Chapter Three: (Volume II)
NINE COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS AND MISAPPLICATIONS OF PRESCRIPTION
Chapter Table of Contents
There are nine areas that need clarification to avoid misunderstanding the complex subject of prescription. These are: (1) confusing the good with the bad – a form of blindness, (2) there is a difference between domestic and international prescription, (3) problems are created by confusing domestic and international prescription, (4) the legal meaning of "peaceful" possession can be misconstrued, (5) deposed monarchs in situ can still hold all royal rights and prerogatives, (6) even if domestic law outlaws the use of regal titles and arms, rights can be preserved on an international level, (7) prescription cannot preserve all claims, (8) external recognition or acquiescence of third parties is immaterial to the preservation of rights, and (9) confusing territorial sovereignty with external sovereignty blurs reality.
Confusing the Good with the Bad
Great care must be taken to prevent throwing out something good and wonderful with something that is temporarily disagreeable, or "throwing out the baby with the bath water." Since this kind of action is fairly common place in different legal settings, it should be addressed. What is essential and necessary must not be at the mercy of an unwelcome transitory byproduct.
For example, the natural law of prescription has proven itself just and right in regard to the negligent treatment of dispossessed sovereignty. It is a time-honored and legitimate law. Further, it is something to uphold and cherish. But there are some things that are intrinsically beyond the reach of prescription. For example, common sense tells us definitively that:
. . . unjust claims are not validated by prescription. . . . "Those things which are [truly] imprescriptible [like the basic human rights of freedom, life, and liberty] will not become the objects of prescription [or loss] in consequence of legal measures, nor on the basis of lapse of time even after the passage of a thousand years." This observation is supported by the testimony of innumerable learned authorities.
". . . Prescription . . . is [also] not applicable in regard to those things which have been assigned to all mankind for its common use."
. . . It is impossible to acquire by usucaption or prescription things which cannot become property, that is, which are not susceptible of possession or of quasi-possession, and which cannot be alienated. All of which is true with respect to the sea and its use.
In other words, ". . . prescription [that results in unjust laws or a claim of ownership for something that exists freely for all of the human race] will be regarded not as a right but as a wrong." ". . . No one has the power to grant a privilege unfavourable to the interests of the human race."
The point is:
. . . Unjust [or wrongful] claims are not validated by prescription, regardless of the lapse of time involved, and that, consequently, an unjust law does not result in prescription, nor is it justified, because of the passage of time.
Wrongful prescriptive assertions to justify genocide, tyranny, oppression, or some other unjust rule can never become legitimate through the passage of time. Such a proposal is thoroughly against any natural understanding what is just and true.
In addition, great care must be made to avoid misjudging the past based on current moral and ethical standards. It is inappropriate to apply modern laws to ancient people when they had no such laws to guide their behavior. No people should be held accountable or responsible for violating laws that did not exist when they lived on the earth.
In almost every territorial dispute, two or more of the traditional modes of territorial acquisition are usually involved in supporting the claims of the legitimate party. In contrast, these same rules are often attacked by the opposing party. The party with the loss often will not accept that it previously renounced the claim and is subject to estoppel or that it failed to properly protest at the appropriate time. Therefore, the losing party will attempt to discredit the cession, renunciation, prescription, or whatever the conveyance mechanism is. The same party will argue that the conveyancing mechanism was either defective or inapplicable in some way. This produces a ". . . a barrage of criticisms, such as unreliability of terminology, dogmatic interpretation, and glossing over the intertwined and mutually complementary nature of the modes of territorial acquisition." This has an intended effect of undermining the law.
But these arguments continually fail. This is because the existing conveyancing mechanisms are incredibly sound and provide justice, stability, and order to the world.
Reading their arguments makes it look like the ancient just procedures for the transfer of regal and secular rights are somehow flawed, when it is only the bath water (the result) they are objecting to. They do not want to lose their case, so they rail against the binding, solid, and rightful laws. They dishonor what is honorable by slander. Nevertheless, the baby, the legal modes themselves, protect the future well-being of mankind, but reading their distorted arguments, makes them look sinister and unworthy.
In order to protect the international legal principles from attack and discredit, international courts and arbitration tribunals generally do not disclose the basis of decisions, unlike domestic courts. While this safeguards the law from contamination and attack, it also has some drawbacks as discussed earlier in the book. The first drawback is that this creates a situation where the law itself is allowed to remain highly uncertain. The counterweight is that this allows flexibility for international courts and arbitration tribunals. The second drawback to this is that the court rulings can seem to be contradictory and confused rather than fundamental landmarks or legal precedents for the future.
Domestic lawyers, being used to domestic regimes where certainty and precedence are established practice, can be easily mislead by international court results and actions. Nevertheless, the publicists, lawyers and jurists fundamentally agree as to what the law is on an international level, which helps maintain stability and continuity. The purpose of the law is to provide a just and productive international society of nations.
The Difference Between Domestic and International Prescription
. . . Certain local laws have no place whatever in international tribunals. It has been decided, for instance, with regard to local laws of prescription that they relate exclusively to the domain of the civil law and cannot be applied to an international dispute. Nevertheless the fundamental ideal of prescription has received application before international tribunals, and this has been given without any reference to national laws upon the subject.
Since domestic prescription cannot be applied to international prescription, the differences between the two are important to understand. First, in general, "[the] requirements [of international prescription] are not as stringent as in the municipal sphere. . . ." Thus, it is important to understand these requirements. There are two major and important differences:
(1) In local domestic cases, the question is most often the ownership of property; internationally, the question involves the supreme entitlement or right to rule,
(2) On the local civil level, good faith is often required:
"The last requisite of every prescription in both Roman and Modern [domestic civil] law is good faith on the part of the possessor. To possess by force, or secretly, or upon sufferance is not possession in good faith."
This good faith requirement of domestic prescription needs elaboration:
No prescription is valid [in many civil cases] unless it is based in good faith not only at the beginning but through the entire course of time required for prescription. . . .
It has never been the purpose of [municipal] prescription to reward unethical behavior such as theft or the wresting of rights or release from obligations by violent means. Good faith has always been an essential element.
In other words, "By the principles of most systems of municipal law, a prescriptive title cannot be acquired where the original taking of possession was by force." But this is not true for all nations. For example, in the Holy Roman Empire:
The estates [the kingdoms and principalities] of the old Empire rested on a legal basis. Any defect in their title to existence had been healed by a prescription of centuries.
Good faith is never obligatory in the international realm. It is simply not required. In fact, ". . . in the international sphere the requirement of good faith, if insisted upon, would virtually amount to putting the whole machinery of prescription out of operation." Hence, ". . . the International Law doctrine of uti possidetis is indifferent to the way sovereignty was acquired. . . ." This includes usurpers of territories or nations through conquest in the past, which is now outlawed.
[Prescription] operate[s] where the acquiring state originally acquired the territory by force [that is, by violence or other coercive or illegal means], provided the state follows with peaceful possession.
