Chapter Two: (Volume II)
LOSS OF ROYAL AND SOVEREIGN RIGHTS
Chapter Table of Contents
The Permanent Loss or Forfeiture of De jure Internal Non-Territorial Sovereignty
Introduction (four major lies)
There are literally thousands of people with phony or spurious titles of nobility and royalty, who claim illustrious descent, and masquerade as genuine throughout the earth. As much as thirty or more foul organizations are pumping out many counterfeit titles of nobility taking advantage of innocent, unsuspecting people, and at least 100 self-appointed phony orders of chivalry and knighthood are also being advertised as real and genuine. Internet fraud is a frightening and growing problem especially for the future of nobility and royalty. It is important to be able to distinguish between authentic claims and falsehoods.
In this endeavor, like most others, those who are uninformed are easily misinformed. But knowledge can help discern what is real and genuine.
The list of [authentic and true] claimants [and fraudulent pretenders] to the thrones of defunct monarchs is a lengthy one, the chronicles of nearly every civilized country affording more or less numerous instances of the appearance of these pretenders to royalty.
The following is merely a few of the historical charlatans from the past taken from the table of contents of the book Claimants to Royalty:
The False Smerdis of Persia
The False Antiochus of Syria
The False Alexander of Balas of Syria
The False Philip of Macedonia
The False Alexander of Jerusalem
The False Nero of Rome
The False Clotaire the Second of France
The False Clovis the Third of France
The False Suatocopias of Moravia
The False Henry the Eight of Germany
The False Alexis, Emperor of the East
The False Baldwin of Flanders
The False Frederick the Second of Germany
The False Voldemar the Second of Brandenburg
The False Richard the Second of England
The False Mustapha of Turkey
The False Edward the Sixth of England
The False Richard the Fourth of England
The False Mustapha the Second of Turkey
The Fasle Sebastian of Portugal
The False Demetrius of Russia
The False Demetrius the Younger of Russia
The False Zaga Christ of Abyssinia
The False Ibrahim of Turkey
The False Mohamet Bey of Turkey
The False Hercules D’este of Modena
The False Charlotte of Russia
The False Peter the Third of Russia
The False Hereditary Prince of Badin
The False Dauphins---Hervagault, Bruneau, Herbert, Naudorff, Meves & Williams
The False Princess of Cumberland
The False Counts of Albany
There are certainly more fakes in the modern era since there are generally no laws or adverse consequences for any person to declare that he or she is the rightful successor to or high prince of the ancient kingdom of fairyland. After that declaration, it generally follows that this charlatan will graciously ennoble members of the public or invite them to join a fake Order of chivalry – for a fee. Whether they are con artists or self-deluded individuals, they misrepresent the truth.
There is often a commonality in the types of untruths they present. Three important and pernicious lies told over and over again. The falsehoods are essential to their cause in order to justify and maintain their fabrications and phony claims.
The "first lie" is the unsupported idea that ancient and modern dynasties, which have been deposed, can never lose their royal rights and entitlements no matter what (except by debellatio). This unjustified statement is based in part on one of the four assertions of the discarded Divine Right of Kings Theory. The same false idea is expressed as "indefeasible hereditary rights." Alternatively it is sometimes called, jus sanguinis or right of blood. However, "Their notions [of indefeasible hereditary right] are fetched [drawn forth] neither from divine revelation, nor human reason. . . ." ". . . There is not the least syllable in Scripture which give any countenance to it." In other words it is unsupportable.
Edmund Burke declared that this ". . . absurd opinion concerning the king’s hereditary right to the crown does not prejudice one that is rational, and bottomed upon solid principles of law and policy." The point is, there is no law, divine or human, to back up indefeasible hereditary right in any kingdom. ". . . There is no ground for the claim of an indefeasible hereditary right from the law of nature, or from the holy scripture, [and] certainly none from the law of England." For example, of the following:
. . . Edward the Confessor, William the Conqueror, William Rufus, Henry I, King Stephen, Henry II, King John, and Henry III [not one of these] eight first Kings did at first accede to the Crown by Hereditary Right, or Lineal Descent, but succeeded thereto by other Titles; and after them the Lineal Hereditary Descent was, before the Revolution in 1688, interrupted in the Six Persons of the Kings Edward III, Henry IV, Henry V, Henry VI, Edward IV, and Henry VII. So that [in] these Fourteen Instances, being more numerous than the Successions that took Place by Hereditary Descent from their . . . Predecessors, totally disproved [indefeasible, absolute and inviolable hereditary right].
The question is asked, if hereditary right is truly indefeasible, absolute and inviolable, ". . . How did they [these kings, who did not descend by hereditary right] derive an Hereditary Right from their [immediate] Predecessors [their fathers], who had none themselves?" How do you get a right that doesn’t exist from a father who did not have the right himself? Of course, a hereditary right could be set up, but whatever is created by supreme authority can also be changed or altered by whoever is fully sovereign in the future. In other words, hereditary right is not indefeasible. It is merely one form of succession among many. It is not incapable of being amend, transformed or revised as demonstrated by history and practice in nations all over the world. Another English example follows:
. . . George I [the first Hanoverian king of England] and his heirs were kings by parliamentary designation under the terms of the Act of Settlement (1701), and more than 50 Catholic Stuarts with a stronger [hereditary claim] to the throne had been set aside in their favour [showing that hereditary succession can be annulled and extinguished].
In other words:
The lawfully established monarch had a [perfectly lawful] claim to dominion [whether he is reigning or unjustly deposed], like the peasant’s to his inherited farm; both claims are equally sacred [equally rightful in the eyes of the law], but [and this is important] both are equally exposed to the risks of forfeiture.
Both reigning and non-territorial dynastic rights can be lost. To claim otherwise, would be to promote a myth -- fabricated either by the self-deceived, the uninformed or the willfully corrupt.
". . . Indefeasible Hereditary Right . . . Examin'd by Scripture and History Prov'd to be Absurd. . . ." However, like any absurd idea (i.e., the world is flat), some people can be convinced to believe it who don’t know any better. In conclusion, "Hereditary right does not mean indefeasible right [a right that cannot be lost, overturned or annulled]." Dynastic rights can die, that is, legally and lawfully lost on a permanent basis in a number of different ways, which will be discussed. In the sub-section entitled, "The Political Theory of Divine Right of Kings." This provides additional proof concerning the absurdity of the Divine Right of Kings Doctrine that dynastic rights are perpetual and cannot be extinguished. The point is, it is not hereditary right, blood, or jus sanguinis that creates a legal way for the dispossessed to keep and maintain royal and sovereign rights. It is only through prescription that this is possible.
The "second lie" is very similar to the first, but just as irrational. It shows basic ignorance of the bedrock principle, or chief organizing force, of all nations. It is the false idea that ". . . sovereignty [the cornerstone of all royal rights] . . . is absolute, perpetual, indivisible, imprescriptible and inalienable." Those who believe this do not understand an important legal reality. Sovereignty may imply the above, but in real life sovereignty is not almighty, eternal, supreme or endless without following natural law rules. Those who feign royal rights -- rights that they do not have -- do not want to admit there are exceptions and qualifiers to their quotes about sovereignty and royalty. They mislead people into falsehoods. It is simply not possible to make something true that is only half-true.
One of the best ways to investigate the truth is to examine original sources. The idea that sovereignty can never be lost or forfeited came from some things declared by Jean Bodin (1530-1596), a well-known French jurist and political philosopher. Few people known that Bodin, who made sovereignty popular – especially sovereignty as indivisible and absolute, also proclaimed the very opposite. That is:
Throughout [Bodin’s book] the Republic . . . every . . . assertion [of absolute sovereignty that is proclaimed] is balanced by a reassuring counterclaim: [in other words] Sovereignty is [actually] conditional, limited, accountable, and surprisingly unfree. Boden’s unbound sovereignty is restricted in a number of ways.
Thus, the ideas of inalienability, indivisibility, etc. are countered and opposed by the very theorist who had such a profound influence on the idea of sovereignty being indestructible, which he did not actually teach. In other words, "Bodin’s theory of sovereignty was more prescriptive [wishful thinking] than descriptive, [it was] more an ideal [than a reality]. . . ." The truth is, internal de jure sovereignty is vulnerable to forfeiture, because the "inalienable right of sovereignty . . . can be lost. . . ." (emphasis added) In other words, "Absolute inalienability characterizes no kingdom [and no state] of this world. . . ."
Bodin admitted that inalienability was over-ruled by a higher law of prescription, which determined how and when the right to command, enforce, legislate, be honored (bear titles) and honor others (the right of an authentic fons honorum) would be lost to a deposed sovereign house:
. . . If a [usurper’s] children and relations hold on to the [de facto rule] transmitted by their forebears for a very long stretch of time, say one hundred years in unbroken succession . . . then that regime should not be called a tyranny [or made out to be wrong] since the prescription of long time has legitimating force. . . . The rules of prescription determine when [and if the new sovereign house] becomes [fully and completely] legitimate.
This contradicts the two major falsehoods taught by some of the impostors, because history shows that internal de jure sovereignty (including the right to titles and to honor others):
. . . has been divided and subdivided, acquired and lost, restricted and enlarged, times without number, and by various means, during the world's history. . . . The history of the world is full of examples of two or more nations being merged into one, and of one divided into two or more; of sovereignty lost by conquest or by voluntary surrender, and sovereignty acquired by rebellion or voluntary association. To say that a State cannot surrender or merge her own sovereignty, is to deny the existence of sovereignty itself; for how can a State be sovereign [having supreme power above all other things in life and not be able to] . . . dispose of herself?
That is, ". . . the doctrine of inalienability is belied [or contradicted] by the facts of history." For example, Burlamaqui, one of the founding publicists of international law, declared the following concerning the alienation of sovereignty, which was a common practice in those early days. The following concerns a proprietary kingdom or principality (See the sub-section "Proprietary and Non-Proprietary" in Chapter IV of this volume)
There is no reason to hinder the sovereign power, as well as every other right, from being alienated or transferred. . . [that is] the prince shall have full right to dispose of the crown [his sovereign territorial and dynastic rights], as he shall think proper. . . .
In other words:
Indivisibility of sovereignty . . . does not belong to international law. The power of sovereigns are a bundle or collection of powers, and they may be separated one from another.
Thus, "Sovereignty is divisible, both as a matter of principle and as a matter of experience." If sovereignty was indivisible, the question could be asked, ". . . what became of the 'indivisible' sovereignty of the British Empire when it was divided into twelve or thirteen independent States?" History shows, ". . . Sovereignty [mostly internal] has been revisable and revised, violable and violated -- constantly and continuously, for diverse causes and purposes." In fact, ". . . States have always violated, compromised, and truncated sovereignty [especially internal sovereignty]."
. . . [The] most important empirical conclusion of [a well-known political work] is that principles associated with both Westphalian [mostly internal or domestic sovereignty, which is also the sovereignty of the deposed] and international legal sovereignty [external sovereignty composed of outside recognition, independence and legal equality] have always been violated [throughout history]. Neither Westphalian nor international legal sovereignty has ever been a stable equilibrium from which rulers had no incentive to deviate.
". . . External [or outside international] sovereignty has remained far steadier than holders of sovereignty within borders [or internally]." That is:
. . . compared with internal sovereignty, external sovereignty has remained constant -- not completely fixed, admittedly, but sturdy like a coat of armor whose plates and joints are only occasionally refashioned, while the character inside morphs often, from reform to . . . revolution.
". . . [There is, in fact] example upon example of how Westphalia [mostly internal sovereignty] is pockmarked, truncated, violated, limited, leaky, and restricted." To define it as immovable, inalienable, perpetual, and endless, etc. is to deny reality. One might as well deny the sky is blue or deny history. There is no such thing that either reigning or deposed sovereignty (dynastic or otherwise) can never end. Therefore, ". . . defining sovereignty as inalienable, unlimited, irrevocable, and imprescriptible, ran time and again into inherently fickle dynastic practice." "What is clear is that sovereignty is no more (and never was) inherently territorial nor exclusively in the hands of states. . . ."
It is neither an invention of the Westphalian Treaties of 1648 [it existed from the very beginning of mankind] nor is sovereign power indivisible. In practice, sovereignty has for centuries been divided among a variety of actors and shared by them across territorial boundaries.
Only under some discredited theories of the past, but never by practice and natural law, was sovereignty considered to be impenetrable or unassailable. It was not supernal, magical or everlasting. In sum, there are ways ". . . of obliterating the prescriptive title of a deposed line of sovereigns. . ." so that they entirely lose their royal rights and privileges.
A "third erroneous lie" being propagated is that prescription only transfers "state rights" and not the "dynastic rights" of a royal house. This idea, however, is as irrational and erroneous as the other two claims, because dynastic rights, privileges and honors are inseparable connected to either reigning or non-territorial sovereignty. This myth was created to attempt to say that such rights cannot be forfeited by prescription.
However, the legal understanding in the days of monarchs, in the 19th century, was that "State rights . . . were . . . dynastic rights" -- not two different qualities. To try to separate them is non-sense, because state rights (which includes dynastic rights) and sovereignty ". . . are by nature inseparable one from another," whether the discussion is about reigning or deposed houses. Such a house cannot lose its state rights (its sovereignty) without also losing all its rights to royal rank and status. Royal dynastic rights only encompass a fraction of the great principle of sovereignty, because "national rights [the internal entitlement to rule are] superior to dynastic rights" in both legal principle and in practice. As such, prescription has full weight and authority over dynastic rights as well as the higher right of sovereignty. As an example:
In the eighteenth century . . . dynastic rights [being merely a lesser yet internal part of the supreme entitlement of sovereignty] were systematically violated in numerous territorial exchanges of the period. Even the selection of monarchs became a matter of strategic and diplomatic calculation, for the convenience and interests of the powers, and not a matter of discovering the correctness or priority of competing claims. Matters of succession, in other words, has become fully internationalized and the means of selection were either negotiated agreements among all parties concerned or the verdicts of the battlefield.
This happened because dynastic rights do not consist of a fullness of sovereignty. The reason why dynastic rights are inferior to sovereignty is quite simple. Sovereignty is the supreme ruling power above all things, whereas, dynastic rights are the legal, secular entitlement of a family to use the supreme power according to limitations imposed constitutionally, culturally, by statute, prescription, house rules, and both natural and international law.
Sovereignty in its fullness, as explained before, is a combination of four important qualities: (1) jus imperii (the legal right to command and legislate), (2) jus gladii (the legal right to enforce), (3) jus majestatis (the legal right to be honored and respected), and (4) jus honorum (the legal right to publicly honor others). Take these away, and royalty ceases, because the supreme power to command, enforce, be respected and honors others, no longer exists. A royal house, which has lost its sovereignty by prescription, or any other legal method, is no longer royal, and does not have the legal right to be honored by titles or to honor others with knighthoods or any other public distinctions. Everything royal and grand is forfeited forever.
Johann Wolfgang Textor, considered to be one of the late founders of international law, made it clear and unmistakable that "prescription [that is, loss] of [deposed] kingly sovereignty" is an undeniable legal fact.
. . . Prescription entails that one State [the deposed dynasty or dispossessed government] loses her sovereignty [all her rights] over a territory or a boundary and another [the subsequent government] acquires it. . . .
Through this means, the originally valid sovereign royal house loses their deposed rights to "[the new] state and dynasties became legitimate by ‘usucaption,’ [another term for prescription]. . . ." In a nutshell, "Any right . . . [even] the right of sovereign [or dynastic] title, may be prescribed . . . ," or taken away.
. . . There is not strictly, in human nature, any such thing as an absolutely indefeasible right [that is, by definition, something incapable of being annulled, impeached or rendered void including royal title]. Sovereign right [the greatest secular right on earth] itself furnishes no exception to this general principle.
Kings and sovereign princes, being the personification of sovereignty:
. . . in their persons are to be reputed sacred. As men, [however] they have no such right, no such sacredness belonging to them: as kings [or monarchs], they have both, unless they forfeit them. (emphasis added)
The important point here is that dynastic right is ". . . a purely secular form of authority. . . ." Being secular, temporal or mortal, it is not to be regarded as indestructible or impervious to loss. Individuals can ". . . acquire by Prescription any Right (including the exclusive dynastic right] of the Sovereignty, great or small." In other words, the rights of "Regalia" [dynastic or royal sovereignty] ". . . can be alienated and acquired by Prescription." Thus, by this means, new individuals can and did become "real [and actual] Sovereigns." For:
. . . Even a legitimate dynasty may easily forfeit its rights to the throne by its own misdeeds. The rights of sovereigns, as those of other human beings, are not imperishable. (emphasis added)
Alternatively, as described earlier, sovereignty can be maintained or perpetuated by the most fundamental law in existence, the law of nature. In order to discern authentic sovereignty or nobility, the natural law test must be applied.
". . . The vote of the whole world can not make wrong right [or] falsehood truth. . . ." For an obvious example, in the dark ages, it was taught that the world was flat and millions of people sincerely believed this, but this could not make it true. Similarly, to say that a royal dynasty can never lose its rights does not fit with historical or scriptural reality.
All things human [including the royal and imperial rights of dynasties] are subject to the laws of change. God "who changeth times and ages and taketh away kingdoms and establisheth them" mocks the designs of mortals, and their solicitude [or strong desire] for transmitting an inheritance to [their] remotest posterity.
In truth no species of possession [sovereign deposed, reigning or otherwise] however firm, ever devised since the creation of the world, could invest any man with a right [so permanent to royal sovereignty], which would be entailed in all its integrity on [to] his latest posterity [that is, to the end of all time].
To presume that a dynasty can never lose its rights, as many impersonators of royalty claim, is like saying the rightful successors of a person who legally and lawfully sold all the rights, privileges and entitlements to his car, as in any normal sales contract, can never lose their rights to that property even though it is legally and lawfully sold. This mythical idea that dynastic rights can never die is not consistent with history, justice or natural law.
As an example, the Irish men of the 6th century considered to be "king material" knew and were anguish about the fact that ". . . failure to [keep their entitlements alive by law] meant the loss of dynastic rights to themselves and their descendants for ever." (emphasis added) Anyone can, in fact, be deprived or transfer their rights by various binding and irreversible legal means. In conclusion, the complete and total ". . . loss of sovereign rights, i.e. rights which only a sovereign [or royal dynastic house] . . . can have [is an undeniable legal reality]." The point is, "all [not some, but all] titles terminate with prescription. . . ." Prescription is that far-reaching, that powerful and all inclusive.
The point is, "sovereignty," by definition, is "royal rank, power, or authority." If it is lost, so is royal rank and all that goes with it including all regal titles, rights and distinctions. Without de jure sovereignty, either regnant or deposed, a once dynastic house is no longer the personification, embodiment, or glory of a nation that they have legally abandoned according to prescriptive law. Thus, everything grand is gone. At this point, they, as a once royal house, are nothing more than any other earthly family with notable ancestors. Royal rank ceases to exist.
Those, who willfully distort and misrepresent prescriptive law, do so, most often out of their fear or concern over its ramifications. That is, unless their ancestors consistently preserved sovereignty in the required way, it automatically bars their progenitors of all dynastic rights and therefore leaves them empty of any regal entitlements. Commoners, as they now are, they cannot honors others with genuine public law titles or knighthoods as they are irreparably dispossessed of such rights.
A "fourth major deception" is the misrepresentation or myth perpetrated by some phony pretenders that prescription only has an effect on external or outward sovereignty, rather than internal legal rulership. However, prescription, by its very nature and definition, is all about internal, domestic, or national supremacy, not outside or exterior rule; that is, the question is always, "who has the lawful and authentic legal right to rule, which is always an internal quality?" (See "Confusing Territorial and Internal Sovereignty with External Sovereignty" in Chapter III)
Divine Right and Prescriptive Right
Some impersonators or charlatans have attempted to justify that rights never end on the basis of "Divine Right." Sir Robert Filmer [1588 – 1653], one of the most distinguished supporters of the theory of Divine Right of Kings, wrote an important book on this subject in the 17th century. He explained one way that even the Divine Right can come to a complete and total end. He stated:
The monarch and his legitimate heirs being, by divine right entitled to the sovereignty, cannot forfeit that right by any misconduct, or any period of dispossession. But where the knowledge of the right heir is lost, the usurper, being in possession by the permission of God, is to be obeyed as the true heir. (emphasis added)
So even when the theory of the Divine Right of Kings was popular, it was recognized that sovereignty or royalty could be permanently lost under certain circumstances. Again:
. . . The Right of a Lawful [Deposed] Monarch and his right Heirs, is a Divine Right, and that no length of time, or Prescription, can bar it, because a Divine Right never dies, can be lost, or taken away, till the knowledge of the Right Heir be lost by all the subjects. . . . (emphasis added)
The way a knowledge of the "Right Heir" is lost takes place when the deposed royal family becomes so derelict, negligent and careless about their royal right that no heir or successor is chosen, but the position is left vacant, and eventually in time no one really knows or cares who the real "Rightful Heir" is, because no one in the former royal house uses their exalted titles or made the required public protest or royal claim to maintained those rights. And if they are not kept alive, after a long period of time, they cease to exist.
The right dies or is lost through disuse or legal abandonment. Again, ". . . where a Usurper hath continued so long, that the Knowledge of the Right Heir is lost by the Subjects," at that time lawful internal sovereignty ends for the deposed house and all regal rights are automatically transferred outside of any court decree or other legal action to the usurper. (emphasis added) The time period for this to occur is 100 years through the principle of acquiescence or silence when one should have protested, which action or inaction results in the legal presumption of implied consent or agreement. Obviously, if the rightful House continued to use their titles and national arms and publicly protested, ". . . the knowledge of the right Heir [would not be] lost by the Subjects," and they would have maintain their rights. However, this is rarely the case, most once royal houses in the history of mankind simply give up and sink into oblivion. All that is left for posterity is the knowledge that they had illustrious progenitors. The inevitable result:
. . . After the third Generation or Succession of the Crown in the Family of the Usurper [or for a Republic, in other words, about 100 years], they [the usurpers] have a good and perfect Title to their Crowns [their sovereignty -- their royal prerogative] against the [once] Right Heirs [who legally deserted or banished their own rights through their own acquiescence or neglect of it].
Immemorial prescription for [deposed] regality [that is, for the loss of the entitlements of royalty and monarchy] is scarcely admitted under less than a hundred years.
But after this period of time, it is automatically non-existent. It is an inescapable legal conclusion of natural and international law that he who neglects, in other words, legally abandons his property.
A long continued prescription or possession of sovereignty, without opposition [from the deposed king or sovereign prince or their successors], . . . implies a full consent [to the transfer of all internal sovereign rights to the usurper], and [this] derives [or creates] a good [valid] title of inheritance [or ownership], before God and man.
The ancient rules of prescription, which are from the beginning of time, are founded on the principles of nature. The Divine Right theory, even if it did not wither under historical and legal scrutiny, cannot override this higher law of nature.
There is not any divine Precept against it [that is, against prescription]; no Dictates of Nature repugn [or make it unacceptable or incompatible] thereunto. . . . Prescription of an hundred Years, or less Time . . . does create a Right [for the usurper and a loss of right for the former derelict sovereign] . . . according to the Law of Nations, which formally approves thereof, even betwixt Prince and Prince; and fundamentally, according to the Law of Nature. . . .
. . . [Immemorial prescription] one-hundred Years of Usage, or Possession, do[es] suffice to determine [conclude or decide] the Controversy.
In other words:
. . . Usurped rule can become legitimate rule, not because of the original unjust act of usurpation, but . . . by prescription and acquisition of the right to rule from the former ruler [to the new], if this former ruler . . . can . . . be presumed to have abandoned it.
As a law of nature, prescription was considered to be nothing less than indirect divine providence working in the lives of man. Charles Loyseau (1564–1627), a French jurist considered to be the best authority on the Kingdom of France and French society in the 17th and 18th centuries, wrote that:
Kings . . . have arisen in different ways, some by popular concession, others by simple force "ancient usurpation;" but as they now exist, after the process and passage of time, "they have all acquired by prescription the property in sovereign power." In other words, continuous use has given them something more than the exercise of authority: it has given them [full hereditary] ownership of authority; and their subjects are thus tied to them, and the authority which they own, by the [legal] necessity of respecting ownership and all the [lawful and legitimate] rights which it carries. This mere legalism [rested or was based] . . . on the plea that a long-time warrant was also the warrant of God.
Unlike the King Saul and King David of ancient Israel, there is not direct divine revelation for in the transfer of sovereignty through prescription. But through natural law over time by the rules and principles of prescription, changes in dynasty were, in effect, a warrant or a manifestation of divine will; and it transferred all sovereign rights to a new royal house or subsequent republic.
