is irrevocable, it is vital for royal Houses to understand how to preserve them.
Royal dynasties tend not to stay in power over a kingdom forever or in perpetuity; life is unstable and unpredictable. History teaches that the oldest modern dynasties are scarcely a little over 1,000 years old, even though the timeline of human history is much longer. The eventual loss of de facto power of a royal House is inevitable and inescapable. Only one dynasty, the biblical house of David, was ever divinely promised to be perpetual. The kingship over the ten tribes of Israel was lost in just the third generation of kings, and the Kingdom of Judah provided about 400 years of rule before falling. While some other royal and imperial dynasties may also have origins with the House of David, potentially among them the British, Georgian, and Ethiopian dynasties, it is clear that it is extremely hard for royal Houses to retain rule for long periods of time. These losses of the throne come because of high crimes, corruption, and iniquities of both the people and their leaders. Thus, while de facto rule will likely be lost by every royal House at some point, the House’s right to reign on a deposed basis can last forever, if it is maintained by the rule of prescriptive law.
There are two legal analogies helpful in understanding prescription, which demonstrates both the preservation of rights and the loss thereof:
Keeping de jure internal non-territorial sovereignty alive by diplomatic protests may be compared by analogy to the claim of the owner of a stolen automobile. The owner of a stolen car must keep the claim of de jure ownership "alive" by filing a report with the competent police authorities. The owner is not in the de facto possession of the automobile since it has been stolen, but by filing the claim with the police, the owner remains the de jure (actual owner) of the car.
The claim to the stolen automobile is not the mere expectation of a right. Rather, this claim possesses a valid, authentic right as a direct result of filing the necessary report with the police. The claim, therefore, has real substance in asserting ownership to the car, and it will prevent the sale or transfer of lawful title to other party attempting to register it in the future.
In contrast to preservation, if the original owner fails to make any claim on the stolen car or register any official complaint, the car's ownership can be legally transferred to the thief, the usurper, simply with the passage of time. A new title can be applied for after the specified statutory limit. This analogy demonstrates that making a claim is critical and necessary to preserving the right of ownership, whether it is a stolen car or usurped de facto control of a kingdom or territory.
Every statute of limitations or prescription, ancient or modern, contains a saving clause in favor of persons making continual claim [in international prescription, this refers to official protests and/or the consistent use of exalted royal titles and arms]. . . . Justice requires that it should be so: the law of civil society has recognized it; and the code of every nation has adopted it. (emphasis added)
The second analogy demonstrates that sovereignty is not identical to power. It is a legal term, and it is akin to authority. Power is like an automobile. It has the ability to move a person quickly to where he or she wishes to go. But the capacity to drive is not the same as the authority to drive. The authority to drive the car requires a driver’s license, which grants the legal and lawful right to drive on public roads, highways, and streets. In deposed sovereignty, the dispossessed monarch or government-in-exile has the metaphorical driver’s license, which is the legal right to rule. However, the deposed sovereign no longer commands the apparatus of his or her former government. Metaphorically, the deposed sovereign has no car to drive.
Authority [sovereignty in this analogy] commands, power executes. [Sovereignty] is a warrant or license – an authorization – to exercise power: a search warrant, a driver’s license, a passport or visa, etc. Authority is usually defined by offices that people occupy [such as, a king or sovereign prince].
As these analogies attest to, prescription is the central key of royalty and nobility. It is the foundation upon which deposed sovereignty can legally be perpetuated, in perpetuity if the sovereign rights are properly maintained. For instance, in the 19th century in Russia, there were ". . . no less than 34 existing princely houses, all bearing their titles in virtue of their dynastic decent by immemorial prescription. . . . " They followed the law which perpetuated their rights.
As seen earlier, to be royal requires the actual legal possession of either reigning or non-territorial sovereignty. The prescriptive loss of sovereignty is the full and complete loss of all regal rights, entitlements, and prerogatives. Sovereignty is the core issue for genuine royalty. It cannot exist without it. It is the life blood of an authentic royal House or exiled government.
The way to safeguard the rights of non-territorial sovereignty has been known for thousands of years. It is part of the ageless law of nature and right reasoning. "Do we not read in Holy Writ, that Jephte [Jephthah (Judges 10 - 12], when summoned by the king of the Ammonites to surrender some territory, pleaded a possession of three hundred years?" In a more recent case, in the modern landmark decision regarding the 1928 Island of Palmas case:
Judge Huber did well to stress the importance of maintaining titles [ownership of the right to sovereignty] as well as acquiring them, because there is a tendency among the writers to place less emphasis upon this aspect of the matter. It is true that methods of losing titles are sometimes classified along with methods of acquiring them. But this practice seems to presuppose that, if a title is not actually lost through one of the recognized methods of loss, it is automatically maintained.
In other words, emphasis must be paid to keeping sovereignty, as it is not "automatically maintained" or preserved without effort and work. "Waiver, acquiescence and extinctive prescription are legal concepts entailing the same effect –they lead to the loss of a right or claim." "Once the conditions for any of them are met, the claimant State’s right [or dispossessed monarch’s right] . . . ceases to exist [immediately]." In other words, "As Judge Huber indicated in the Island of Palmas case, it is necessary that a title [in this context, sovereignty] be . . . continuously maintain[ed]. . . ." Please note the word continuously is used in the previous statement not sometimes, but in a constantly maintained manner. This means that the regal rights must be preserved, else they are eventually forfeited. ". . . A State [or de jure king or his or her rightful successors] that does not present claims . . . within a given period of time permanently loses its right to do so, even where it has not acquiesced in their extinction."
In every legal system there was a period when de facto became de jure ownership, when possession became property. "The nature of man, the reason of the thing, the very existence of society, demand that such should be the case [because certainty and stability are primary values]."
Put in another way, ". . . It is necessary that affairs should some time or other be brought to a conclusion, and settled on a firm and solid foundation." This is one of the major purposes of international law. A higher ethical, moral, and equitable concern operates in prescription that protects and preserves the internal sovereign right for deposed monarchs or governments-in-exile.
The State with title [the dispossessed monarch or government-in-exile] is only required to show that there has been no tacit [inferred or undeclared] abandonment of its right or acquiescence [to the usurping government] in the rival claim.
Prescription’s transfer of the internal, non-territorial right to rule cannot be completed, conclusively achieved or ". . . finally settled if the former owner continued to agitate the issue," that is, continued to protest, or consistently and publically use his exalted titles and arms, so as to prove beyond doubt that the claim was never abandoned.
Legally, this agitation by public protest disturbs the required peaceful possession of the usurper. It therefore preserves all sovereign and royal rights that the deposed monarch has.
Professor Emilio Furno, an advocate in the Italian Supreme Court of Appeal, explains:
There are not a few judgments, civil and criminal, albeit some very recent, all of which tend as a rule to the acceptance of traditional principles re-enunciated not long since. The issue is that of innate nobility -- jure sanguinis -- which looks into the prerogatives known as jus majestatis and jus honorum and which argues that the holder of such prerogatives is a subject of international law with all the logical consequences of that situation. That is to say, a deposed Sovereign may legitimately confer titles of nobility, with or without predicates, and the honorifics which pertain to his heraldic patrimony as head of his dynasty.
The qualities which render a deposed Sovereign a subject of international law are undeniable. . . . (emphasis added)
"The [sovereign] prince, in his quality of prince, is not considered as an individual; he is a public personage, all the state is comprised in him. . . ." He possesses public law claims as a deposed monarch and is therefore a subject of that law. That is, "To this category of subjects of international law belong . . . dethroned princely Houses . . . as long as the princely House has not given up its claims. . . ." These claims can be given up overtly, by some form of renunciation, or tacitly via abandonment, desertion, or neglect.
The point here is that deposed monarchs, being subjects of international law, are also subject to the jurisdiction of that law. One of the most important, if not the most important, of all laws impacting the preservation of dynastic regal rights is immemorial prescription. The just principles of prescription are so ancient in the law of nature that they can be observed in the writings of the ancient Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans. (Judges 12:7)
Rights can be Maintained Perpetually without End
As an example of Byzantine Roman law in regard to other nations from about 300-400 A.D., we read, "The dependent king of Lazica received his sceptre at the hands of the Persian monarch, and the successors of Constantine acquiesced . . . as a right of immemorial prescription." And "Plato [about 300 B.C. or 600 years earlier, wrote] Rules for . . . Prescription in . . ." ancient Greece long before Rome ever existed as a country.
A sovereign is a transcendent honor, because "to be a sovereign is to exercise the highest authority that it is possible for man to obtain."
[A people can confer on a man] and his descendants forever the hereditary rights of [sovereign] prince. . . . [This act gave him] then and there the hereditary titles and [regal] prerogatives of prince. . . . [Once] conferred, [this puts] him and his heirs at the head of the . . . people forever.
The wording from the following treaties demonstrates this well-known principle of enduring rights for the lawful heirs of a hereditary monarchy:
(a) Territory was given to Imperial Russia to ". . . be possessed by his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians, his heirs and successors, for ever."
(b) Another royal House were given principalities, the recipients were the king and ". . . his heirs and successors, in perpetual sovereignty. . . ."
(c) Again, ". . . we are now in possession of Guienne and Gascony, to hold forever by us, our heirs and successors, in the same manner that the kings of France have always held them. . . ."
(d) ". . . The full sovereignty of the Northern Island of New Zealand vests in Her Majesty Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors, for ever."
(e) ". . . His heirs and successors, with all the rights of sovereignty, of absolute power and entire dominion . . . shall remain in his possession evermore. . . ."
(f) ". . . His heirs and successors, shall have, hold, keep and enjoy forever, with plenary right of sovereignty, dominion, possession and property, all those lands. . . ."
(g) ". . . It is agreed and consented, that his Majesty the King of Prussia, his heirs and successors, as well as male as female, shall freely possess the Kingdom of Prussia for ever, with all it sovereignties and independencies. . ."
Hugo Grotius declared that, ". . . the successor has a right to all the privileges and prerogatives that his ancestors enjoyed. . . ." This is a hereditary right and one that is most special, unique and sacred.
. . . The right of kings to rule their kingdoms has been almost universally admitted, nay held as the most sacred of all human rights, and next to this right of kings, in respect and sacredness, has ever been the right of landowners to their lands. . . . Hereditary right . . . are natural rights . . . and natural rights are divine rights. . . .
Nevertheless, these royals are subject to the natural or higher law of prescription, which has jurisdiction over and above sovereignty, the supreme secular attribute, either in the preservation thereof or the loss it. Jean J. Burlamaqui wrote, "Every [sovereign has] a right to succeed in his rank, and transmits this right to his descendants, though he has never reigned himself, that is to say, the right of the deceased passes to the living . . ." down to the next in line through their generations forever provided they faithfully maintain it. That is:
He that is born a king and a prince can never be unborn . . . the eldest son of such a king is, in respect of birth, the Lord's anointed in his father's life-time, . . . to deprive him of his right of reversion [his right to be king in the future] is as true [an] injustice as to dispossess him of it.
Once the people had agreed upon the fundamental law of the kingdom, and given the king and his descendants power over them, [so that all royal rights were owned, possessed and retained by the royal house] . . . the natural right to govern the body politic resided henceforth in full only in the person of the king.