In other words, ". . . violent [or illegal] occupation [can be turned] into a legal right [through prescription on an international level]." If this were not the case, most countries on earth would be illegitimate and unlawful. This is because most, if not all, nations were involved originally in some sort of illegal overthrow of a former ruler. Therefore:
[If not for the principle of prescription,] the Titles of most (if not all) of the Princes [sovereigns] of Europe [or all the world] at this day [would be] very weak and disputable, whenever any other Person [with an abandoned claim] shall setup a Title against them.
To prevent such future conflict or discord:
. . . Prescription . . . [totally eliminates the] doubtful title [of a usurper or possessor] and . . . remove[s] the uncertainty which would result if ownership of territory, though wrongfully acquired, after years of uninterrupted enjoyment could be called in question.
Prescription terminates controversy over abandoned sovereign claims because it invalidates claims where there has been long-standing and obvious neglect by a former ruler. Thus, the new possessor is not to be held liable for any old assertions ". . . or remain under the threat of an international claim which is subject to no limitation [or legal end]." Legitimate possession of a nation or kingdom must be legally settled, and prescription completely settles sovereign claims after 100 years of obvious neglect or acquiescence.
Problems associated with Confusing Regnant Prescription and Non-Territorial Prescription
When reading about prescription, some authors appear to condemn sovereign prescription. However, quite often, they are not discussing international prescription at all; instead, they are discussing the loss of sovereignty on a domestic level to private citizens. Grotius declares:
It is an inquiry of importance whether the law of usucaption and prescription, if it prevail in a prince’s dominions, can be applied to the tenure of the crown, and all its prerogatives.
Excluding international law, he concludes by saying there is:
. . . [no] civil law [that is no local, domestic or municipal law] to be found which either does or designs to comprehend sovereign power within the rules of prescription.
Notice that this is a domestic situation, not an international one; this can confuse the casual observer. Bodin declares:
. . . more than two thousand years ago Themistocles, moving to recapture public land [domestic] usurped by private individuals, said in the speech he made to the people of Athens, "Men cannot prescribe against God, or private individuals against the commonwealth." And Cato the Censor used the same maxim in an oration delivered to the Roman people for the reintegration of public land usurped by certain private individuals. . . . This is why anyone who employs the prerogatives reserved to the sovereign prince is guilty in law of a capital offense [an act of treason].
Part of the reason for this was "because the [reigning] king, as the keeper of the kingdom, could not be expected to keep track of all of his rights and properties, he enjoyed freedom from the ticking of the clock [that is protected from prescriptive forfeiture]." The legal ". . . maxim nullum tempus occurrit Regi – time does not run against the king," was applied. It meant that prescription was not to apply to a ruling king. It was:
During the thirteenth century [that] Roman and cannon lawyers developed the general idea that there were certain rights and functions which a kingdom had to exercise if it was to exist and flourish."
Thus was born the idea of inalienability and imprescriptibility in regard to reigning kings and ruling princes. But these concepts were not intended for a deposed and neglectful dynasty who disregarded or abandoned its claims. For such dereliction, de jure royal rights of a dispossessed monarchy are prescriptively and legally eliminated. It was “the essential functions" of the reigning Crown and nation that were to be guarded and preserved.
The kingdom was dependent for its identity upon the preservation of certain inalienable rights and privileges. . . . The ruler was entrusted with the power of office for the span of his life, and had to pass it [the kingdom] on undiminished. . . . [He had to pass on the] sum of authority requisite for proper executive action.
All of this had nothing to do with deposed prescription; only reigning prescription was affected. For example, both the reigning English and French kings at their coronations were sworn by oath ". . . to maintain the status of the Crown, not to alienate its powers, and to revoke all alienations his predecessors may have made." The royal lawyers of the French kings went even further. In order to protect the realm, they:
. . . denied that [regnant] regalia [royal prerogatives] are prescriptible and forbade the prince to dispose freely of them; but, should a king have alienated them, and this is especially true of jurisdictional powers, he may revoke his grant.
Prescription may operate against the private [royal] patrimony . . . [but] goods pertaining to the ruler qua ruler, that is, in his public capacity [as a regnant monarch], may never be prescribed.
This general protection against alienation through the effects of time did not prevent the king from being himself subjected to the law of prescription whenever res non ita sacrae, "things less holy," were concerned. . . . "With regard to those things, time runs against the king as against any private person."
. . . [That is] the king was under the law of prescription [domestically]; he was a "temporal being," strictly "within Time," and subjected, like any ordinary human being, to the effects of Time. In other respects, however, that is, with regard to things quasi sacrae or public, he was unaffected by Time and its prescriptive power; like the "holy sprites and angels," he was beyond Time and therewith perpetual or sempiternal [that is, enduring forever or endless in principle].
There had to be some logical reason why certain rights could not dissipate. The answer given was that it was not in the ruler’s power (being non-patrimonial) to give what was only entrusted to him and not owned by him. Thus, with non-proprietary monarchies, the king being only "a temporary administrator" and non-owner, inalienability was promoted in opposition to the common practice of sovereign conveyances. However, legal loopholes developed that chipped away at the assertion of inalienability. The numerous subtle exceptions permitted ". . . to a great extent the by-passing of the rule. Yet the very fact that the rule remained an obstacle that could not frontally be assaulted indicates its strength."
This was, of course, all in reference to reigning sovereignty, not deposed sovereignty. Without this understanding, one can read about imprescriptibility applied to regnant monarchs and incorrectly try to apply these statements to deposed sovereigns who have abandoned their claims. Some modern impersonators of royalty have either ignorantly or willfully quoted such passages in an attempt to convince people that royal rights cannot be lost to a deposed royal House, even when that House neglected its claims for long periods. This goes against the law of natural justice and the consistent practice of mankind from ancient history through modern times.
Although most of the major European powers began using the idea of imprescriptibility on a domestic governmental level, this was not the case with the non-reigning sovereign princes and non-sovereign counties, baronies, and lordships that were patrimonial or owned by their rulers. For example, the ". . . sale [or alienation] of fiefs took place as early as the tenth century in France and the eleventh in Germany and England."
Knowing full well that the ownership of ancient sovereignty rights to a small country could be alienated, sold, mortgaged, etc., by their monarch, the Duke of Bouillon faced the following action:
On February 18, 1791, the General Assembly of [the dukedom of] Bouillon passed a decree asserting that the sovereignty of the duchy could not be mortgaged, alienated, exchanged or sold without express consent of the nation of Bouillon, and asking the duke [their sovereign or monarch] to provide for the succession to his house in case (as everyone expected) his son died without heirs.
The following was added as a note to clarify what Bodin meant by the imprescriptibility of sovereignty. It was not that a deposed monarchy could not lose their rights, but:
What [he] said about the rights of sovereignty not being prescriptible applies to private individuals who attempt to usurp the rights of sovereignty while the state (respublica) still stands [that is, still exists or is still reigning]. . . .
The authority [of the kingdom] is always entirely his [the reigning monarch’s exclusive right], even though others exercise it in his place [like a general, a legislative house, or a judge], and he [the ruling prince or king] cannot be held to have lost any part of it merely because he has allowed [or delegated to] them to exercise it for a long time. In other words, those who exercise authority under the sovereign have no prescriptive right to that authority which they can appeal to against the sovereign if he decides to deprive them of it.