As Sir Filmer explained, divine right of kings theory is not that the dynastic right "never dies, nor can be lost or taken away," from a deposed royal house, because negligence and "long prescription may take away right." What is "never lost or ceases" he explained is the right for a country to have a kingly or "paternal government" should they so desire. Royal sovereignty can be rightfully "transferred or usurped . . . by the permissive will of God" to another dynasty or to a republic or back to a royal house. "Divine right" never meant that the deposed cannot forfeit their rights by unworthiness, juridical abandonment or extinction under natural law principles. The loss comes by natural law, which laws are part of the inalienable rights and laws given to govern mankind by divine providential justice. Prescription was, according to Filmer, a rightful law. However, "Prescription itself was not the source of legitimacy but was a sign of divine sanction. . . ." In other words, it was God’s natural way of fixing problems of a political sovereign nature.
In conclusion, ". . . the [flagrantly false] idea that sovereignty is not subject to prescription [that it cannot be permanently lost] has not been retained, at least not in international law " After giving some examples, the author, a doctor of laws and minister of state concluded, "All this to show that international law cannot be said to admit the imprescriptibly of sovereignty." In other words, "Prescription extends to incorporeal things" of which "jurisdiction and sovereignty" are an integral part. In other words, deposed sovereignty is subject to the rules of prescription and all that this natural law principle entails upon deposed monarchies and exiled governments.
The great proof that dynasties can lose their hereditary right to royalty outside of debellatio (complete destruction and subjugation) is spelled out or exemplified in the Old Testament by what happened to King Saul of ancient Israel (1079 BC-1007 BC), whose posterity were deprived of succession to the throne, because of Saul’s serious transgressions and their eternal ramifications. King Saul was told:
And if thou hadst not done thus, the Lord would now have established thy kingdom [a regal dynasty] over Israel for ever. But thy kingdom [the royal right to rule] shall not continue. The Lord hath sought him a man according to his own heart: and him hath the Lord commanded to be prince [king] over his people, because thou hast not observed that which the Lord commanded. (1 Samuel 13:13-14) (emphasis added)
This loss by Saul was ". . . not only the removal of the king himself but also forfeiture of his dynastic line." "King Saul had lost his dynasty, his character, and his throne and crown." David (1040 BC–970 BC) was anointed and consecrated, while King Saul yet lived, to have the full and complete internal royal right to govern all Israel in a hereditary monarchy. He became the Lord’s anointed King years before he held the office. According to the ancient historian Flavius Josephus (37-100 AD), after the Prophet Samuel anointed David as the rightful king of Israel, he prophesied to him as the spokesman or mouthpiece of the Lord:
. . . that God chose him to be their king; and exhorted him to be righteous, and obedient to his commands, for that by this means his kingdom would continue for a long time, and that his house should be of great splendor, and celebrated in the world; that he should overthrow the Philistines; and that against what nations soever he should make war, he should be the conqueror, and survive the fight; and that while he lived he should enjoy a glorious name, and leave such a name to his posterity also.
Thus it is not only possible for a dynasty to lose its royal rights, outside of debellatio, but Saul’s royal house and posterity did, in fact, forfeit every sovereign and regal right, which they could have enjoyed forever.
Solomon, the son of David and king of ancient Israel, had in the later years of his life lost his way and set up idols, which were so extreme that human sacrifice was offered. Because of this reprobate behavior, his heir Rehoboam would forfeit most of the kingdom and have only two of the twelve tribes of Israel to rule over in the land of Judah. This was prophesied by the Lord’s prophet Ahijah, who anointed Jeroboam, who would become the king of the ten tribes, while Solomon yet lived. (I Kings 11:29-39) What can be learned from this is, even though Solomon was the rightful and legitimate king of all the tribes, sacred literature shows us that major sin or transgression can bring about permanent dynastic and territorial forfeiture again showing that the rights of sovereignty are not inalienable or incapable of loss.
This same lesson was again demonstrated with King Jeroboam after he obtained the crown of Israel. He was solemnly promised, before he was the king by a prophet of God, that he could have a dynasty as great and lasting as King David if he embraced God’s way. Alternatively, if he did not obey God, he was told that his dynasty would fail and be dishonored. When King Jeroboam set up two idolatrous golden calves to worship, his dynasty was thereby doomed to suffer the penalty. (I Kings 13:1-6 and 2 Kings 23:13-16) Again, dynastic hereditary sovereignty is impermanent and transferable when major wrongs are committed.
In principle, if a royal house is deposed by divine revelation (as took place in biblical times), all royal rights end permanently. For ". . . Whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever: nothing can be put to it, nor any thing taken from it. . . ." (Ecclesiastes 3:14) There is no internal de jure sovereignty left to them to carry forward. On the other hand, if a royal house is deposed, by natural law, all rights end after 100 years of neglect. Either way, divine providence and intervention rules for "[God] removeth kings and setteth up kings. . . ." (Daniel 2:20) Sir Filmer explained:
Many times by the act either of a usurper himself, or of those that set him up, the true heir of a crown is disposed, God using the ministry of the wickedest men for the removing and setting up of kings. . . . [This is] God’s Providence who only hath [the supreme and exalted] right to give and take away kingdoms, and thereby to adopt subjects into the obedience of another fatherly power.
In Sir Filmer’s view, ". . . what . . . plays a vital role in turning an illegitimate claim into a legitimate one . . . is [always] connected [with] the idea of providence." "Providence [divine involvement] was shown to work by [the rules and principles of] prescription and the test of time." In other words, loss of all rights can take place through natural law or divine law, both of which are considered to be a manifestation of divine providence only by different means.
Nevertheless, a belief in the law of nature does not require a belief in God. Both theist and atheist can agree on the principles of justice, right and good by the light and wisdom that is within them. Right reasoning and correct principles unites people rather than divides them.
There is only one universal, time-honored law for all people, all cultures, and all ages that can validate the idea ". . . that the Successors of a Usurper can never acquire a lawful Right . . . against the Posterity of the King unjustly dethroned." That is, if the deposed sovereign consistently complies with the requirements of natural law, then he or she can perpetually retain all sovereign rights. Prescription is the only law, the only rule that can legally sustain and perpetuate dispossessed non-territorial sovereignty.
The Political Theory of Divine Right of Kings
It is important to briefly explain the political theory of Divine Right of Kings and how the concept of hereditary indefeasible right came about and why it was rejected, and why it was never fully accepted by all the kings and countries of Europe. First of all, indefeasibility means something that cannot be annulled, forfeited or made void. Thus an indefeasible hereditary right meant that:
The succession to monarchy is regulated by the law of primogeniture. The right acquired by birth cannot be forfeited through any acts of usurpation, of however long continuance, by any incapacity in the heir, or by any act of deposition. So long as the heir lives, he is king by hereditary right, even though the usurping dynasty has reigned for a thousand years.
Interestingly, even during the heyday of Divine Right of Kings idea, during the 16th and 17th Centuries, most of the kings and sovereign princes knew full well, along with the scholars and all the fathers of international law, that for deposed houses, the only way a hereditary indefeasible right could exist was if the rules and principles of prescription were fully followed. That is, if they were violated, the de jure royal rights would be terminated. The point is, it was recognized that a questionable and weak political theory, such as, the Divine Right of Kings, was not enough (too uncertain and too debatable) to save royal rights for the deposed. Only natural law through prescription could do that. Hence, during this time, the general practice of dispossessed Royal Houses was to continue to use their exalted titles and arms as a protest to be sure that they could maintain their claims and keep them alive.
Divine Right of Kings Theory was not part of the ancient natural law of mankind. It was not an ancient law at all. It was an act of rebellion starting in the 14th and 15th centuries, basically ending in the 17th century. "This theory [in essence or at the core of its purpose and meaning] was the divine right of secular governments to be free from Papal control. It took shape in the fourteenth century as the Divine Right of the Emperors. " In fact, "If there had been no Holy Roman Empire, or if there had been no failure to realize the ideal embodied in it, there would have been no theory of the Divine Right of Kings." It came about:
In opposition to the claims of the Pope to [supreme secular] sovereignty [claims over all the kings and kingdoms on the earth] by Divine Right, men . . . formulate[d] the claims of the King to sovereignty by a right that is not inferior [but equal to or greater than Papal authority]. Thus the doctrine is anti-clerical . . . [from its very conception and it laid the foundation for and promoted the Protestant Reformation].
Being an elective monarchy, the Emperors of the Holy Roman Empire did not possess hereditary rights, so they did not emphasize hereditary indefeasibility. It was not a major concern to them. The real engine that drove this political theory into acceptance revolved around Papal meddling and interference in the sovereign affairs of the Empire and its rulers.
. . . The divine right of the hereditary monarch . . . is a comparatively modern product [of the Middle Ages]. Neither Germanic nor ecclesiastical law contained originally any theory of hereditary rule.
. . . The doctrine of Divine Grace, so far as succession to the throne is concerned, was unknown in the early Middle Ages. An indefeasible hereditary right to the throne did not exist.
Most monarchies the earlier years were either (1) elective, (2) "‘seniorat’ (or ‘tanistry’), i.e., the succession of the oldest relative," (3) "‘majorat,’ i.e., the succession of the oldest relative of the same grade as the next in blood-relationship, (4) primogeniture, (5) by coup or assassination, or (6) by will or decree.
The idea of indefeasibility of a dynastic house was added later in the late 16th century as it was not originally considered significant to the theoretic concepts of this political philosophy. "Some -- but far from all -- adherents of the Divine Right of Kings . . . maintained the principle of indefeasible hereditary right. . . ." (emphasis added) Primogeniture was not originally a part of Divine Right of Kings. It was an after-thought in some countries, but never universally accepted as divine or necessary.
For example, the hereditary component was officially rejected and overturned in England when Parliament instituted Protestant succession in 1701. This act by-passed and ignored the birthright of living royal heirs. Put another way, if succession to the firstborn was an indefeasible requirement, Queen Victoria would never have sat upon the throne.
In contrast, in France, it was proclaimed that, "That the Successors of a Usurper can never acquire a lawful Right of Force against the Posterity of the King unjustly dethroned." But the history of French succession and usurpation defied this idea and it was eventually given up. For example, it was asked, ". . . by what Right the Crown of France has pass’d [was usurped] to the Carolingians by the means of Pepin and to the Capetians [by the treachery of] Hugh Capet, if it be true," that primogeniture or the right of the firstborn cannot be annulled or forfeited. In Germany, Divine Right of Kings had all, but disappeared during the 30 years war through the two secular treaties of Westphalia in 1648. However, Divine Right of Kings was never universally believed or agreed to in every European country and land. Nevertheless, it was an exclusive European conceptual theory. It revolved around the idea of a need to separate Church authority from State authority in reaction to Papal impositions and meddlings. In the 12th century:
. . . The separation of the spiritual and temporal power of the Pope was practically abolished [in much of Europe]. It was claimed that the Pope could not be judged by anyone, and that he had full freedom to change laws, even those of his predecessors. He could excommunicate princes, kings and even the emperor. He claimed the power to declare treaties between kings null and void, to annul secular laws, to order kings to dispatch armed troops in support of another king or against pagans or heretics.
Such absolute Papal power could not persist indefinitely, even on a doctrinal level.
As discussed earlier, a major doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings Philosophy, which was added later on, was the law of primogeniture or "indefeasible" right of the firstborn (or closet male relative) to succeed after the death of the reigning monarch. Since this law could not be demonstrated in either scriptural history or in the practice of nations, its rejection was inevitable, because it had no foundation in the important historical events to support it.
Birthright alone has never been the sole determiner of the sacred right to rule in any nation or culture on earth. There have always been other requirements, such as the legitimacy of the potential inheritor; current status of titles, estates, or other displays of wealth; conviction of any high crimes; the inheritor’s religion; the inheritor’s marital status; or the characteristics (e.g. non-Catholic) that the potential inheritor was married to. Many things, including birth defects, insanity or injury, could override birth as conferring the right to rule. There is an important difference between the legal right and the so-called blood right. For example, it is estimated that over a thousand people had a stronger historical hereditary claim to the throne of England than Victoria (due to the Protestant succession requirements). But Queen Victoria had the "legal" right, which was supplemented with her hereditary claim to the throne. Therefore, she was Queen.
If the right of the firstborn was truly the divine irrevocable requirement of heaven, according to Divine Right of Kings theorists, then it would be enshrined, or be manifestly obvious throughout sacred history. That is, if it was a divine requirement that could not be made void or overturned -- it being an eternal law, it would be noted as a well-observed fact of history. However, the ancient records show that succession is not indefeasibly passed down by primogeniture, which negates one of the later major premises of the Divine Right of Kings theory. For example, Japheth, the firstborn son of Noah was bypassed and Shem, his second son was given the birthright blessings as his successor.
When Abraham entered into Canaan ". . . journeying with his large retinue, as a powerful prince . . ." no one disturbed him or interfered. He and his heirs or successors Isaac and Jacob ". . . exercised . . . sovereign power; they never resigned that power; nor gave up to others the property of that land, which now, by long prescription, as well as by the promise of God, had become entirely their own." (emphasis added)
Esau [the older son of Isaac] was not only alienated from his family and a rebel against the laws of his organized society: Esau forfeited his hereditary rights . . . . The law of his land was: To marry a Canaanitish woman is to lose your primogeniture. . . . Esau supplanted himself [by his own choice].
In addition Esau sold his birthright, or right as heir, to his younger brother Jacob for a mess of pottage or for something of no lasting value. (Genesis 25:29-34) Joseph, the 11th son of Jacob (later renamed as Israel] obtained the birthright over Reuben the oldest or firstborn son. King David and King Solomon of the ancient Kingdom of Israel were younger sons, not the eldest. David was made king even though he was the youngest son of Jesse, ". . . because his heart was right, and Solomon, his son, because he was the beloved of God . . ." even though he was ". . . the tenth Legitimate Son . . . some think the nineteenth by birth . . ." as one of the heirs to the kingdom of Israel. In other words, it was ". . . personal worth, not birthright [that] was made the Foundation of Succession." Rehoboam, the son and heir of Solomon was not the firstborn, neither does his son seem to be. Nothing in the scriptures attest to the idea that any of the kings of the line of David were firstborn sons.
The antediluvian reign of the Patriarchs before the Biblical flood again showed that primogeniture was not followed, or if it did, it rarely took place. These examples demonstrate the fact that the Divine Right doctrine of hereditary succession of the firstborn was not immutable or sacrosanct as propounded. In fact, it is actually incompatible with the divine record as it happened so rarely. One English author wrote:
One would therefore be amaz’d that any Clergyman, or other Protestant, should contrary to plain Scripture, assert a divine Hereditary, and indefeasible Right in any one Person by Birth to our Crown, when it appears there was no such Thing, even in the House of David thou they had better Pretensions to it, than any other Family ever had, or can have.
These important, numerous and almost universal exceptions were noted by the more educated people, nevertheless the false doctrine or philosophy of Divine Right of Kings did do some temporary damage to the natural law principle of prescription, especially in the Kingdom of France, where they considered the need for prescription to be unnecessary, even wrong, because the concept of sovereign indefeasibility had replaced or superseded it. Yet even their own history contradicted this so-called immutable law during the three major dynastic upheavals in France.
In a number of European countries, prescription was never forsaken, but was honored and revered as of equal important, that is, "The King . . . is King by Divine Rights and ancient prescription. . . ." (emphasis added) Both were considered necessary and essential. The Bering Sea Tribunal of 1893 concluded:
It is true that some later writers on the law of nations have denied that the doctrine of prescription has any place in the system of international law. But their opinion is overwhelmed by authority, at variance with practice and usage, and inconsistent with the reason of the thing. Grotius, Heineccins, Wolff, Mably, Vattel, Rutherforth, Wheaton, and Burke constitute a greatly preponderating array of authorities, both as to number and weight, upon the opposite side.
This Arbitration Council also declared that:
. . . the right of a government by prescription, based on occupancy and claim of title, to any dominion, on land or sea, of anything in the nature of property, whether corporeal [de facto rule], or incorporeal [de jure or deposed is so] . . . firmly [fixed, immovable and concluded, it is] as if the right were established by grant or as the result of conquest or cession.
In other words, now:
State practice, interpretive works, and decisions of international tribunals unanimously agree that long continued possession and effective control, combined with declarations of sovereignty, eventually confer title by prescription. The length of time required varies according to circumstances – for example, whether any protests or challenges are lodged – but there can be no doubt that prescription has conferred title. . . . (emphasis added)
Prescription is a settled and establish doctrine -- ". . . the balance of authority is overwhelmingly in its favor." It has survived its enemies even during the time when some nations, but not all, espoused the faulty doctrine of Divine Right. Now, ". . . There can be no doubt that long-continued possession of territory gives good title to it in International Law. . . ." It is prescription, not the indefeasibility doctrine, that can and does protect the lawful rights of deposed monarchs. In fact, ". . . leaving aside the theory of the Divine Right of Kings. . . ," that is, completely outside of this theory, the legal, binding power of the natural law principle of prescription, was how rights could be legally preserved and never end. That is, through the rules of prescription, a rightful and legitimate ". . . king had a right to supreme power which was natural and inalienable, inalienable to such a degree that dethroned kings and their descendants kept this right forever . . ." by abiding by its precepts.
There was no more need for an implausible, problematic and rejected Divine Right theory to preserve internal, non-territorial royal rights. The ancient higher law of nations had provided a just and perfect way for what is ethically and morally just to triumph and prevail. The requirement was fulfilled by caring enough about the royal and regal rights enough to follow its established rules. In summary, the theory of Divine Right of Kings ". . . is dead and buried we may concede. It should, however, be . . . remembered with respect . . . [because] it served its purpose in its time. . . . " In other words, this theory ". . . ceased to have practical importance . . . because its teaching had become unnecessary. The transition stage had passed. The independence of the State had been attained." "The extravagant doctrines . . . concerning the indefeasibility of hereditary claims, and the imprescriptibility of royal titles, form no part of the law of nations." Such discredited notions fit neither in the law nor in the practice of reigning and deposed royal houses, and are not to be found in any of the writings of the founding fathers of international law.
Part of the reason divine rights was rejected came from the bad experience that Europe suffered from it. For example:
Hobbes [and Grotius] saw that appeals to the divine right of kings were an invitation to perpetual conflict [and resulted in numerous and painful wars], and that therefore the legitimacy of the regime had to have a [more solid and sturdy] foundation less permeable [or vulnerable to] religious and dynastic controversies.
The "Hundred Year’s War" between Britain and France (1337-1453) and the "War of the Roses" between the House of York and House of Lancaster (basically between 1455-1485), were about indefeasible hereditary rights to the thrones of England and France. This caused untold anguish and suffering.
[The civil conflict between the Yorkists and the Lancastrians basically between 1455 and 1885] in which Englishmen were slaughtering Englishmen, was the most destructive that England had ever been engaged in; this fraternal ferocity [with all its cruelty and carnage] was the cause of the loss of more lives than all the wars with Wales, Scotland, and France. . . .
This tragic conflict was over divine right and the so-called unalterable hereditary right of succession. Divine right and indefeasibility did not create peace, but rather it created disputes and promoted great wrongs.
Claims to hereditary precedence were usually resolved by war. Next to mercantilist trade wars, wars of succession and, more broadly, wars over hereditary claims, became the dominant form of international conflict.
Dangerous rival claims abounded because of old worn-out claims that were supposedly unending. They were complicated by dynastic marriages creating confusing rights, regencies, divorces, power vacuums, multiple heirs, illegitimate offspring, insanity, inbreeding, physical weaknesses, partitions, informal family ties and alliances, all of which carried the seeds of war and bloodshed. Divine right and/or indefeasibility were a major part of the problem, and not the answer or solution to the major conflicts of their time, because it promoted wrongful claims.
In conclusion, ". . . it [should be] perfectly clear [at this point] that, if antiquated claims [that supposedly could never die] are to be set up against recent treaties and long possession, the world can never be at peace. . . ." This is why Hobbes, Grotius and other major publicists upheld the universally sound principles of immemorial prescription to end stale royal claims.
Given the intertwining of primogeniture and the Divine Right theory, one may wonder how this practice became the most prominent succession rule. It was a practical one that had nothing to do with Divine Right of Kings. Partitioning of territories among brothers especially in Germany became a serious problem in the Middle Ages, because smaller and smaller territories were formed, yet primogeniture was tenaciously opposed even after the Reformation. However, ". . . between 1640 and 1700, most dynasties were forced to introduce primogeniture" to save their little tiny kingdoms from disappearing entirely. It was not the so-called Divine Right of Kings philosophy, but practical necessity that brought this about. This move had the effect of ". . . concentrated the political and economic power of the territory in one ruler," thus preserving the territory.
The following sub-chapter describes several well-established ways de jure internal claims to sovereignty are forfeited and permanently lost. And once lost, ONLY competent sovereign authority, which has the appropriate jurisdiction in the matter, could legally and lawfully restore it. This is because of the legal principle, les facit regem or "the law makes the king." "There was no particular divine right in royalty, the proper rights of royalty were historic ones [rooted in law]." And what is created by law can also be destroyed by law.
Once sovereign royalty is lost, it is lost forever, and those families, who have lost the royal prerogative, no longer possess the right to restore what they no longer own or legally possess. One cannot use rights that no longer exist. Protests, such as, the use of titles and arms after-the-fact of loss ". . . does not defeat a prescription [or transfer of rights] once obtained." That is, once the transfer is made it cannot be overturned. It is final and there is no appeal provided in the law.
Twelve Ways to Permanently Lose Royal Sovereignty Rights
These five [the most well-known] modes of acquiring title to [sovereignty over] territory [accretion, conquest, prescription, occupation and cession] had their reverse image in the rules governing the loss of title. . . . (emphasis added)
In other words, one must lose something for another to acquire it. "Prescription . . . must [therefore] be named as a mode of acquiring [as well as losing dynastic or governmental] sovereignty."
. . . Old [traditional] concepts of the nature of territorial supremacy – feudal, dynastic, patrimonial – had their corollary [or end] in old modes of acquisition and loss of the same. A number of these are now entirely obsolete. Others have survived. . . . A few novel methods have emerged. (emphasis added)
Since justice demands that we use the proper law that was binding and obligatory during the time in question, rather than unjustly trying to apply a modern law that did not exist or was not in force back then, it is important to know what those laws were. The following is a list of some of them:
Among the obsolete modes of acquisition or loss may be cited: marriage [morganatic or equal, approved by the monarch or not], inheritance ad intestate, succession in virtue of a will, division of dynastic estates, a family pact or pact of confraternity, an Imperial "expectative," a Papal grant, a clause of "reversibility," feudal forfeiture, a pseudo-judicial decision of a "cambre de reunion," the lapse of a mortgage, discovery or symbolic occupation, and the creeping effect of a personal union.
There were many ways a whole dynasty or an individual member of that royal house could lose all rights. Pufendorf gives a few examples. "Those Princes do likewise forfeit this Sacredness [the dynastic right to rule which includes jus imperii, jus gladii, jus majestatis, and jus honorum] who have" "given up," "deserted," "abandoned,"or "resign’d" their rights, or been "depraved" by some "Misfortune." "Another way by which a King falls into the Condition of a private Man, is in case his Kingdom be seiz’d upon as forfeited either by a Felony," "alienation," by an unauthorized major change in the government, or eventually through prescription via a successful coup or takeover. Some of the above create an immediate loss, some impact the monarch alone and some terminate the dynasty as a whole.