In a hereditary monarchy, this right [the right of sovereignty] is indissolubly [inseparably] linked to the person of the members of the reigning family in the established order of succession. It can only die out by the death of all its members, who, themselves, or their descendants, could have been called to the crown by virtue of that order of succession.
"Once a king is anointed [in a hereditary monarchy], he and his descendants are granted the monarchy forever. . . ." This gave ". . . the king . . . supreme power which was natural and inalienable, inalienable to such a degree that dethroned kings and their descendants kept this right forever. . . ." These rights are immutable, perpetual and endless provided they are not legally abandoned or lost by any of the methods specified in the section on "The Loss or Forfeiture of De jure Internal Non-Territorial Sovereignty." If maintained, as stated in a legal battle, ". . . the late king, being once a king, had, by the Law of Nations . . . tho’ he had lost his kingdoms . . . still retained a right to the privileges that belong to Sovereign Princes," and that includes Jus Imperii, Jus Gladii, Jus Majestatis, and Jus Honorum either in an active or inactive mode. 
The Congress of Vienna (September, 1814 to June, 1815) . . . [enacted international treaties] to preserve forever the divine dynastic rights of the reigning [hereditary] rulers of the Great Powers participating therein. . . . (emphasis added)
Inalienable Unless Freely Given
. . . [The sovereign rights] of a legitimate monarch was in principle inalienable [or inseparable]. The only [way this could be changed] was through [the] freely given consent of the affected monarch.
[Those who proclaim the rights of hereditary monarchy] agree . . . that if any of these kings be dethroned de facto, he and his heirs still retain for ever a right to the sovereignty unless there be on their part a voluntary surrender [that is] . . . neither he [the king or sovereign prince] nor his heirs lose their right to the throne, except by personal voluntary surrender. . . .
". . . No one can be dispossessed [of his internal de jure right to rule] except by his own consent." Free will is the universal cardinal requirement to validate a juridical act having such monumental import to hereditary monarchies for both reigning and dispossessed royal dynasties. ". . . Juridical acts or further legally relevant facts can operate as titles by which territorial sovereignty [the internal right to rule] can be acquired [or] lost. . . ." In other words, "The dominion of nations [not just territories] is acquired and lost by prescription." The royal prerogative can go on forever as a lawful right, but it can also be permanently lost. As seen earlier, this can be accomplished overtly by a renunciation, abdication, cession, or treaty. However, "voluntary surrender," can also be legally concluded or established by dereliction or negligence on the part of a deposed royal House. That is:
. . . A right to property [or royalty] may be renounced not only by words, but also by actions, or any other indication by action of the will. . . . Nor is there any reason, why the same rule may not take place between sovereign princes, and independent states, as between individuals.
[Sovereign] prescription therefore can take place [even though] . . . the Owner hath not renounced either by Words, or by any Express Deed, or Overt Act, but in which we presume his intention to leave them, from his neglecting to inquire after them, and to challenge them again.
In other words: ". . . Nonperformances or Omissions . . . do, in moral account, pass for Actual Deeds. . . ." That is, they have the same effect as a legally completed conveyance.
A core requirement of prescription is that it is voluntary, but this voluntary consent can come from indirect consent. "Acquiescence [lack of protest] is the crux of the matter and if that implied consent [acquiescence] is not present, a prescriptive title does not arise." Acquiescence is indicated "by actions of the will" and is legally interpreted as implied [or indirect] consent. It is a legal and lawful form of "voluntary surrender," and it sets up the powerful legal presumption of freely surrendering all royal and sovereign rights on the highest level called juris et de jure meaning it cannot be overturned; that is, new evidence is inadmissible after 100 years of neglect.
The real point is that de jure rights can be endlessly preserved by the solid rules of prescription, which protect and safeguard royal privileges and the rights of a legitimate government-in-exile, if applied correctly and responsibly. This is because the illegal ". . . dispossession of a [king or sovereign] prince does not invalidate his title."
The Use of Titles and Arms to Preserve Rights
In a footnote showing that prescription can both preserve and destroy the dynastic rights of sovereigns, Peter Du Puy (1582-1651) is quoted declaring that those who do not believe that prescription can both destroy and preserve these rights:
. . . will, I believe, find it difficult to make a Reply to that universal Consent of all Kings and Sovereign Princes, who have never waved any Part of their ancient Pretensions. . . [to] those Dominions, tho' not in Possession of one Foot of Land in them." The Author then sets down a great Number of Examples. . . .
In other words, prescription was a dominant concern to the deposed in order to preserve what they considered to be extremely precious.
Actual or even imagined membership in a ruling dynasty that had once ruled a sovereign state and then lost power when the country forfeited its independence was of considerable importance in Europe [because of the rules of prescription. Hence, many of the high nobility continued to] preserved legends and tales [etc. of their illustrious progenitor’s] . . . dynasties [royal houses] that had once ruled those lands.
This was done to maintain their claims intact as valid and binding in international law. Many examples come from the Holy Roman Empire (963-1806) as prescription was a common legal practice and a known and accepted way to maintain and preserve the most important right of all -- the right to rule. That is, ". . . We find it [prescription] mentioned more than once in the Constitutions of the ancient German Empire and as a mode of acquiring Public Rights." Public law in the Holy Roman Empire included the hereditary rights of proprietary ownership and rulership over dukedoms, principalities, counties, and other fiefs. Many of these semi-independent entities were virtually sovereign, both before and after the Peace of Westphalia. Nevertheless, they were still legally bound by the Constitution of the Realm and the Imperial Courts. Prescription was taken very seriously. A deposed sovereign noble or royal house, as required in prescription, used the regal titles of a territory it no longer ruled over when it wanted to preserve the de jure or lawful right to a particular titled territory that was wrongfully taken from them -- "(e.g. Dukes of Saxony bore titles of the extinct house of Jülich-Kleve and Archdukes of Austria bore titles of Dukes of Burgundy and Lorraine)."
Other examples are abundant similar to the Sovereign Prince of Monaco who has 28 ancient titles including Duke of Valentinois, Prince of Château-Porcien, Count of Belfort, Baron of St. Lo, and 24 other ancient realms that no longer exist de facto upon the earth. The claim to these titles was originally for the express purpose of maintaining their right to these ancient lands under the rules and principles of prescriptive law. For the same reason, the Imperial and Royal House of Habsburg claims seven deposed sovereign kingdoms, nineteen duchies, eight principalities, four counties, three lordships and four margravates.
The following historical titles claimed by the royal House of Spain are an example of how prescription rules preserve ancient regalities. Please note that some of the following have been forfeited or are also claimed by other royal Houses. But most listed below are still valid, uncontested non-territorial sovereign territories:
1. King of Castile -- initially a county of Galicia, became independent in 935, a kingdom in 1035
2. King of Leon -- formed in 909; united to Castile 1038-1157 and from 1230
3. King of Aragon -- kingdom since 1035, passed to the counts of Barcelona in 1130+/-, united to Castile in 1469 by the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon to Isabel of Castile
3. King of the Two Sicilies -- one Sicily (the island) conquered in 1282; the other (Naples) conquered in 1440 by Aragon; united to the crown of Aragon 1460; lost in 1713, conquered by Don Carlos, younger son of the king of Spain, in 1738; he became king of Spain in 1759 and ceded the throne to his younger son Ferdinand; united to Italy in 1860 although the kingdom disappeared in 1191, the rights to this title were acquired by Charles of Anjou, king of Naples and Sicily, in 1281; the claim was considered to have been conquered along with the Two Sicilies; the pope invested Don Carlos with the title in 1738
4. [King of Jerusalem – as members of the royal house of Naples. Two other royal houses claim the Crusader kingdom of Jerusalem by descent: the Imperial and Royal House of Habsburg and the Royal House of Savoy].
5. King of Navarra -- formed around 850; title claimed by Aragon since Juan II, most of the kingdom conquered in 1512 (the part north of the Pyrenees was united to France after 1589)
6. King of Granada -- Moorish kingdom, conquered 1492 by the Catholic Kings
7. King of Toledo -- Moorish kingdom, conquered 1085 by Castile
8. King of Valencia -- Moorish kingdom, conquered 1238 conquered by Aragon
9. King of Galicia -- founded in the 8th century by Pelayo; one of his successors took the title of king of Leon
10. King of Sardinia -- conquered 1287; raised to a kingdom by the Pope along with Corsica, Apr 4, 1297
11. King of Cordoba -- Moorish kingdom, conquered 1236 by Castile
12. King of Corsica -- conquered early 15th c., abandoned 1434
13. King of Murcia -- Moorish kingdom, conquered 1248 by Castile
14. King of Jaén
15. King of the Algarves -- Algarve is southern Portugal, conquerred by Alfonso III of Portugal but claimed by his father-in-law Alfonxo X el Sabio. The Algarves refers in the Portuguese title to Algarve and places conquered in Morocco.
16. King of Algeciras -- conquered by Castile in 1344
17. King of Gibraltar -- one of the two pillars of Hercules which frame the Spanish coat of arms, Djebel-al-Tariq, named after the man who took it to lead the Moors in Spain in 711; conquered by Castile in 1212; ceded to Great Britain in 1713; subject of bitter disputes to this day
18. King of the Canaries Islands -- colonized by Spain in the 15th c. The title was granted by the Pope on 15 Nov 1344 (Fortunatarum Insularum Rex).
19. King of the West and East Indies
20. King of the Islands and Mainland of the Ocean Sea -- title assumed in 1521 by Carlos I to represent his territories in the New World (with viceroyalties in Mexico 1536, Peru 1543, New Granada 1719, La Plata 1776)
21. Archduke of Austria -- hereditary title of the Habsburgs, from the marriage of Juaña with archduke Philip of Austria in 1496
22. Duke of Burgundy -- title claimed by the Habsburgs since the death of Marie of Burgundy (1480), wife of Maximilian of Habsburg and grandmother of Carlos I, although Burgundy has been part of France since that time; in 1700, a strange situation arose when Felipe V, grandson of Louis XIV of France, king of Spain and titular duke of Burgundy, happened to be the younger brother of Louis de France, duke of Burgundy!
23. Duke of Brabant -- title inherited from Marie of Burgundy; ceded to Austria in 1713
24. Duke of Milan -- ceded to Carlos I by the last duke of Milan Francesco Sforza in 1535
25. Duke of Athens
26. Duke of (Neo-)Patras -- Two titles related to the principalities of Achaia and Morea, formed after the partition of the Byzantine Empire by the Latins in 1204; acquired by Aragon 1312, lost 1387
27. Count of Habsburg -- Habsburg title
28. Count of Flanders -- title from the Burgundian heritage
29. Count of Tirol -- Habsburg title, united to Austria 1363
30. Count of Roussillon -- county in the 10th century, inherited by Aragon in 1172; it revolts and joins France in 1640; Spain formally cedes it and Cerdaña to France by the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659
31. Count of Barcelona -- Carolingian county formed in the late 8th c., united to Aragon 1162
32. Lord of Viscaya
33. Lord of Molina
Again, the loss of right was a very important concern; hence, public titutlar claims were the rule, not the exception. Sir Ernest Satow describes the different types of titles held by various royals in his 1922 work:
Certain sovereigns use three sorts of titles: the grand titre, the titre moyen and the petit tire. The first of these includes the names of the fictitious as well as of the real dominions. . . .