Yet Grotius concedes that:
Many legal writers, who have treated [elaborated] on the nature of sovereign power, according to the principles of Roman civil law, seem to affirm that it [prescription] may be so applied [within a nation for some things, but not all].
In summary, prescription applies to sovereignty and dispossessed dynastic rights on an international level, but it often does not legally or intelligently apply on a domestic governmental level. These facts should be fully understood to avoid misjudging a situation.
The Legal Meaning of Peaceful Possession can be Misconstrued
Some authors that have written about the requirements for prescription have stated that the reign of the usurper must be "peaceful" for a long time in order for internal sovereignty to legally transfer to the usurper or subsequent government. However, this can be misconstrued. In this context, peaceful only signifies that the usurper’s rule is undisputed or uncontested by protest from the dispossessed original government or monarchy. ". . . Peaceful possession is finding that the dispossessed state has acquiesced the possession." That is, the dispossessed government abandoned the territory by a lack of an official public protest. "‘Peaceable’ thus meant acquiescence by the opposing party." In other words, peaceful possession means ". . . one without protest by interested states of the sort that prevents prescription, and of sufficient duration to establish a prescriptive title."
. . . If the [deposed] King makes an attempt to regain his position [through proper protests such as the use of titles and arms, etc.] during the running of this prescriptive period . . . [then] the Republic’s quasi-possession of liberty [that is, their bid for a prescriptive de jure title for internal sovereignty] will be interrupted [ruined or foiled].
War, or lack of peaceful rule from anyone other than the original deposed monarch or government-in-exile, does not stop prescription. Nor does peaceful possession refer to tranquility of rule, unending sereneness, or a rule without problems. Thus:
(1) Wars waged by parties other than the former sovereign against the ruling state now possessing the former sovereign entity’s territory does not prevent or interrupt prescription,
(2) If two or more nations took over and ruled various parts of the former kingdom or principality, this does not stop prescription from transferring all the rights to the new possessors of the land if the former sovereign does not properly protest, and
(3) If subsequent nations possess the territory after the initial conquerors took the land from a sovereign, the subsequent nations inherit all the internal de jure and de facto rights of the former kingdom or sovereign principality, provided that the original sovereign fails to properly protest within the appropriate time period.
So, how does one determine if possession is peaceful from a sovereign perspective? "What conduct is sufficient to prevent possession from being peaceful and uninterrupted?" What is the quality that destroys peaceful possession? The answer is the presence of, "effective protests [that] prevent acquisition of title by prescription." That is, ". . . Protests undermine prescription’s requirement of an undisturbed exercise of sovereignty. . . ." This is because prescription is only completed and finalized:
. . . by the silence of the injured party [a deposed monarch] when that party [the deposed monarch] is dealing with a prince [or republican usurper] who possesses that which belongs to him, or sells, cedes or alienates it. . . . Silence on those occasions is equivalent to consent [or agreement]."
An estoppel will arise where one party has clearly made or consented to a particular statement on which another party relies in subsequent activity to its detriment or to the other’s benefit. In this situation, the former cannot subsequently change it position.
If the deposed government or monarch fails to protest against the usurper, implied estoppel causes the deposed to lose all rights. The act is permanent and cannot be retracted or changed later on. However, for implied or overt estoppel to be binding, it must be clear and unambiguous, voluntary, unconditional, and officially authorized. A failure to protest at critical legal junctures fulfills all of these important requirements. That is, ". . . Acquiescence [silence on the part of a de jure king or his successors or the deposed government at a critical time] . . . acts as a preclusion or estoppel . . . [it results in a permanent] waiver of rights. . . . " In fact, acquiescence or negligence is ". . . a conclusive test by which the validity of a prescriptive claim may be evaluated. . . ." Such ". . . acquiescence . . . is a precondition of that possession being peaceful. . . ." (emphsis added) "'Peaceful' thus meant acquiescence [implied consent and abandonment] by the opposing party [the dispossessed king, sovereign prince, or exiled government]." (emphasis added) As already seen above, "Peaceful [means] acquiescence by any state that has any title" to a territory or nation in dispute. (emphasis added) Disturbance by any entity other than the one holding the right to de jure internal sovereignty over a territory is immaterial to prescription.
Two quotes again demonstrate that peaceful means uncontested by the former ruler or former government, not necessarily a government without problems and challenges:
(1) "If . . . a de facto exercise of jurisdiction is continuous and, in relation to other states, peaceful, that is to say, not contested, such a position is ‘as good as a title.’" (emphasis added)
(2) ". . . acquiescence in the possession of territory by a foreign state is a precondition of that possession being peaceful and constituting an effective reversal of the title of the definitive sovereign." (emphasis added)
Prescriptive legalization over time, of course, cannot justify ongoing belligerent occupation, tyranny, slavery, genocide, or other major crimes against humanity. Examples of these were practiced by coercive communist regimes in Asia and Africa and by Nazi and Fascist dictators in Europe. "In these circumstances the longest [prescriptive] possession imports no more than a long continuation of injustice." "No prescription is sufficient to maintain a tyrant on a throne he disgraces."
. . . When a Person hath not only intruded into the Throne, by Force or Fraud, but likewise still grievously oppresseth the People, and seems to make open and arbitrary Violence the Standard of his Reign; this is a Guilt which seems incapable of being purg'd by any Course of years, tho' Time in other cases be thought sufficient to found a Right of Prescription. For long Possession is here nothing else but a long continued Injury.
In other words, prescription does ". . . not operate in cases where possession was maintained by [criminal] force; but it did operate in cases where the original act of taking possession was forcible, if the subsequent possession was peaceful [that is, uncontested]."
The point is that prescription cannot sanctify the continuing rule of a totalitarian sovereign -- even though it has been peaceful, that is, the former ruler has not contested it. In other words, ". . . no lapse of time will give a prescriptive right to anything unjust. . . . " Peaceful possession, in prescription, does not refer to peaceful rule, but rather to acquiescence. (See the footnotes  and  for more references on the legal fact and reality that "peaceful" means in prescriptive law) This concept has been confused by some modern writters, which is why this section has been included.