While the above is a good primer, the following is a more comprehensive, yet abbreviated list of the chief ways for that bring about a legally binding permanent loss of all sovereignty as well as succession rights:
(1) Some kingdoms and principalities were never fully sovereignty, but were protectorates or vassals under a suzerain or supreme overlord. As puppets rulers or figureheads, devoid of real sovereignty, they had no authentic rights to pass on to their posterity. Others protectorates and dependent territorial entities were originally sovereign; however, if these lesser lords overtly or tacitly consented to the loss of their royal rights, their sovereign entitlements were forfeited on a permanent basis. In other words, acquiescence of rights leads to their loss over time,
(2) A number of kings ceded their rights to others and/or renounced the throne for themselves and their posterity. In such a situation, if the living heirs acquiesced, agreed or accepted the renunciation or transfer of governmental rights, by silence or neglect, then they have no lawful claim to them as they were by legal presumption surrendered. And this cannot be reversed due to the legal principle of estoppel. Thus the binding juridical act of renunciation can result in a total legal forfeiture of all rights,
(3) The principle of debellatio (the complete subjugation and destruction of a country, its rulers and its law) is similar to ceding, renunciation, abdication and regicide because no rights are left, not even in exile, to legally carry on the rights of the former government. Overt abandonment of the crown also represents a total loss of rights with the passage of time,
(4) The death of a whole royal house by regicide or natural causes would obviously mean that the crown and all its ruling rights would be lost, but only if no officially authorized collateral heirs exist. (Note: some collateral or junior lines have no royal rights and cannot legally claim a right to the crown),
(5) Deposed monarchs, who neglected their rights by acquiescing to either rebel factions or a conqueror, permanently lose de jure internal sovereignty after a period of time by virtue of the ancient natural rules of prescription. This terminates all dynastic rights including that of hereditary succession. Similarly, if a claimant cannot conclusively prove he complied with the requirements that preserve and maintain deposed sovereignty, the claim has no legal standing, entitlement or existence. (See "Substantial Proof is Required for Any Claim to be Considered Valid" in Chapter VI),
(6) Non-hereditary and/or elective monarchies cannot pass on the royal prerogative as the legal right to do so does not exist. Succession belongs to the electorate in such a case, not to the family temporarily in power,
(7) Some monarchies, if they were deposed, immediately lost everything upon dispossession. That is, the unique sovereign law of their culture denied the existence of any sovereignty upon dispossession. As such, the deposed were immediately disenfranchised by their deposition. They became commoners without any royal entitlements, privileges or rights above that of common citizens or other subjects of the newly created rulers,
(8) Various hereditary lines were from time to time permanently disinherited from the succession, because of unequal marriages, illegitimacy or a failure to obtain prior permission and approval for their marriages from the reigning monarch and/or from Parliament as required by law. They could also belong to the wrong religion and automatically lose their rights. All of these loses were fairly common, wherein many potential successors were eliminated, some losing their titles and all rights to succession not only for themselves, but their posterity as well,
(9) Exclusions or legal designations created by the reigning monarch can change the rights of dynasts, which includes such juridical instruments as testaments and/or wills, depending on house rules, and permanently altering or modifying the future of potential successors and their heirs, etc. Some changes cannot be amended however except through the agreement of all dynasts. It might also have to be supported by the legislative body depending on the Constitution of the land,
(10) The permanent loss of both reigning de facto rights and non-territorial or de jure sovereignty can come, because of actual oppression or serious crimes against the people, even adultery can and has been considered to be high treason. This can create a justification for the overthrow of a monarch as well as the whole monarchy if the king’s heirs were complicit or accomplices in the crimes,
(11) Constitutional provisions, as well as House Rules, can eliminate all sovereign and royal rights under whatever unique circumstances are establish in the supreme law of the land or the house,
(12) The Popes in Medieval Europe not only deposed monarchs, but stripped their dynastic families of all royal privileges, such that, in some cases, there were no de jure rights or titles left to be passed on or inherited. This power was also exercised by the ancient Romans and by Emperors of the Holy Roman Empire. In many cases, it resulted in the total forfeiture of all deposed as well as hereditary regal rights.
Some of the above methods of loss would affect only single individuals and their families, while others would impact the whole dynasty wherein the regal claim would cease to exist and they would become mere commoners. In addition, some of the above would take effect immediately, with no delay, such as, death or extinction, renunciation, abdication, cession, etc. Others take a long time like prescription. A new way to forfeit sovereignty over a territory has come into great prominence, but existed long ago as well. It is called estoppel. It cannot actually transfer sovereignty, but it can permanently preclude or legally bar a royal house or an exiled or reigning government from it rights, therefore causing a complete and total termination of those rights. Estoppel was part of the natural law of nations as described by Vattel. Therefore, care must be taken ensure that these precious entitlements remain intact. Some important protests cannot be delayed without immediate and very serious repercussions. Therefore, it is considered to be in the best interests of any deposed or reigning royal house to see the section on the "The Immediate Loss of Sovereignty" in this chapter, as some things create an immediate termination of a house as a royal and sovereign entity. (See also "Recognition of the Deposed by the Reigning Government or Recognition by Reigning Government by the Deposed Ruler: Both have Profound Legal Consequences either Way" in Chapter IV)
Obviously, if a claimant’s ancestral family or ancestors lost or never received legitimate rights, because of any of the above twelve ways of loss, a claim of sovereignty cannot legitimately exist. There are many examples of irretrievable termination of personal and dynastic rights. Only a regnant king, or sovereign prince, or non-reigning deposed monarch of appropriate and competent jurisdiction could make any change to a permanent forfeiture or loss. As an example, a non-territorial sovereign, such as, the head and chief of the Imperial and Royal House of Habsburg would have the jurisdiction to restore the rights of a vassal king or prince, whose family lost their dynastic entitlement and were under their legal jurisdictional authority. No other entity could lawfully and legitimately do this. It takes valid, current, and internal, de jure, non-territorial sovereignty to restore the exalted rights of supremacy after it is forfeited, because such an entity cannot restore itself as they have no sovereign authority to do so.
Preservation of dispossessed sovereign rights is the towering crown jewel of deposed monarchies and governments-in-exile, without which, they have no legal right to any kind of sovereign claim. If prescription was not a law, all such rights would cease to exist or come to a complete end immediately after the royal dynasty or government was officially deposed and replaced by a usurping entity. Nothing could be left over after such an occurrence, because there is no other law on earth which perpetuates deposed sovereignty. However, with prescription, rights can justly continue and be maintained on a de jure internal non-territorial basis. This privilege can last indefinitely and endlessly in spite of the fact that the de facto ruler is in full power over the nation. This is why prescription is so important to deposed nobility and royalty because it is the only law on earth which can preserve such exalted rights and perpetuate them eternally.
It cannot, however, preserve sovereignty that has already been forfeited or lost, nor can it protect any claim, if it never existed in history, or was merely a fabricated tale, a myth or a fable. If it cannot be proven by cold hard facts to have actually existed and to have been properly and consistently retained, as required by law, it is canceled out and voided by that same law. The might and power prescription has over sovereignty is of vital importance to the legal and lawful existence of deposed governments, who have no leg to stand on without its binding efficacy.
The discussion that follows explains in detail the twelve more prominent legally established means of dynastic and governmental nullity.
High Crimes and the Forfeiture of Hereditary Rights
Royal privileges are subject to legal loss for high crimes against the nation, but such does not destroy the rights of the heir apparent to the throne and his right to succeed unless he was an accessory to the crimes. In other words, ". . . a Person may forfeit his Regal Rights, and ceases de jure [legally and lawfully] to be King, and that according to the ancient statues . . . when necessary to the general ruin [that is] otherwise inevitable." Grotius concurred, he declared, "The kingdom is forfeited if a king sets out with a truly hostile intent to destroy a whole people." As an obvious manifestation of the unclean hands doctrine: "[A sovereign prince] who violates the . . . rights of others, places himself outside the legal order, and forfeits all claim to protection for his own . . . rights." It is only those who are unjustly and wrongfully deposed that maintain any regal leftover rights. Natural law, binding throughout the ages and in all cultures, acknowledged valid forfeiture of the right to rule for serious crimes. In the history of ancient India, we find:
Actual instances are not wanting to prove that tyrannical kings were deposed . . . [and] if the prince fail to reach a requisite standard, proved unruly, or showed signs of wickedness or perverse character, he forfeited his right to the throne, and another [would] be installed in his place. . . .
The law rule of Mahu-smriti impacted all heirs to the throne, that is, ". . . never shall a wicked . . . son be installed on the royal throne."
In practice, dynasties failed as a result of foul deeds. Willful unworthiness, as in the case of King Saul of ancient Israel, destroyed or ruined all his rights to the throne. "It is clear that Saul’s sin is pinpointed as the cause for his loss of dynastic rights." Put another way:
A King . . . may forfeit his Right to the Crown, in the following Cases:
1. When he endeavors to overthrow the Kingdom and Common-wealth, that is, if it be his Purpose and Intention to destroy the Kingdom, like Nero and Caligula,
2. When he makes himself another's Vassal and subjects a free Kingdom to the Dominion of another, as Baliol, and
3. When he voluntarily resigns.
That is, by the innate and inherit "sense of justice implanted by nature in each of us," that is, by the law of nature, "the crowned criminal," the monarchs, "who are traitors to their own country," "guilty of high treason against humanity" have been deprived of not only "civil rights of honour" or political rulership, but also "the loss of princely rights of honour." In other words, de jure sovereignty and royalty is forfeit, which means the permanent confiscations of all titles, dynastic rights and privileges. So much so, that "this would mean that they would remain permanently incapable (should they remain alive) of ever again exercising their princely calling." Textor declared that, ". . . Such a King as this loses, by the Law of Nations, not only the possession of, but also the right to, his regalities [or royal privileges]. . . ."
When sovereignty is forfeited by crimes, a dynasty (for example, the Merovingians) ". . . justly lost the title and honours of a dignity of which they had abandoned the functions [and its vital, essential and necessary responsibilities]. . . ."
. . . The bad king deprives himself of the capacity to rule, and by his own misdeeds or ineptitude he ipso facto forfeits his royal rights. The unjust king ceases to be a king in the eyes of God; for king and right are inseparable ideas. [In other words] The ruler dethrones himself by his own misdeed. . . .
. . . Cain [the Biblical son of Adam] had a Hereditary Right to universal Monarchy, after the Death of his Father Adam: but it is apparent . . . that Cain, by the Murder of his Brother Abel, forfeited his Hereditary Right to Empire [or rulership]. . . .
. . . [The] principle of [hereditary] legitimacy, which was invoked by Louis XVIII, [was] recognized by the allied sovereigns [as legally valid in all monarchies]. But it must not be confounded [confused or mixed up] with the slavish doctrine [the theory of the divine right of kings], that the [hereditary] right thus vested is by divine origin indefeasible [that is, cannot be annulled, lost or made void]. [In other words] the heir-at-law [the crown prince] in private life may dissipate by his folly, or forfeit by his crimes, the patrimony which the law conveys to him; and the legitimate monarch may most unquestionably, by departing from the principles of the constitution under which he is called to reign, forfeit for himself, and for his heirs . . . [their] birthright [if they are involved as accomplices or accessories to his major crimes]. . . .
Loss of sovereignty requires that the case be severe, not a matter of whim, popularity, a fad or some false theory that cannot in any way justify sedition or bloodshed. In other words:
The penalty of forfeiture is an extreme case, provided, not in virtue of the constitution, which recognizes no possible delinquency in the sovereign, but because the constitution has been attacked and infringed upon by the monarch, and therefore can no longer be permitted to afford him shelter. The crimes by which this high punishment is justly incurred, must therefore be of an extraordinary nature and beyond the reach of those correctives for which the constitution provide, [such as] the punishment of ministers and counsellors. . . . . [In other words] His advisers, not he himself, shall be called, in such a case, to their responsibility. But if, like James II., the Sovereign infringes upon, or endeavors to destroy, the constitution itself, it is then that resistance becomes lawful and honourable, and the King is justly held to have forfeited the right which descended to him from his forefathers, by his attempt to encroach on the rights of the subjects. (emphasis added)
Severe violations could result in a termination of all rights. For example, "The minor princes [of the German Empire] . . . knew that their thrones would be instantly forfeited if they refused to join in the struggle against an invader. . . ." A violation of sacred covenants of defense in a state of invasion would be an act as grave as treason and sedition. Therefore, covenant violation in this context ended all hereditary, dynastic, and family rights.
The following is an example of the ruin of a whole dynasty. In the early 1800s, the British government, in an agreement with the chiefs of the Island of Ceylon, declared:
. . . that the Rajah Sri Wickreme Rajah Singha, by the habitual violation of the chief and most sacred duties of a sovereign, has forfeited all claims to that title, or the powers annexed to the same, and is declared fallen and deposed from the office of king; his family and relatives, whether in the ascending, descending, or collateral line, and whether by affinity or blood, are also for ever excluded from the throne.
This document on the part of the British government legally acknowledged that "a habitual violation of the chief and most sacred duties of a sovereign" constitutes the right of a forfeiture of sovereignty, which is sustained by international law. This happened because of severe and extraordinary wrongdoing on the part of the whole royal house of Ceylon, such that all dynasts were guilty as accessories and accomplices to the crimes of the king. The offenses were of such a magnitude that the king and his house were forever denied the right to rule. The following is a description of it:
. . . The cruelties and oppression of the Malabar [Ceylon] ruler, [included] the arbitrary and unjust infliction of bodily tortures, and the pains of death, without trial, and sometimes without an accusation or the possibility of a crime, and in the general contempt and contravention of all civil rights. . . . [The offenses – cutting off arms, noses and ears of innocent people] have become flagrant, enormous, and intolerable; the acts and maxims of his government being equally and entirely devoid of justice which should secure the safety of his subjects, and of that good faith . . . with the neighbouring settlements.
"The doctrine of hereditary right does by no means imply an indefeasible [or inviolable] right to the throne." The heirs can lose their rights just as much as a king or sovereign prince who is guilty of a major crime. In fact:
It is absurd . . . to suppose that any right of superiority [sovereignty] founded on mere natural descent is indefeasible [cannot be changed or altered] . . . [as] they may be discrowned and unkinged, for their crimes or those of their dynasty, and reduced, with their children, to the plain level of humanity [that is, become commoners like any other citizens].
However, it is also an ultimate ". . . perversion [an act of high treason for a people] . . . to disturb the fixed law of succession when the crown had done nothing to forfeit its hereditary rights." It is treachery of the highest magnitude.
If, on the other hand, a monarch is lawfully and rightfully dethroned, his successor, if he is not guilty, still holds the supreme and inalienable right to succeed, "but if he [the heir apparent] be dissolute [corrupt, degenerate] . . . or very wicked, and behaves himself as such, before he enters upon the Government, he is to be [that is, he can be] excluded from the Succession." "[However, the] Successor [cannot] be adjudg'd Guilty of mis-governing the Common-wealth, [or] any Crime of his own, when he has not committed one. . . ."
. . . The Vacancy of the Throne [for whatever reason] does not overthrow the Law of Succession. . . . A King who forfeits his Kingdom, does only forfeit it for himself, and not for his Posterity. . . . For it cannot be supposed, that upon declaring the Throne Vacant, all former Laws [are] ipso facto null. Now if our Laws be in force, the Succession cannot be wronged, nor our Monarchy devolve [be deposed], while there are natural Heirs politically capacitated: For it was never the design of our Laws, nor the Practice of our Kingdom, to [make the] Heirs [responsible] . . . [for] the . . . male-administration [the wrongs] of the Predecessor and it is inconsistent with the Law of Equity and Justice, to punish the Child for the Parents Fault.
The full and complete right to rule in the lawful successor is absolute and unalterable in a hereditary monarchy. This is because:
He that is born [to be] a king and a prince can never be unborn . . . the eldest son of such a king is, in respect of birth, the Lord's anointed in his father's life-time, . . . to deprive him of his right of reversion [his right to be the sovereign prince in the future] is as true [an] injustice as to dispossess him of it.
In other words:
When a king forfeits his authority, his heir ought naturally to remain in the same situation, as if the king were remov'd by death; unless by mixing himself in the tyranny, he forfeits it for himself.
If the monarchy was hereditary, unless the heirs acquiesced, consented or gave up without protest to the forced loss of their rights, they would still hold all sovereign and royal rights and privileges fully intact. This principle is true in situations where there is a ceding of the kingdom or principality without the approval and acquiescence of the heir or heirs to the throne. In this context, hereditary rights mean that:
. . . [No] abdication, renunciation, or surrender [can] be valid [or impact the whole royal household] without the free [will acceptance and] consent of the prince royal and the other princes of his family both in the direct and collateral branches.
For an example of this important concept, His Majesty Vyner Brooke, the lawful king of Sarawak, sometime after World War II, ceded the sovereign territory of the Kingdom of Sarawak completely and in total to the British Empire for a large pension. His actions were objected to by His Royal Highness Anthony Brooke, the Raja Muda, or Crown Prince, whose objection meant that he retained all the non-territorial sovereign and royal rights to reign over the kingdom, but after years of fighting the British, he gave up and renounced his de jure rights in 1951 and thus lost all his entitlements and royal prerogatives. However, as Hugo Grotius declared:
. . . If a Prince . . . should decline to accept an additional sovereignty, or for the same reasons, should relinquish that, which he had already accepted, he would not be charged with injuring his heirs and successors, then unborn, who could have no rights before they had a natural existence.
That is, ". . . no rights can belong to a person before he has any existence. . . ." Those, who are born after the fact, have no birthright to any claim, but what existed at the time of either their birth or proven conception.
If the body of the nation declare that the king has forfeited his right [to rule] by the abuse he has made of it, and depose him, they may justly do it when their grievances are well sounded; and no other power [no other country or judge] has a right to censure their conduct.
Why? Because “An independent nation acknowledges no judge.” No world courts existed with authority to try such cases except on a voluntary contractual basis. So, “. . . who shall judge whether a king has been dethroned lawfully or by violence?” History can only give us an educated guess.
The party who have expelled the king, maintain that they have right on their side: the unfortunate prince and his allies flatter themselves with having the same advantage; and as they have no common judge upon earth, there remains no other mode of deciding the contest [unless arbitration is used], than an appeal to arms: they therefore engage in a formal war.
However just the cause of that king may be, who is expelled from the throne either by his subjects or by a foreign usurper, his allies are not obliged to support an eternal war in his favour.
No Hereditary Rights means Nothing can be Passed onto Posterity
Prescription, though a universal and a natural law, cannot overcome the fact that there is no such thing as hereditary rights in many former empires and kingdoms. Since, a dispossessed monarchy with no legally established hereditary succession cannot continue, the only alternative left is for a valid government-in-exile to be formed. It would have to be composed of the highest official authorities of the land to be the legitimate dispossessed government. The point is, in some countries, deposed monarchs and their heirs have absolutely no claim on anything. After being dispossessed of the kingdom, they have nothing left, because de jure non-territorial (deposed) sovereignty does not exist in their laws. This is the situation in an elective monarchy. It is also the situation where sovereignty is based on conquest, the succession of the strongest, or the mandate of heaven. (See "Prescription Cannot Preserve all Claims" chapter 3 of Volume 2) The following is one general example of total forfeiture, where there was little hope of continuing a conquered monarchy, because there was no legal deposed hereditary right in their laws:
. . . Conquest, with the power to retain and transmit, gives the only title to be had in Asia, a very short period of complete and firm occupation confers on a government, a dynasty, or a family, a good heritable right, and rapidly obliterates all preceding claims. . . . So that the English right by conquest and prescription to hold India is perfectly good -- is, in fact, the only valid and recognised title known to Asia.
Ancient Imperial China operated differently, but also had no recognition for the depose to hold any sovereign other than to be an ordinary citizen or subject of the next dynasty. No Chinese dynastic house had a permanent right to rule, which is the opposite of what was believed in Europe. A European house was granted the right to rule for all time and without end as long as they existed. So:
Unlike the [sovereignty of European] Divine Right of Kings . . . the Mandate of heaven by which the Chinese emperor [and his successors] ruled was a conditional mandate, not an absolute one. The emperor and his dynasty were legitimate as long as certain conditions were met. When these conditions were not fulfilled, the mandate was declared forfeit and transferred to another line of rulers more capable of fulfilling these conditions imposed by the mandate. (emphasis added)
When the “Mandate of heaven” to rule was lost in a deposition, the members of the formerly sovereign House were immediately treated like they were merely ordinary citizens under the new Emperor.
Within Imperial China, this cultural norm was derived from their political philosophy. Unlike in Europe, where heredity impacted who had a right to rule, the philosophy of Confucius ". . . posed a direct challenge to the principle of heredity as the ultimate principle of legitimate power. . . ." Succession was supposed to go to the most able and the most virtuous regardless of heredity or even race. "If the people killed or deposed an emperor, it was a sure sign that the emperor had lost the mandate of heaven;" which was to lose everything royal and sovereign. ". . . Allegiance to the reigning family is not indefeasible, and at the present day, even loyal subjects regard the signs of the times as pointing to a change of dynasty." In other words, the Chinese Imperial right to rule ". . . does not rest upon the principle of legitimacy or of divine right, but is solely determined by possession [not by any legal right]. . . ." There was simply no "de jure" internal sovereign right for a deposed royal house in China just as there was no legal right for an elective monarchy to bypass the elective laws. Prescription, though ageless and universal, cannot apply or override monarchies that are based upon different principles where no deposed rights exist. Therefore, all dynastic regal rights ceased immediately upon dispossession. As a direct result, no right to rule could be passed on to posterity.
Another example of an immediate loss of all rights upon dispossession was observed in many historic Islamic monarchies:
. . . Islamic jurisprudence had, over the ages, shown an amazing tolerance for usurpers, revolutionaries and persons aspiring to kingship. Success in overthrowing this or that monarch was almost immediately followed by the legitimizing of the takeover by the Shari'a or holy law. Under the circumstances, no crowned heads could ever feel entirely safe.
Again, the culture and legalities of these lands did not allow for deposed rights. "Succession was determined by the de facto ascendance to the throne. . . . Pure force and not primogeniture [heredity] or consecration thus defined the ascension [and succession] to sovereignty." In other words:
. . . Where religion [or legalities] considers victory or success [in dethroning a monarch] as a divine [or secular] decision in the favor [of the usurpation of the current king or sovereign prince] . . . [there is] no such thing as a monarch de jure, but only de facto. (emphasis added)
In such countries, sovereign prescription does not exist, because the old deposed rulers and their families have no rights left after being dethroned. They lost everything of a royal and sovereign nature after dispossession. In other words, by law and convention, the new rulers are immediately endowed with all the legal power and rights of full sovereignty. The dethroned, being completely destitute of any right to non-territorial sovereignty, could not pass it on to their posterity, which is self-evident, because, "you can't give what you don't have," or "you cannot bequeath to posterity what belongs to someone else." As Grotius made clear, ". . . They [definitely] cannot . . . give to another what they themselves have not. . . ."
A lack of legal, non-territorial sovereignty in a kingdom or nation means the deposed automatically become commoners. This can happen in a hereditary monarchy as well, if the regicide takes place and collateral or offshoot lines do not have any right of succession. Because in many Houses only the royal house itself has the exclusive unshared entitlement to sovereignty, usurpers often had the whole royal house executed.
In a hereditary monarchy, this right [to sovereign rule] is indissolubly linked to the person of the members of the reigning family in the established order of succession. It can only die out by the death of all its members, who, themselves, or their descendants, could have been called to the crown by virtue of that order of succession. That is why Machiavelli says in his book The Prince, that the usurper could not firmly establish his power, if he did not take the life of all the members of the family which reigned legitimately.
If a royal House is destroyed by a complete regicide, relatives, who had no original succession rights, still have nothing. They cannot give to posterity what is lost or they never held. In other words, if the House rules do not support succession rights for collateral lines, then all regal rights in the House become extinct. You cannot give what you do not have.
Protectorates, Vassals, Quasi-Sovereignties
There are varying levels of regal rights intrinsic to protectorates, vassal states, and quasi-sovereignties. With reference to internal sovereignty, protectorates can generally be divided into three kinds:
1. The first consists of those protectorates over which the Crown exercises external sovereignty only. The internal sovereignty is left wholly to some local government to which the territory is recognized as still belonging. . . .
2. The second class of protectorates consists of those in which the Crown exercises not merely exclusive external sovereignty, but also some measure of internal sovereignty, concurrently. . . .
[3. The third type is where] the whole governing authority of such a protectorate, whether external or internal, is in the hands of the Crown.
Historically, the sovereign rights of protectorates, vassal states, and quasi-sovereignties varied in scope.
Some regalities [in Europe] had full regalian rights and were indeed miniature kingdoms complete with chancery, justiciar and all the other great offices of the feudal state. . . . Other [vassals, dependencies, etc.] . . . had no such powers. . . .
As seen above, some were fully sovereign, some were total dependencies with no sovereignty at all, or they were somewhere in between. It all depends on the situation and the agreement between the weaker nation and the strong and more powerful nation that is in control. As Johann Wolfgang Textor (1693-1771), one of the founding fathers of international law, declared:
There is . . . no absurdity in the possession . . . of true rights of sovereignty by one who yet is and remains the vassal of another. This is, indeed, the case, where the vassal is so vested with the practical lordship (dominium utile) of a realm -- which implies the utmost force and effect of sovereignty -- that he can exercise it, so far as rights of Majesty are concerned, independently of the consent of his directly superior lord. . . .
The inferior party retains its sovereignty, provided that the party is "under protection, not under domination,". . . "under patronage, not under subjection. . . ."
When the vassal does not have the rights of actual lordship, then sovereignty is non-existent and the protectorate is merely a dependent entity even if it boasts to having a king or a hereditary monarchy. Semi-sovereignty simply does not square with the definition of sovereignty as being an absolute right, because ". . . absolutes don't exist in degrees. You can't be partially pregnant, sort of dead, kind of human, or almost sovereign. These are not absolute conditions."
Sovereignty is an entire [whole and complete] thing; to divide it is to destroy it. It is the supreme power in a state, and we might just as well speak of half a square or half a triangle as of half a sovereignty.
This is why the well-known political philosopher, Jean Bodin, taught:
. . . that a king who holds territory in vassalage to another loses his sovereignty. . . . He ultimately concludes that subjection to another’s sovereignty through homage [vassalage] is indistinguishable from the condition of a slave [not a supreme ruler].