[For example] the King of Spain's grand litre includes the two Sicilies, Jerusalem, Corsica, Gibraltar, Austria, Burgundy, Brabant and Milan, Habsburg, Flanders, Tyrol, all of which are fictitious, one of them, Jerusalem, being also claimed in the grand litre of Austria. . . .
The litre moyen is confined to real facts, and the petit Htre, the most generally made use of in these days, is the highest of the whole number -- namely, that by which the sovereign is habitually designated [or entitled with as king or sovereign prince].
The sovereign claims made by these princes have been passed on from one generation to the next to protect their rightful claims. While these sovereign rights are also maintained for tradition and history, it is a vital imperative to publicly show that these royal claims were never discarded or abandoned. Therefore, it is no surprise that prescription has been treated as a serious matter in history. In the 1600s, it was declared ". . . men [deposed sovereigns] do not so easily acquiesce . . . when they think they have any Right." History demonstrates that prescriptive sovereign claims survived and were strongly maintained.
Nicholas II, the last Tsar of Russia, claimed the following titles of sovereign rule, even though he did not have territorial control of all of them. This is consistent with the legal principles of prescription for the endless preservation of claims. His grand titre was:
Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russians, of Moscow, Kiev, Vladimir, Novgorod, Tsar of Kazan, Tsar of Astrakhan, King of Poland, Tsar of Siberia, Tsar of Tauric Chersonesos, Tsar of Georgia, Lord of Pskov, and Grand Duke of Smolensk, Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, and Finland, Prince of Estonia, Livonia, Courland and Semigalia, Samogitia, Belostok, Karelia, of Tver, Yugra, Perm, Vyatka, Bulgaria, and other territories; Lord and Grand Duke of Nizhny Novgorod, Chernigov; Sovereign of Ryazan, Polotsk, Rostov, Yaroslavl, Beloozero, Udoria, Obdoria, Kondia, Vitebsk, Mstislav, and all the northern territories; and Sovereign of Iveria, Kartalinia, and the Kabardinian lands and Armenian territories; Hereditary Lord and Ruler of the Cherkass and Mountain Princes and others; Lord of Turkestan, Heir of Norway, Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, Stormarn, Dithmarschen, Oldenburg.
Another example of a prescriptively preserved right follows:
Long after the English had been routed at the end of the Hundred Years War, Elizabeth I’s royal title [still] referred to her [as well as her progenitors] as the [rightful] King[s] of France.
These sovereign de jure claims were also reflected in the grand royal arms for the respective royals. The arms are powerful public claims that help preserve the sacred sovereign claims. Holding the prescriptive title, the actions of these royals ". . . justify the right to some crown [even if there is never again de facto control of the lost territory]. . . ." Hence, "In the practice of the European countries the powers, indeed, very often involve prescription . . . in regard to rights they do not want to abandon." ". . . The use of titles, shields [arms], protests, public and solemn notifications" are all ways of interrupting prescription to maintain internal non-territorial claims. Titles and arms are used to perpetuate such possibilities. In history, on the appearance of any potential vacant throne, there were a number of candidates immediately willing to put forth a royal claim. "Every royal marriage, in fact, from time immemorial, has been but another effort to perpetuate in a peaceful way, a title to royalty. . . ." This continued until international law required that when a marriage took place between two kingdoms or principalities, either the bride or groom had to fully renounce her or his succession rights. This was so that nations would no longer be combined through marriage, thus preserving the balance of power among the major European states. (See "Dynastic Renunciations and Potential Divisions" in Chapter VI).
The most generally accepted public protest to maintain sovereign rights is to continually use the title and arms of the de jure kingdom or nation. But there are other ways of making a protest:
. . . The [actual] form of the objection [or protest] is irrelevant, so long as the dispossessed state [or exiled royal house] make clear its opposition to the acquisition of title by someone else.
It is not the form but the clear and unyielding protest that preserves a sovereign claim. As seen, the use of royal titles and national arms is the most obvious and consistent protest. It is completely sufficient to stop a prescriptive title transfer and maintain a legitimate and authentic claim for a deposed sovereign House. This is why:
Some of them [some of the deposed royal houses] have retained the Titles of their pretended [that is, rightful claims to] Kingdoms and Lordships, others the Arms, and a third Sort both the Arms and Titles of those Dominions, tho' not in Possession of one Foot of Land in them.
The various forms and practices of heraldry in Europe were a part of international law in the Middle Ages:
. . . Arms of Pretension are those borne by sovereigns who have no actual authority over the states to which such arms belong, but who quarter them to express their prescriptive right thereunto. (emphasis added)
. . . Arms of pretension [are] where a [deposed] sovereign claims de jure [legally and rightfully] a possession which he no longer holds, and sometimes never held, de facto. Thus the kings of England from Edward III to George III bore the French lilies, and claimed to be kings of France, and the kings of Sardinia and Naples used the arms of Cyprus and Jerusalem. In fact, nearly all the older sovereigns of Europe used arms of this character. The armorial shield of the house of Austria at the dissolution of the empire affords a number of curious examples of arms of pretension. Besides Hungary, Bohemia, Da matia, and Slavonic, it contained Aragon and Sicily, Brabant, Swabia, Antwer, Flanders, Burgundy, Naples, Jerusalem, Lombardy, and Milan.
That is, the sovereign princes having full knowledge of the rules of prescription used heraldry, or the national symbols of their rights, to keep their entitlements and claims legally alive and perpetual. The following example is part of an 1861 appeal to prescription for the rulership of a princely kingdom in India. The royal House requested the full recognition and support of the British Empire on the basis of it faithfully maintaining the necessary requirements of prescription:
The hereditary sovereignty of the Cafnatic, secured by a series of uncancelled treaties to the Wallajah family, remains undisputed, unimpugned and unclaimed by any opponent, even by us, inherent in the person of Prince Azeem Jah. . . . The lawful successor has kept up a continuous claim. Prescription [the power to preserve rights] is entirely on the side of the Wallajah family.
As demonstrated many times in this work, prescription legally validates and upholds the internal sovereign rights for those who maintain these legal entitlements, ". . . for Prescription hath power to Ratify and Confirm [that is, make good] the Titles both of Princes [in international law] and of Private men [domestically]."
Proprietary and Non-Proprietary
Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924), before he became President of the United States, as a college professor, wrote in his book:
The most notable feature of feudalism is that in its system sovereignty has become identified with ownership. The rights exercised by the barons were in many cases nothing less than sovereign. Not only did they decide property titles by the custom of their baronies and private rights by laws determined in their own courts, they often also coined money, they constantly levied tolls upon commerce, and they habitually made war when they pleased upon rival neighbors. They gathered about them, too, as the king gathered about himself, an immediate following of knights, whom they endowed with lands as, so to say, barons of these lesser kingdoms. . . . They commanded this retinue and exercised these sovereign powers, moreover, because of their relations as owners to the lands and tenantry of their domains. Sovereignty . . . had become a private hereditary possession . . . . Whoever should be able to accumulate these territorial lordships into one really great kingship would be owner, and, as owner, sovereign of the realm.
In other words, there is an ". . . inseparable connection between land tenure and . . . genuine sovereignty. . . ." "Those kings possess[ed] the crown in full property. . . ." The landlord was Lord of the land. "Rulership and Ownership were blent," that is, combined in most cases. Ownership meant sovereignty.
Kings, [Jean Bodin] holds, have arisen in different ways, some by popular concession, others by simple force and "ancient usurpation;" but as they now exist, after the process and passage of time, "they have all acquired by prescription the property in sovereign power." In other words, continuous use has given them something more than the exercise of authority: it has given them ownership of authority [in other words, full sovereignty]; and their subjects are thus tied to them, and to the authority which they own. . . .
Prescription unites the actual ownership of land, and/or the right to the ownership of land, with sovereignty. It ". . . transfer[red] feudal lordship (dominium) into ‘private’ ownership (dominium directum as distinguished from dominium utile). . . ." In other words, because of the impact of prescription creating feudal ownership, quasi-rulers grew from vassal lords into proprietary monarchs that actually owned their kingdoms, principalities, and counties.
This ownership was called the "regalian doctrine" or "jur regalia," and it:
. . . refers to ancient feudal or royal [property] rights – the rights which the king, ruling prince or sovereign lord had by virtue of his proprietary ownership over all property in the realm. . . . [The connection between ownership and sovereignty has] been inseparable for thousands of years or since the dawn of civilization itself.
Thus, "the legitimacy of the sovereign power results from the ancient status of possession, just as, for private individuals, does the right of property."
Sovereignty and ownership has been around beyond historical recall. Even today, "international law conceives of state sovereignty in terms of ‘the ownership of rights’"
There is a difference between proprietary sovereigns, who fully own the territory of their kingships, and non-patrimonial principalities and kingdoms. But both types are sovereign. Textor explains, ". . . A non-patrimonial kingdom [the more modern type of kingdom] . . . is . . . in the position of the possessor [owner] of a majorat," which is a right of owning rulership and not the territory of the nation. ". . . The possessor of a majorat is during his life a true owner, and not merely a usufacturary," which is one that uses someone else’s rights. Even in ". . . an elective kingdom [where the king only holds sovereignty for his life and cannot pass it on] . . . the royal right is essentially the same, and therefore, an elective King is a true owner of his Kingdom [during his period of rule] just as the king of a . . . [hereditary] non-patrimonial kingdom is." Modern day non-proprietary monarchs are limited or constitutional monarchs, and these royals do not own the territory over which they rule in the same way that their forefathers, the ancient patrimonial kings, owned the land.
If deposed, there is little practical difference between patrimonial and non-patrimonial sovereigns. Both were robbed of their privilege to rule, both are non-territorial, and both continue to hold their internal royal rights, provided that they properly protest in accordance with the laws of prescription. Both types of kingdoms are dynastic if they have hereditary succession, and both are subject to either loss or preservation through prescription. Territory is vitally important to both; here is why:
Territorial sovereignty bears an obvious resemblance to ownership in private law, less marked, however, today than it was in the days of the patrimonial state, when a kingdom and everything in it was regarded as being to the king very much what a landed estate was to the owner. . . . The sovereignty of territory [which is internal sovereignty] may be acquired by . . . prescription. . . .
Whether a dispossessed king or ruling prince ruled over a proprietary or non-patrimonial kingdom or principality, prescription is crucial to both. Prescription determines who rightfully and lawfully owns the internal legal right to rule over a land and its people.
There is very little difference between a proprietary kingdom and one that is not when they are dispossessed. But, when they are reigning, there is a difference. For example, in terms of public lands, Vattel explains the limits experienced by a non-patrimonial prince – one who does not own the territory of his or her country:
The prince, or the superior of the society, whatever he is, being naturally no more than the administrator, and not the proprietor of the state, his authority, as sovereign or head of the nation, does not of itself give him a right to alienate or mortgage the public property [without the approval of the people]. The general rule then is, that the superior cannot dispose of the public property, as to its substance -- the right to do this being reserved to the proprietor alone [that is, the people] . . . If the superior exceeds his powers with respect to this property, the alienation he makes of it will be invalid, and may at any time be revoked by his successor, or by the nation. (emphasis added)
Put another way, in a non-proprietary kingdom, public property generally cannot be domestically prescribed or alienated to private citizens according to the municipal law or the law of the nation. This is because the land is not owned by the king or sovereign prince, but it is instead owned by the state:
If it has been alienated, even according to the proper legal forms, and in perpetuity, it nevertheless remains susceptible of recovery, so that [even century-old domestic] prescription of one hundred years, which normally constitutes a title to possession, does not hold [for public lands and domestic sale] . . . even against Princes of the Blood who have been deprived of domainal lands after a hundred years’ prescription. . . . [This was or is] a custom binding on the kings of Spain, Poland and England, for they also are required to take an oath against alienating the domain. The rule is also observed in aristocracies and popular states. . . .