In attempting to judge a situation, as to what is an illegal or unlawful rule, that could spoil the transfer of sovereignty, one must consider the norms and practices that existed in a particular historical time and setting. In ancient times, governmental norms and customs were very different from our modern era. One cannot, with fairness and equity, judge those who lived in other times and places with current law and practices. They must be judged on the basis of their own laws and customs. Otherwise, we can grossly misjudge them, and thus, the fact that "peaceful" rule existed for the required time period; and, therefore, the full right to rule was irrevocably transferred to the new ruling government -- even though this government was not perfect and somewhat or obviously unjust by modern standards. (See Volume I, Chapter V, "The Law of Nature is the Highest and Most Important Law on Earth and is Binding on All Countries Whether Reigning or Non-Territorial" on ex post facto laws not being binding for determining or reaching a conclusion on what happened in the past)
Deposed Monarchs in Situ Can Still Hold All Royal Rights and Prerogatives
Emanuel Kant rightfully declared that a deposed monarch, who was not a tyrant, ". . . has suffered an injustice in being deprived of his throne and has a moral right to it (his 'property'), provided he does not waive it." This is an accepted moral, ethical and legal truth, but the question is, does a king or sovereign prince, or their successors, waive their royal rights if they become citizens of the new country that has usurped the land of their forefathers? Kant believed that "if he [the deposed king or sovereign prince, or his successor] accepts citizen’s status he quits his claim to the throne. . . ." Since many prominent claimants (true and rightful successors to ancient thrones) are now citizens of the republics that took over their former countries, does this mean they have lost their rights, because they waived them or acquiesced to the new power? The answer and the problem is contained in the following:
There is an evident proof of presumptive abandonment of a territorial right on the part of the nation when its agents or subjects, with the approval of their Government [or the deposed sovereign], enter into any official relations or make any contracts, in a manner that takes for granted the acknowledgement of the right of the new possessor of the territory that did not belong to him before. It does not matter if the seizure of territory by its last possessor is of a very recent date. The fact of dealing with it as having full authority to do so, of allowing subject of the first owner to be submitted to the new domination going to that territory, and obeying and respecting the laws and regulations of the second owner [the republic, subsequent, or possessing government] without any prohibition or protest whatever from the first owner [the chief and head of the depose royal house], is enough to form a presumptive abandonment of any pretension of ownership. (emphasis added)
Please note that the above abandonment of rights occurs if, and only if, there is no "prohibition or protest." The ex-monarch and his or her lawful heirs are still exiles in situ; that is, they are still exiles whether they are full citizens or not of the successor state. They have been denied their rightful place as heads of state, so they remain in a form of exile. The royal House was unlawfully deprived of its de facto authority to rule their own land.
A prince once possessed of a kingdom coming to him by inheritance, can never, by any, upon any occasion be dispossessed thereof, without horrible impiety and injustice. . . .
The wrong done the ruler when he is deprived of his throne, is [unfortunately and wrongfully] represented in such a way as to suggest that it is only slightly, if at all, different from that which he suffers when he is robbed of his household furniture.
This act of theft is an enormous and monumental wrong that is perpetrated on a sovereign royal House. It is far more serious than any petty theft. It is not only grave treachery, but it is an act of treason against a lawful ruler. It is a major crime against a nation and its people.
These stolen rights are not in any way given up by the deposed monarchs or their successors if they choose to live and dwell among the people they or their ancestors once ruled. This is recognized indirectly by both a well-honored treaty and the common sense of what is just and true.
The European Convention on Human Rights in Article 3 of Protocol 4 of 1963 stated unequivocally that: "No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the state of which he is a national;" "Everyone has a right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country;" "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country;" "No one shall be expelled from the territory of the State of which he is a national or be deprived of the right to enter it." The above are found in Articles 3(2), 13(2), 12(4) and 22(5) These rights are universal to all signatory nations, and they extend to a former ruler and his or her lawful successors. To deprive a royal House of any of these rights after 1963 is counter to the law unless it is a national security issue, which is extremely unlikely. It can generally be safely said that none of the de jure non-territorial sovereigns or their heirs pose a security risk. To force them to sign away their rights in order to return to the land of their nativity is manifestly absurd and against the natural law of moral justice. Any agreement made under force, duress, or fraud is empty and meaningless. In the 1600s, Samuel Pufendorf declared:
. . . All unlawful influences which oblige Men, contrary to their inclination, to give their consent, which otherwise they would not, takes away that liberty which is necessary to make an Engagement valid, and consequently makes all Promises and Agreements, in such cases, null and void.
This principle has been regularly demonstrated as a basic seminal legal principle. In other words, ethically, morally, and by law, no nation has the right to take away a royal House’s non-territorial sovereignty through any kind of coerced renunciation in return for the royal’s ability to live in his or her own native land. "A contract [or agreement], which by its contents or necessary implication is contrary to good morals [or the right reasoning of natural law] . . . is null and void. . . [especially] when it has been entered into as a result of threat, fraud or abuse of circumstances," such as a forced deal of citizenship at the expense of de jure sovereignty rights such as, a forced deal of citizenship at the expense of their de jure sovereignty rights. That is, it is an abuse of circumstances.
This was made clear by an Italian court in February of 2010. In spite of hearing the contention of HRH Duke Amadeo of Aosta, claimant to the united throne of Italy, the court did not find:
. . . that the prince [HRH Prince Victor Emmanuel, the son of King Umberto II] forfeited his right to the dynastic title because in order to be allowed to return to Italy from exile in 2002, Victor Emmanuel had to formally recognize the Italian republic as the country's legitimate government," [the Court]"ruled the Savoy royal title can now only be used by Prince Victor Emmanuel and his son, Prince Emmanuel Filiberto. . . .
". . . The claim to a long defunct royal line . . . was at stake," and the outcome was in favor of the son of the last king in spite of his Italian citizenship and forced acquiescence. This is a significant ruling that upheld the rights, claims, and the royal honors of former kingdoms. Royals have the lawful right to be citizens of their former lands and still not give up their de jure sovereign rights.
. . . An individual may remain a subject of the state to which he belongs, and may be the sovereign of another country. The sovereign, therefore, can have a double personality. Thus, Ernest Augustus, and George V, Dukes of Cumberland, were subjects of Queen Victoria and peers of England at the same time Kings of Hanover. In 1787 the sovereign bishop of the principality of Osnabruck, the Duke of York, sat as a peer of England in the House of Lords.
What this means is that an indidivdual can have a dual citizenship. He can be the legal sovereign head of an exiled Kingdom, and be a citizen of the republic that illegally dispossessed his ancestor. He can serve in their military, be a prime minister of the Republic under domestic law, and still be the rightful heir to the throne of his ancestors in international law. What he cannot do is recognize the sovereignty of the Republic over his rights as the true sovereign of the land. (See "Certain kinds of Official Recognition can have Profound Legal Consequences" in chapter IV)
As seen earlier, under the doctrines of public international law, a deposed ruler remains the legitimate de jure sovereign as long as the House properly maintains the claim. The royals do not lose their claims by virtue of being citizens of the new subsequent government. As such, the royal may serve his or her country as full citizens. This is not an act of acquiescence. It is not necessary, nor is it right, to force a former monarch to have no nationality or leave his or her homeland to keep those rights. These royals remain, in effect, monarchs-in-exile, no matter where they live and have citizenship.
Regal Rights Can Be Preserved on an International Level even if Domestic Law Outlaws the Use of Regal Titles and Arms
Another problem that may exist is the use of titles and arms may be disallowed by the domestic or national law of the subsequent government. For example, after the deposition of its monarchy, Austria outlawed the use of titles, and Germany only allowed the royals and nobles to use their main titles as last names, but not as titles. Does this mean that these royals, or other royals in similar situations, lost by prescription their sovereign de jure rights? The answer is obviously no. Because, as discussed before, if they are denied the use of their exalted regal titles and coat of arms, they can protest in a different way:
. . . The [actual] form of the objection [or protest] is irrelevant, so long as the dispossessed state [or exiled royal house] makes clear its opposition to the acquisition of title by someone else. 