However, this is not true, if the king or sovereign prince of a dependent fief is internally supreme within his or her kingdom. Once internal supremacy is lost, the ruler is demoted from being supreme to a metaphorical-obedient lap dog. Such a ". . . prince who holds anything in fealty is not sovereign." He wrote, "Those who are sovereign must not be subject to the authority of anyone else. . . ." This kind of rigid, all or nothing, thinking led Bodin to deny sovereign authority to all mixed governments even the English king in Parliament.
History provides many examples of rulers who were called kings, who held the title in name only.
It should be remembered . . . that the [exalted] title of king did not invariably denote sovereignty; and, according to the ancient feudal system, of which those Irish kings formed a part . . . were in a state of vassalage. The King of Majorca was tributary to the King of Aragon; the King of Man to the King of Scotland; and the Kings of Ireland to the King of England. . . .
The possession of the royal status or condition does not indicate that the possessor of it is invested with any determinate political powers . . . or sovereignty. . . . The powers possessed by persons of royal dignity have been very different in different times and places . . . As [an example] popular institutions were developed in Greece, the office of king became, in several states, merely honorary. . . . In like manner the Teutonic kings were only the chiefs of the military and . . . did not possess . . . sovereign power. . . .
[The only thing we can conclude is] that king is a title of honour which may be borne by persons having very different amounts and sorts of political power.
In more modern times:
The kings of Poland [from about the 16th to the 18th centuries] present a clear case of royalty without sovereignty [as they were merely finger puppets to the powerful and sovereign princely nobles of the land]."
Such kings were not sovereign, because they were dependent vassals. According to Textor, ". . . [a dependent] realm is barred [devoid or empty] of sovereignty by the Law of Nations." Nevertheless, if they are not internally and externally dependent or regulated by the suzerain, then in international law, ". . . tributary states, and those subject to a kind of feudal dependence or vassalage, are still considered as sovereign. . . ." The way to tell, if a vassal is sovereign or not, was described by Textor. He declared that the protectorate is sovereign if the leader can:
. . . undoubtedly make laws for them [his fief] freely, strike treaties, declare war, make peace, and exercise other like rights of sovereignty, without either advice or command from the [overlord or sovereign chief].
The proper test, according to Phillimore, is its capacity de facto to deal with other states in peace or war, without reference to the protecting state. States which have lost this capacity have been called semi-sovereign states. They have the organization of an independent nation, but are in practice subject to the rule of another state. . . .
Sovereignty exercised de facto over any territory makes it the territory of the sovereign [or dominant] state.
Textor made it clear that:
. . . It is impossible for one to be at the same time Vassal and true King, unless the terms of the grant (or what comes [or amounts] to the same thing, namely, ancient and uninterrupted usage [in other words, prescription] expressly provide otherwise.
In other words, ". . . To what degree [a] dependent [nation is sovereign or not], will depend upon the treaty or treaties by which it is made dependent. . . ." In fact, a treaty or grant is one of the best ways to preserve rights, because, it is the nature and disposition of almost all suzerains to encroach upon the sovereign rights of weaker and dependent governmental entities with the desire to eventually either take them over completely or to make dependent puppets of them.
A good example of such a protective agreement is the Treaty of Georgievsk of 1784 between the Kingdom of Georgia and Imperial Russia. The Russian emperor was "to preserve His Serene Highness Tsar Irakli Teimurazovich and the Heirs and descendants of his House, uninterrupted on the Throne of the Kingdoms of Kartli and Kakheti . . . forbidding [the Emperor’s] Military and Civil Authorities from intervention in any [domestic laws or orders]." The Kings of Georgia thus maintained themselves as real and authentic sovereigns over their kingdom.
Another more modern example is the 1912 Treaty of Fez which allowed France to take over many sovereign functions for Morocco, both in internal and external affairs, but Morocco retained its international status and preserved its Sultan’s exclusive right to rule by Treaty as did the Kingdom of Georgia.
Many vassals or dependencies were definitely non-sovereign. The vassal kings of the Byzantine empire, especially in Europe, for example, ". . . were not independent, but dependent, they were not sovereignties, but vassals to the Roman, or as we wrongfully term it, the Byzantine Empire." This is why, "Most of the offices and titles [in the Byzantine Empire] were honorifics only. . . ."
The Eastern Empire (Byzantium) was different in many ways from Western Europe. For example, feudalism did not really exist in the Byzantine Empire. There were similarities, but Byzantium was organized quite differently. "The concept of [European] vassalage and the hierarchy it produced was foreign [or alien] to Byzantium." "Being highly centralized and patrimonial . . . the aristocracy [governors, rulers, and kings, etc.] always remained reliant on the emperor [that is, they were subject to his right to rule in all things]. . . ." However, in Western Europe vassals and fiefs were often internally independent and sovereign. That is:
Each feudal lord (whether he was a king, a noble, or a knight) was virtually a sovereign or ruler in his own fief or domain. He collected taxes from his vassals, dispensed justice, exacted obedience and loyalty, and received gifts and services. When he went out to war, his vassals accompanied him as fighting men.
In contradistinction, in the Byzantine Empire, the vassals were dependencies and the emperor was the supreme authority everywhere. That is:
. . . When granting out fiefs to hereditary holders -- a practice that became essential on a wide scale [in the Byzantine Empire], especially on the borders of the empire – the government succeeded in maintaining the direct supervision of every fief holder to itself and in thus avoid[ed] the hierarchy of independent vassals and subordinate sub-vassals which became characteristic of European feudalism. (emphasis added)
The question is asked, "As allies of Byzantium, were they sovereign rulers or vassals who had surrendered a part of their sovereignty?" According to the above discussion, they were merely puppets rulers with exalted titles.
"There is no question that the Byzantine Empire [was] . . . the best organized state of the time. . . ." "Europe . . . developed as a territory of separate countries and kingdoms organized on feudal systems. In Byzantium, all territory was one empire under God." The political structure resembled a pyramid. At the apex was the emperor, the sovereign head over all, and he administered by an extensive bureaucracy that tightly ruled all entities in the empire through themes or provinces. This is in great contrast to the Holy Roman Empire, where the kingdoms and principalities were independent sovereign entities that were organized to work together.
In the Byzantine Empire, the so-called kingdoms that existed were merely figureheads or puppet states. All were subject to the emperor and his powerful bureaucratic officers. People in high position were often honored with high-sounding titles, but they were not given supremacy or sovereignty.
The following example confirms the true situation of one of these allied border land vassals:
Tiberius [I (578-582 AD) the Byzantine emperor] formally declared Mundir deposed as the king of the [name redacted people] and that the [name redacted -- a border state] Basikia was to have a new incumbent soon. Furthermore, this could only be done through the basileus [the great king or emperor] in Constantinople, who was the kingmaker [the real sovereign of the land]. Two years before he had crowned Mundir; now he dethroned him and made another [name redacted -- a border] king. It is the emperor who makes and unmakes the federate [vassal puppet] kings of the empire. [He, as emperor, was the real sovereign of the whole empire and all its many different people]. And the case of this brother of Mundir is the third one in which Tiberius actually, and explicitly in the sources, appears as a . . . kingmaker [the real or true sovereign entity over this border state].
". . . The Byzantine emperor was the full sovereign, the representative of God on earth, and all other Christian rulers were in one way or another . . . [merely] his vassals or dependents. . . ." In other words, ". . . The emperor was the sole repository of sovereign power [in the whole empire]." "Only in religious affairs does the absolutism of the Emperors find itself genuinely limited." Thus, it is highly questionable to believe that any kingdom (including the allied controlled border kingdoms of the Byzantine Empire) were sovereign with what information we have. One thing is clear, however, ". . . the Byzantine autocrator [the emperor] was the supreme head."
Being a typical vassal or puppet state, "[The] [name redacted -- this border state's] kings [were] not allowed to mint coins." Why? – Because:
. . . no Christian vassal ever struck gold [coins] without intending to proclaim his own independent sovereignty and . . . to defy the suzerainty [that is, the supremacy] of the Caesars.
That is, ". . . to strike coins [was] the surest mark of sovereignty," in the ancient world of those times. ". . . The coinage of gold, no matter where, was always intended as a marked defiance to the pretensions of sovereignty by the Roman Empire. . . ." Hence, the vassals did not strike their own coins, but they instead used the coinage of Byzantium with the image of their sovereign lord upon it. Because "the right to coin money has always been and still remains the surest mark and announcement of sovereignty," the [name redacted -- the border state] were not allowed to mint coinage. This is one of the ways one can tell if claim to the rights of a kingdom or principality is rightful or not, especially in Byzantium and its border states.
In other words, to be a king in many lands did not mean that the person was really a king in the full sovereign and royal sense. For example, "How fictitious this [presumption of] sovereignty was could be seen from the fate of the [name redacted -- the border] princes who crossed the paths of [the emperors] Tiberius and Maurice late in the century." The result of these conflicts was that these [name redacted -- border] princes were dethroned as discussed earlier. Supremacy, or the highest authority, always lies in he who has the power to dispossess and dictate, as the rightful sovereign, who becomes the next ruler in a territory, whether that governor is called a king or not. The supreme right was always in the Byzantine suzerain. He was so powerful, he could control succession in all his kingdoms. ". . . As is reported by the Arabic sources in the case of [the border king discussed] Tha'laba around 500 [AD again of the name redacted people]," his succession had to be confirmed by the Byzantium emperor. Obviously, this border state did not have sovereignty, but were nothing more than puppet state.
". . . Basileus [the Greek title for king], which was the common title for the rulers of the eastern dependencies of the Byzantine Empire . . . ," was also given to the governors of the dependent province of all Egypt. Even court judges were called basileus. It did not mean they were sovereigns, as obviously, provincial governors and judges weren’t really kings, but they were endowed with the same exalted title thereof. In other words, ". . . The authority of the basileus need not imply sovereignty. . . . The word . . . means ‘king’ only ambiguously," which means vaguely or inconclusively. For example, one ancient Byzantine border vassal basileus or puppet king, named Arethas, was recognized to be ". . . a king without a kingdom, a rex without a regnum [that is, without a kingdom or realm]. . . . The title basileus . . . had other contexts within which it could be used and was used [other than meaning a sovereign]." Therefore, being called a basileus did not mean a person was really was a genuine sovereign lord. The point is, in Byzantium, ". . . basileia carried with it no real territorial jurisdiction [that is, no real sovereignty] since [such] were settled on Roman soil . . . of whom the Byzantine autokrator was the supreme head."
As an example, ". . . Ashot [of Armenia] never achieved full sovereignty; he nevertheless acquired the title of King . . . ," under Byzantium rule and was given a crown, but he was not given supremacy. Byzantine kingly titles, coronations, crowns, and robes were certainly high honors, but sovereign supremacy was always retained by the emperor.
As mentioned earlier, the above situation that existed in Byzantium was not the case in the Holy Roman Empire. In the latter, there was as many as 300 immediate imperial fiefs that were internally sovereign, and were ruled by their own regal monarchs over their small territories. The Holy Roman emperor was more like a modern chairman of a corporate board, whereas the Byzantine emperor held supremacy over all. The Byzantine Emperor was the dictator, or supreme ruler, over all the governors and kings of his land. As an example of kings not being sovereign, note that, "The dependent king of Lazica . . . [was solemnly invested [by the Byzantine emperor] with the diadem, and his cloak and tunic of white silk, with a gold border, displayed, in rich embroidery, the figure of his new patron [Byzantium]." This vassal king was not supreme, he was subservient to the emperor and to his powerful bureaucratic ministers.
For these reasons, the grand prince and ruler of Russia, St. Vladimir (958–1015), even though he brought Byzantine culture and religion to Russia and even married the daughter of the Byzantine emperor, kept Byzantium dominance at arms length. This is because he would not have them ". . . infringe upon his own sovereignty. . . . [He would not allow] his status as a sovereign ruler [like so many others] . . . be reduced to that of a vassal to the Byzantine emperor."
This is not to say there were not numerous non-sovereign kings in both Roman and Byzantine times. Rome had a number of dependent "puppet-kings" who:
. . . surrendered their sovereignty to Rome. Their appointments as "kings" were conditioned upon their complete subservience to Rome’s imperial authority. . . . Rome allowed absolutely no competition to her sovereignty or glory."
In other words, "The [Roman] client kings were . . . false [national] symbols, subordinate to the real [supreme] king, the emperor." ". . . [The] kings . . . were really subjects of the superior power, as the kings of Armenia to the Romans. . . . [and later to their Byzantine Roman overlords]." The figureheads were not sovereign, but they were not without sufficient limited authority to function as ruling governors. They functioned with limited, dependent, or subordinate authority. They could not pass on a royal prerogative to their heirs simply because there was no royal sovereign prerogative to pass on. They were, in essence, merely high nobles and federal officers like the aforementioned basileus or kings who were merely judges and the non-sovereign governors of provinces. The legal maxim of nemo dare potest quod non habet (no one is able to give that which he has not) is legally applicable and binding in this situation. One cannot give to posterity what one does not have, especially when the legal right never existed or was lost a century prior through prescriptive neglect.
. . . The existence or non-existence of a sovereign authority does not depend . . . upon the bare fact of vassalage, but upon the nature of the fief . . . a prince even though the feudatory of another, does not thereby cease to be a sovereign, provided his person is not subject to another’s jurisdiction [as in the Byzantine empire] and he himself retains the absolute authority over his own subjects. He holds, in short, that "the sovereignty is measured by the seigneurie [the amount and quality of internal sovereignty held within] and not by the Seigneur [the suzerain or Imperial autocrat, thus apparently making internal rights to rule in a state the chief criterion of sovereignty].
Obviously the real answer as to whether a vassal or fief is sovereign or not, depends on a number of integral factors. That is, does the governmental entity have full and complete authority to rule internally without the interference of the protector and his ministers? Bodin declared, "They are not sovereigns [if] they are subject to the laws and commands of another. . . ." Similarly, English legal experts declared:
. . . the right of embassy [an integral component of a sovereign] does not belong to every great and powerful personage but only to a legal sovereign, the head of a sovereign state. It is only through the headship of an independent [not dependent] state that a prince is a sovereign. . . .
The simple fact is, "The independence of a territory is an all or nothing proposition in that an entity [vassal, protectorate or dependency] is either the highest level of authority in a territory or it is not." If a suzerain controls who becomes the next king or ruler, as in the example given earlier in this section, it is a sure sign as to who is really in charge and who is subordinate and non-sovereign. In summary, whoever has the right to approve, control or veto a succession obviously has greater authority than the king, his family, or anyone else in the vassal or fief. Put another way, if this is the case, the king is not an authentic king, but in name only. He is a figure head -- an appointed governor with a high, but empty or misleading title. The suzerain, in such a case, is the real grand head of the government and the so-called king is an underling or deputy.
If the kingdom or principality was truly sovereign before they acquiesced to the power of a suzerain or protecting nation, unless there was a treaty, or written law, that sovereignty would never be lost, there was a danger of losing all the rights or entitlements of dynastic sovereignty:
[The empire, kingdom or nation] who has the position of vantage in a treaty [of protection], if he is greatly superior in respect to power, gradually usurps the sovereignty [of the lessor power]. . . .
That is, far too often, the nature of such relationships.
. . . As an instance of political prescription, the case of a small nation that comes under the protection of a greater one and then fails to resist "encroachments" on its sovereignty; if it keeps silent, "its acquiescence constitutes, in course of time, an implied consent which legalizes the acts of the usurper."
Consider the following example:
It was a very modest request, that made of King Edward l England, in the year 1282, when, after the death of that most puissant of Welsh heroes, King Llewellyn, in the last great decisive battle between the English and Wales, and the subsequent beheading of David, the king's brother, the people asked, as one of the terms of peace, that they be governed by a prince of their own country. But when the condition was accepted the astute and not over scrupulous English king presented the over-credulous and deluded Welshmen with his own son, who, by dint of the accidents of birth, had been opportunely born a few days before, in the Welsh castle of Caernarvon.
The accidental potentate infant was then and thereupon "dubbed" by this strange investment with the title of Prince of Wales; which inexplicable titles has ever since been borne by the eldest sons of the kings of England; and the Welsh have modestly accepted the conditions, until England has acquired a . . . kingly [sovereign] prescription [over the] country and its people. This failure to demand, and claim rights that are unquestionably one's own [such as having their own prince to rule over them was permanently lost by silent acquiescence over a long period of time].
. . . If [a deposed monarch or] nation . . . does not resist the encroachments . . . if it makes no opposition to them, -- if it preserves a profound silence, when it might and ought to speak, -- its patient acquiescence becomes in length of time a tacit consent that legitimates the rights of the usurper.
Therefore, sovereigns must be vigilant:
It is indeed the duty of the king to keep a watch on all the lands and rights, all the powers, laws, and liberties of the crown of his kingdom, to keep them intact in their entirety and without diminution [or loss]. . . .
A surrender of rights leads to a loss of sovereignty. It doesn’t matter if true sovereignty existed in the past or in the here and now, internal de jure rights are lost by such actions. "What you permit, you promote." If a king subjects himself ". . . to serve and obey another, either of his own will or against his will, he would [by so doing eventually] lose the ‘Title and Rights of Majesty.’"
Knowing that it is the general trend for the strong to take over the weak, it is not surprising that the history of Europe is as follows:
This [sovereign] right [of fiefs] was . . . [eventually] usurped by the superior and powerful lords, among others by the kings. . . . When the publicist friends of feudalism complain that the sovereignty of the simple lords was usurped by great barons, and that of the great barons by kings, they are quite accurate; such was the case.
Of course, situations and circumstances can be very divergent in different kingdoms or principalities by their established policies, practices and customs. For example, the non-sovereign allied border vassals and kingdoms of the Byzantine Empire can be contrasted by a totally different paradigm that operated in the contemporary empires that were adjacent to their Eastern borders. For example:
The tradition of the Persia and Ottoman Empires (Hittites) was [much more favorable for] ". . . the vassal was guaranteed sovereignty in his kingdom, and also the sovereignty of his legitimate successors in his direct family line."
The dependent kingdoms and principalities of Persia and of the Ottoman Empire were upheld as sovereigns rather than being mere figureheads as was the practice in the Byzantine Empire. This Persian/Ottoman practice was a guarantee if the vassal was faithful and true.
However, all such historical conclusions are flawed to some degree or another. There is far too much assumption and mere guesswork involved to put a lot of reliance on them one way or the other. Therefore, royal claims must be built on facts not on assumptions based on hunches or wishful thinking.
Since real facts cannot be obtained in cases of great antiquity (since much of the evidence being destroyed over time), the claim can only be inferred. It can never be proven. Inferences, however, are not enough make a valid claim to the greatest secular right on earth, which is the right of sovereignty or the right of regal or dynastic privileges.
There is only one way to prove a valid sovereign claim, "A person legitimates his claims [is] when he produces [authentic] legal proof of their justice." Hence, as a general rule, the older or more ancient a claim to sovereignty is, the more likely it can never be legally supported as legitimate. Put another way, speculative evidence is legally the equivalent of hearsay. It is no better than irresponsible, reckless gossip. Thus, assumptive proof of sovereignty is empty and void of any legal worth or value in the real world. If the following critical issues cannot be established, then a royal claim is no better than a whitewash, which is a counterfeit imitation of what is real and authentic. The seven major issues are:
(1) If an ancient entity actually existed and is not a matter of conjecture or guesswork,
(2) If that territory was actually sovereign and this was demonstrable by solid facts,
(3) Whether there is contrary evidence making the claim of sovereignty unlikely or questionable,
(4) Whether the monarchy ever ceded, renounced, forfeited, or transferred its sovereignty to another person, family, or entity. This is extremely hard or impossible to prove, unless number five below is evident,
(5) Whether the deposed claimant to the territory can prove factually, not by assumption, that the previous claimants in his or her line consistently maintained the sovereign claim by following the rules of prescription. This is a central issue,
(6) Whether there is solid evidence of a hereditary right, not by a faulty or questionable genealogical line, such as, the McCarthy Moor scam. The claimant must be the rightful and true heir and the genealogy lines are accurate and verified. Out of hundreds of thousands of relatives (the present-day posterity of an ancient former royal house), there must be conclusive proof that the claimant is not an impostor feigning succession rights he does not have, claiming royal ancestors that are not his own, or being of a member of a juror collateral line rather than the succession line, and
(7) Whether the rules of succession have been rigorously followed according to the ancient laws throughout the generations. Or, if the rules have not been followed, that the House rules were changed appropriately according to international or constitutional rules. This change must be able to be proven by demonstrable evidence.
Otherwise, a claimant to a title has no legal or just foundation. The claim is no better than make-believe since it is only supported by speculation. In short, contradictory historical guesswork so typical of historical research cannot constitute a legally valid claim to supreme authority.
President Abraham Lincoln once asked, "How many legs does a dog have if you call the tail a leg?" His cabinet ministers answered five. But he said, "No, the answer is four. Calling a tail a leg doesn’t make it a leg." The dog still only has four legs; you simply can’t change the facts of reality or truth by calling it by another name. A fake prince is still an imposter and a rogue, no matter what he is called or even how popular he becomes.
Unprovable claims are merely illusory. They are not certainties. In summary, if a claim cannot be proven or verified under conclusive rules of evidence, then it is not a lawful claim. Only proven honors are valid, legitimate, and authentic. (See the sub-chapter entitled, "Substantial Proof is Required for Any Claim to be Considered Valid" in Chapter VI.)
Some families held onto sovereign territories by sheer power, but never held the legal and legitimate hereditary right or constitutionally established privilege to rule. They were temporary rulers without the lawful right to pass this exalted entitlement on to their posterity. For example, in the Byzantine Empire, hereditary monarchy was never established until the last two hundred years of its existence somewhere around 1200 AD. "The principle of hereditary succession had no legal sanction . . ." until that time. So for the most part ". . . Succession in Byzantium was not hereditary. . . ." "The imperial ideology made divine providence the decisive factor, which could make any individual the new emperor through military success."
It was a dogma, it was an axiom, that the emperor’s authority came directly from God. . . . [Therefore] if an emperor was deposed, this meant that the Grace of God had departed from him; and by the same token, the failure of the pretender proved that he had opposed God’s will. The circularity of the reasoning is identical to that lampooned in the old verse:
Treason doth never prosper; what’s the reason?
Why, if it prosper, ‘tis no longer treason.
For all its supernatural trappings, the doctrine is pure pragmatism: to become emperor proves that one is entitled to be emperor. Possession confirms the rights. It is an exact parallel to the Chinese Mandate of Heaven doctrine. It is a very destabilizing doctrine, since it invites anybody to try to seize the throne.
The well-known writer and priest, Saint Cyril (abt. 826-869 AD), who was a professor of philosophy in Constantinople, was asked the following by the visiting Khazars:
"Why do you persist in the bad habit of always taking as your emperors different persons, coming from different families? We, for our part, do it according to family." Cyril replied by quoting the example of David, who succeeded to Saul, though not of his family but chosen by God.
". . . The Byzantine Empire was far worse off under this pragmatic doctrine than Imperial China, where the hereditary principle prevailed and brought about long-lived dynasties [instead of so many violent coups]." The problem with this kind of succession was there was no Christian revelation appointing the ruler; hence the system promoted ruthlessness. "As a [direct] result, there was an extraordinary instability of individual imperial power. Half the Byzantines emperors were forcibly removed from power." "Thirteen were banished, eight were blinded, and twenty-one were murdered." This brutal system exemplified the crooked and morally bankrupt philosophies of "might makes right" and the end justifies the means. These idea have been used to rationalize a great deal of wrongs upon humanity. The tragic record of usurpation and instability contrasts negatively with the Holy Roman Empire, which did not have such a violent succession system, which only had about 30 emperors (kings) from five different families in a thousand years and only 7 were deposed. Compare this with the Byzantium Empire, which had about 27 successful usurpers and 172 unsuccessful attempts to overthrow various emperors.
The Byzantine idea that the Emperor was ultimately selected by God . . . perversely, helped successful rebels and usurpers: If you were able to depose the existing Emperor and rule in his place you obviously had God's approval -- otherwise He would never have allowed you to succeed.
As for dynastic succession, Ibn Khurradadhbeh notes that kingship in the Byzantium is not hereditary: "There are no codes that regulated imperial succession; it is open to anyone, including women. Only strength counts."
A very ancient, possibly the most ancient method of settling these quarrels [over sovereignty] was that which has been called in our day Natural Selection [or survival of the fittest]. The competing chiefs fought it out, and the ablest, or the strongest, or the luckiest, lifted himself into supremacy.
This method of resolving dynastic disputes is sometimes called cut-throat succession. Since the right to the throne was not hereditary in these disputes, no dethroned family had any legal or lawful right to the Imperial throne. Therefore, whatever rights they had were immediately lost to them upon being dispossessed. Both non-hereditary and elective monarchies had no de jure sovereignty or royal entitlement once they were removed from office. Once dispossessed of de facto power, the former king or emperor had nothing legally left. There is just a memory of past glory because, ". . . No law of succession was issued, and the way to the throne remained open to anyone except an eunuch or a monk." "There was no constitution [in the Empire] in which the imperial succession was laid down. . . ." There were occasional episodes of co-emperorship, but this practice was not a legal hereditary system. Some of the co-emperors were not even family members. It was merely a way to get around the fact that the family had no legal right to the throne.