However, as explained previously, a proprietary prince can do the above. This is because:
Territory . . . [is] but a proprietary appendage of the dynasty [or royal House]. It was thus handled like an economic asset in international relations – a disposable mass for inheritances, compensations, exchanges, securities, cessions, donations, partitions, indemnities, satisfaction, sales, and purchases (Arentin 1981; Grewe 1984:462-463; Klingenstein 1997:442).
A proprietary prince can alienate his or her kingdom because he or she owns it; therefore, he or she has the power to dispose of it, including selling it. Vattel wrote that he thought this was an abuse of power, ". . . unless it be expressly given him by the entire body of the people [or their representatives]." But, he admits, "I know that many authors, particularly Grotius, give long enumerations of the alienations of sovereignties," because ". . . proprietorship is defined to be the right to dispose of a thing. . . ." Later, Vattel admits that a monarch can alienate his kingdom ". . . if he has full, unlimited and absolute authority," which is an inherent quality enjoyed by proprietary princes. Put another way, a proprietary sovereign can sell his or her principality, mortgage it, give it away as a gift, exchange territories with another, partition it, etc. A non-patrimonial king could not do these things without the consent of the people or their representatives. (See the subsection "The Buying and Selling of Sovereignty" in Chapter II).
Again, once deposed, there is little difference between proprietary sovereigns and non-proprietary sovereigns.
Prescription should be understood as a claim or title or right to something based on long [and unchallenged] use or enjoyment of it. . . . Prescription was . . . another word for possession, proprietary right and, indeed, ownership: a lawful [sovereign] title of possession of a territory, a right to control its affairs, and, to that end, to command its population [which is a fundamental-basic component of internal or territorial sovereignty]. . . .
The passage of time alone, however, is not enough to change the legal situation:
Grotius was clear in his mind that in and of itself time does nothing at all: "Time, in fact, in its own nature has no effective force; nothing is done by time, though everything is done in time." But something else did have effective force. . . .
It takes two compelling legal situations to create the complete and total loss of royal and/or republican non-territorial sovereignty:
(1) There is an evidential problem -- after a long period of time (50 to 100 years generally), there is no longer any competent living witnesses to bear testimony of the true facts, and, there is the inevitable destruction of the required and necessary evidence that is solid enough to determine what really happened, or didn’t happen, in the past, i.e., unknown cession, treaty, renunciation, etc.,
(2) The irrevocable legal presumption of a loss of all rights comes through the dereliction and neglect of the former sovereign house or exiled government to maintain its internal legal right to rule according to law.
The point -- ". . . [whole] kingdoms or territories are . . . acquired [lost to the deposed monarchy and acquired by the usurpers] by occupation and prescription. . . ." For example, if a usurper (revolutionary or conqueror), according to Samuel von Pufendorf:
. . . has ejected a monarch, and put himself in his place, . . . the obligation to restore the throne does not expire until either the king [who has been displaced] and his heirs, for whom there had been an acquired right to the kingdom, are dead, or the king himself renounces his kingdom and leaves it derelict. And it is presumed that he has done the latter, when he [or his lawful successors] make no attempt over a long period to recover it [that is do not use their exalted titles and arms and protest as appropriate]. (emphasis added)
The following is an example of the protective right to rule gained by prescription from the history of the Scottish crown:
How then can they [the former ancient family in power] claim Restitution from King Kenneth [of Scotland (943-958) and his royal house], after more than six hundred Years that he [King Kenneth] and his Successors have been in Possession of the Kingdom? But granting that they came to this [kingdom] by a fraudulent action with the People; yet, as the Lawyers say, Prescription has a greater Power and Authority. . . . The Right of a [whole kingdom] can prescribe which cannot be alienated by [any outside force of] action. Wherefore, if the Kingdom came to King Kenneth’s Children by a fraudulent action, it belongs to them now by a long Prescription: So that whatever Way they came to it, at this Day, by all the Laws, it belongs so to them, that they cannot be deprived of it without a manifest Violation of the Rights of Mankind.
In ancient times both genuine and false claims to sovereignty were taken very seriously as it might mean war -- a very heavy price to pay for both the parties. However, in more modern times, the claims of legitimate and rightful dispossessed kings and sovereign princes as well as lawful governments-in-exile are almost entirely ignored. Most nations are indifferent or apathetic about it, because the kind of sovereignty the dispossessed hold is de jure internal sovereignty without any appreciable power or control over the territory. Therefore, they are not a threat to anyone. Nobody cares too much about lawful, internal, non-territorial sovereignty in our day and age, yet:
De jure sovereignty . . . has its foundation De jure in law. . . . It . . . can always show a legal right to rule. . . . It may not be the actual [de facto or ruling] sovereign, for it may be expelled [deposed by a usurper] . . . from its rightful place or may have temporarily disappeared through disorganization or disintegration; but, however this may be, it has legal right on its side and is lawfully entitled to command and exact obedience [even if this is only a right, and not a de facto or actual privilege].
Prescription offers a ". . . supranational legal remedy when lands under possession were threatened or usurped by others." That is, a dispossessed sovereign entity may legally and lawfully keep their non-territorial rights intact, even if they never again possess any power over the former lands and people. A maintained prescriptive right can last forever unimpaired by time as long as it can provide consistent, official, public proof it was never neglected throughout the generations of its existence. Any lapse in time can result in an invariable forfeiture.
Recognition is Unnecessary: the Fact of Sovereignty is Not Determinded by Outside Recognition
There was a time when external recognition of new regimes involved a judgment as to whether the new government was de jure (legal and rightful) or merely just de facto. However, this has gradually changed. In 1930, the Estrada doctrine began, and it has since been favored over traditional recognition. As an example, the Mexican government published the following announcement that in the future, it would issue:
. . . no declaration in the sense of grants of recognition, since that nation considers that such a course is an insulting practice and one which, in addition to the fact that it offends the sovereignty of other nations, implies that judgment of some sort may be passed upon the internal affairs of those nations by other governments; [and that in the future the Government of Mexico would confine itself] . . . to the maintenance or withdrawal as it may deem advisable of its diplomatic agents. . . .
Being an opinion, it does not establish any kind of legal reality. Nor does it reflect what is right or just; this is because states often chose to recognize a usurper or an unlawful government purely on political and financial considerations. Thus, external recognition has little moral value in the world, chiefly because most decisions are self-serving rather than a consideration of what is legally, ethically, and morally right. Currently, ". . . Government does not pretend [except in rare instances] to express any opinion on the legality or other wise of the means by which its power [the authority of a new government] has been obtained." In other words, recognition is not a legal act, nor is it binding:
. . . As such [it] remains only a matter of minor significance, a matter for academic discussion, being essentially a question of ceremonial etiquette.
International law . . . cannot [and should not] concern itself with mere matters of form and ceremony.
Being insignificant and not a determination of legality, external recognition is not a valid mechanism to determine an internal de jure sovereign claim. Please consider the following:
If a state exists, international law cannot perpetrate the folly and injustice . . . of acting on the extraordinary [unjustified] assumption that the state [or sovereign right] does not exist [unless it is recognized by other states].
The failure to accord recognition does not in any way affect the substantial effect of the existence of a State [and its supreme right to rule]. . . .
". . . The doctrine of non-recognition . . . is [now] an integral part of modem international law. . . ." When they are used, "The word de jure [for example] adds nothing in practice to recognition itself, except as a courtesy. . . ." In summary, as quoted earlier in the book, "The only criterion [presently] in international law for the recognition of an authority as the government of a State is its exercise of effective control over the State's territory."
If a government has exiled its king or unlawfully dethroned him, and even if it has obtained both de jure and de facto acceptance by other nations, it is important to understand, as quoted before, that:
. . . The recognition of a usurper by foreign powers does not destroy the rights of the legitimate sovereign of the country. Such a recognition is nothing more than saying as the usurper is peaceable master of the country he governs, we may venture to treat him as a neighbour; but this is far from guaranteeing his right to the throne he [the usurper] possesses [through the criminal deposition of the original sovereign]
As stated earlier, in the past, many exiled governments and unlawfully deposed monarchs were given official and formal recognition. For example:
Since the beginning of [the 20th] century some seventy-five authorities in exile have called themselves or claimed to be the [deposed] "governments" of certain States. Of these, more than half have been recognized "as (legitimate) governments."
However, just as the practice of judging new governments as de jure or de facto has basically ceased, governments and monarchs-in-exile are rarely given official or formal recognition. There are four major reasons for this:
(1) It would violate the requirement not to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations. "Recognition of a government in exile, when there is a government effectively holding power in the state [of the deposed sovereign], is regarded as amounting to unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of that state." "Non-recognition of the existing government and recognition of a government in exile [instead] are hardly compatible with such respect." That is, respect is due to the nation-state in question and for the cardinal principle of non-interference.
(2) It is not necessary. ". . . Governments of countries occupied . . . remain the sovereign governments of their countries even in exile. No [international] recognition of this [fact] . . . is necessary."
(3) There is no real incentive or motivation to recognize others. "There is nothing to force countries to recognize such governments in exile, as long as they are unable to exercise real control over all or part of the territory they claim to represent. . . ."
(4) "Courts agree that sovereignty can exist in the absence of recognition by any state. . . ." In other words, "No recognition of . . . the exiled government . . . is necessary." The point is, ". . . sovereignty is not something that is decided by other countries. They can only recognize it or not."
It is not external recognition that counts; it is the possession of real, genuine, and authentic internal sovereignty, whether it is de facto or deposed. External recognition is simply not needed for internal sovereignty, even for reigning or regnant nations. Pufendorf explains that:
. . . just as a king owes his sovereignty and majesty to no one outside his realm, so he need not obtain the consent and the approval of other kings or states, before he may carry himself like a king and be regarded as such. . . . [I]t would be an injury to the sovereignty of such a king to be called into question by a foreigner.
Emilio Furno, an advocate of the Italian Supreme Court of Appeal, declared the following. Recognition does not determine the validity of a legal, non-territorial sovereign. The only thing that counts is if the sovereignty is real, authentic and genuine.
The qualities which render a deposed Sovereign a subject of international law are undeniable and in fact constitute an absolute personal right of which the subject may never divest himself [without his consent] and which needs no ratification or recognition on the part of any other authority whatsoever.
Recognition by third parties of either a reigning or deposed sovereign entity is merely the acknowledgement that a certain government is either in control of a state or a deposed ruler still holds his or her lawful right. But it does not legitimize or legalize either. It is simply an optional political acknowledgement and nothing more. ". . . And there is no legal duty to recognize [or not to recognize]."
The internal sovereignty of a State does not, in any degree, depend upon its recognition by other States. A new State, springing into existence, does not require the recognition of other States to confirm its internal sovereignty. The existence of the State de facto is sufficient, in this respect, to establish its sovereignty de jure. It is a State because it exists.
Recognition simply does not create or destroy actual sovereignty.