If any sufficiently declares by any sign [for example, other than the use of royal titles and the symbols of sovereignty] that he does not want to give up his right, even if he does not pursue it [does not go to war over it], prescription [or loss] does not avail against him.
In addition, as discussed earlier, duress nullifies wrongful or forced sovereign seizure except for proven acts of tyranny. Not only was this recognized in the 1600s by Pufendorf, it was reiterated in the 1920s in the League of Nations and again in Article 52 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties in 1969. All agreements, seizures, etc., that are wrongfully made by force, duress, or fraud shall be null and void or of no effect. Therefore, prescription cannot lawfully take away rights in such a situation.
Laws that are created by nations on a domestic basis that are against the law of nature cannot be accepted as valid or binding. The higher law of nature prevails over and supersedes all inferior laws when there is a conflict. Sir William Blackstone declared, ". . . no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this. . ." higher law. If a former monarch and his or her successors maintain their rights on an international level according to the rules of prescription, they keep these rights intact. This occurs despite the domestic law of any subsequent government that may seek to destroy the royal House’s noble or regal honors or privileges.
In other words, Austria’s morally repugnant rule that banned its deposed royals from protesting did not, and could not, destroy the internal sovereign rights of the Imperial House of Habsburg. One of the reasons that this law failed to destroy their rights is because the Imperial House continued to award knighthoods, restore titles outside of Austria, and socially and publically, where possible, maintained their claims through proper protests, which shall be seen in a latter chapter. Thus, it is publically well-known and universally accepted that they have legally never abandoned their rights. The Imperial and Royal House of Habsburg therefore enjoys the full sovereign privileges of a deposed monarchy in their own land and country. This is true of many other royal Houses in both European and non-European countries.
The [royal] prerogatives which we are examining may be denied [by a subsequent reigning republican government] . . . within the limits of its own sphere of influence [that is, within its boundaries, and it] may prevent the exercise by a depose Sovereign of his [royal] rights in the same way [just] as it may paralyze the use of any right not provided in its own legislation. However, such negating action does not go to the existence of such a [legitimate de jure] right and bears only on its exercise.
The point is that domestic law cannot destroy what natural law on an international level supports and defends. Outside of a domestic country that forbids the use of titles and arms, if a royal House preserves its rights, the law of a domestic nation cannot rob the House members of their international rights as sovereign entities.
There are in all more than forty sovereign houses of Europe, but all do not reign over independent lands or principalities. Although many of these houses possess only the title of sovereignty and the right of royal privileges, they [as deposed royal houses] are equal in rank to all reigning houses, and their members intermarry freely without loss of title or rank.
Prescription is a serious matter for royal Houses. Through it, a dethroned king or sovereign prince can maintain his or her rights forever on an international level even if domestic law will not allow the use of the exalted titles of a royal house and the national symbols of sovereignty through the maintenance of a royal coat of arms. But prescription can also destroy a royal claim without the possibility of redemption. Therefore, the future of royalty and nobility centers around this time-honored natural law that preserves rights.
Prescription Cannot Preserve all Claims
When a treaty or similar event occurs that nullifies or terminates the de jure rights for a royal House or former government, then there is no longer any sovereignty left in the dispossessed. The rights simply no longer exist. Therefore, prescription would not be pertinent or relevant to such a situation.
Prescriptive loss always involves the sovereignty of at least two parties: the government currently in power and either an internal, non-territorial sovereign or a government-in-exile. If a dethroned claimant has already legally and lawfully given away his or her sovereignty via cession or renunciation in the past, or if he or she lost these rights prescriptively after 50 or 100 years of negligence, then there is no sovereignty left to dispute. Therefore, any claim of retained royalty is unequivocally false. It is simply void and empty of any truth. To discuss prescription further after these rights are gone is pointless.
This is equally true in ancient regimes where sovereignty was legally lost immediately upon dispossession. This occurred in ancient China, some Islamic nations, and in elective monarchies. Examples where there were periods of elective monarchies can be found in the Byzantine and Holy Roman Empires. In situations like these, prescription does not and cannot preserve what is already permanently gone.
In the Philippines, there is an example of a former royal house that lost their internal sovereignty through a valid international treaty agreement. But it then later sold and/or ceded their non-existent sovereignty to others and finally later to the existing republic. Years later, the descendants of this non-royal House again proclaimed that they had royal rights and non-territorial sovereignty, which is a gross error at best, or at worst an attempt to deliberately deceive.
Prescription cannot help such a group obtain rights that have already been terminated. "Prescription: in International law [by definition is] without a treaty of cession . . ." because if sovereignty is already forfeited by an international agreement, then prescription no longer has any legal impact or bearing on the case. "In other words, prescription operates only in the absence of a written agreement [that gave up rights]."
Some non-royal persons with royal ancestors have, either through a willful attempt to deceive or misguided error, attempted to argue that they have retained a royal right by prescriptive preservation due to the consistent use of royal titles and arms within the family. But history has clearly demonstrated that those same royal ancestors lawfully ceded or forfeited the sovereign rights of the kingdom or principality in the past. In this situation, the descendant is simply not royal. To claim a royal preservation of rights from prescription in this scenario is completely unsupported by natural law since there are simply no rights left after a cession or forfeiting of regal rights. These are permanent and irrevocable decisions in the law of nations.
Similarly, sometimes other non-royal persons with royal or illustrious ancestors will claim rights that their ancestors either never possessed or had forfeited or lost. In this situation, the descendant is clearly not royal nor does he or she have any royal rights.
As there are scores of false claimants impersonating royalty -- some very cleverly misrepresenting the truth, pertinent knowledge on how to identify what is true and valid is invaluable in order to see through the charade and skillful artiface of the self-proclaimed.
External Recognition or Acquiescence of Third Parties is Immaterial to the Preservation of Rights
As seen earlier in this work, ". . . Sovereignty is neither created by recognition nor destroyed by nonrecognition." Real sovereignty is the supreme right to rule; there is none higher on a secular level. This work has already demonstrated that internal legal sovereignty exists whether it is officially acknowledged or not by other nations or sovereigns. The Montevideo Convention of December 26, 1933, on the Rights and Duties of States made this clear:
Art. 3. The political existence of the State [or sovereign entity] is independent of recognition by the other States. . . .
Art. 6. The recognition of a State [or other sovereign entity] merely signifies that the State which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and duties determined by international law.
External recognition is merely a peripheral status generated politically by outsiders. It does not determine the internal legal status of a sovereign entity, especially a de jure non-territorial entity. While such recognition can be helpful, it is not essential to understanding the actual status of a de jure sovereign. For example, "Just because the United States does not recognize Castro’s Cuba does not mean that Cuba is not a state." These recognitions are politically and commercially driven, and they do not reflect authentic sovereignty.