"Hereditary succession was never firmly established in the Byzantine empire." Only the last Byzantine dynasty legally instituted the lawful and legal right of hereditary inheritance. That is, ". . . after 80 years of continuous rule the dynasty of Palaiologos had established an inalienable right to the crown [of the Byzantine Empire]." This was the ". . . establishment . . . on a permanent [legal] basis of a single Imperial family at Constantinople -- the Palaiologos family -- the victory of a purely hereditary and dynastic succession. . . ." Before this time, families held onto the crown through the manipulation of circumstance, that is, by making a son a co-emperor, so when the emperor dies his son will reign after him. Many of their tactics, however, involved treachery.
As already discussed, these prior families did not have the automatic de jure right by law to pass this honor on to their descendants if they were deposed. As a direct result, no prior house to the Imperial Palaiologos dynasty could pass on any rights in the hereditary dynastic sense, because they didn’t own any legal hereditary right to pass on Imperial rights. The Byzantine Empire was exclusively a de facto sovereignty until the Palaiologos dynasty were eventually able to change the legal situation. You simply cannot pass anything on to your posterity that you don't lawfully and rightfully possess. This kind of succession was a continuation of the way the most ancient Roman Empire consistently applied. For example:
If we compare the Roman monarchy to other monarchies with real [legal and lawful hereditary] dynastic legitimacy, such as the Danish, French, Ottoman, or even Spartan monarchies, the difference becomes quite clear. Whenever a Roman emperor fell, his sons, without exception, always fell with him [they had no legal right to rule after him]. This cannot happen with a monarchy with dynastic [hereditary] legitimization. The Ottoman case illustrates the difference. If the Sultan was deposed and killed, only his sons were qualified to rule.
It may be objected at this point that the sons of Roman emperors [often] became the successors of their fathers. That is true. . . . [However], it is not at all the result of a specific dynastic legitimacy [or a legal right]. . . . [The right could not be passed on, as] in monarchies with dynastic [or hereditary] legitimacy, as the Ottoman case vividly illustrates.
Nature law and common sense teaches us that:
. . . They [the descendants] have no right to inherit any thing from him, which [the father does not truly] own. . . . They can have no pretence [no legal and lawful claim] to inherit from their ancestor, what such ancestor himself had no right to. . . .
All family ownership of sovereignty obviously permanently ends with the death of a non-dynastic or elective king. For example, consider the German Holy Roman Empire:
The early Germanic kings . . . did not come to the throne through a simple personal right of succession. . . . [It was] election . . . alone [that] gave them a legal right to the throne. . . . At best they possessed only a "privileged throne-worthiness. . . ."
[The Elector] assemblies in Germany always retained a voice in the election of their emperors; and though they often made their choice [as though] from the line of succession, they never acknowledged any hereditary rights whatever.
"The German monarchy had always contained an elective element but after 1273, it becomes purely an elective. Emperors could not pass their title to their sons." Therefore, as with the Byzantine Empire, "The title of Holy Roman Emperor could not be inherited." That is the nature of elective or non-hereditary sovereignty. For example, it was a recognized fact that, "No dynastic [hereditary] rights had been violated by the liquidation of the Polish elective monarchy . . ." in the late 1700’s. The reason, as stated earlier, is that no hereditary rights exist in an elective monarchy.
Sovereignty is Alienable
Vattel makes the statement that "every true sovereignty is inalienable." When this is quoted out of context, it gives the wrong impression. In the same chapter as the above quote, Vattel discusses the transfer or alienation of the crown – the opposite of inalienability. For example:
If it [a kingdom or nation] entrusts that authority to a prince, even with the power of transferring it [the right of the rule] to other hands, this can never take place without the express and unanimous consent of the citizens. . . .
What this means is that the crown may be given to another, but the people still hold ultimate say on whether it is alienated or not. If one merely quotes "every true sovereignty is inalienable," then one can misinterpret what is being said. Vattel continues:
Let us conclude then, that, as the nation alone has a right to subject itself to a foreign power, the right of really alienating the state can never belong to the sovereign, unless it be expressly given him by the entire body of the people. (emphasis added)
Can the people allow the sovereign prince to alienate the crown and give it to someone else? Yes, which means internal sovereignty is alienable under certain circumstances. Care must be taken not to read into a short sentence something other than the intended message. Vattel declares, ". . . many authors particularly Grotius, give long enumerations of the alienations of sovereignties. But the examples often prove only the abuse of power, not the right." But then he explains:
Neither are we to presume that he [the sovereign] possesses a right to nominate his successor or surrender the scepter to other hands, -- a right which must be founded on an express consent, on a law of the state, or on long custom [prescription], justified by the tacit consent of the people.
The common practice of buying and selling sovereignty was by long custom and tacit consent. This is because proprietary sovereigns owned the territory as a family possession and therefore had the right to sell what was theirs. In contrast, a non-proprietary sovereign would obviously need permission, but not a royal and regal owner.
A "Patrimonial" [or proprietary] monarchy is not simply a hereditary monarchy: it is monarchy in which ". . . the king by title of prescription possesses or owns sovereignty," and therefore (if sovereignty be regarded as the essence of the State) owns, or is, the [actual] State. (emphasis added)
This is by being the personification or embodiment of the State. This kind of king or sovereign prince is the rightful owner and therefore lord of the land and the rights to all of its majesty and glory. As such, he can convey it to someone else. In doing so, he loses all the honors and dignities that go with it. Of course, as Vattel writes:
We do not find any great state that is reputed alienable. If some petty principalities have been considered as such, it is because they were not true sovereignties.
This statement taken on its own, out of context, can misrepresent the message being conveyed. That is, if one reads the whole section, it becomes quite clear that Vattel is talking about the sovereign rights of the people in a non-proprietary or unowned kingdom or principality. In other words, the big picture or true interpretation is to be observed by reading farther as to what was really meant. He wrote:
We do not find any great state that is reputed alienable [that is, alienable without the consent of the people of the land]. If some petty principalities have been considered as such, it is because they were not true sovereignties. They were fiefs of the empire, enjoying a greater or lesser degree of liberty: their masters made traffic of the rights they possessed over these territories [they bought and sold, mortgaged them, etc.]: but they could not withdraw them from a dependence on the empire.
In contrast, the principalities that were bought and sold in the Holy Roman Empire were mostly proprietary and the people did not need to be consulted. That is, "Within determined [a certain type of] territories, princes acted like kings in their own realms. Their principalities were 'statelets.'" In other words, they were, in effect, small states or independent nations for the most part:
. . . One of the principal things he [the Emperor] promiseth in his Oath, is, That he will save to every of the States their Rights and Privileges, and disturb none of them in the exercise thereof. And this is one of those Rights in which the Princes and States of Germany take the greatest Pride; That every one of them can govern their own proper Subjects, according to his own will, or to the Compacts he has made with them.
. . . The princes were not mere officials of the Empire with delegated powers, but true rulers [sovereigns or monarchs] who represented their dominions in the Imperial Diet. . . .
[In] the eleventh century . . . the possessor of the fief, great or small, possessed all the rights of sovereignty in his domains. No external or distant power gave laws there, established taxes, or administered justice; the proprietor alone possessed all this power . . . in a word, he was sovereign.
[Thus the] great feudatories [or fiefs] were petty kings ruling petty kingdoms. These facts did not escape contemporary notice and so it is not astonishing that legalists categorized duchies, [princes] marquisates, and counties as fiefs of regal dignity.
The pivotal nature of the Peace of Westphalia lies in the fact that it recognized the full territorial sovereignty of the member States of the Holy Roman Empire. . . .
However, the treaties of the Westphalian Peace Accord of 1648 merely recognized the actual fact that they held internal supremacy all along. "By this [these treaties] and other changes the princes of the empire became absolute sovereigns in their own dominions [and the constitution of the Empire officially acknowledged it]."
. . . If such Kingdoms [or principalities] are Patrimonial . . . I cannot see any Reason why such a Prince may not alienate his Dominion over such a Kingdom and People, as well as any private Man may his Property in his Estate. . . . But in limited, or Hereditary Kingdoms, which are such by their Fundamental Constitution, I suppose, the Prince cannot, upon any account whatsoever, make over his Dominions to a foreign Prince without the Consent of his People, and next Heir.
. . . The monarch was the owner of the entire realm. . . . In him lay the final legal title to all land. All other persons had "tenures" rather than rights of ownership.
. . .This patrimonial conception of monarchy explains the accepted idea that the throne might be inherited, or willed away by testament, like a piece of property, and that it might be bought and sold, and acquired by marriage. It explains also the recognized right of the king to requisition, upon occasion, the goods of his subjects, and even to sell those subjects themselves to foreign powers, as, for example, was done when the Hessian soldiers were sold by their ruler to England for use against the Americans in the Revolutionary War.
Princes can cede, concede, or contract away all or any part of their patrimonial power, as every proprietor can give, grant, or make contracts with respect to all or any part of his property. Sovereignty is property of the prince. Such is the patrimonial conception of the State in the fullest sense of those words.
Obviously, it is important not to take things out of their context and misinterpret things. There were both proprietary and non-proprietary rulers of principalities in the Holy Roman Empire. Both kinds of sovereigns could alienate their rights, although the non-proprietary type needed permission. But the important point is that both proprietary and non-proprietary realms could gain or lose dynastic rights through various processes.
Territories were transferred back and forth and thus boundaries were [quite fluid] drawn and redrawn as a result of war, conquest, treaties, dynastic marriage, purchase and other transactions that largely disregarded the people who made their home in those territories. The people merely came with the territory.
The Buying and Selling of Sovereignty
Several hundred years ago, it was not uncommon for patrimonial kingdoms and principalities to be bought and sold:
. . . Grotius and the early writers upon public law [taught that] kingdoms were divided into patrimonial or proprietary, and usufructuary. The patrimonial, as it were, belonged to the monarch as a kind of private domain which he might alienate or dispose of it at will.
"Grotius saw sovereignty as a right in its own sense that could be acquired, partitioned, alienated or exchanged." He explained that, ". . . The law of nature . . . allows every man the right to relinquish what is his own. . . ." In other words, "As far as the Law of Nations is concerned, every State as a rule can cede a part of its territory to another State, or by ceding the whole of its territory can even totally merge in another State."
Sovereignty [in the Holy Roman Empire] . . . could pass by inheritance, testament, investiture, infeoffment, or even sale or lien. Its possession or enjoyment did not require noble status.
The right to receive [noble sovereign] investiture was nevertheless attached to the land, and could not be denied by the Emperor.
In truth, the greatest nations and the haughtiest rulers have engaged in such transactions; selling as the circumstances suited them outlying provinces of their vast estates. England, France, Germany, Russia furnish instances of this kind of traffic. A King of England sold Dunkerque to France. Napoleon sold the Mississippi valley to America. Most of the mediatized princes of Germany sold their sovereign rights for money. During the Caliph's own reign Russia has sold her great province of Alaska to the United States. Denmark has sold her duchy of Lauenburg to the King of Prussia. France has recently bought up the sovereignty in Monaco. Not many years ago the Prince of Mingrelia sold his sovereign rights to Russia for a pension, and more recently the Elector of Hesse-Cassel sold such remnants of his -- rights as had survived defeat to Germany. No one denies that such transfers of authority are legitimate, if they are carried out with due regard to all existing rights. In India we have bought up sovereignty after sovereignty. Not long since the King of Holland was on the point of vending Luxemburg to France.
The conclusion here is that, ". . . International Code specifically provides . . . that sovereignty may be bought and sold. . . ." (For literally hundreds of examples of the lawful transfer of kingdoms and principalities in the nineteenth century, see Edward Hertslet's book, The Map of Europe by Treaty showing the Various Political and Territorial Changes which have Taken Place since the General Peace of 1814, three volumes, 1875:
a. Volume I: http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.30112012254568;view=1up;seq=62
b. Volume II: http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.30112012254576;view=1up;seq=10
c. Volume III: https://archive.org/details/mapeuropebytrea10hertgoog
History is full of such examples, such as the following:
When the counts palatine of the Rhine began to execute their office, they neither possessed on that river lands, cities, nor castles; but having by degrees made great acquisitions by marriages, purchased, agreements, imperial donations, or otherwise, they have at length formed a very considerable principality.
Probably the first recorded example of the sale of the regal right to rule came from the writings of the ancient Hebrews. Esau, Isaac’s firstborn son, sold his birthright, his right to be the prominent heir to his brother Jacob for a mess of pottage. (Genesis 25:29-34) From the blessing given to Jacob, we learn what this amazing right actually consisted of:
Let people serve thee, and nations bow down to thee [certainly a description of a king]: be lord [another word for ruler, prince or king] over thy brethren, and let thy mother's sons [the posterity of Abraham] bow down to thee [that is, be subject to your kingship]. . . . (Genesis 27:29)
Jacob bought the sovereign right or birthright from his brother. The buying and selling and/or ceding of sovereignty is not a surprise to people who know and study European history. For example:
§ 10. Patrimonial Kingdoms. There are numerous examples of such treaties of sale. In 1301, Theodoric, Landgrave of Thuringia, sold the Marquisate of Lusatia to Burchard, Archbishop of Magdeburg, for six hundred marks of silver, -- "insuper cum ministerialibus, Vasaliset Mancipiis, et aliis hominibus cujuscunque conditionis in jam dicta terra commorantibus," etc. In the same manner, in 1311, Dantzic, Derschovia and Swiecae, were sold by the Margrave of Brandenbourg to the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, for ten thousand marks. In 1333, the city and territory of Mechlin was transferred for one hundred thousand reals of gold, by a treaty of sale between its sovereign and the Earl of Flanders, the fealty being reserved. About the same time, the city and county of Lucques were sold by John of Luxemburg to Philip of Valois, for one hundred and eighty thousand florins; and a few years after, the sovereignty of Frankenstein was sold by the Duke of Silecia, for two thousand marks, to the king of Bohemia. The sovereignty which the Popes so long held over Avignon was purchased by Clement VI., for eighty thousand florins, from Jane, Queen of Naples and Countess of Provence. (Ward, Law of Nations, vol. 2, pp. 258-260; Dumont, Corps Lip., liv. 2, pp. 330, 364, 365; Dupuy, Droits de Boy F. C, p. 70; Leibnitz, Cod. Dip., p. 200; Biquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 2.)
§ 11. In habitants of such kingdoms. The practice also extended to the mortgaging of sovereignties, and the sales of reversionary interests in kingdoms. Thus, Robert, duke of Normandy, in order to raise money to engage in the first crusade, mortgaged his duchy for six thousand six hundred and sixty-fix pounds weight of silver, to his brother William, and transferred the possession before his departure for the holy land. In 1479, Louis XL bought the right of the house of Penthievre, the next male heirs in reversion, to Britanny. And fifteen years later, Charles VIII purchased, for an annual pension of four thousand three hundred ducats, an estate of five thousand, in lands in France or Italy, and the disposition of the Morea (when conquered,) of [Andreas] Paleologus, the nephew of Constantine, the last Christian emperor, his right to the whole empire of Constantinople. The act of sale being drawn up by two notaries, and ratified, Charles [VIII of France] assumed the robes and ornaments of the imperial dignity, and made no scruples in claiming the imperial rights vested in him by virtue of this purchase. (Ward, Law ef Nations, vol. 2, pp. 260-262 ; Garnicr, Hist, de France, liv. 1, pp. 429, 461, 494; Russell, Hist Modern Europe, vol. 1, pp. 185, 472; White, Hist. of France, p. 208.)
§ 12. Modern transfers. It was also the custom to dispose of sovereignties and dominions by deeds of gift, and by bequests. The emperor Lewis V., created the dauphin Humbert king, with the full privilege of disposing of his sovereignty at will, during life, or at his death. In 1343, Humbert ceded his dominions to Philip of Valois, by solemn deed of gift. By similar deeds, and upon a like principle, the emperor Henry VI. conferred upon Richard I, the kingdom of Aries, and the emperor Baldwin gave to the duke of Burgundy the kingdom of Thessalonia. By bequests, not only were whole sovereignties disposed of, but the orders of succession were frequently changed. Thus, Charles H., king of Sicily and count of Provence, changed by will the order of succession to the county, and the claims of Charles VHI to the throne of Naples were founded upon the adoption of Louis of Anjou, by Jane, queen of Naples, in 1380, which was evidenced to all Europe by a solemn and public deed. (Ward, Law of Nations, vol. 2, pp. 262-264; Leibnitz, Cod. Dip., pp. 51, 237, 158, 220, 382; Pfelfel, Droit Pub. d'AUemagne, tome 1, p. 541; Henault, Hist. Chron, tome 1, p. 315; Dumont, Corps Dip., tome 1, pp. 288, 337, 362.)
In other words:
§7. A state may acquire property or domain in various ways; its title may be acquired originally by mere occupancy, and confirmed by the presumption arising from the lapse of time [prescription]; or by discovery and lawful possession; or by conquest, confirmed by treaty or tacit consent; or by grant, cession, purchase, or exchange; in fine, by any of the recognized modes by which private property is acquired by individuals. . . . (Wheaton, Mem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 4, §§ 1, 4, 5; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 221-277; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 2, cap. 4; Vattd, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, chs. 7 and 11; Rutherforth, Institutes, b. 1, ch. 3; b. 2, ch. 9; Puffendorf,de Jur. Nat. et Gent., lib. 4, chs. 4, 5, 6; Moser, Versuch, etc., b. 5, cap. 9; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 35, et seq.; Schmaltz, Droit des Gens, liv. 4, ch. 1; Kluber, Droit des Gens, §§ 125, 126; Heffter, Droit International, § 76; Ortolan Domaine International, §§ 53, et seq.; Bowyer, Universal Public Law, ch. 28; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, cap. 4; Biquelme, Derecho, Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 2; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, pt. 3, ch. 5.)
§9. Authority to make a valid transfer. . . . Formerly, what Grotius calls patrimonial kingdoms were considered in the light of absolute property of particular families, who, power, which must be superior to it in that respect; when any government is in that condition owing to any cause w hathaving received the blind submission of their subjects, sold and bartered them away, like any other property which they possessed. And such transfers of sovereignty included, not only the right of eminent domain and the absolute property of the sovereign or State, but all private lands, and the property, and services of the subjects, who were transferred with the soil, in the same manner as a slaveholder may transfer his slaves and all they possess, together with the title to his plantation.
As an example of a few more, note the following from the book: Atlas Geographus or, A Compleat System of Geography, Ancient and Modern, 1711, pp. 19, 61-62, 92, 291, 292, 294, 322, 323, 362 respectively:
"[Phillip] also purchas’d from the K. [king] of Aragon the Counties of Roussillen and Cerdaigne, with the Barony of Montpellier, which that King, held in Fee for the Crown of France."
"Twas given by Henry II of England and D. [duke] of Normandy to Robert de Montfort, afterwards purchas’d by Philip Angufius of France, came to the K. [king] of Navarre by way of Inheritance, was by him exchanged with Charles VI in 1410 and made a Dutchy and Peerage by Lewis XII."
"Twas called the great Fief of Annis, because it depended on the Crown, but was purchas’d from its Lords by Philip the Fair, and Phillip pf Valois."
"In 1422, the Cantons of Uri, Underwold, and Switz, purchas’d the Town of Belizona from the Count of Monfax, but the Duke of Milan pretending to it, seiz’d it before-hand, and the Sissers attempted several times to recover it, but in vain."
"In 1473, Charles the Warlike D. [duke] of Burgundy, having some Years before purchas’d the County of Ferrette from Sigismund of Ansiria. . . ."
"In 1493, the Cantons purchas’d the County and Town of Verdemberg."
"One of ‘em had great Differences with the People of Appenzel, who purchas’d their Liberty from him, and one of his Successors renew’d his Pretensions over ‘em afterwards. . . ."
"[It] was purchas’d, together with the Country, by the Six first Cantons in 1488 from the Count of de Montfert."
"Twas formerly a Lordship possess’d by the Family of Doria, but purchas’d by D. Emanuel Philibert in 1576. His Son made it a Principality in 1620, joining to it the Marquisate of Marre, and the Lordship of Prele."
"Sovereignty like anything else may be conveyed." ". . . It is this which gives the receiver [the purchaser] . . . regal [kingly and/or princely] right," depending on the legal status of the sovereign territory. Hugo Grotius declared that, "A free people, or a king, may alienate their territory, in part or in full." In other words, "A state may cede its own domain ["in totum"], in order to become a part of another state. . . ." The "cession" may ". . . come as a result of war, or cession by gift, sale, exchange or other international act. The treaty of cession usually prescribes the conditions under which the transfer is made. . . ." Hundreds of such conveyances took place. The following is one example:
Edwin, King of Northumbria, about 618, conquered the Isle of Man, and his successors held it till the invasion of Orry, a Danish chief, who, after subduing the Orkneys and the Hebrides, made this island the seat of his dominions. In the eleventh century the insular sovereign, Magnus the Dane, transferred his regal rights for a sum of money to Alexander III. of Scotland and it was governed by lieutenants under the Scottish kings till 1340, when Sir William de Montacute, afterwards Earl of Salisbury, invaded and conquered this island, with the sanction of Edward III., by whose command, in 1344, he was crowned King of Man. He subsequently sold it to Sir William Scroop, one of the favourites of Richard II. . . . (emphasis added)
In the past, ". . . sovereigns bought and sold [rulership or the regal right to rule from] one another. Specifically, they purchased [and sold] sovereign territory." This was permitted in ancient days and was a common practice, but no modern nation would obviously tolerate such an idea. Yet in 1803, the United States doubled its size by purchasing the "Louisiana Territory" for $15,000,000 from the Emperor Napoleon. All the rights to the present states of North Dakota and Minnesota were bought from the United Kingdom in 1818. In 1819, what is now the State of Florida and part of Louisiana was purchased from the Kingdom of Spain. In 1845, the right to rule Texas and most of New Mexico was bought from Mexico in 1853. Then to complete things, in 1867, His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, formally ceded all the rights of possession, ownership and dominion over what was then called the "Alaskan Territory" for $7,200.000. The United States also purchased the Philippine Islands from the Kingdom of Spain in 1898 for $20,000.000 in the Treaty of Paris.
The reason that this ancient practice of buying and selling sovereignty is presented here with so many examples is so the following is clear. Royal hereditary rights cannot be claimed by any persons today for kingdoms or principalities that were ceded or conveyed by his or her ancestors to someone else. Obviously, what is no longer owned or possessed cannot be passed on by inheritance.
[One means] of transferring royal authority . . . was the inheritance treaty. This was . . . a formal agreement between sovereigns to provide for the contingency that one of them might die without legitimate heirs. If this occurred the surviving royal house acquired a legal claim to the throne of its extinct partner. . . . They were openly based on the premise that royal power was essentially a private matter. Sovereigns [kings and princes] regarded their authority as essentially disposable . . . like any other personal possession."
. . . Cession is a mode of acquiring title, which requires no explanation. It demands the union of possession and right, which occurs where one party having possession and right transfers both to the other, or where the party having right being dispossessed transfers the right to the party in possession [or to another as chosen] . . . . Treaties . . . are the instruments of cession. (emphasis added)
In other words, not only could reigning patrimonial sovereignty be conveyed, but the sovereign rights and entitlements of a deposed monarch could be bought and sold as well and thereby permanently ceded to another. In other words, as stated by Burlamaqui:
Some are masters of their crown in the way of patrimony, which they are permitted to share, transfer, or alienate to whom they have a mind; in a word, of which they can dispose, as they think proper. . . .
A good example of this was the case of "Andreas (Andrew) [who] . . . was the only legitimate representative of the dynasty of the Palaeologi, who possessed the rights to the lost [that is, the deposed] Byzantine throne." It was a well-known historical fact that, "The title [or ownership] of Eastern Roman Emperor was the sole inheritance of Andrew Palaeologus. [As mentioned earlier] He sold his claim to Charles VIII of France [in 1494]." Andrew Palaelogus was the non-territorial, de jure and rightful Emperor of the Byzantine Empire. His direct line ancestors lost de facto or territorial rule to the Ottomans in 1453, and his family were deposed. An authentic transfer of all Imperial rights were conferred and given to King Charles VIII as a result of his purchase. The following Kings of France continued the claim and used the Imperial titles and honors: Louis XI, Francis I, Henry II and Francis II. Not until Charles IX, in 1566, was the claim neglected and therefore eventually lost by prescriptive law. Charles IX wrote that the imperial Byzantine title ". . . is not more eminent than that of king, which sounds better and sweeter." This disinterest was the equivalent of a juridical abandonment, because both he and those who came after him failed to use the imperial titles or use the Byzantine symbols of Imperial sovereign right. Therefore, the internal legal right to rule Byzantium was eventually lost and lawfully transferred by prescriptive rules to the Ottoman Empire – the successor state of the former Byzantine Empire.