Certain kinds of Official Recognition can have Profound Legal Consequences
Normally, recognition is legally irrelevant in most situations. However, there is one way that recognition has a powerful binding legal impact. For example, if a usurping or ruling nation officially recognizes the unlawfully deposed former king or sovereign prince as having the true and lawful right to rule, this will have a profound legal consequence. This happened when the United States of America recognized the illegal takeover of the Kingdom of Hawaii in 1993. If the protests (e.g. the use of titles and arms) of the former monarchy did not take place, this act of recognition, in itself, would have stopped prescriptive loss from taking place.
Logically, if a [possessing] State claiming acquisitive prescription acknowledges the sovereignty of another State [that is, it recognizes the rights of the unjustly deposed government or monarchy] over that territory, then the acquiescence of the [dispossessed] State, which is a necessary requirement of acquisitive prescription, is lacking.
In other words:
. . . A state cannot acquire title by acquisitive prescription if, although administering a territory, it admits that the sovereignty over that territory belongs to another state [the unjustly dispossessed]. . . . [T]he administering state is by its own admission estopped from claiming prescriptive title to the territory.
This is one way that recognition given by the possessor to the deposed can fully stop prescription. The other way is, if a deposed king or sovereign prince, or their rightful successors, officially recognized the sovereign right of the possessor -- the presently de facto or ruling government. This also creates a legally binding preclusive estoppel that bars the royal House or sovereign entity from claiming something different in the future. Put another way, this means that a deposed monarchy can extinguish the legitimacy of its own rightful claim through the principle of estoppel; the result can be the complete and immediate loss of all sovereign rights. (See "The Immediate Loss of Sovereignty" in Chapter II) This action has very serious consequences; it is the opposite of a public protest to preserve and maintain royal rights. The action acknowledges the new government as the valid and rightful bearer of sovereignty, and this is a formal act of abandonment of de jure rights. This gives the de facto government the right to receive all the royal rights of the former sovereign after the required time passes. In this situation, "ordinary prescription" (short-term prescription) is sufficient for all rights to transfer since the former sovereign has already precluded itself from its once rightful claim.
"The concepts of acquiescence and estoppel are inter-linked."
Estoppel . . . [is] a legal bar [or preclusion] preventing a state [or dynastic House] from asserting a claim or fact which is inconsistent with its previously taken position, [it] often has the [same] effect [as] acquiescence. . . . 
[It] is a legal result or "conclusion" arising from an admission [such as an official recognition] which has either been actually made, or which the law presumes to have been made [such as in acquiescence after 100 years], and which is binding on all persons whom it affects.
However weak a title [to a territory] may be, and irrespective of any other criteria, recognition estops the state [or deposed claimant] which has recognized the title [of the other party] from [ever] contesting its validity at any future time.
That is, there can be no more ". . . arguing and rebutting a previously made (explicit or tacit) statement of fact or representation on [the] same issue." The issue is, in effect, legally firm or an established legal fact. Such is the impact of estoppel in international law and how it can speed the prescriptive transfer of all sovereign rights to the de facto possessor of the land. For example, Norway because it had recognized the whole of Greenland as Danish literally debarred itself from ever contesting Danish sovereignty. Hence, they lost their case over this in the world court held in 1931.
In review, recognition can be very impactful if a reigning government acknowledges the rights of the deposed, thus stopping prescription from transferring all sovereign and royal rights. Conversely, if the deposed sovereign officially recognizes the legal supremacy of the de facto reigning government, the royal House will lose its own de jure right to rule. These are as far-reaching, and profound consequences. Great care must be taken not to unwittingly be eternally precluded from sovereign rights.
The Extensive Legal Authority of Deposed Sovereigns
With the great authority of a de jure non-territorial sovereign, the supreme right to rule on earth, the head of a dispossessed royal House, in his or her capacity as de jure King or Queen and Head of State, has the authority to act in the place of Parliament. Therefore, a constitutional sovereign, who is deposed can perform the acts of state that would otherwise require the consent of Parliament if that sovereign was reigning. Being unrestricted by the constitution, such a monarch exercises the fullness of sovereign power, which includes the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. All restrictions of a former constitution cease to be binding on a de jure non-territorial sovereign, except for succession rules. The succession rules can only be changed under international law, as explained in the sub-chapter "Legal and Lawful Solutions to Succession Conflicts Provided under International Public Law" in Chapter VI.
Being the legal personification of the supreme power, even if unrecognized by external parties, the head of a deposed sovereign House is extremely powerful. His lawful heirs inherit this same supreme right. By this power, a de jure sovereign and his or her successors can enact laws, create and grant titles of nobility and royalty, and have all honors of the royal patrimony. Thus, among other things, the rightful heir to the throne may create new orders of chivalry. This is because:
The king has the sole power of conferring honors and dignities and all the degrees of nobility, of knighthood, and other titles are secured by immediate grant from the crown.
It is widely accepted that the head of a royal house retains his rights of fons honorum whether reigning or not. [Provided, of course, the House has maintained its non-territorial sovereignty]. He may [therefore] continue to confer orders of a discontinued monarchy, or he may institute new ones.
Orders of chivalry are an attribute of the sovereignty of a kingdom or principality. Following the usurpation of a kingdom, the fons honorum, the right to honor, continues to reside exclusively in the chief of the royal House concerned. Exercising this great authority on December 30, 2007, His Majesty King Michael I of Romania officially gave out some regal titles to family members and re-established one of his kingdom's former royal orders of chivalry in full harmony with his rights as a deposed monarch.
In 1949, Dr. Otto von Habsburg, before he voluntarily resigned his rights later in life, was in full possession of his imperial status as titular as well as de jure emperor of Austria. He granted the title of Prince or Princess of Altenburg to the descendants of one side of his family. Some also contracted morganatic (unequal) marriages, and he decreed that for unequal marriages, where permission for the marriage was sought but not given, the family members may use the title of Count (or Countess) of Hapsburg-Lothringen. The Royal House of Savoy also created titles and ennobled nearly 200 individuals after the royal House was unlawfully and wrongfully dethroned by an illegal referendum. This authority to ennoble remains part of the House’s legitimate authority.
During the 60-year period that the Popes were without any territory to rule over, they still had the right to have embassies, consulates, and ambassadors all over the world, wherever they were accepted, because they held non-territorial sovereignty as illegally dispossessed rulers. ". . . A king deprived of his kingdom [de facto] and royalty [that is, has forfeited everything royal and has no non-territorial sovereignty] . . . hath lost his right of legation," or ambassadorship, for only sovereigns can have state deputies or special emissaries, not commoners. Deposed sovereign entities have the right of embassy and ambassadorship when they hold the lawful right to rule unless they through one of the various methods of forfeiture lose sovereignty.
Arnold McNair, 1st Baron McNair, an accomplished British legal scholar, professor, judge, and the First President of the European Court on Human Rights, wrote:
The mere fact that a foreign Government has been deprived of the control of a part or the whole of its territory by an enemy [whether by war or illegal referendum] in no way invalidates legislation passed or other acts of sovereignty done by it outside its normal territory. . . . There is no principle of International law which says that a [deposed] Government cannot act validly upon foreign territory. . . .
Public international law recognizes that a government or monarch-in-exile can revise its constitution or supreme law. It can also alter its House rules. Unlimited by popular opinion or the limits and restraints of a constitution, the dispossessed king or sovereign prince can even dispose of the crown as desired, which includes the right to renounce his or her deposed rights and cede them to another. This was done in the case of Andreas Palaiologos, who legitimately conveyed all the non-territorial de jure rights, majesty, and glory of the deposed Byzantine Empire to Charles VIII of France in 1494.
Because of the just rules of prescription, Edmund Burke wrote, ". . . the king does not lose his quality [his imperial royalty] merely by the loss of his kingdom. If he is stripped of it unjustly by a usurper, or by rebels, he preserves his rights. . . ." That is, ". . . One who has a true right does not lose his right because he has lost possession. . . ."
Another reference confirming the nature of regal rights is the following: "Sovereignty like anything else may be conveyed [sold or lost]." Imperial and royal internal sovereignty may be renounced and disposed of, similar to any other claim, right, or possession under international public law. Hugo Grotius declared, ". . . sovereignty can be alienated by the one under whose control it, in reality, is. . . ." Sovereignty is sometimes defined as inalienable, but this only means that it cannot be alienated without the free will consent of the sovereign. In other words:
Whatsoever is their right . . . in their private possession [such as sovereignty for a patrimonial king], they may alienate as any private person may his lands. Thus Solomon gave the twenty cities (which his father-in-law the king of Egypt had conquered and given him with his wife in dowry, and which himself had won) to Hiram [the king of Lebanon]. Alexander [the Great] gave all his kingdoms to his princes that served him in his wars. Attalus gave Asia to the people of Home; Nicomedes gave Bithynia [a kingdom] . . . by gift. . . .
This is only one right available to a de jure non-territorial sovereign, but it demonstrates how sovereignty is the highest of all rights. However, there are some important restrictions, and these extend beyond merely succession rules. Professor Furno, quoted earlier in this section, declared that:
The prerogatives which we are examining may be denied [under domestic law] and a sovereign state within the limits of its own sphere of influence may prevent the exercise by a deposed Sovereign of his rights in the same way as it may paralyze the use of any right not provided in its own legislation. However such negating action does not go to the existence of such a right and bears only on its exercise.
Competent protests to preserve regality can consist of the rightful use of titles and arms. These represent a legal reality of preserving sovereign rights. In other words, legitimate royals have fundamental and basic rights both implicit and explicit in international law. As international public personages, de jure sovereigns can create and maintain orders of chivalry and honor others with titles of nobility, etc. Such honors are not private club conferrals, nor are they similar to fraternity titles like given by the Moose Club or Elk Club. Instead, these honors are fully real and authentic. Holding internal non-territorial sovereignty, de jure monarchs hold the highest legal secular right on earth. Therefore, as seen previously, they are public international persons.
For example, if a legitimate government-in-exile or the deposed head of a royal House is located abroad, and either of these parties makes a public law, the legal validity of such acts is governed by the legal rights of the usurped State or Kingdom rather than by the domestic laws of the usurper. A public law right conferred on an individual becomes a public "vested right" or public "private law right" that by international law is binding on all within that jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is to be respected by other nations under the international doctrine of non-interference.
In other words, the conferral of a chivalric honor or title from a true non-territorial sovereign is a public grant, not a private conferral. (See "Private Law Rights, Ownership and Chivalry" in Chapter IV and "Orders of Chivalry and Sovereignty" in Chapter V).
However, some countries will not honor international law nor recognize these legal realities. But this does not change the fact that these honors are public honors, and the honor bestowed can legally pass from one generation to another if the bestowal was hereditary.
In summary, when a sovereign is deposed, he or she is free of the former constitution. The sovereign is legally the embodiment of all the supreme, absolute, and unlimited entitlements of his or her ancient de jure territory. Since sovereignty is the highest secular right on earth, the sovereign has the legal and lawful ability to do many things that a commoner cannot do. The royal heirs in succession inherit this full, complete and unreserved right to rule, enact laws, and create a genuine and authentic knighthood or other honors, including titles of nobility or royalty.
Yet, unfortunately, our modern era has numerous people who prey upon the public’s lack of knowledge on how to determine authentic royals. Thus, many imposters pretend to be genuine and true, and some even have developed extensive networks of supporters. Thankfully, international law provides the legal requirements to differentiate between the real and the imposters. The deceivers can then be avoided and the innocent protected.