Recognition of a government exercising sovereignty over a nation or territory by third parties is only helpful in determining who has de facto control over a country or territory in question. With this in mind, "Recognition or acquiescence on the part of third states [or outsiders] . . . must strictly [be interpreted as] irrelevant. . . ." (emphasis added) Third parties simply have no legal claim on a territory or the sovereign rights involved; therefore, neither recognition nor acquiescence by third parties is material to a sovereign claim. (See the sub-section "Recognition is Unnecessary: the Fact of Sovereignty is Not Determined by Outside Recognition" in Chapter IV).
Confusing Territorial and Internal Sovereignty with External Sovereignty
Sovereignty has two "faces" – internal and external sovereignty. As seen earlier in this work, internal sovereignty is the right to rule and govern a people and land within the boundaries of the nation or kingdom. That is, "internal sovereignty was the [supreme] authority exercised within the monarch’s territorial dominion. . . ." This is the realm of prescription. "External sovereignty governed a monarch’s relationship with other sovereign European princes. . . ." "External sovereignty consists in the independence of one political society [a nation, a government-in-exile or a deposed monarchy], in respect to all other political societies." Put another way, it is ". . . the right of representing the nation and entering into relations with other [countries or] nations." Prescription has nothing to do with these external affairs. It is exclusively about the internal right to rule.
"Civitas sidi princeps" was a "construct of prescription" from the 15th and 16th Centuries. Like "prescription" today, it ". . . addresses what modern parlance terms problems of internal sovereignty, not those of external [or outward] sovereignty." (emphasis added) As stated before, internal sovereignty is the sovereignty of deposed monarchs and governments-in-exile. And, "internal sovereignty . . . has, within modern Western history, rested on grounds that include . . . prescription . . . ," because prescriptive rules govern internal or territorial sovereignty either to preserve it or terminate it.
The definitions for both territorial sovereignty and internal sovereignty are for all intents and purposes identical. There is such little difference between them that internal sovereignty ". . . is usually called territorial sovereignty."
. . . This aspect of sovereignty [which is "the internal aspect of sovereignty"] is also known as territorial sovereignty, which means the complete and exclusive authority a state exercises over all persons and things found on, under, or above its territory [or land].
Because internal and territorial sovereignty are synonyms, no wonder they are occasionally used in the same sentence. Note that, ". . . The idea of ‘territorial sovereignty’ or internal sovereignty was not firstly developed by Bodin but by John of Paris, Clement V in 1313." And of the four forms or categories of sovereignty in international law, the first is, "Internal or territorial sovereignty" The following sentence again uses both internal and territorial sovereignty as equivalent terms:
The sovereignty of states encompassed [two important dimensions] complete territorial sovereignty (internal sovereignty) and independence in respect of other states (external sovereignty). (emphasis added)
To be very explicit and clear, "Territorial sovereignty . . . [is] 'an aspect of sovereignty connoting the internal, rather than the external, manifestation of the principle of sovereignty.'" (emphasis added)
A related question is what separates a dynastic sovereignty and territorial sovereignty. The answer is, ". . . dynastic sovereignty and territorial sovereignty [are] so closely intertwined and overlapping. . . ." that there is little difference between them. Sovereignty is the same in both -- it does not change; the only difference is that in a dynastic monarchy, there is a monarch and usually a hereditary component. In other words, territorial, internal and dynastic sovereignty are all nearly identical in meaning, because they share the common quality of the right to rule internally and because their basic definitions overlap and can in practically all instances be used interchangeably. In other words, "Internal sovereignty . . . is . . . distinguishable as territorial . . . ," because it is. Therefore, when scholars explain that territorial sovereignty is transferred by prescription, they are directly proclaiming that internal sovereignty and dynastic sovereignty are also under the same legal standard of prescription. But to be more unequivocal and clear about this, note that "dynastic sovereignty is based [built or founded] on prescription" and ". . . Title [or authority] to the exercise of the royal power [or any kind of sovereignty for that matter] arises only by prescription." The point is, ". . . Dynastic legitimacy [is] what Burke glorified as ‘prescription’ . . ." Prescription has everything to do with dynasty, legitimacy, rights, titles and distinctions.
Quoting again, Johann Wolfgang Textor von Goethe (1749 - 1832), he wrote:
The modes of acquiring Kingdoms [not just small territories] under the Law of Nations are: Election, Succession, Conquest, Alienation and Prescription. (emphasis added)
As demonstrated earlier, one can acquire a whole kingdom under prescription, that is, the internal right to rule. This encompasses full domestic internal and territorial rights, which include royal titles, arms, and hereditary rights. Demonstrations of this by various legal scholars are abundant. Here are examples of some; that is, "There are several recognized modes of acquiring territorial sovereignty under international law." "Prescription" is one of them. Again, by another international scholar, ". . . Territorial sovereignty may be acquired by . . . prescription" among other well-known ways. With the possession of full and complete sovereignty in a kingdom or principality comes royal title and prerogatives which the former ruling house lost or forfeited.
Prescriptive loss or gain is always a question of who has the internal de jure right to rule, not who is actually ruling de facto. In other words, internal de jure sovereignty is the domain of prescription, and it rules supreme in application to the sovereign rights of deposed royal Houses and exiled governments.
"External sovereignty (involving the state’s relations with others states) . . ." has nothing to do with prescription. On the other hand, "territorial sovereignty (involving . . . a state’s interaction with all persons and things within its territory) . . ." is nothing more or less than internal supremacy within its own boundaries, which is the domain or province of prescriptive legal oversight.
 Gabriel Vázquez (1549–1604) quoted by Hugo Grotius, Online Library of Liberty: Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, January 22, 2010, p. 210: 2012: http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/1718.
 Hugo Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty,  2006, p. 205.
 Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas . Ralph van Deman Magoffin, trans., 1916, p. 47.
 Ibid., p. 214.
 Op.cit., Hugo Grotius, Commentary, p. 207.
 Op.cit., Hugo Grotius, The Freedom, p. 210.
 Edwin My, Connecticut Journal of International Law, vol. 13, no. 1, Winter/Spring 2000, p. 21.
 Jackson Harvey Ralston, International Arbitration from Athens to Locarno, 1929, p. 84.
 Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, 1947, p. 428.
 Charles P. Sherman, "Acquisitive Prescription: Its Existing World Uniformly," The Yale Law Journal, vol. 21, no. 2, December 1911, p. 152.
 Robert T. Kennedy, "Prescription," New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, John B. Peal, ed., 2000, p. 230.
 D. W. Greig, International Law, 1976, p. 166.
 Charles Lowe, Prince Bismarck: An Historical Biography, vol. 1, 1886, p. vii.
 Yehuda Z. Blum, Historical Titles in International Law, 1965, p. 19.
 Laurence Henry, Book Review, European Journal of International Law, vol. 15, 2004, p. 1064.
 Ibid.; Note: ". . . The supreme power itself, though unjustly acquired, can be justly retained, when it can plead the prescription of long possession." (John Lynch, Cambrensis Eversus,  1851, p. 45.