In the Holy Roman Empire:
Sovereignty was exercised: by hereditary lords, by elected prelates, by municipal governments. It could pass [that is, be transferred] by inheritance, testament, investiture, infeoffment [complete surrender and transfer of all land ownership rights from one person to another], or even sale [buying it by purchase] or lien [the right to take another's property if an obligation is not discharged]. Its possession or enjoyment did not require noble status.
". . . The right to receive the investiture [as a sovereign prince or count for a noble or wealthy commoner] was nevertheless attached to the land [not the family], and [the right] could not be denied by the Emperor."
The dominical [royal or feudal sovereign] titles [of duke, prince, count, baron, lord, etc.) were associated with government of territories. Territories gave titles to their owners. E.g. a man became a count, when a king gave him a county. When the county went to a new owner, the old one lost the title [and all his dynastic rights].
In other words, sovereignty, dynasty rights, regal title and all royal perogatives were all lost, when a family sold their territory to another sovereign, noble or commoner, who had the acceptable amount of money to buy it. However, if they were illegally ousted and deposed, then they could, by natural and international law through prescription, still rightfully and legally continue to hold all the ruling and regal rights and entitlements on a de jure or non-territorial basis to the land and its people, even though they no longer were de facto rulers. Provided they properly preserved those rights.
In international law, as stated by Burlamaqui:
Nothing in reality hinders the sovereign power [whether reigning or deposed], as well as every other [corporeal or incorporeal] right, from being alienated or transferred. In this there is nothing contrary to the nature of the thing. . . . [Therefore, in a patrimonial kingdom] the prince shall have full right to dispose of the crown as he shall think proper. . . .
As stated by Vattel:
The agreements and contracts which the sovereign makes with private individuals, in his character as sovereign and in the name of the [reigning or deposed] State, follow the rules which we have given for public treaties.
What we can learn from this is a deed of transfer from a sovereign to a private individual takes upon it the legality and binding impact of a treaty.
These examples and more that could have been given illustrate the well-known practice of international law that sovereignty can be ceded, sold, mortgaged or otherwise transferred to another. This can even be found in Old Testament records where King Solomon gave Hiram, King of Tyre, the sovereignty and title to ten cities in the land of Galilee for all the fir and cedar trees that Solomon needed for his Palace and the Temple. (1 Kings 9:11) The process of conveying both reigning and deposed sovereignty, which includes all the rights of ius imperii, ius gladii, ius majestatis and ius honorum, is called inter-vivos. It is the transfer of all the honors, rights, dignities and privileges pertaining to the regal and/or supreme right to rule a nation.
Imperial and Papal Dethronements
In the medieval ages, Popes dethroned sovereign princes, kings and emperors. "[They] could shake the strongest dynasties, who made and unmade kings, and was the acknowledged suzerain of all European States. . . ." This, of course, has changed in the modern world, but it was a very real practice in medieval times. Whole dynasties were lost, and new royal houses were instituted or created. However, the Popes were pushed into becoming International Judges and Arbitrators by most of the Christian monarchs. (See Appendix II) Legal precedence and years of acceptance conferred legitimacy and legality upon their deliberations. That is:
The deposing power came:
. . . not in consequence of any divine rights, [but it was] founded either on compacts [agreements or treaties] or a long prescription pleading against monarchs, whose predecessors had rendered their kingdoms tributary to the Holy See.
If the . . . pontiffs have deviated from the primitive paths [of sticking to spiritual concerns instead of] meddling in the temporals of kings, the reason is obvious. They had [the law on their side] prescription to plead, oaths and treaties to support their claims. In the conduct of kings, choosing [the Popes] for arbiters of their quarrels, and liege lords [for] their territories, [in other words] they found a specious pretext to punish the infraction of treaties, and the breach of prerogative. A repetition of the same acts introduced custom. Custom supported by time, obtains the force of a law. The law bound the parties concerned, and the violation of the law has been attended with penalties.
Prescription is very powerful legally in terms of establishing a valid right.
. . . What is to be considered as establishing a principle in politics, and authorizing any form of government whatever, if it is not the uniform practice of centuries? Facts constitute in time prescription, and surely in matters of state, prescription is everything. . . .
. . . The [sovereign] rights of the Pontiffs, confirmed from age to age by the sanction of Christian nations, now stands before us with a prescription of eleven centuries.
Pope Pius IX clearly explained that the Popes legitimately acted under public international law in these situations:
Infallibility, if sufficiently understood, does not repose the power to depose Sovereigns. The Popes, in former times, deposed and dispossessed Sovereigns, not because of the infallibility of Popes, which only touches matters of doctrines, but because by authority, then recognized in the Popes, the disposition or dispossession was accepted as public law. Christian nations also accepted the Pope in those days as the supreme Judge.
This power no longer exists, since modern states generally act independent of papal wishes, but the Holy See’s power was widely accepted in those times to be so great that not only could a sovereign be removed de facto, but his whole hereditary dynastic rights could be seized and permanently revoked. In practice, the heirs legally lost all their rights with a dispossession of the Pope.
A man [king or sovereign prince] who is excommunicated, is deprived, ipso facto, of all temporal rights [which includes external sovereignty]; in such a case a prince is [also] deprived of royalty [internal sovereignty], and cannot do any royal act [that is, he cannot be a fountain of honor as a deposed king or once sovereign prince] without rebellion against his legitimate superior, the Pope. [In other words] the Pope may therefore deprive him of his crown, absolve his subjects from their oath of fidelity, and transfer his [principality, kingdom or] empire to another. If the prince persists in disobedience, he may be treated as a tyrant, in which case anybody may kill him.
As an example of this recognized international sovereign power, Pepin (who lived in the 8th century A.D.), who was ruling de facto the Frankish kingdom wrote to Pope Zachary (who reigned from 741 to 752) and asked whether the title of king belonged to the one who exercised it or to the one with actual royal lineage and hereditary rights. The Pope, being duly bribed beforehand, decided, in this case, to divest the lawful royal sovereign Chlderic III and his heir divesting them of all royal prerogatives and regal privileges, and crowned Pepin as King in his place. Thus ended Monrovian rule forever.
"[The Popes had] a [recognized and acknowledged] power that could at its option . . . create or destroy a dynasty. . . ."
As to the possession of the deposed man's kingdom, if the pope says nothing, the lawful heir succeeds. But the pope can assign, and often has assigned, the dominions of deposed princes to other[s] . . . and that at once gives them the right to seize such dominions.
The Popes claimed and rightfully exercised sovereignty to such a great extent that it was:
. . . the most absolute even over their bodies [that is, it was above or greater than any hereditary or dynastic right on earth, which the Popes could legally annul and terminate], their property [which could be taken or confiscated], and their governments [which could be banished, reorganized or taken over by a new monarchy appointed by the Papal king].
"[This power was] . . . asserted and held in terrorem over the princes of the world." Thus, by law, prescription and by practice ". . . [they] were entitled to depose sovereigns, and to transfer Kingdoms from one dynasty to another at their own will." They had recognized international authority to do this. A number of kings and/or sovereign princes willingly accepted Papal deposition rather than suffer the great punishment of having their lawful heirs lose the great privilege and honor of ruling after them. That is, ". . . [these monarchs would] prefer to lose the crown for themselves only, [rather than] losing it for the family as well."
The following is an example of a royal house losing all of its regal and sovereign entitlements:
Pope Martin IV excommunicated Peter, king of Arragon, declared that he had forfeited his kingdom, all his lands, and even the regal dignity, and pronounced his subjects absolved from their oath of allegiance. . . . He then offered Arragon and Catalonia to the Count de Valois, second son of Philip the Bold, on condition that he and his successors should acknowledge themselves vassals of the holy see, take an oath of fealty to the pope, and pay him a yearly tribute.
Showing the power they had over a whole dynasty, Henry III of Navarre was given the edict the "[W]e deprive them and their posterity for ever, of their dominions and kingdoms."
Papal dispossession often meant the immediate loss of every royal and sovereign privilege a House once owned. The descendants of those so disinherited could not restore or recover what the family no longer possessed. All rights were ended by the highest international law of the time – a Papal decree.
But "The Pope [was not the only one who legally and lawfully] had transferred royal crowns from one dynasty to another." "The [Holy Roman] emperor could, and did, depose princes [as well]. . . ." In addition, before the Popes and the old German emperors had recognized international authority to deposed dynasties and provide new ones, ". . . the [ancient Roman] emperor could depose or instate kings at will."
In the Holy Roman Empire, especially when Italy was a part of it, that the Emperor, as a high prince over all, was considered to be the "ruler of the whole habitable world" and the personification of all that is lawful, by right of being the rightful heir to the ancient Roman Empire after coronation by the Pontiff. He was thus considered to be the "lord of the world." This exalted status, which was supposed to be above all kings, was gradually eroded and diminished, but for a time, these men stood on top of the secular world.
No imperial privilege was prized more highly than of creating kings, for there was none which raised the emperor so much above [others]. . . . The prerogative was his in the same manner in which that of conferring titles is still held to belong to the sovereign in every modern kingdom.
A number of kings were created by this authority and a number of requests were denied. The Holy Roman Emperors also upgraded a number of territories in title, and gave the status of a royal or imperial "Prince of the Empire" to all the heads of Imperial States and others of his choosing. He also took territories, honors and rights away from some of the princes and counts, who were deemed as offenders by one or other of the Imperial courts.
In conclusion, in evaluating any claim for authenticity, it is important to note if their family’s rights were legally and lawfully terminated rightfully by one of these or other legally established authorities.
Constitutions: the Supreme Law of the Land, and House Rules: the Supreme Law of a Dynasty
Constitutions of sovereign States are of such great power and authority that their provisions, being the supreme law of the land, can entirely strip royal scions and their descendants from succession. For example, from the Dutch Constitution Article 28 of 2008:
1. The King shall be deemed to have abdicated if he contracts a marriage without having obtained consent by Act of Parliament.
2. Anyone in line of succession to the Throne who contracts such a marriage shall be excluded from the hereditary succession, together with any children born of the marriage and their issue.
But none of this is really new. For example, in the mid-19th century:
The rights of succession [to the Danish throne], which rested with the Augustenburg family, were forfeited by a compact which the Duke of Augustenburg entered into for the surrender of his claims. . . . The duke's morganatic marriage, and his subsequent rebellion, in 1848, against the Danish king, were the causes which led to the arrangement of this family compact. . . .
Not only had the Duke of Augustenburg lost his own personal rights, but all his descendants were cast off as well. None thereafter counted as successors or dynasts. Legally royals can lose their place under constitutional provisions. As stated in England:
. . . According to our English Constitutions a Person may forfeit his Royal Rights, and cease de jure [cease legally] to be King; and that according to the ancient Statutes and ireprovable Usages of this Country. . . .
For another example, Article 29 of the constitution and laws of the modern Kingdom of the Netherlands, it states, "One or more persons may be excluded from the hereditary succession by Act of Parliament if exceptional circumstances necessitate." For those excluded, the 2002 Act of Membership of the Royal House, Article 8, no. 3 states, "The title Prince (Princess) of the Netherlands will revert with the loss of the membership in the Royal House."
The Swedish Constitution of 1809 also declared unequivocally:
Art. 44. No prince of the royal house, whether crown prince, hereditary prince, or otherwise, may marry unless the king, having taken the opinion of the counsel of state, has given his consent thereto. Should he do so nevertheless, he shall forfeit all hereditary rights to the crown for himself, his children and descendants.
Hence, if there are constitutional succession rules associated with a claim, it must be investigated to see if a claim is legitimate or not. For instance, consider the following on Dom Pedro of Portugal:
By his not having taken the oath, prescribed by law, for all Sovereigns ascending the throne, Dom Pedro was again deprived of his rights, and if these at the time had been ever so valid, they were lost and forfeited by the mere act of his attempting to revoke and overturn the Fundamental Statutes, as well as the Charters and privileges of the People, of his own free will, and without any legal or Constitutional process, a ground sufficient in itself to expel him from the throne, even if his title had been ever so good. [That is the constitutional law of the land] originated with the People and received sanction of the reigning Sovereign, and in the same manner only could they be revoked, or altered.
Thus, certain actions can result in the loss or forfeiture of royal sovereignty. Generally speaking, one cannot not violate House rules or constitutional laws and not expect serious legal ramifications. House rules are the supreme law of a dynasty and unless amended in full accord with international law, they are binding. Any investigation of a claim must take into account what was lawful or unlawful during the time and place in question.
The following ten Houses, for example, specifically required equality of marriages in the past: Austria, Bavaria, France, Hanover, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Prussia, Saxony, Russia, Spain and Württemberg. There were many others and some still require this in their House rules. However, equality of marriage was not required in any of the following twenty-one Royal and Imperial Houses for the most part: Albania, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Denmark, the Empire of France (Bonaparte), Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, the Netherlands, Parma, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, the Two Sicilies and Yugoslavia. However, generally the House Rules of the last twenty-one Houses required the approval of the Chief of House in order to give a particular marriage royal succession rights. Violations often meant the total loss of all dynastic entitlements for both the individual and his or her posterity.
For an example of a dynastic forfeiture based on a constitutional religious requirement, note the case of Luitpold, Prince of Bavaria (1821-1912), who was the heir presumptive to the throne of Greece. This was because his older brother who was the reigning sovereign of the land (King Otto 1815-1867 reigned from 1832-1862) had no children and had officially name him as his successor. Otto was then deposed in 1862, but Prince Luitpold never pursued the throne. He never made himself eligible by joining the Eastern Orthodox religion. Since both he and his kin were in violation of the Greek law of succession concerning religion, ". . . the three great powers under whose protection the Kingdom of Greece had been placed at its organization . . ." -- England, France and Russia, agreed ". . . that King Otho and his dynasty . . . lost their rights to the Greek throne. . . ." They ". . . signed a protocol by virtue of which the throne of Greece was declared vacant." Thus we have an example of a religious constitutional termination of a whole and complete dynasty who refused to obey the supreme law of the land. This loss was further solidified and confirmed by immemorial prescription, as King Otto was replaced by a Danish prince who became King George I. The new Greek dynasty reigned from 1863 to 1973 -- one hundred years on and off with six reigning kings.
The Bavarian Royal House also forfeited the de jure crown of Greece by being in breach of the religious obligation. All the elements of prescriptive neglect and desertion are also present in this case. There were no protests or ongoing complaints registered – no use of the exalted title, etc. The claim had been abandoned by the obvious neglect of the Royal House. Therefore, an immutable title to the internal sovereignty of the dethroned Kingdom of Greece now belongs to His Majesty King Constantine II of the Hellenes and his lawful heirs. King Constantine II continues to publicly assert his royal titles and rights. Provided that his heirs also do likewise in the future, his dynasty will retain de jure sovereignty indefinitely.
Law is the dominant factor in rightful succession, not blood, not juris sanguinis or DNA, but lawful acts of legislative bodies. For example, the English Act of Settlement in 1701 dictated that only Protestant heirs of Princess Sophia, granddaughter of James I, may succeed to the British throne. In addition, only a Protestant could be in the line of succession. Hence, George I (1714-1727), a protestant related to the Stuarts became king. However, ". . . there were at least six people ahead of George I [some say over 50] with a superior [genealogical] claim to the throne of Britain."
On all hands it is admitted that the Hanoverian dynasty has no claims on the ground of heredity. It proudly rests its claim upon the parliamentary vote. . . .
This has been law in England for over 300 years. But before this, a problem that most hereditary houses suffer from is hidden adultery wherein a different bloodline ends up on the throne. For example, scientists now know that the DNA from King Richard III does not match the DNA of the present ruling family of the United Kingdom.  Does this mean the present royal house has no right to the throne? The answer is, it is not bloodline, but law that is most important in these considerations. The rule of law governs the rightful transfer of regal rights more than anything else, not only in England, but universally, because of unique constitutional mandates, house statutes and the requirements of natural prescriptive law. These things govern the ownership rights to dispossessed and reigning sovereignty in every kingdom and nation on earth.
Violations of binding Constitutional provisions, legal legislative acts or House statutes can permanently terminate all royal and hereditary rights, so that they no longer exist. Descendants of defrocked individuals, or whole dynastic houses, cannot restore what they legally no longer own.
Any investigation of a claim must look into what is mandated in these supreme laws or legal act as they impact sovereignty rights. If they were violated at some point in the past, there are at times some very heavy consequences. However, this kind of investigation is difficult, because there is not necessarily any obvious historical documentation for such. Like prescriptive forfeiture, no court decree, no tribunal hearing or legal declaration of fact is necessary to effect the loss of all rights under these laws, because they are automatically binding. Nevertheless, they are crucial in whether a claim is authentic or a mere fiction.
Prescriptive Rights do not Require Court Involvement
In virtually all nations, there are domestic adverse possession or prescriptive laws that ethically and morally transfer all the rights of property to the squatter, usurper or possessor for the same basic reasons as in international law. Unless the transfer of ownership is challenged, court action is not required on a local civil or domestic level in many nations once the required number of years expire. This could be from 5 to 60 years depending on the case and on the law of the particular country.
In some of countries, after the passage of a certain amount of time, as in England, the former owner is legally precluded or bared forever from taking court action against the possessor. The statute of limitations for unregistered land is 12 years. At this point, the claim is final and the transfer of all rights to the possessor is automatic and requires no legal action. This is how things work in England and internationally. That is, after 100 years have passed, the case is made final and cannot be annulled or controverted by any court unless that action is voluntary, or agreed to by both sides. In international law, all such court involvement is voluntary, so either party can stop the meddling or interference of a court or tribunal simply by refusing to be involved. Hence, the statement is true that "[international prescriptive] disputes are subject to no judge [no trial, no court action]. . . ." (emphasis added)
In sum, in domestic prescription, a court or arbitration decree is generally not required. On an international level, no requirement exists for any kind of hearing or decree. The transfer all rights legally takes place automatically after 100 years and becomes indefeasible or permanent after this time period. The following is a short review concerning the facts that support this legal reality.
When examining the internal sovereign rights of deposed royal Houses, legitimate governments-in-exile or indigenous people, one must look more particularly to the natural law principles and rules of prescription to determine if a claim is actually valid. Sovereignty and royalty are secular legal rights under natural law. "When monarchs claimed to rule legitimately and lawfully by heredity, by inheritance, by marriage contract, etc . . . such claims are conventionally labeled as 'prescriptive.'" Sovereign prescription, by the power and authority of the law of nature, in public international law, can justly and legally, both preserves and destroys royal rights immutably.
If a deposed indigenous people, a royal House or a government-in-exile fails to protest the usurpation, or de facto theft of their rights, these sovereign entitlements are eventually forfeited in their entirety and without appeal. That is, any evidence, after 100 years of neglect is inadmissible, immaterial, irrelevant, and cannot be rebutted; therefore, the loss is conclusive and final. For a royal House, they must consistently use their exalted royal titles or lose them and all their former rights and entitlements. Note the following:
Nobiliary International law states that the heads of the Houses of sovereign descent, who have not incurred debellatio, retain forever the exercise of the powers attaching to them, absolutely irrespective of any territorial possession. They are protected by the continued use of their rights and titles of nobility. . . . (emphasis added)
It was generally noted in the early 1700’s, even when the theory of Divine Right of Kings held sway, that, "[Deposed] Princes, by keeping the Titles or Arms of a Kingdom, of which they have not been in Possession of a considerable Time, [do so] . . . to preserve their Right. . . ." These deposed monarchs did not believe in an indefeasible hereditary right that can never end without the added prescriptive requirement that they consistently make the proper protest. The whole purpose of their actions was designed as a ". . . sort of a Protestation made, that hinders Prescription . . ." or stops it in its tracks. In other words, ". . . Keeping up the Titles and Arms of Kingdoms, implies in it a Kind of continual Protestation, to prevent the Prescription [or loss] of the Rights which are . . . [authentically and rightfully claimed for] these Kingdoms or Dominions." However, ". . . this Act [alone] cannot be supposed to interrupt the Possession, or in any Manner prejudice the Right of the Possessor, when there are other Acts and Circumstances sufficient for grounding a Presumption of abandoning such Right." That is, even if titles and arms are retained, this, in and of itself, cannot override failure to make them public or from acts of omission or commission which destroy their imperial or royal entitlements when needed. Note that:
Prescription [is completed and rights lost] by the silence [or quietness] of the injured party [by a deposed monarch or government-in-exile] when that party is dealing with a prince [or other type of usurper] who possesses that which belongs to him, or sells, cedes or alienates it; silence on those occasions is equivalent to consent [voluntary surrender or the legal abandonment of de jure sovereignty]. (emphasis added)
It must be clear and undeniable, through as many means as publically possible, that the once-reigning house has not relinquished, abandoned or given up their lawful claims. This is fundamentally important because the consequence of "sleeping on one’s rights" can mean the permanent loss of those rights. (See the sub-chapter on "Substantial Proof is Required for Any Claim to be Considered Valid" in Chapter VI).
Emerich de Vattel explains the basic natural law principle upon which this prescriptive rule is founded.
. . . The law of nature lays an injunction on the proprietor to take care of his property, and imposes on him an obligation to make known his rights, that others may not be led into error: it is on these conditions alone that she approves of the property vested in him, and secures him in the possession.
"If he has neglected it [failed to assert his titles or made the required protests] for such a length of time . . . the law of nature will no longer allow him to revive and assert his claims. . . ." He loses them altogether.
In international law, prescription is considered to be among the most important of principles, not in and of itself by comparison, but because ". . . the principle of prescription is founded in the law of Nature. . . ." As explained by Edmund Burke, it is ". . . rooted [and grounded] . . . in the law of nature." Thus it is part the law for all nations and all people. Being a part of the "Necessary Law of Nations," the permanent law, not just the "Voluntary [or temporary] Law," prescription has been and still continues to be binding. Hence, because the law of nature and the law of justice are the legal basis for both the preservation and the forfeiture of sovereign regal rights, there is an unequivocal legal injunction to use one's titles or lose them forever. As a logical result of this law, most once legitimate claimants in the past and for thousands of years, have lost their rights through neglect, implied consent, dereliction, or the legal abandonment of rights that are recognized as juridical, obligatory or permanent acts of law.
Juridical acts do not require court involvement, yet they create ". . . legal effects that the legal order recognizes and guarantees." "Among legal acts, the juridical act is of fundamental importance. In fact, it constitutes the most complete and interesting expression of legal activity." Examples in domestic law include wills, contracts, conveyance documents, declarations and acknowledgments. In international law, juridical acts include treaties, sovereign succession decrees, conquests (illegal since 1946), cessions, official consents, renunciations, and legal neglect of a claim; that is, implied abandonment or lack of protest, for a long time equals a juridical or legal loss via prescriptive law. In international law, none of these modes require any kind of court or judicial involvement. They are automatically and legally binding if properly done.
. . . Each "mode" [prescriptive neglect being one of them] affords . . . a factual or juridical process which international law . . . acknowledges to be capable of creating a "title" to -- or basis of -- [or transfer of] territorial sovereignty.
". . . Juridical acts or further legally relevant facts can operate as titles by which territorial sovereignty [the internal right to rule] can be acquired [or] lost. . . ." In other words, by juridical means, "Legal rights can expire without the intervention of a court." Royal status can and has been created and terminated by appropriate non-judicial juridical acts.
A juridical act is any statement or agreement or declaration of intention, whether express or implied from conduct, which has or is intended to have legal effect as such. It may be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. (emphasis added)
Prescriptive abandonment in international law is juridical. It is a conclusive and legally binding act which stands independent of any kind of outside judicial involvement. Vattel explains:
. . . the law of nature ordained that all men should respect the right of private property in him who makes use of it? For the same reason, therefore, the same law requires that every proprietor who for a long time and without any just reason neglects his right, should be presumed to have entirely renounced and abandoned it. This is what forms the absolute presumption (juris et de jure) of its abandonment, -- a presumption, upon which another person [the subsequent government] is legally entitled to appropriate to himself the thing so abandoned. (emphasis added)
"Centennial or immemorial possession gave rise to a presumption in law of juris et de jure. . . ." In other words, immemorial abandonment by lack of protest or use of titles and arms creates an "incontrovertible and fundamental presumption of law . . . [that] one cannot argue against, or try to otherwise refute. . . ." It is conclusive and final in and of itself outside of any court involvement. The juridical, non-judicial act of acquiescence and neglect of a sovereign or royal claim for a long period of time automatically establishes a "conclusive presumption," which is ". . . an inference which the law makes so peremptorily that it will not allow it to be overthrown by any contrary proof, however strong."
An international juridical act is so legally powerful and binding that it cannot be annulled outside of a proper authoritative court, unless all parties voluntarily agree to release it. Since all international courts and tribunals are non-compulsory, there is no international power that can rescind or overrule a prescriptive transfer. The loss stands on solid legal ground and it cannot be altered or changed without some type of binding mutual consent. All royal and/or sovereign rights eventually and automatically come to an end without careful obedience to the obligatory maintenance acts required to preserve these entitlements since time immemorial. In other words, ". . . [Non-territorial] dynastic rights of a Sovereign may potentially end without a court ruling."