Private Law Rights, Ownership, and Chivalry
Sovereignty is the supreme secular law on earth. But there is another, albeit lesser, international law that further supports and legally recognizes the entitlements of predecessor states. This law is sometimes called vested rights or, more properly, private law rights. To understand the legal principles involved that provide the special privileges for deposed royal Houses and governments-in-exile, one must comprehend how it preserves and maintains ownership. This demonstrates the royal right to orders of chivalry and to confer titles of nobility and royalty.
To start, private law rights must be distinguished from public law rights. A public law is a law applying generally to the public-at-large, while a private law is one that is confined in operation and effect to particular individuals, associations, or corporations. Private laws do not affect the community-at-large. Put another way, a public law is usually a law affecting the whole of the nation or territory under the jurisdiction of the authority making the law. A private law is generally an exception to the public law, and it is concerned with the definition, regulation, and enforcement of rights between private persons (including corporations). Private law rights may include grants by a sovereign of land, rights, titles of nobility, honors, royal titles, privileges, ownership of an order of chivalry, corporate existence, etc. These private law rights are perpetual for the person or entity granted it, unless the sovereign later changes it. Therefore, a private law right is closely akin to a vested right. This is because, once a private law right is created, it becomes vested in the person, family, or organization to which it rightfully belongs. The following provides a good judicial definition from a court of law:
A ‘vested right’ is the power to do certain actions or possess certain things lawfully, and is substantially a property [or ownership] right, and may be created by common law, by statute, or by contract. A failure to exercise a vested right before the passage of a subsequent statute, which seeks to divest it, in no way affects or lessens that right.
A vested right is therefore absolute, certain, and unconditional. These ". . . rights [just] cannot disappear, because they are vested [by law] . . . and that is the end of it." By definition such ". . . rights are sacred and inviolable." ". . . Acquired or vested rights signify any [lawful] right, corporeal or incorporeal, in rem or in personam, that vest in a natural or juristic person. . . ."
Vested rights can be enjoyed perpetually or alienated by renunciation, even if a new sovereign power or government has taken over and made laws to the contrary. These rights persist indefinitely as long as the internal de jure sovereignty is lawfully maintained. That is, as long as the royal House or exiled government exists as sovereign, the vested rights can be enjoyed, provided the recipient hasn’t renounced them.
The legal position of the principles of private law rights in international law is very strong. These principles require successor states to recognize, respect, and honor them, even though they were granted by a previously deposed government. Furthermore, these rights triumph in the event of a conflict with a subsequent statutory enactment of the new government or successor state. In addition, a right that becomes vested under a particular law continues to exist even after the law under which it arose is repealed or changed:
. . . A right which has become vested is not dependent upon the common law or the statute under which it was acquired for its assertion, but has an independent existence. Consequently, the repeal of the statute or the abrogation of the common law from which it originated does not efface a vested right, but it remains enforceable without regard to the repeal. (emphasis added)
"It is elementary that a change of sovereignty does not affect the [corporeal or incorporeal] property [or ownership] rights of the inhabitants of the territory involved." The deposed kings and sovereign princes still hold the private law rights to their orders of chivalry, their titles, and the ability grant honors under international law.
. . . In principle, the rights which a private company [or individual] derives from a deed of concession [creating a private or vested right] cannot be nullified or affected by the mere fact of a change in the nationality [or sovereignty of the country]. . . .
Three things are evident in this law:
(1) Domestic law in effect when a private law right is granted controls the determination of the full rights conveyed by the grant;
(2) Such domestic law is a vested property right and is, thus, a part of the grant of special law rights;
(3) The owner of the special law right cannot be deprived of the effect of the domestic law in force at the time that the original grant of special law rights was made by subsequent legislation or any decrees of the successor state.
In conclusion, these rights cannot be lost unless the royal House ceases to exist as a non-territorial sovereign entity. Thus, if these rights are maintained as required, the de jure monarch has the right to:
(1) bear the designation of Head of the Royal, Imperial, or Princely House [as appropriate], which includes the appropriate prenominal style of Royal, Imperial, Most Serene Highness, etc., and all other qualities, attributes, styles and prerogatives that belong to the hereditary right;
(2) be the Grand Master and/or Head of all past orders of the House and new ones that are created;
(3) honor others as appropriate with medals, royal or noble titles, arms, etc.
"Private law rights," however, are not public rights. That is, they are secondary and insignificant before to the profound rights of internal sovereignty possessed by a deposed royal house or exiled government, but they support, legally sustain and validate those rights by the acquired or special law privileges they convey and vest under public international law. (See "The Renunciation" under "Succession Problems -- The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies")
However, whenever any just law is discussed, it must be recognized it is not always applied even though it should or ought to be. The law can be perfect, but justice is not universally upheld by those who are in charge. Nevertheless, the "principles . . . never change; if true once they are true [and accurate] forever."
Even though some nations are built on rogue philosophies that deny what is just and right in terms of vested private law rights, among other correct principles, it does not change the fact that what is just is just, and that the law of nations is still the rightful law of all nations.
Natural law is universal and it is just, wholesome and good in every way. It is the only law that never changes, and is binding on all mankind whether it is respected and honored or not. Those who follow it provide the potential for a truly just society. Those, who do not, who disregard it, violate the lawful and most fundamental rights of mankind.
Private law rights provide some justice to the unlawfully dispossessed royal houses and exiled governments that exist and to the people of those former states who were given special grants of ownership, which should be held in high regard as immutable entitlements. But ultimately it is sovereignty that is the key to all the higher rights for it is sovereignty that makes these private rights into public entitlements. For instance, ownership of an order of chivalry or a title of nobility as a vested private law right, without sovereignty behind it, is an order or title that is without legal public validity. It has private validity only. The unethical use of private titles publically is not only in bad taste, but is dishonest. Example, the Masonic title of "Sovereign Grand Commander" is not a public title, but a private one and should only be used in the context of this private organization. The use of an ancient royal title, such as, the Prince of Assyria, when that once royal house has lost its de jure or deposed public right, is to impersonate royalty and claim what is patently false and therefore wrong. Only public titles can be used publically without guile or deception.
There are fundamentally only three different kinds of distinctions or honors:
(1) private titles from social clubs and organizations valid only within the organization that provided them,
(2) public domestic or civil titles valid nationwide, but no further, and
(3) international public titles which are valid worldwide.
If an individual is a knight in a true order of chivalry presided over by a living sovereign, or valid fountain of honor, and not an imitation or fantasy order, he or she can with confident and integrity use his chivalric titles -- usually abbreviations after one’s name, such as, "KC, etc." for knight commander of such and such order as this is a public title under international law. Likewise, if I hold a true family title of nobility as a private law right that is part of a deposed but still intact monarchy, according to international law, my title is still a public international title under sovereignty law.
However, if the monarchy, by prescription, no longer exists, on either a regnant or deposed level, then the title of nobility becomes a private grant as it is no longer sustained or upheld by any public law on earth. In such a situation, the title should not be used except privately among family members, as it is a private law right, not a public legal prerogative. In other words, private titles should only be used privately, and public titles can be freely and ethically used anywhere it is socially and legally appropriate. The difference between a private title or order and a public one is the supreme secular right of sovereignty.
 John Penford Thomas, A Treatise of Universal Jurisprudence, 2nd ed., chapter 10, no. 34, 1829, p. 305.
 Ibid., no. 27, 1829, p. 301.
 Mighell vs. Sultan of Johore, A Selection of Cases on the Engllish Law of Contract, 1893, p. 377.
 Conrod Swack Lamer, The United States Democratic Review, vol. 40, 1857, p. 407.
 Orestes Augustus Brownson, The Works of Orestes A. Brownson: Politics, vol. 16, 1885, p. 559.
 James Roberts, Encyclopedia of International Relations, "Sovereignty," Department of Political Science, Towson University, 2011: http://www.towson.edu/polsci/irencyc/sovereign.htm.
 Robert A. Klein, Sovereign Equality among States: the History of an Idea, 1974, p. 7.
 Lassa Oppenheirm, International Law: a Treatise, vol. 1, 2nd ed., 1921, p. 429.
 John Stuart Mill quoted in Ernest Nys, "The Development and Formation of International Law," The American Journal of International Law, vol. 6, no. 1, January 1912, p. 11.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 1, chapter 1, no. 18.
 Dictionary.com, Royal, 2014: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/royal
 Princes of the Holy Roman Empire, 2014: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Princes_of_the_Holy_Roman_Empire.
 Jesse Russell and Ronald Cohn, Princes of the Holy Roman Empire, 2012, p. 5.
 Robert von Friedeburg, "The Reception of Bodin in the Holy Roman Empire and the Making of the Territorial State," The Reception of Bodin, Howell A. Lloyd, ed., 2013, pp. 308-309 and Andreas Knichen, De jure Territorii, 1658, pp. 130, 168, 171, 174, 189-191, 192, 199, 200, 201-202.
 SensAgent, Dictionary, Mediatization, 2014: http://dictionary.sensagent.com/MEDIATIZATION/en-en.
 Michael Hurst, Key Treaties for the Great Powers, 1814-1914, vol 1, 1972, p. 36.
 Hugh Chisholm, The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed., vol. 18, “Mediatization,” 1911, p. 23.
 The Last Years of the Ancient Empire, 2014: http://grmrulers.angelfire.com/last.html.
 Art. 10: “Tabellarisch-statistische Uebersicht der Staaten des Deutschen Bundes -- Rinteln,” The Westminster Review, no. 43, January 1, 1835, p. 83.
 Kenneth Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 1200-1600: Sovereignty and Rights in Western Civilization, 1993, p. 3.
 Peter Haidu, The Subject Medieval/Modern: Text and Governance in the Middle Ages, 2004, p. 160.
 Andrew Vincent, Nationalism and Particularity, 2002, p. 17.
 Ibid., Book 2, chapter 3, no. 43.
 Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, M. J. Tooley, abridger and trans., Book 1, 1955, p. 8.
 Thomas Fleiner and Lidija Basta Fleiner, Constitutional Democracy in a Multicultural and Globalised World, Katy Le Roy, trans. and ed., 2009, p. 320.
 Henry Wheaton, Wheaton's Elements of International Law, Coleman Phillipson, ed., 5th ed., 1916, p. 34.
 Thomas Fleiner and Lidija R. Basta Fleiner, Constitutional Democracy in a Multicultural and Globalized World, 2009, p. 320.
 Shabtai Rosenne, The Perplexities of Modern International Law: General Course on Public International Law, 2002, p. 261.
 U.S. Legal, Government-in-Exile Law & Legal Definition, 2011: http://definitions.uslegal.com/q/government-in-exile.
 Thomas R. Van Dervort, International Law and Organization: An Introduction, 1998, p. 325.
 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 1959. p. 289.
 Krystyna Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law, 1968, p. 95.
 Carl A. Reuterskiöld, Folkrätt, Särskildt såsom svensk Publik Internationell Rätt, 1928, p. 47.
 Lassa Oppenheim, Oppenheim’s International Law, Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts, ed., 9th ed., 1992, p. 123.
 Moraitis v. Delany, Annual Digest, 1941-1942, case no. 96.