 Constantin Fasolt, The Limits of History, 2004, p. 114; Note: ". . . Usurped rule can become legitimate rule, not because of the original unjust act of usurpation, but either because of a subsequent tacit transfer of authority by the people governed, as far as they had had the right to govern themselves [that is in a republic], or by prescription and acquisition of the right to rule from the former ruler, if this former ruler had not exercised his rule effectively [that is, acted as a tyrant] or can otherwise be presumed to have abandoned it [by neglect or acquiescence]." (Christoph A. Stumpf, The Grotian Theology of International Law: Hugo Grotius and the Moral Foundation of International Relations, 2006, p. 189).
 James Tyrrell, "Dialogue II: Whether there can be made from the Natural or Reveal’d Law of God any Succession to Crowns by Divine Right," Bibliotheca Politica, 1727, p. 94; Note: ". . . Prescription . . . through long usage, mellows into legality governments that were violent in their commencement." (Edmund Burke, The Works and Correspondance of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, vol. 4, 1852, p. 286)
 Theodore S. Woolsey, "Prescription," Universal Cyclopaedia and Atlas, vol. 9, Charles Kendall Adams and Rossiter Johnson, eds., 1902, p. 456.
 F. V. Garcia Amador, Louis B. Sohn and Richard R. Baxter, Recent Codification of the Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, 1974, p. 84.
 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 4, no. 11.
 Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from The Six Books of the Commonwealth, Julian H. Franklin, ed., 1992, p. 87.
 Janelle Greenberg, The Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution, 2001, p. 30.
 Peter N. Riesenberg, Inalienability of Sovereignty in Medieval Political Thought, 1955, p. 3.
 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
 Ibid., p. 110.
 Ibid., p. 111.
 Ibid., p. 156.
 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology, 1985, pp. 170-171.
 Peter N. Riesenberg, Inalienability of Sovereignty in Medieval Political Thought, 1955, p. 178.
 Ibid., p. 174.
 Ibid., p. 10 and Alfons Dopsch, The Economic and Social Foundations of European Civilizations, 1937, p. 274
 François Velde, The Duchy of Bouillon, 2013: http://www.heraldica.org/topics/france/bouillon.htm.
 Jean Bodin, Bodin: On Sovereignty, Julian H. Franklin, ed., note, 1992, p. 112.
 John Petrov Plamenatz, M. E. Plamenatz and Robert Wokler, From the Middle Ages to Locke, vol. 1, 1992, p. 156.
 Brian M. Mueller, "The Falkland Islands: Will the Real Owner Please Stand Up," Notre Dame Law Review, vol. 58, rev. 616, 1983, p. 7; Note: ". . . The process, by which one State acquires a prescriptive right to the territory of another, is adverse, or in effect, illegal possession . . . . It is by a settled and uninterrupted course of such illegal activity [that is, the usurper continues to exercise full, but unlawful, sovereignty over the country, and if] acquiesced in, or not effectively or sufficiently countered in the manner, or to the extent, prescribed by international law for the upkeep of the title [by the former sovereign], that a title [or the de jure internal right to rule] by prescriptive means is [legally] acquired [by the possessor or original usurper]." (Gerald Fitzmaurice, "General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law," Recueil Des Cours, Acadimie de Droit International de La Haye, vol. 91, no. 71, 1957 reprinted 1993, p. 121).
 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. 11, pp. 309, 328; Note: ". . . International law does not recognize a shift in sovereignty unless the prescribing sovereign’s occupation [or reign] has been public, peaceful and uninterrupted." (Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations, 2000, p. 40). Peaceful means: "The exercise of state power over a territory must be peaceful in sense that it is not challenged by other states [who have a claim as the original sovereign entity over the nation or territory being considered]." (Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, 6th ed., 22.214.171.124, "Peaceful display," 2007, p. 159).
 David John Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 1998, p. 198.
 Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, John Pauley Bate, trans., vol. 2, chapter 10, no. 18; Note: "Basically . . . [prescription] indicates the acquisition of title by a long standing and undisturbed possession. . . . Furthermore, where the possession is adverse, it is not sufficient that the claimant State displays acts of sovereignty; there must also be an acquiescence on the part of the original sovereign. If the latter keeps its claim alive by protest or bringing of an action, there will not be that undisturbed or ‘peaceful’ possession which alone enables a State to prescribe title." (Sir Robert Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, pp. 20-23).
 Alina Kaczorowska, Public International Law, 4th ed., 2010, p. 281.
 Sean Fern, "Tokdo or Takeshima? The International Law of Territorial Acquisition in the Japan-Korea Island Dispute," Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 5, no. 1, Winter 2005, p. 87
 Gabriel Bonnot de Mably quoted by Vicente Santamaría de Paredes, A Study of the Question of Boundaries between the Republics of Peru and Ecuador, Harry Weston van Dyke, trans., 1910, p. 295; Note: "Acquiescence [is] silence or absence of protest in circumstances which generally call for . . . objection [like during usurpation]." (Ian Callum MacGibbon, "The Scope of Acquienscence in International Law," British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 31, 1954, p. 143).
 Malcolm N. Shaw, Title to Territory, 2005, p. xxv.
 Elihu Lauterpacht, International Law Reports, vol. 33, 1967, p. 91; Note: "Acquiescence means consent to a claim which may be explicit or it may be implied from the absence of protest or from mere silence." (Surya Prakash Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes, and International Law, 1997, p. 118).
 Iain C. Gibbon, "Customary International Law and Acquiescence," British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 33, 1953, p. 306.
 D. P. O’Connell, International Law, 2nd ed., 1970, p. 110.
 Randall Lesaffer, "Argument from Roman Law in Current International Law: Occupation and Acquisitive Prescription," The European Journal of International Law, vol. 16, no. 1, 2005, p. 51.
 Jessup worldwide Competition for International Law, "Bench Memorandum 2010," p. 12; Note: "For prescription, therefore, the possession must be long-continued, undisturbed, and it must be unambiguously attributable to a claim to act as sovereign. It depends as much on the quiescence of the former sovereignty as on the consolidation through time of the new." (Robert Yewdall Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 23).
 Quote from Palmas Island case quoted in Georg Schwarzenberger, "Title to Territory: Response to a Challenge," The American Journal of International Law, vol. 51, no. 2, April 1957, p. 312.
 D. P. O’Connel, International Law, vol. 2, 1970, p. 424.
 Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, Thomas Nugent trans., vol. 2, chapter 7, no. 13; Note: In modern times, peaceful can be different than in earlier times, because ". . . the Chamizal case denied the United States’ claim of prescription because there was evidence that the American authority was maintained by threat of force. Any authority based on force or which is only intermittent cannot support a prescriptive claim." (Richard Stubbs, "Strengthening the Efficacy of Acquisitive Prescription in International Law," BYU Prelaw Review, vol. 28, 2014. p. 59, and Chamizal (Mex. v. U.S.), 11 R.I.A.A. 309, 329 (Int’l Boundary Comm’n 1911)
 James White, History of France: from the Earliest Times to MDCCCXLVIII, 1870, p. 185.