The founding fathers of international law, who codified the well-known ancient natural law principles of prescription, which were binding and valid laws from before all known history, knew that there were "no international courts" available in their day nor from the beginning of civilized life. Nor did they believe such a court could legally exist above the supreme right of sovereignty, which is above all things. From the very onset of modern international law and for hundreds of years afterwards, there was an obvious ". . . lack of a tribunal possessing the necessary authority [to try a sovereign prescriptive case]." Prescription, therefore, has never required a court decree or verdict to be binding. "[International prescriptive] disputes are subject to no judge. . . ." They stand valid on their own as juris et de jure, juridical, natural law principles for all people and all ages.
Since the beginning of international law in the 16th and 17th centuries until the early 1900’s when international arbitration began, prescription can and does operated outside the jurisdiction of any court or tribunal as part of natural law for thousands of years by sheer common sense, justice and right reasoning. Even in modern times, ". . . There is no requirement to refer a [prescriptive] dispute to international tribunals or other settlement mechanism." (emphasis added)
The complete independence of prescription from court involvement can be seen in history many times. In the 1700s, Austria acquired a full prescriptive title over Silesia from Prussia because she exercised conspicuous sovereignty over the territory for over a hundred years. Austria received this formally by treaty, but this was merely an unnecessary formality. All the world knew that ". . . Austria had by then acquired [all of Silesia] by the operation of prescription." A court decision was not required in ancient days nor was their any international court or tribunal set up to handle such a case. International prescription can and does operate outside of arbitration and had done so from time immemorial.
"It is certain that, whoever might have been originally right, Prussia had submitted. Prince after prince of the House of Brandenburg had acquiesced. . . ." Both extinctive and acquisitive prescription conferred a just and perfect title on the Kingdom of Austria to this ancient land.
. . . By the treaty of Westphalia [Prussia had] been above 100 years out of possession [of the Duchy of Silesia]. But, says he [Frederick], I ought not to be deprived of my right because my forefathers were good natured, generous, or silly enough to part with it before I was born.
He then determined to break with the natural law of justice and violate the treaty of his forefathers. He conveniently banishing from his mind that he was not born with any right to this territory. It had been legally and lawfully forfeited years ago. Nevertheless, in 1740 King Frederick attacked and conquered Silesia all based on a false claim. He knew he had no just cause, but this did not matter. ". . . Considerations of legal title or dynastic rights [of others] counted for little with Frederic." He wrote of the so-called legal justification for the conquest, which his minister had drawn up, that it was "the work of a splendid charlatan." So he trampled on the rights of others and took of the weakness in Austria to add a large territory to his possessions. The demonstrates that legal, moral and ethical rights are not always honored. But a terrible wrong was committed and innocent lives were forfeited:
. . . The revival of ancient . . . claims of sovereign rights [by deposed princes] which, on a proper view, have been lost by prescription [are to be "condemned"]. (emphasis added)
Why? – As seen in Volume 1, the lack of the recognition of prescription has led to wars, anguish and death in the past. In addition, and both in the past and the present, it is patently wrong to pretend to have a lawful claim to sovereignty, when that claim has been legally terminated by years of neglect. This kind of dynastic family pretense is nothing less than an act of fraud.
King Frederick’s 1740 invasion of Silesia was nothing less than a malevolent criminal act of barbarism that terribly wronged the people and the rightful rulers of the land. In addition, it violation of international law.
However, although King Frederick’s invasion was unlawful, the Austrian Emperors from whom Silesia was seized failed to protect or maintain their claim to the territory. Consequently, through prescription over time, the territory became the property of the conqueror. If this mechanism for the lawful transfer of sovereignty did not exist, at least 90% of the countries in this world could never have become legally and lawfully legitimate. Therefore:
It is especially important that the passage of time have this moral and legal effect in politics; otherwise the legitimacy of all governments would be permanently in doubt [or in question], since all or nearly all regimes have ultimately disreputable origins.
Wars and contentions over territory have been the common lot of mankind.
Prescription is the moral and legal expression of a natural process, necessary to civilized life, by which stability and order are eventually restored after disruptions have taken place.
. . . [Because it is] certain, that if we remount to the first origin of every nation, we shall find that there scarce is any race of kings, or form of a commonwealth, that is not primarily [or originally] founded on usurpation and rebellion. . . . 
In history, there are thousands of cases of acquiring sovereignty over other nations through prescription. It is extremely rare, if ever, that a court or tribunal was involved in any of these prescriptive transfers.
. . . There can be no doubt that prescription has conferred title to the European discoverers and their successor states over hundreds of years that they have controlled the New World.
The colonial nations of North and South America began:
. . . in sheer violence, the brute force of the stronger, or in fraudulent compacts with the natives, never honestly kept, if ever intended to be so kept, time alone has sanctioned our possession of the land.
As stated, prescription can legally heal and mend wrongful beginnings. In Australia, this fact is again reiterated:
. . . The Commonwealth's claim to sovereignty over the Australian continent is [by] the rule of prescription as it applies to territorial acquisition. . . . If there were any defect in Australia's title, the rule of prescription would apply to overturn the defect and to vest sovereign title in the Commonwealth’s government.
The above is true with the exception that the original sovereigns could have maintained their rights, even with the loss of de facto control of the land. As seen earlier, prescription can also preserve and safeguard rights when followed. The American Indian tribes perpetuated their rights and continue to maintain them. This is illustrated in the following example from Rome:
When Antiochus, demanded certain cities from the Romans which his father and grandfather had never claimed, the Romans pleaded a possession of a hundred years, a period which covers three generations of men. . . . [It was acknowledged] as absolutely certain, and admitted among all nations, that public possession [of the rights of sovereignty], no less than private [property rights], is so confirmed by time.
"[For immemorial prescription] the lapse of time must be time ‘exceeding the memory of man,’ such memory being normally less than a century, or three generations." If the usurping government succeeds:
. . . in keeping up its possession undisturbed [uncontested] for so long a time that the former possessor has ceased to protest and has silently dropped the claim, the conviction will be prevalent among States that the present condition of things is in conformity with international order.
This recognition is not determined by a court order but by well-known historic facts and the reality of undisturbed or uncontested possession. This transfers all rights to the subsequent government.
Immemorial possession cuts off all claims [to royalty and sovereignty]. . . . . Should the lineal descendent of the Saxon kings whom William the Conq[uer] expelled [from England] prove their descent, no one would imagine they would exclude the present [ruling] family; or those of Charlemagne or the Greek emperors exclude the French king or the Grand Turk. (emphasis added)
The loss, of both the de facto and the de jure right to royal and sovereign rule, outside of any kind of judicial decree was a common experience in the Middle Ages. For example:
By a breach of the law, the monarch ipso facto forfeited his right to rule. He deposed himself . . . without any process of law [or court involvement] . . . [and this has happened in] countless cases. . . . The forfeiture of the right to govern [internal de jure entitlement] was actually completed at the very moment the prince overstepped the bounds of the law, and so deposed himself.
. . . He placed himself outside the legal order [by doing so]. . . .
[He] loses his claim to obedience [his de jure right to rule], without any necessity for formal legal proceedings on the part of the community. (emphasis added)
Hence, the law itself is sufficient to authorize the hard consequence or delegitimization of a sovereign, where a king "ceases to be king," In these situations, there is ". . . no formal legal process of deposition."
Over 750 thrones have been lost or deposed since the 13th century. For example in about a twenty year period:
. . . twenty kings and sovereign princes have been precipitated from the throne, and forced to wander as exiles from country to country; states have been confounded; one knows no longer their names, their chiefs, nor their limits; Europe is become a chaos. . . . The [hereditary or dynastic] rights of birth and election have been extinguished. . . .
The names of these dethroned monarchs, their families, and even their countries or statelets have basically disappeared from history. No deposed royal claims were made by the exiles or their families, no protests occurred, although they could have used them, that is, their titles and arms. Thus, they have disappeared from history through neglect and abandonment.
Although a deposed government can hold on to its lawful sovereign rights indefinitely, the vast majority of the time, it will fail to preserve it. The reason why very few deposed royal Houses perpetuate their rights is simple. After decades, centuries, it may become a subject of ridicule rather than one of reverence or honor to make such a claim. Who would believe that a modern individual had the right to be the King of Assyria, Babylon or the Empire of Persia given that few are familiar with prescription and its power to retain royal or sovereign rights? Who would support the lawful right of these claimants to be restored to power and dominion over these lands? Thus, when the people of the land fail to value or care about anyone’s claim, the royal families all too often cease to have much of an interest in using their titles or maintain the claim in such a climate. Therefore, they let it slip away into oblivion. Thus, rights naturally and quietly pass away automatically and are then fully invested in the subsequent government(s) that now rule their former territories. This happens without court action, fanfare, or public announcement. It is a natural, quiet, and fairly well-known process in history. By this means, ". . . a [de facto or ruling] king can acquire right [or title of sovereignty] as against a [deposed] king [or his successors]. . . ."
To keep rights alive takes continual determination for generations of successors, and these successors may have little or no interest in continuing the claim. For a modern claimant, for a regal claim to be recognized as still valid, it also requires conclusive proof that the claim was maintained publically and consistently for hundreds or even thousands of years during times of social indifference. Few royal families have the high degree of commitment required to keep such a claim alive, especially when it seems to have little or no value to them or anyone else. Some societies even frown upon and mock such royal claims. Thus, de jure non-territorial sovereignty is so easily discarded, and this eventually results in total forfeiture.
After long uncontested possession, all of the exile’s regal rights are transferred. This legitimizes the entitlement of the conquering sovereign house or new government as the valid and lawful rulers. ". . . Prescription . . . has been always allowed to give a right," to the usurper when rights are not maintained. This is the binding rule of law. "The basis of prescription in International Law is nothing else than [the] general recognition of a fact. . . ."
The rule of law continues to make prescription binding now as it was in the ancient past. Prescription operates without adjudication of any kind. One of the reasons for this, as mentioned earlier, is that all international courts are optional, voluntary and without force:
[I]n the context of a domestic dispute [within a nation], the failure of a losing party to comply with the ruling of a court . . . leads to sanctions -- most typically a seizure of property or person. . . . In contrast, when a state loses before an international tribunal, no formal legal structure exists to enforce the ruling. The assets of the noncompliant state will not be seized, nobody will be arrested, and the state will not even lose its ability to file complaints.
"As is well known, the Security Council has chosen to enforce only one ICJ decision in its history -- against Libya and only with that state’s concurrence." International tribunals and courts are akin to harmless paper tigers. They seem dangerous, but they have no teeth or claws. Their jurisdiction is voluntary, rather than being compulsory. States, or deposed monarchs, having sovereignty, which is the highest and most supreme of all rights in international law, are not compelled to recognize any authority above and beyond themselves, except natural law. As Bodine has stated, sovereigns are bound by the high nature law of prescription, such as, prescription in either preserving or losing of their supreme entitlements. In conclusion, outside of any court, one note the following:
. . . Extinctive prescription in international law is a procedural tool with substantive law consequences, since it both precludes the [lost] claim from being tried and extinguishes the [deposed dynastic or governmental sovereignty] claim as such so that it cannot even be used. . . .
In other words, ". . . Stale [unmaintained] claims cease at some time to be enforceable and/or valid. . . ."
The Example of the Falkland Islands
In the long-standing argument over the ownership of the Falkland Islands, the central argument for Great Britain revolves around prescriptive rights and Argentina’s failure to use the international judicial system plus the questionable theory of self-determination. (See the sub-chapter "Self-Determination and Restoration" in Chapter IV of Volume I). The prescriptive requirement Great Britain subscribed to is as follows:
. . . Argentina protested [since the early 1800’s as required by the rules of prescription to preserve the internal de jure sovereignty of her lost land], and for a time these protests were effective in blocking Britain's claim to sovereignty by extinctive prescription, had not changing political circumstances intervened. The establishment of the World Court . . . changed the situation so that diplomatic protests were no longer sufficient to keep alive Argentina's claim to sovereignty. In order to avoid extinguishing its claim, Argentina should have resorted to the ICJ rather than continuing to protest. The fact of the matter was that Argentina never submitted its claim to the Court for judgment. Its failure to do so, to take advantage of the requirements prescribed by international law, has quietly ceded sovereignty to Britain by extinctive prescription. Thus by 1982, Argentina's claim was extinguished.
This idea is also proclaimed in the following:
In acquisitive prescription, title arises out of a long continue possession, provided there is no formal protest or that all interested or affected States have acquiesced in this exercise of authority. However, the protest should be "effective," i.e., mere diplomatic protest is insufficient. It must be followed by a reference to an appropriate international organization or international tribunal unless it is not possible to do so.
But these courts are not obligatory or forced. The point is:
. . . In light of the fact that international law has no compulsory judiciary machinery for the settlement of disputes; it is unrealistic to insist [that a] referral [be made] to a judicial body. . . .
It is also unrealistic and unlawful to require a deposed claimant to submit a claim to an international tribunal since only 62 out of 192 counties that are members of the United Nations actually accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Put in another way, not even half of the member countries subscribe to it. Therefore, the International Courts are not compulsory. For example, Australia accepts the ICJ, but only with reservations, and Brazil rejects it entirely along with 134 other countries that do not recognize it.
The failure to take steps to use the United Nations or the International Court to resolve the dispute should not, as some have suggested, be a bar to denying the existence of a prescriptive title. . . .
The suggestion [that a case must be brought before an international court] would make a mockery of the fact that the jurisdiction of these organs rests upon consent; the threat of territorial loss cannot be used to force bodies to bring forth their case for arbitration.
As stated before, ". . . There is no requirement to refer a dispute to international tribunals or other settlement mechanisms?" It may be objected to by some that international courts and international law are voluntary, but:
The answer . . . will be found in the willingness of the nations to abide by international principles, just as in any other international controversy. To deny that [controversies] can find a mode of settlement is to deny that any international dispute can be legally settled; which is to undermine the whole theory of an international law.
International law is largely dependent on the willing obedience of the parties involved to freely submit to the just and equitable principles of that law. No matter whether a case has gone through an international court or not, international law should be honored and revered in the best interests of all mankind.
It is recognized by most that individuals have the inalienable right to life, liberty, and property. These are vital human rights. Nations, as well as people, also have immutable rights to life, liberty and property. These are called the right of safety and self-defense, the right to independence or freedom and the right of non-interference or the non-meddling of others. To give international courts compulsory jurisdiction would be an intolerable and appalling encroachment on the sovereignty of nations, which would be a violation of their inviolate rights.
Being voluntary and consensual, an international ruling by a tribunal is not required, nor can it be made mandatory. Therefore, Argentina, or any other just claimant, will not have to go to a tribunal or arbitrators to maintain its just and rightful claims. They will continue to hold rightful non-territorial sovereignty over the Falkland Islands as long as it continues to make the needed protests.
Additionally, the idea of adding a new requirement to prescription is against the principle that the past cannot be held answerable to the present. In this context, some argue that Argentina must bring their claim of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands to an international tribunal or else lose the right of claim. But this argument is unreasonable and does not stand under scrutiny. Only the rightful laws that were effective when the events took place, which gave rise to the dispute are lawful and binding upon the parties to the dispute. New requirements, new doctrines or laws are only valid for claims originating after, not before, the new rule have become a recognized part of customary law, which is voluntary and changing. In contrast, the rules and principles of prescription, being part of the universal law for all ages and all people, will not change. Attempting to add new obligations to prescription is against the natural law.
The crucial factor affecting prescriptive forfeiture, or loss of entitlement is that a ". . . [long] period of the silence, or passiveness (inertia)." Put another way, ". . . the absence of any attempt to exercise proprietary rights, by the former possessor" gives to the usurper all the de jure sovereign rights to the realm or territory in question.
Britain’s absence of 1774-1833 was over fifty years. Britain’s lack of protest, and recognition of Spain’s and Argentina’s claims [during this time], does imply its acquiescence in its loss of title during that period.
According to [Angel M. Oliveri] López, British sources dating back to 1833 to the present day themselves acknowledge consistent Argentine protests of British seizure and occupation, hence [this author] concludes that, "Again, it is British records themselves that destroy the case for acquisitive prescription" (López, 1995, xi). There is, however, a gap between 1849 to 1884 where Argentina did not protest. In spite of this, Argentina emphasized that this silence should not be read as an indication that they had surrendered. It can be argued that these 35 years were long enough to conclude that Argentina had submitted to British occupation and hence Britain acquired the title by prescription. According to [Christopher] Bluth though, most writers on international law hold that fifty uninterrupted years of occupation is the minimum for the acquisition of the title by prescription. (emphasis added)
Great Britain therefore only has a qualified or imperfect title to the Falkland Islands, chiefly because Argentina’s ". . . protest preserves their rights," and there is no "customary [international] rule attributing to effective possession alone the capacity to shift the existing title to sovereignty." As a direct result:
. . . Argentina still holds some title to the Islands [internal de jure], but Britain, by means of controlling them for so long, holds a better [more active] title [technically -- internal de facto and external de jure and de facto].
The granting of superior, though not exclusive, title to Britain based on prescription without acquiescence is a negative grant. . . . Sovereignty is assigned to one state because forcing a change in title would be worse [create violence and further problems] for the world order. [But] it does not create full title. . . . Prescription requires acquiescence if it is to produce full title. . . . Full title continues to elude Britain’s grasp. (emphasis added)
That is, ". . . acquiescence, in the case of prescription, is essential. . . ." Essential means prescription cannot take place without it.
Where the possession of territory is accompanied by emphatic [meaning forceful public] protests [or the consistent and obvious use of titles and sovereign symbols] on the part of the former sovereign, no title by prescription can arise, for such title [must] founded on acquiescence of the dispossessed State [or deposed monarchy]. . . . Where a dispossessed sovereign disputes the control exercised by a new sovereign, title can hardly pass. 
"Title based on prescription without acquiescence of the former owner is akin to title based on [unlawful] conquest." There must be acquiescence, which is legal abandonment, or there can be no honest, rightful or legitimate transfer of title. There is no ". . . customary rule attributing to effective possession alone the capacity to shift the existing title to sovereignty." Effective or successful rule is not enough.
If title is to be acquired by acquisitive prescription, it is necessary that [the original and rightful sovereign] had consented and acquiesced, either expressly or impliedly. . . .
The important point here is "British possession was not peaceful, uninterrupted and uncontested," as is required in the natural law rules of justice and prescription. Only "long continued and undisputed possession is accepted as conferring a sound [or unquestionable] international title by prescription. . . ." There was never a period even close to fifty years in which Argentina did not manifest an obvious and unambiguous protest against the usurpation of its right to rule the islands.
. . . The period of fifty years . . . has met with general favor [among scholars and international practice] and will very probably be recognized for the future as the necessary period [for "ordinary" international prescription].
This period of time has been acknowledged as most valid and appropriate for non-immemorial or what is called "ordinary prescription." In contrast, 100 years of silence or implied consent is mandated for "immemorial prescription." Ordinary prescription will be discussed in the next sub-chapter.
"It is noteworthy that the international community has accepted the United Kingdom’s sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. . . ." But not totally:
The discussion of the dispute at the United Nations in 1964 and 1965, Resolutions 2065 (XX) of 1965 and those that followed, which took notice of the existence of a dispute "concerning sovereignty," clearly show, on the one hand, that the international community did not -- and does not -- regard the British occupation to have been consolidated. . . .
In other words, ". . . the British arguments were overruled by the General Assembly [at that time]." But whether there is ultimately recognition of the British claim by members of the United Nations, this is merely external and political acceptance. External recognition of this type does not confer the internal legal right to rule, which is what is being discussed. Great Britain has internal de facto control and a lot of external recognition, but Argentina holds internal de jure sovereignty, which is the more important right, because they hold the highest entitlement on earth to the legal right to rule the Islands. Again, this is not a court or tribunal finding; it is merely legal fact. Whether some refuse to receive it as such or not, does not change the truth. Reality is not altered or changed by popular opinion or external recognition.
Prescriptive Examples and the Principle of "Ordinary Prescription" in International Law
Some historical authors taught in more ancient times that prescription cannot take place in less than 100 years. Jean Bodin was one of them. He taught that, "Although it is said that sovereignty cannot be prescribed, that means in less than a hundred years, especially if there has been neither opposition nor protest. . . ." Vattel explained non-immemorial prescription (the shorter kind) exists as part of the law of nations. This kind of prescription has been termed "ordinary prescription," which is not to be confused with civil or domestic prescription, as this term refers to sovereignty. For non-immemorial prescription to be achieved, there are three factors:
. . . 1, that the proprietor cannot allege an invincible ignorance [that is, the former sovereign cannot supply an invincible defense because of ignorance] . . . either on his own part, or on that of the persons from whom he derives his right; 2, that he cannot justify his silence by lawful and substantial reasons; 3, that he has neglected his right, or kept silence during a considerable number of years. . . .
The amount of time, that is less than a hundred years, is left open, but it should be "a considerable number of years." While this is less than 100 years, it is unclear exactly how long he meant. But history provides some guidance, and it is notable that these occurred outside of any court or tribunal. Consider the following from the weekly British Journal in 1858:
It is quite evident . . . that our [Great Britain’s] title to British Honduras (now the Commonwealth Nation of Belize] by usucaption and prescription is an indefeasible [insurmountable or undefeatable] one; that the conditions laid down by Vattel have been complied with. 1st. That the proprietor cannot allege an invincible ignorance. 2nd. That he cannot justify his silence by lawful and solid reasons. 3rd. That he has neglected his right, or kept silent for a considerable number of years.
Now, let us see if these three conditions have been complied with:
1st. "That the proprietor cannot allege an invincible ignorance."
Now, taking this as a correct definition of invincible ignorance [meaning the failure of a former sovereign entity to do anything to keep its rights cannot be completely be absolved by ignorance] . . . Can Spain plead an invincible ignorance of the British possessions of Honduras? Of the exercise of territorial rights on the part of the British Crown in Honduras? Of the commission of acts and deeds in Honduras expressly prohibited by the treaties of 1783 and 1786? Has she made every inquiry? Has she adopted every means within her power? Has she conscientiously, sincerely, and earnestly sought information? And, notwithstanding all her endeavors, has she been for the last sixty years in profound ignorance that Honduras was in the possession of the British Crown, and was treated by her as an absolute dominion? The supposition is too absurd. Pass we then on to the next condition.
2. "That he cannot justify his silence by lawful and solid reasons."
I am not aware of any reasons. [Of note is that no reasons were offered when it was addressed with the opposition view as represented by "Buchanan"].
3. "That he has neglected his right, or kept silence for a considerable number of years."
That Spain has done this [for sixty years], can . . . be very clearly proved. The 4th article of the Convention of 1786 [with Spain], after stipulating that no fortification shall be erected, nor any body of troops posted, nor any piece of artillery kept at St. George's Key, concludes as follows: -- And in order to verify with good faith the accomplishment of this condition sine qua non (which might be infringed by individuals, without the knowledge of the British Government), a Spanish officer or commissary, accompanied by an English officer or commissary, duly authorised, shall be admitted twice a year, to examine into the real state of things.
. . . Up to the year 1796, a period of ten years, the Spanish commissaries made with the greatest regularity their half-yearly visits. Since that period, such a person as a Spanish commissary has never been seen at St. George's Bay, or in any part of British Honduras. The fact is undisputed, that for the last sixty years no commissary has been dispatched from Spain. (emphasis added)
Mexico and Guatemala, upon achieving independence from Spain in the 1820’s both claimed the whole country of British Honduras (Belize) as theirs by right of inheritance from Spain. This was rejected prima facie (on the face of it) on the fact that neither ever occupied that part of Spain’s New World colonies or had any jurisdiction or governmental power there. The only international law with any standing in this case was prescription. This alone provided Great Britain, not Mexico or Argentina, with full and complete title in 1859. "The history of Belize is an example of acquisitive prescription."
. . . There can be no real doubt today that sufficiently long adverse possession of a disputed territory by one State can override the claim or title of another State which may originally have possessed title but has not in fact exercised it.
British Honduras became independent of the United Kingdom in 1981 and became a constitutional monarchy. Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II is presently its Head of State and Belize is therefore a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations.
Again, it is noteworthy that this transfer of internal de jure sovereignty was accomplished outside of the involvement of any court or arbitration council. Besides, these ". . . courts and arbitral bodies have no power to grant title." ". . . [The] task [of an arbitration court] is to declare the rights which the parties already have, not to create new rights . . . adjudication [therefore] does not give any territory which [the party] did not already own." Furthermore, Belize has never consented to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as requested by Guatemala. Instead, it has relied on a negotiated settlement through the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States. But there is no doubt as to what government has the legal right to rule the land and what the proper borders are. The 2001 legal opinion on this issue was given by Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, a world court litigator; Judge Stephen Schwebel, judge and former president of the International Court of Justice; Professor Shabtai Rosenne, an international lawyer having experience in presenting cases before the ICJ; and Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña, having international arbitration experience. All declared that:
On the basis of international law and on the evidence considered, Belize has good title to all its territory including the islands and islets lying off the mainland shore. The claim to Belizean territory by the Republic of Guatemala is without merit and in our opinion would be regarded as such by the International Court of Justice.