 Quote from the 2nd edition of Halvar Sundberg’s textbook on the international literature of public law as cited in Jacob W.F. Sundberg, Regarding dethroned princely Houses and their legal rights, 2012: http://www.mocterranordica.org/Sund_Eng.pdf.
 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, 6th ed., 2007, pp. 125-126.
 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, 2007, p. 123.
 Klaus J. Meyer, The Quest for a Czar: The Law and Politic of the Disputed Succession to the Headship of the Imperial Russian Family 1999, 2014: http://macedonsky.narod.ru/meyer/quest.html#VI.
 Marjorie M. Whiteman, "Governments-in-Exile," Digest of International Law, vol. 1, 1963, pp. 921-930; F. E. Oppenheim, "Governments and Authorities in Exile," American Journal of International Law, vol. 36, 1942, pp. 568-595; Note: "Where territory claimed by one state has been effectively occupied by another over a period of time, the latter may seek to establish de jure sovereignty by 'prescription', so long as there has been no serious and regular objection from the original owner to the occupation. Though now infrequently invoked, cases do still occur. Regular declarations by the original owner of his claim to continued sovereignty helps to prevent the territory passing to the occupier by default." (Roy E. H. Mellor, Nation, State and Territory: A Political Geography, 1989, p. 55). Only when such protests cease does a prescription arise against the de jure rights of a legitimate claimant.
 U. S. Congress, Executive Documents printed by order of the House of Representatives at the First Session of at the Twenty-Third Congress, vol. 2, December 7, 1831, doc. no. 77, p. 4.
 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, 2007, p. 14.
 Marshall Poe, Early Exploration of Russia , 2003, pp. 420-421.
 John Lynch, Cambrensis Eversus, vol. 3, part 1, 1851, p. 43.
 "Consolidation as a Root of Title in International Law," The Cambridge Law Journal, vol. 13, no. 2, Nov. 1955, p. 224.
 Christian J. Tams, "Waiver, Acquiescence and Extinctive Prescription," University of Glasgow, 2009, 2011: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1414188, p. 1.
 D. H. N. Johnson, "Consolidation as a Root of Title in International Law," The Cambridge Law Journal, vol. 13, no. 2. Nov. 1955, p. 223.
 Christian J. Tams, "Waiver, Acquiescence and Extinctive Prescription," University of Glasgow, 2009, 2011: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1414188, p. 17.
 Henry Reynolds, Aboriginal Sovereignty, 1996, p. 105 and Robert J. Phillimore, Commentaries on International Law, vol. 1, 1854, pp. 265, 272, 279.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 149.
 Sir Robert Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, pp. 23-28; Note: "The rule requiring the maintenance of the title [by the original sovereignty] ought not to be interpreted to mean that the State with title [the deposed royal house or government-in-exile] necessarily loses it if it fails to maintain a degree of activity at least equal to that of the rival claimant [the usurper in de facto or actual possession of the nation]." (Ibid.).
 Henry Reynolds, Aboriginal Sovereignty, 1996, p. 105 and Robert J. Phillimore, Commentaries on International Law, vol. 1, 1854, pp. 265, 272, 279.
 Emilio Furno, "The Legitimacy of Non-National Orders," Rivista Penale, no.1, January 1961, pp. 46-70.
 Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, Politics Drawn from the Very Words of Holy Scripture, Patrick Riley ed., 1999, p. 66.
 C. A. Reuterskiöd, International Law, Particularly as Swedish Public International Law, 1896, 1927, p. 47; Note: Prescription can only be successful by a long: ". . . period of silence [on the part of the original owner], ‘or the passiveness, or the absence of any attempt to exercise proprietary rights, by the former possessor.’" (Henry Reynolds, Aboriginal Sovereignty, 1996, p. 105 and Robert J. Phillimore, Commentaries on International Law, vol. 1, 1854, pp. 265, 272, 279).
 Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. 3, 1890, p. 156.
 Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, 4th ed., Basil Kennett, trans., Book IV, chapter 12, no. 4, 2005, p. 442.
 Henry Graham Crocker, U. S. Department of State, The Extent of the Maginal Sea, 1919, p. 195
 Isaac Mayer Wise, History of the Hebrews' Second Commonwealth, vol. 4, chapter 14, no. 2, 1880, p. 137.
 T. C. Hansard, ed., The Parliamentary Debates from the Year 1803 to the Present Time, vol. 32, 1816, p. 115.
 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (Authorized edition), vol. 107, 1849, p. 1152.
 Sir John Froissart, Chronicles of England, France, Spain, and the Adjoining Countries, 1880, p. 13.
 Facsimiles of the Declaration of independence and the Treaty of Waitangi, 1887, p. 11.
 Cobbett's Weekly Political Register, vol 1, no. 14, 1802, p. 426.
 The Case of Venezuela: A Reply, A Special Report of the Government of Venezuela, 1896, p. 67
 "Translation of a Treaty between the King of Prussia and the King and Republic of Poland," The Scots Magazine, vol. 35, Appendix, 1773, p. 689.
 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Book 1, chapter 3, no. 10; Note: ". . . Hereditary monarchies . . . [have] a hereditary right to the crown . . . [and] that right cannot be forfeited, nor that throne become vacant, as long as any heir of the family remains. . . . Every prince . . . were he the last of five hundred comes to it under the same conditions under which the first took it, whether expressed or implied. . . . The first and the last hold [it] by the same tenor [that is, by the same supreme immutable laws]." (Henry St. John Bolingbrok, The Works of Lord Bolingbroke, vol. 2, 1841, p. 392). The only exception to this enduring right is that the dynastic royal entitlement can be discarded and given up voluntarily either overtly through a renunciation of some kind, or tacitly by neglect and indifference through prescription.
 James Dunwoody Brownson De Bow, "Art. III: Bonaparte, Cromwell, and Washington," De Bow's Review, vol. 28, 1860, p. 146.
 Jean J. Burlamaqui, The Principles of Politic Law, vol. 2, part 2, chapter 3, no. 37(4); Note: "The essential legal quality in monarchy is . . . lawful descent from the previous legitimate monarch. No considerations of utility can set aside a valid hereditary claim; even an accomplished revolution does not invalidate it; and no law of prescription runs against the legitimate heir." (George Holland Sabine, A History of Political History, 1973, p. 396). However, there are a number of ways sovereign rights may be premanently and legally lost.
 Quoting M. Symmons in Samuel Rutherford, Lex, rex, or, The Law and the Prince, (written 1644),1910, p. 42.
 Jacques Maritain, "The Concept of Sovereignty," The American Political Science Review, vol. 44, no. 2, 1950, p. 348.
 Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand, Vol. 2, Duc De Broglie, ed., Angus Hall, trans., 1891, p. 120.
 Moses Maimonides quoted by Chaim Miller, The Gutnick Edition Chumash -- Book of Deuteronomy, 2005, p. 132.
 Ibid. & Jacques Maritain, Man and the State, 1998, p. 37.
 Dr. Ildys as quoted in Sir Robert Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, vol. 1, chapter 13, no. 256, 1889, p. 433.
 Thomas Nelson Page, Italy and the World War, 1920, p. 19.
 Mikulas Fabry, "Succession and State Recognition in International Relations and Law," On the Way to Statehood: Secession and Globalization, Aleksandar Pavkoviae and Peter Radan, ed., 2008, p. 54.
 Lord Robert Montagu, "The Sovereignty in Modern States," The Dublin Review, vol. 75, Nicholas Patrick Wiseman, ed., 1874, p. 290.
 Reparations: Interdisciplinary Inquiries, Jon Miller and Rahul Kumar, eds., 2007, p.30
 J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Prespective, vol. 3, 1970, p. 347; Note: "[The purpose of prescription] is to put an end to uncertain situations, and to prevent complicated and fruitless actions." (Sir Edward Shepherd Creasy, First Platform of International Law, 1876, p. 255). Endless contests from stale claims, especially when there is the potential threat of armed conflict, is counterproductive to the stability and perpetuation of government. On the other hand, if the original sovereign never gives up the protest against the usurper, but follows the rules and does not promote war, violence or bloodshed, it would be ethically wrong to invalidate their title to the rights of internal sovereignty, which is why prescription also preserves rights as well as destroys them. It is a law of equity and justice. In reference to international prescription, there are "That rights of the [royal and/or sovereign] character] . . . may be acquired on the one hand and lost on the other by open, long-continued and uninterrupted possession of territory, is a doctrine not confined to individuals but applicable to sovereign nations as well." (Michigan vs Wisconsin 270 U. S. 295, 309 Annual Digest, 1925-1926, Case number 84] in Felice Morgenstern, Legal Problems on International Organizations, 1988, p. 114).
 Antonio Riquelme, Derecho Publico Internacional, 1875, p. 29.
 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace: Including the Law of Nature and of Nations, Book 2, chapter 4, no. 4.
 Samuel von Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and Nations, Book 4, chapter 12, no. 7(d).
 Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Journal of the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Issue 1, 1988, p. 8; Note: ". . . Prescription applies to a territory that had a sovereign. It is the long occupation and the implied acquiescence of the dispossessed that are the basis of prescriptive rights." (S. K. Verma, An Introduction to Public International Law, 1998, pp. 120-121).
 Orestes Augutus Brownson, Literary, Scientific, and Political Views of Orestes A. Brownson, 1893, p. 182; Note: "The proprietor may be dispossessed in fact of his estate by violence, by illegal or unjust means, without losing his right, and another may usurp it, occupy it, and possess it in fact without acquiring any right or legal title to it. The man who holds the legal title has the right to oust him and re-enter upon his estate whenever able to do so." (Orestes Augutus Brownson, Literary, Scientific, and Political Views of Orestes A. Brownson, 1893, p. 182). This right never dies as long as the true owner continues to competently protest the wrong.
 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, vol. 2, Jean Barbeyrac trans., ed. & writer of notes, and Richard Tuck, ed., book 2, chapter 4, no. 1, note 5, , 2005.
 Serhii Plokhy, The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine, 2001, p. 154.
 Sir Robert Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, vol. 1, 2nd ed., 1871, p. 298.
 Val Rozn, The Imperial Nobility and the Constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, 2011: http://web.archive.org/web/20071110132006/www.geocities.com/vrozn/Constit.html and Sam Smith, The Holy Roman Empire: Law and Government, 2011: http://web.archive.org/web/20040822094014/http:/sam_smith1_07755.tripod.com/The.Holy.Roman.Empire/id19.htm.
 François Velde Royal Styles, 2011: http://www.heraldica.org/topics/royalty/royalstyle.htm; Note another example from this same reference for Emperor Ferdinand III of the Holy Roman Empire from the Treaty of Munster 1648: "Most serene and most powerful prince and lord, lord Ferdinand III Emperor of the Romans, forever August, king of Germany, Hungary, Bohemia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, archduke of Austria, duke of Burgundy, Brabant, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, marquis of Moravia, duke of Luxemburg, of Upper and Lower Silesia, of Wurttemberg and Teck, prince of Swabia, count of Habsburg, Tyrol, Kiburg and Goritz, marquis of the Holy Roman Empire, of Bavaria, of Upper and Lower Lusatia, lord of the marches of Slavonia, of Portenau and Salines, etc."
 Sir Ernest Mason Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, vol. 1, 1922, pp. 51-52.