 Samuel von Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, Basil Kennett, trans., Book 7, chapter 7, no. 4; Note: ". . . A possession, not only violent in its origin, but also violent in its duration, can not lead to the acquisition of international dominion. So long as violence exists prescription can not begin." (M. Ortolan as quoted in Venezuela, Case of Venezuela in the Question of Boundary Between Venezuela and British Guiana, vol. 2, 1898, p. 190).
 D. H. N. Johnson, "Acquisitive Prescription in International Law," British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 27, 1950, p. 346.
 Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Sea, , Ralph van Deman Magoffin, trans., James Brown Scott, ed., 1916, p. 57.
 Peter Nicholson, "Kant on the Duty Never to Resist the Sovereign," Ethics, vol. 86, no. 3, April 1976, p. 225.
 Manuel Maria Madiedo, "Treatise on International, Diplomatic Consular Law," (1874) as quoted in Venezuela, Case of Venezuela in the Question of Boundary Between Venezuela and British Guiana, Vol. 2, 1898, p. 283.
 Quoting M. Symmons in Samuel Rutherford, Lex, rex, or, The Law of the Prince, (written 1644), 1910, p. 42.
 John Augustine Ryan, Catholic Principles of Politics, revised ed., 1940, p. 95.
 Stephen Hall, Nationality, Migration Rights, and Citizenship of the Union, 1995, p. 16.
 Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, Book 3, chapter 6, no. 11, note 5.
 Sonja Kruisinga, Non-Conformity in the 1980 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 2004, p. 210.
 Italian Aristocrat Cousins Fight over Defunct Throne, 2011: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/7244567/Italian-aristocrat-cousins-fight-over-defunct-throne.html.
 Professor Egide Arntz in Sir Travers Twiss, “The Free Navigation of the Congo,” Compilation of Reports Committee on Foreign Relations United State Senate, vol. 6, Charles G. Bennett, ed., 1901, p. 256.
 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, 6th ed., 2007, p. 159.
 Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo, Scientifica Pertractatum, vol. 2, John H. Drake, trans., chapter 3, no. 361, 1934, p. 364.
 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1, 1765, p. 41.
 "The Legitimacy of Non-National Orders," Rivista Penale, no. 1, January 1961, pp. 46-70.
 George H. Merritt, "The Royal Relatives of Europe," Europe at War: a "Red Book" of the Greatest War of History, 1914, p. 132.
 Charles Kendall Adams, Universal Cyclopædia and Atlas, vol. 9, Rossiter Johnson, revised ed., H. A. Hark, ed., "Prescription," p. 456.
 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations, 2000, p. 40.
 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th edition, part 3, vol. 17, 1981, p. 312.
 Krystyna Marek, Identity and Continuity of State in International Public Law, 2nd ed., 1968, p. 159.
 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, "All Dressed Up but not Invited to the Party: Can Taiwan join the United Nations Now the Cold War in Over?," The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order: Legal and Political Considerations, Jean-Marie Henckaerts ed., 1966, p. 96.
 Robert Yewdall Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 39.
 Ken MacMillan, "Imperial Constitutions: sovereignty and law in the British Atlantic," Britain's Oceanic Empire: Atlantic and Indian Ocean Worlds, c.1550–1850, H. V. Bowen, Elizabeth Mancke, and John G. Reid, editors, 2012, p. 72.
 David Nasmith, The Institutes of English Public Law, 1873, p. 50.
 James Wilford Garner, Introduction to Political Science: a Treatise on the Origin, Nature, Functions and Organization of the State, note 3, 1910, p. 265.
 Magnus Ryan, "Bartolus of Sassoferrato and Free Cities," Transaction of the Royal Historical Society, vol. 10, 6th series, 2000, pp. 77-78.
 Ibid., p. 79 and Walter Ullmannn, Jurisprudence in the Middle Ages, 1980, p. 66.
 Jack Donnelly, "State Sovereignty and Human Rights," footnote 1; 2016: http://mysite.du.edu/~jdonnell/papers/hrsov%20v4a.htm.
 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Peace in Northeast Asia, chapter 3.3, no. 3.3.1, 2008, p. 30 and Lowell S. Gustafson, The Sovereignty dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, 1988, p. xi and Zoe Keyuan, "South China Sea Studies in China: A legal Perspective," Southeast Asian Studies in China, Saw Swee-Hock and John Wong, eds., 2007, p. 174; Note: "The acquisition of 'territorial' [sovereignty] or property rights by prescription is of course known in private law also." (Gerald Fitzmaurice, "General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law," Recueil Des Cours, Acadimie de Droit International de La Haye, vol. 91, no. 71, 1957 reprinted 1993, p. 121).
 Christopher C. Joyner, International Law in the 21st Century, 2005, p. 35.
 Philip Yang, "Taiwan's Legal Status," Paper delivered at the CSIS Seminar on Cross-Strait Relations at the Turn of the Century, September 21-22, 1999, Washington D.C.: http://taiwansecurity.org/TS/Yang-9910-Taiwan's-Legal-Status.htm.
 Rodrigo A. Gómez Sr., "Rapanui and Chile, a debate on self-determination: a notional and legal basis for the political decolonisation of Easter Island," Master Thesis in Pacific Studies, PASI 591 Victoria University of Wellington, VUW, New Zealand, 2010, p. 31.
 Konrad Ginther, Erik Denters, P. J. I. M. de Waart, Sustainable Development and Good Governance, 1995, p. vi.
 University of Western Cape, Parliaments & Foreign Policy: the International & South African Experience: a Conference Report, 1995, p. 45.
 Clive Parry and John P. Grant, Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law, 1986, p. 370 and Wang Tieya, "International Law in China," Recueil Des Cours, vol. 2, 1990, p. 297
 Paul W. Schroeder, "Reviewed work(s): National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems by Rodney Bruce Hall," The International History Review, vol. 22, no. 1, March 2000, p. 145; Note: Sovereignty is sovereignty, ". . . [Republican sovereignty was] chartered to do business on the same lines and with the same powers [as the Kingly sovereignty]." (Thorstein Veblen, Absentee Ownership: The Case of America, 1967, p. 26). There is little difference between them. In other words, "Whatever, then, a King or Prince may, by the Law of Nations, do in his Kingdom or Principality, the same may be done in a Republic. . . ." (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, John Pauley Bate, ed., chapter 10, no. 3,  1916). (emphasis added).
 Sir John William Solmand and Glanville Llewelyn Williams, Jurisprudence, 1947, p. 517.
 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, 2007, p. 61.
 Edwin R. A. Seligman and Alvin S. Johnson, Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 14, 1957, p. 429.
 Robert H. Jackson, "Negative Sovereignty in Sub-Saharan Africa," Review of International Studies, vol. 12, 1986, p. 247.
 Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, 1680, p. 77.
 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Peace in Northeast Asia, chapter 3.3, no. 3.3.1, 2008, p. 30.
 Lowell S. Gustafson, The Sovereignty dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, 1988, p. xi.
 Tania Voon, “Multinational Enterprises and State Sovereignty under International Law,” Adelaide Law Review, vol. 20-21, 1998, p. 225.
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