 The Compleat History of the Treaty of Utrecht as also that of Gertruydenberg, containing all the Acts, Memorials, Representations, etc. relating to the Negotiations there, vol. 2, 1715, p. 41.
 Marc Ferro, Nicholas II: Last of the Tsars, 1991, pp. 36-37.
 Daniel H. Nexon, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic, Empires and International Change, 2009, p. 94.
 John Ordronaux, Constitutional Legislation in the United States, 1891, p. 10.
 De Martins, Summary of the Modern Law of Nations of Europe,  1864 as quoted in Venezuela, Case of Venezuela in the Question of Boundary Between Venezuela and British Guiana, vol. 2, 1898, p. 246.
 Ibid., p. 295.
 John Ordronaux, Constitutional Legislation in the United States, 1891, p. 10.
 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, 6th ed., 2007, p. 159.
 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, vol. 2, Jean Barbeyrac trans., ed. & writer of notes, and Richard Tuck, ed., book 2, chapter 4, no. 1, note 5, , 2005; Note: ". . . No . . . amount of action by the [usurping] State purporting to acquire sovereignty would avail [or prevail] in law against [the] adequate reaction [consistent use of titles and arms or proper protest] or counteraction by the existing [or deposed] sovereign." (Gerald Fitzmaurice, "The General Principles of International Law," Recueil Des Cours, vol. 92, 1957, p. 121).
 Henry Gough, A Glossary of Terms used in Heraldry, 1894, p. 18.
 The Encyclopaedia Brittanica: A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences and General Literature, vol. 11, "Heraldry," 1880, p. 614.
 Evans Bell, The Empire in India: Letters from Madras and other Places, 1864, pp. 104-105.
 George Buck, "The Life and Reign of Richard III," A Complete History of England: with the Lives of All the Kings and Queens Thereof, White Kennet, ed., 1706, p. 575.
 The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics, 1898, pp. 177-178: Note: "All the jurisprudents that I have ever come across have admitted the right of prescription, which is common sense and good law. People who have been for . . . centuries in possession of a country have the prescriptive right to the ownership of the country." (Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary debates: Official Report, vol. 419, 21 February 1946, p. 1381).
 Morris R. Cohen, "Property and Sovereignty" Rights and Duties, vol. 6, Carl Wellman, ed., 2002, p. 9.
 Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principle of Natural and Politic Law, vol. 2, chapter 7, no. 5(52).
 Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, 1958, p. 88 and David Ellerman, Towards a Modern Theory of Property: A Reconstruction Based on Old and New Ideas, p. 10; 2016: http://www.ellerman.org/Davids-Stuff/Econ&Pol-Econ/NIPT8.pdf.
 R. K. Pruthi, The Political Theory, 2005, p. 299.
 The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie, eds., 1991, pp. 377, 90.
 reference unknown; Note: "[A reigning nation or kingdom’s] present Rights rest upon . . . the fact of the national possession of any Territory, continued and unquestioned [for a long period of time], of itself constitutes a Right [or entitlement] of possession. Prescription, which is a mode of acquiring a Right for individuals, holds also for States." (William Whewell, The Elements of Morality including Polity, vol. 2, p. 376). (emphasis added).
 Prince De Talleyrand, Memoirs of the Prince De Talleyrand, vol. 2, Duc De Broglie, ed.,  2006, p. 120.
 Ian Brownlie, Principals of Public International Law, 3rd ed., 1971, pp. 111-112.
 Johann Wolfgang, Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, Part 2, chapter 20, no. 24, 1680.
 J. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th ed. 1963, p. 163 and Queens College Bench and Bar Association, Queens College Law Journal, vol. 5, 1989, p. 44.
 Emerich deVattel, The Law of Nations, Book I, chapter 21, no. 260.
 Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, M. John Tooley, ed., Book 6, chapter 2, 1990.
 Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648, 2003, p. 231.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book I, chapter 21, no. 261, chapter 5, no. 69 and chapter 21, no. 260.
 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Ideal, 2007, p. 62.
 Constantin Fasolt, The Limits of History, 2004, p. 114.
 Richard Zouche, Luris et Iudicii Fecialis, sive, Iuris Inter Gentes, etQuaestionum de Eodem Explicatio,  Thomas E. Holland, ed., The Classics of International Law, John Brown Scott, ed., 1650, p. 8.
 Samuel von Pufendorf as quoted in Leslie Claude Green and Olive Patricia Dickason, The Law of Nations and the New World, 1989, p. 64; Note: ". . . [If an expelled] king reserves his rights under all contingencies [then the usurping government] . . . does not secure them[selves] in a right of sovereignty, [it only] secures them the possession or quasi-possession thereof. . . ." (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, James Brown Scott, ed., chapter 10, no. 17,  1916). That is, the usurpers do not obtain de jure internal sovereignty, the most important of all rights. What they do have is the actual rule over the land and external recognition, which is not supremacy, but only outward political acknowledgement.
 George Mackenzie, The Lives and Characters of the Most Eminent Writers of the Scots, vol. 3, 1711, p. 503.
 James Wilford Garner, Introduction to Political Science, 1910, p. 247.
 Ken MacMillan, Sovereignty and Possession in the English New World: The Legal Foundations of Empire, 1576-1640, 2006, p. 181.
 Translated Press Release in the American Journal of International Law, vol. 25, 1931, p. 203.
 Joseph Gabriel Starke, Introduction to International Law, 1984, p. 139.
 Philip Marshal Brown, "The Theory of the Independence and Equality of States," The American Journal of International Law, vol. 9, no. 4, 1915, p. 314.
 James Lorimer as quoted in Ibid.
 (Ernst Wolff, "The International Position of Dispossessed Governments at Present in England," The Modern Law Review, vol. 6, no. 4, December 1943, p. 208.
 (Herbert W. Briggs, "De Facto and De Jure Recognition: The Arantzazu Mendi," The American Journal International Law, vol. 33, no. 4, October 1939, p. 691.
 Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law, 1998, p. 54.
 General View of the Political State of France, and of the Government of Louis XVIII, 1815, p. 9; Note: "Recognition by no means produces subjects of international law. It merely creates a legal basis for relations between the recognizing and recognized states." (Vinod K. Lall and Danial Khemchand, Encyclopaedia of International Law, 1997, p. 46).
 "Who is a legitimate government in exile? Towards normative criteria for governmental legitimacy in international law," Guy Goodwin-Gill and Stefan Talmon, eds., The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie, 1999, p. 500.
 Ian Brownlie, The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie, Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Stefan Talmon, eds., 2003, p. 521.
 Q. Wright, "Non-Military Intervention," Relevance of International Law: Essays in Honour of Leo Gross, K.W. Deutsch and S. Hoffmann, eds., 1968, p. 14.
 Ernst Wolff, "The International Position of Dispossessed Governments at Present in England," The Modern Law Review, vol. 6, no. 4, December 1943, p. 208.
 Joint Publications Research Service report, JPRS-NEA-89-005, 17 January 1989, United States: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, p. 12.
 Werner Levi, Contemporary International Law: a Concise Introduction, 1979, p. 120.
 Ernst Wolff, "The International Position of Dispossessed Governments at Present in England," The Modern Law Review, vol. 6, no. 4, December 1943, p. 208.
 Frank Muyard, Director, Taipei Office, French Centre for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC), April 1-2, 2005; Note: "The recognition of a . . . state cannot affect the title [of another state on way or the other]. . . ." (University of Manchester, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 44)
 Samuel Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and of Nations, Book 7, chapter 3, no. 690.
 Emilio Furno,"The Legitimacy of Non-National Orders," Rivista Penale, No.1, January 1961, pp. 46-70.
 Linda A. Malone, International Law 2007, 2008, p. 43.
 Henry Wheaton, Wheaton's Elements of International Law, 5th ed., 1916, p. 35.
 Ademola Abass, Complete International Law, 2012, p. 318.
 Southwestern University Law Review, vol 7, 1975, p. 211.
 Ibid., p. 202.
 Boleslaw Adam Boczek, International Law: A Dictionary, 2005, p. 250.
 Lancelot Fielding Everest and Edmund Strode, The Law of Estoppel, 1884, p. 2.
 Georg Schwarzenberger, "Title to Territory: Response to a Challenge," American Journal of International Law, vol. 51, 1957, p. 316.
 Nuno Sérgio Marques Antunes, "Estoppel, Acquiescence and Recognition in Territorial and Boundary Dispute," Boundary and Territory Briefing, vol. 2, no. 8, 2000, p. 4.
 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
 New York State Legislature, Journal of Proceedings of the Senate in the Matter of George W. Smith, Judge of Oneida County, 1866, p. 186.
 Dr. J. Robert Carroll, The Augustan Society Committee on Chivalry, "Recognition of Orders of Knighthood and of Institutions of Chivalric Nature" The Augustan, vol. 13, no. 6, November - December 1970, p. 298.
 Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgement of the Law, vol. 1, 1846, p. 216.
 Andrew G. Dulaney, Dennis M. Cusack and Michael van Walt van Praag, The Case Concerning Tibet, chapter 2, section D, June 1998.
 However, if there are other dynasts, who hold succession rights, they could protest and preserve their rights, but if they fail to make the protest, they irretrievably lose those royal privilege by estoppel which is, in effect, a legal abandonment of the right.
 Edmund Burke, The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, vol. 4, 2007, p. 332; Note: "The legal (de jure) sovereignty still remains vested where it was before the territory was occupied although obviously the legal sovereign is unable to exercise his ruling powers in the occupied territory." (Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare, 1959, p. 217).
 Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum: The Translation, vol. 2 , Joseph H. Drake, trans., no. 984, 1935, p. 499.
 Thomas A. Walker, A History of the Law of Nations, vol. 1, 1899, p. 297.
 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, vol. 1, nos. 486 and 488.
 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of Peace and War, Book II, chapter VI, no. 3.
 Jeremy Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, Reginald Heber, Charles Page Eden, Alexander Taylor, eds., vol. X, chapter III, rule 1, no. 11, p. 170.
 "The Legitimacy of Non-National Orders," Rivista Penale, No.1, January 1961, pp. 46-70.
 Security Bank and Trust Co. of Miami, Okla. v. Barnett, 36 P2d 874, 880, Oklahoma.
 "Mr. Sherman’s Reply to Japan," The Nation, vol. 65, no. 1671, July 8, 1897, p. 24.
 James Allen Smith, The Spirit of American Government, 1965, p. 300.
 David Hercules Van Wyk, Marinus Wiechers and Romaine Hill, Namibia: Constitutional and International Law Issues, 1991, p. 112.
 Jabez Gridley Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction, 1943, p. 527; Note: ". . . No municipal enactment can set aside an international rule [such as vested rights created by a former sovereignty without violating the universal laws of justice]." (Krystyna Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law, 1968, p. 71).
 Kilpatrick v. Sisneros, 23 Tex. 113, 131; Musquis v. Blake, 24 Tex. 461, 466; Airhart v. Massieu, 98 U.S. 491, 496, 25 L Ed 213; Jones v. McMasters, 20 Now. 8, 21 15L Ed 805; U. S. v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 87, 8L Ed 604.
 The Sopron-Koszag Local Railway Company Case, League of Nations, Official Journal, 1929, p. 1359; American Journal of International Law, vol. 24, 1930, p. 1359.
 “The Crown and the Constitution,” The Living Age, vol. 137, &, eds., April-June 1878, p. 524.
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