At no time did these distinguished gentlemen recommend or state that this case must or even should go to court or arbitration, because this is legally unnecessary. "It is [only] ‘ordinary prescription’ [that is] subject to be rebutted . . . ," not immemorial prescription.
When in doubt about when ordinary prescription becomes permanent and final, two major guidelines have been given:
A. Inadequate Proof:
[Where] material facts including means of ascertainment [the ability to confirm or verify such facts] pertaining to support or defense are lost, or [such facts are] so obscured as to leave the mind, intent on ascertaining the truth, reasonably in doubt about them, or in “danger of mistaking the truth,” a basis for the presumption [against the original title bearer] exists.
B. No Protest:
"If such situation be fairly imputable [answerable] to a claimant’s laches [his and his heir's fault] in withholding his demand [or protest about the loss of rule], or, in Vattel’s phrase, “when by his own fault he has suffered matters to proceed to such a state that there would be danger of mistaking the truth,” prescription operates and resolves such facts against him. . . ."
In the case of continuing conflict, the law provided the longer period for prescription to mature into an incontestable and unquestionable title of sovereignty for the possessor of the nation in question. The full 100 years of undisputed rule is an option, because "Centennial or immemorial possession gives rise to a presumption in law of iuris et de jure. . . ."
Where [there] is juris et de jure, the law . . . forbids the admission of counter-evidence. The inference (for it is absurd to call it a presumption) is conclusive. That is to say, proof to the contrary is inadmissible. (emphasis added)
That is, international law established an incontrovertible argument for cases of over one hundred years of desertion, neglect, and abandonment to make it so that the transfer of royal and/or sovereign de jure rights was final to prevent further disputes and fulfill the rightful demands of justice according to the law of nature. In other words, it was so final that in ". . . Immemorial possession . . . possession [that is] for more than 100 years, is [legally] presumed to be based on legitimate title, even without documentary proof." In other words, after 100 years a conclusion to a territory is final and cannot be overturned or invalidated. No evidence or additional proof is required after this time as juris et de jure permanently ends all disputes on a sure and certain legal basis. The definition "Juris [or iuris] et de jure" is "conclusive presumptions of law which cannot be rebutted by evidence." These are not court-created presumptions; rather, they are the basis of the law itself.
Examples of this are abundant in history:
The original proprietors of the Roman Empire [in her later years] had eventually ceased to contest the conquests of the Germans [that is, the German conquests over land where Rome once had possession]. In doing so, [the empire] had surrendered their rights and allowed prescription to take effect.
That is, by their neglect, the Romans gave the German kings and princes the full independent right to rule simply by ignoring and neglecting Rome’s sovereign territories in Gaul.
The following three instances provide some good examples of prescription. Of these examples, one, to acquire an island. The second example was a whole nation that returned back to its rightful owner. Finally, the third example, details the acquisition of a complete independent kingdom. No court, tribunal or treaty was involvement in any of these transfers, nor did any situation require 100 years to elapse for the prescription to fully perfect the situation.
The first example took place in the conflict surrounding the island of St. Lucia. The British took over the island in 1639, but it was subsequently lost in a native uprising in 1640. The French subsequently took over the land in 1650, and the British failed to protest. Thus, the island formally became the "prescriptive" sovereign possession of the kingdom of France without court involvement in 1713, which was just 65 years after France took possession.
The second example involves the Egyptian government and how it ruled over both Egypt and the Sudan starting in 1820. After 65 years of peaceful rule, the Sudan was lost to the Mahdi rebels in 1885. But the government retained the right to govern in the land because ". . . Egypt had consistently maintained her claim despite the de facto loss of the territory." So in spite of some serious challenges by both England and France, the principles of prescription held their claim inviolate.
The third example concerns the independent kingdom of Riukiu, composed of 75 islands south of Japan. The territory was a semi-protectorate of Imperial China. However, by prescriptive rules unchallenged by China, this conquered land, became the southern most regal territory of the Empire of Japan.
Japan's title, though not without other support both fundamental and collateral, may be rested upon one basis which is conclusive of the case. That basis is prescription -- a prescription gained by the undivided and undisputed possession of nearly three centuries. A much shorter period of similar possession would have sufficed, on most unquestioned principles of International Law, to establish a Prescriptive Title. Uninterrupted possession [unprotested] . . . is the best and most recognized of all foundations of sovereign title. And this, without regard to the original method of acquisition, whether rightful or wrongful. Before questioning a title created by even a short prescription, such as the period covered by a single generation, a rival claimant must be able to give a satisfactory explanation -- as for instance complete and unavoidable ignorance -- of his own previous silence and absence of protest or of armed interference; for the necessary presumption from such silence is an intention to disclaim or relinquish all right and title. But when such silence has continued for generation after generation, no explanation of it is admissible; then, lapse of time alone makes the title of the possessor absolutely indefeasible [that is, unimpeachable]; and adverse claims and pretensions, however strong originally, are utterly and for ever lost.
For certainly more than 200 years, then, Japan’s title has been placed beyond the legal reach of question. (emphasis added)
In the Lancaster and York succession conflicts of England, the higher right actually belonged to York. The Yorkists descended from King Edward III’s third son, Prince Edmund, while the Lancaster claim came through King Edward III’s fourth son. However, four Lancastrian kings ruled one after another, which created a situation where:
. . . The Lancastrian right (to succession) . . . incorporated all the categories of [rightful] claim, plus one more, that of prescription. [Henry IV was the rightful king] not only because of election, conquest, nomination, and inheritance, but because he and his successors made that combined claim good by remaining in quiet possession of the kingdom for some sixty years. (emphasis added)
[Richard, duke of York’s] claim at the time it was advanced, was rightly barred by prescription, the House of Lancaster having then occupied the throne for three generations. . . .
The House of York lost the highest right or entitlement to the throne, because of perpetual silence. In effect, the Yorkists had deserted their claim by failing to protest for over 60 years. However, by conquest, the Lancastrian line was defeated and became extinct after four kings. The House of York took over the Crown and Scepter of the Kingdom and later perfected the title again through prescription. And the House of York took over the Crown and Scepter of the Kingdom for about fourteen years after which the House of Tudor took the reigns of the land.
The following are two additional examples of sovereign prescription in the British Isles:
. . . So gallantly [did certain Scottish heroes] defend the Sovereignty of Scotland against those bold [English] Pretenders . . . , that their successors [the English kings after Edward III] have had no great stomach to pursue their Claim to it since: so that if ever they had any [lingering right to rule Scotland], it is forfeited by [a] Prescription [of over 200 years].
Great Britain also lost Calais (today part of France) through this same ancient law:
In regard to prescription . . . [in 1558, the French re-captured the territory, and now having been] held without interruption for 210 years, the prescription was perfected 100 years ago, becoming a prescription immemorial.
What is legally right and legitimate does not always prevail in this world. There have been so many usurpations and dethronements of kings and sovereign princes throughout time and especially in the World Wars of the 20th century. But even though "might made right" on a de facto basis, it did not topple the higher legal right of de jure internal non-territorial sovereignty for those royal Houses who maintained their sacred right to the throne, and never failed to honor and bear the titles of their dignity and the symbols of their rightfulness.
An important ancient historical event in the Middle Ages, which was a great breakthrough and a beginning for the recognition of justice, was the triumph of prescription over the will and law of the Holy Roman Emperor. Many Lombardian cities in Italy in the 12th century made prescriptive claims about their independent right to rule and these rights were eventually acknowledged:
In advancing this position of prescriptive acquisition the Lombards implied, but never expressly stated, that use could cause alienation of rights, even those of an emperor. But as disuse could alienate rights, so use could preserve them.
As demonstrated previously, prescription is all about both the alienation and preservation of sovereignty, depending on how a claim is maintained:
The Peace of Constance confirmed Frederick's [the Holy Roman Emperor’s] failure to assert the supremacy of his prerogative against the Lombard claims of the primacy of [sovereign prescriptive] custom."
". . . Frederick [I] did recognize the prescriptive acquisitions of the Lombards." In the recognition of the Lombardian rights through a recognition treaty Emperor Frederick indirectly acknowledged the natural law rules and principles of prescription. Although other conflicts arose afterwards, the 1250 A.D. Peace of Constance was hailed as a major triumph for hundreds of years afterwards for the "prescriptive acquisition of regalian rights." This treaty confirmed the transfer of hereditary royal rights and prerogatives, to the kings of Lombardy and a large group of their prominent cities. Bodin described the "regalian rights" of these Italian entities as the right to:
. . . make law for their subjects, levy war and conclude peace, appoint to all office in their dominions, levy taxes, make a free man of whom they please, pardon those who have forfeited their lives. What other powers has any sovereign prince?
Regardless of their titles, the recipients held supreme power. Through prescriptive neglect or dereliction, the whole of Italy, consisting of its independent cities, royal counties, dukedoms, principalities, and entire kingdoms, was eventually forfeited by the Holy Roman Empire.
The emperor, as we have seen, voluntarily refrains from trying to impose his authority on those who will not obey him, "lest his laws be a laughing-stock." Thus the gaps in the imperial jurisdiction emerge with the emperor’s patientia, scientia and consensus. It is precisely through the emperor’s absence, impotence and hence neglect of his rights and duties that the opportunity is given to the cities to assert their de facto jurisdictional claims, an example of the operation of custom which through diligentia [diligence] prescribes [creates] the rights of another lost through neglignetia [negligence]. This accurately reflects the way in which effective imperial jurisdiction had in fact receded in Italy; the emperor, in a legal sense, did know about such developments in Italy, but was unable or unwilling, after the expeditions of Henry VII and Lewis IV, to do anything about them.
Thus, all the sovereign royal prerogatives were forfeited over a long period of time through various concessions.
You may observe that the [Holy] Roman Emperor is the lord paramount of the world . . . except in the case when prescription has been ruling for some considerable time. (emphasis added)
Italy was finally discarded through the years as the Holy Roman Empire abandoned their imperial and royal rights over the territory, not by cession or official announcement, but by prescriptive transfer, which needs no official decree to be valid. In other words, the Empire gave up, and let the ruling entities of Italy take over completely especially by the late 15th century. Therefore:
He [the reigning Emperor] . . . forfeited his dominion over them [in Italy] by prescription. His title [or right], therefore, to rule over lands not of his hereditary dominions was [lost]. . . .
Both the Holy Roman and Byzantine Empires over the years prescriptively lost internal de jure sovereignty over many kingdoms and smaller units throughout Europe, Asia, and Africa.
In some of these losses, war or conflict erupted. But the ultimate triumph of justice and the rightfulness of prescription prevailed outside of any court or tribunal involvement. For instance:
The prescription of 100 years against the [holy roman] empire must have been common knowledge by the end of the 13th century, because the French use it to prove France's independence of the empire by right of prescription.
When international law is respected, goodwill can prevail over war and confusion. The following is one example of this:
The Treaty of London of 1604 between the Kingdom of England and the Kingdom of Spain and Portugal exclusively revolved around the legal principles of "discovery and prescription" and the New World.
. . . The King of Spain and Portugal had by proscription attained a right as he [his official envoys] had sailed those seas [the seas of the New World] for over a century.
With the discovery of Columbus in 1492:
. . . the Iberians [the Kingdom of Spain and Portugal] – through regular trading activities and the actions of the conquistadores, had made regular, prescriptive use, thereby entitling them to restrain other nations from activity in those regions claimed through discovery and prescription.
The Kingdom of Spain and Portugal argued that they had the right, not just to their colonies, but to the whole Western hemisphere. But a more realistic boundary was eventually agreed upon ". . . that the Spanish and the Portuguese ‘do not possess the 20th part of that which is open, one thousand leagues lying sometimes between one part possessed by them and another.’" The process of this evolution is yet another demonstration of prescription.
. . . Queen Elizabeth declared to the Spanish ambassador, Mendoza, that "this imaginary propriety [the sovereignty claimed by the Iberians to the whole Western hemisphere] could not hinder other princes from transporting colonies into those parts where the Spaniards inhabit not, forasmuch as prescription without possession is [of] little [legal] worth.
It was decided, based upon right reasoning or natural law, that ". . . he that findeth a treasure is lord of the treasure," and that what the English have found is respectively their own. Similarly, what the Iberians found by "discovery and prescription" was theirs as long as neither abandons or relinquishes their possessions to another sovereign entity sometime in the future. Thus prescriptive principles and justice weighed heavily upon the minds of European society during the age of discovery.
In the 13th and 14th centuries, fully understanding that both France and their enemies understood the requirements of prescription and its impact on the legal right of internal sovereignty, France rulers decided that:
. . . so long as the political consolidation of Germany could be impeded and delayed, [France’s] de facto exercise of power [in their conquered frontier border lands] would in time create prescriptions leading to de jure sovereignty.
Royal jurists [in France in the 18th century] acknowledged that through prescription the lords had acquired the right to act as suzerains. . . . Suzerainty [was] a . . . form of sovereignty [that the] . . . lords had acquired . . . through [the] usurpation of regalian rights.
As discussed earlier regalian rights are the sovereign rights of monarchs. Although these rights were taken away from them at a later date, the feudal lords of France had obtained these entitlements by prescription.
For example, in 1457, by ". . . a long Prescription . . . the county of Neufchatel is become Sovereign." It also eventually became a principality. Prescription also later affected this territory in the following way:
. . . John de Chalous, having perpetually pleaded against them [that is, against others who would take his de jure rights away], bar’d all Prescription.
In other words, Chalous continued to hold the right to rule this land by protest, not by silence or neglect. This book has demonstrated many, many examples of prescription, but here are some further ones. The following four cases are where prescription saved the rights of some of the great lords of France and England. The kings wished to exercise full sovereignty over their lands and their people, but were legally prevented in a number of cases.
The English dukes of Gascony from John onwards pleaded history in defense of their independence. The last fourteenth-century counts of Armagnac followed suit by alleging that the land of Armagnac predated France, and [Armagnac] should not be subordinate to it.
In 1463, the count of Brittany’s advocate declared:
Whereas, from time immemorial, we and our predecessors, kings, dukes and princes of Brittany, who have never recognized and do not recognized anyone as the creator, institutor or sovereign lord of our name and principality, save for God Almighty, have the rights and are entitled, by virtue of our royal and sovereign privileges. . . .
Through these rightful claims, the kings who craved total control were forestalled. Consider this humorous yet poignant display of prescription:
Prescriptive rights could be colourfully claimed, as by Gilbert of Gloucester (or the Earl of Warenne) in a famous episode: when challenged to declare by what warrant he wielded jurisdiction, he waved aloft an old rusty sword, crying "Here, my lords, is my warrant!" to show that his claim was rooted in his ancestors’ conquests and in long use.
Although the law of prescription preserved these regalian rights for a long period of time, while they protested and stood their ground, they, unfortunately, by failing to maintain their entitlement, eventually gave up and therefore lost them, both on a de facto level as well as on a de jure basis. Prescriptive rights to sovereignty must be perpetuated in order to legitimately continue.
In most countries many, perhaps most, noble families had been recruited [that is, were created] by prescription. . . . Perhaps the most extreme was that in Poland, where the king could not create new nobles without the consent of the Diet, yet the Diet made no serious attempt to control or prevent [the creation of new nobles who become petty sovereigns or monarchs] by prescription so that by 1630 thousands of cases of usurpation of nobility were alleged.
. . .They had the power of life and death over their vassals; paid no taxes; were subject to none but the king; had a right to all mines and salt-works on their estates; to all offices and employments, civil, military, and ecclesiastic; could not be cited or tried out of the kingdom; might choose whom they will for their king, and lay him under what restraints they please by the Pacta Conventa; and none but they and the burglars of some particular towns can purchase lands.
In other words, "Neither the king nor the Diet held full sovereignty. . . ." "Over-mighty subjects [the counts, dukes, and princes just mentioned] were [the real] kings and the state was a mirage." Usurpation and prescription over time had transferred sovereignty from the usurped high nobility to a large number of new members of the ruling class of Poland.
The question, for instance, whether Prussia, Austria, and Russia have now a good title by prescription to hold their respective formerly Polish territories, although the three partitions of Poland were wrongful and unlawful acts, must, I doubt not, be answered in the affirmative.
While the above was true historically, Prussia [now part of Germany], Austria, and Russia and the royal or Imperial Houses that used to rule them have made no claim of sovereignty over Poland for some time, and prescription has now removed these claims in the modern age. But there was a period of time when these countries once held good title over Poland through 100 years without meaningful protest from the Polish high nobility. Since the kings were elected in Poland by the nobility, there was no hereditary House that could protest in the capacity of king, so the nobility were the highest class with de jure petty sovereignty. No court or arbitration tribunal created this transfer of authority. It was merely the rule of the law.
For another example of prescription in the 18th century:
The sovereign class, or cast of Irishmen, claim their sovereignty as of right, and ground it on an old title of conquest, confirmed, as they contend by possession, acquiescence, and prescription.
Thus these Irishmen preserved their rights to internal de jure sovereignty, at least at that stage of history. In the modern era, there are no claimants from the Gaelic period of Ireland who have perpetually maintained de jure internal sovereignty through prescription that we know of. As seen previously, deposed sovereigns that fail to maintain their rights lose not only their de facto control over the kingdoms and principalities they once ruled, but they also lose all royal identity and prerogatives when they do not maintain their claims. These once-royal high kings and kings of the various territories of Ireland therefore have become commoners, and all sovereign rights have been eternally lost. This kind of loss and transfer of royal rights has been a common occurrence for thousands of years, even before the written history of man.
For another example of prescription, in 786 in the days of Charlemagne, there is the history of Arichis He was the Duke and sovereign Lord of Beneventum, who ". . . claimed rights of prescription – not of conquest as some have supposed" over the whole realm he ruled in what is now southern Italy. No court decided this. It was understood as a matter of fact and law resulting from the natural law of prescription. If law is respected and honored, the result is potentially nothing short of miraculous -- peace, right, justice, and equity prevail. If not, competing eternal claims for sovereignty over a territory can lead to endless war and strife. The point is:
. . . There is a higher law that exists outside of any social or political systems developed by [man]. . . . [It must be obeyed], otherwise [true] equality and justice cannot be achieved.
Natural law is the higher law – the law of right reasoning, justice, and truth. Prescription is one of its more important rules. It is accepted and recognized by all civilized nations. "[It] is a phenomenon in every legal system, municipal or international. . . ." It is, in fact, so powerful as part of the universal law of nature that Grotius held:
. . . that even in those countries, where Prescription is not authorized by the Civil laws [something very rare now], it takes place in regard to Things relating to Sovereignty.
We have shown some of many examples of the dangers of not recognizing natural law to settle proper title. The Falklands War in 1982 between Argentina and Great Britain is only one. Jean Jacques Burlamaqui explained that prescription:
. . . is requisite for the [peace] interest and tranquility of societies; [that] a long and quiet possession of the supreme power must establish the legality of it, otherwise there would never be an end of disputes in regard to kingdoms and their limits. . . .
If claimants had never ending rightful sovereign and royal claims to territories and whole nations, ". . . this would be a source of perpetual quarrels, and there would hardly be any such thing, as a sovereign lawfully possessed of the supreme authority."
. . . International Prescription, whether it be called Immemorial Possession, or by any other name [is so important that] . . . The peace of the world, the highest and best interests of humanity, the fulfillment of the ends for which States exist, require that this doctrine be firmly incorporated in the Code of International Law.
". . . Immemorial possession . . . 'is generally recognized [as critically essential] and cannot be dispensed with.'" It is ". . . of incalculable [worth in] international importance." It can also be used to determine whether a claim is authentic and genuine or if it is false and counterfeit.
Thus, it is ". . . in the highest degree irrational to deny that prescription is a legitimate means of International Acquisition. . . ." Even in modern times, it is acknowledged that:
. . . A state may acquire territory, without formal annexation, by means of prescription, or uncontested occupation of territory of another state over a long period of time. . . . (emphasis added)
The acquisition of a whole territory or whole kingdom can be accomplished "without formal annexation," through the rules and principles of prescription. It need not even have an official or any formal legal act of establishment. Again, prescription [transfers all internal royal and sovereign rights to the possessor ". . . without notification or an act of formal annexation." For example, ". . . if a [new] dynasty occupies a [deposed] throne for one hundred years without a protest, it obtains a prescriptive right. . . ." This is without formal annexation. "Judge Huber [in the Island of Palmas case] pointed out that in international law there was no obligation of a sovereign claiming by prescription to notify other states of his assumption of sovereignty." (emphasis added) A formal announcement is simply not required nor is it necessary. Such an announcement could occur by a court decree, proclamation, or treaty. But there is certainly no requirement for a formal announcement for prescription to occur.
Note the following:
. . . The free cities of Italy had already become prosperous and great, and enjoyed an almost sovereign independence by a prescription which could not produce, and did not require, one single charter to support their long acknowledged rights. (emphasis added)
In summary, the force of prescriptive law after generations of neglect by the original possessor is powerful enough in and of itself to turn an incomplete or faulty title owned by the de facto possessor into a faultless and perfect one.
Fifty to One Hundred Years are Required for the Transfer of the Internal Legal Right to Rule
As demonstrated before, all that was needed was one hundred years of undisputed possession for justice to take its course, because "centenary POSSESSION, i.e. for 100 years, constitutes a possession immemorial, the [highest] and most indisputable of all titles." In fact, ". . . the possession of a century is a better title than can commonly be produced [for any nation on earth]." This is why prescription is irrevocable. It is also why, ". . . One hundred years [is] the generally accepted period [for prescription]." Justice demands that, ". . . when from time immemorial a nation has, without contradiction, exercised the sovereignty . . . nobody can dispute with that nation [that it does not have] the supreme dominion. . . ." "It creates a presumption equivalent to full proof, but it differs from proof in this: that proof is conclusive and final. . . ." (emphasis added) Such that, ". . . one hundred years prescription . . . justified an heir [or successor] in retaining a crown which had been [originally] unjustly seized." As quoted before, Bodin:
Bodinus [Jean Bodin] lays down expressly, that the descendants, even of a tyrant, can justly plead prescription for his inheritance after a possession of one hundred years, and he adds, it is no objection to this principle, that it is generally said, the sovereign power cannot be acquired by prescription: for that is true only of a prescription of less than 100 years.
Bodin again expressed this when he declared that if the:
. . . successors [usurpers] have held sovereignty for a long period of time, such as a hundred years, then, here as in other matters, the prescription of so long a period can serve as a title [or full right to rule].
It was quite well-establish that, ". . . The Time to which memory did not run was usually regarded as a century, the requisite period for the establishment of prescriptive right." In other words, ". . . one-hundred years of usage, or possession, do[es] suffice to determine the controversy." In fact:
. . . 100 years is, it is believed, the longest period of limitation [for prescription] to be found in the ancient or modern jurisprudence of the principal nations of the continent. . . .
In the past, many thought:
. . . On questions of territorial sovereignty, international law admits no prescription but an immemorial one. Now, international prescription, short of being immemorial [that is, less than 100 years], is admitted in principle by the great majority of jurists: no term of years has been fixed for it [that is, for the shorter period of what is called "ordinary prescription"]. . . .
"Immemorial prescription . . . [is] available in all cases in which there was no shorter period of prescription to which a claimant might have recourse." However, one hundred years is sufficient to make it incontrovertible. In other words, "Centennial or immemorial possession gave rise to a presumption in law of juris et de jure. . . ." "Juris et de jure," as mention before, is incontestable and final. For example:
Six Years [of rule for Queen Athaliah, who was a usurper in the ancient Kingdom of Judah] were not long enough for a Prescription, which . . . must be a hundred Years. . . . A long Prescription gives a [supreme] Right; that is, such a Right as makes Obedience due to Princes . . . settled. . . . [in terms of] legal title. . . .
However, ". . . If it concerns the acquisition of unimportant territory, a possession for fifty years might be considered as sufficient," rather than immemorial prescription, which would require a time twice as long. That is:
The length of time required for acquiescence has never been determined by a tribunal, but most writers on international law [now] suggest that fifty years or more without interruption are required for the acquisition of title by prescription to occur.
"Grotius deemed a 'possession beyond memory' (possessio memoria excedens) essential." However, modern-day international tribunals and councils have recommended shorter periods of less than 100 years. A treaty between Great Britain and Venezuela in 1897, for example, ". . . affirmed that a fifty year prescription gave good title." (emphasis added)
. . . Acquisitive prescription . . . states that after all nations [who have claims] have acquiesced to one nation's de facto control of territory for a period of time, often fifty years, that nation gains legal title to that territory.
Legal scholars [in more modern times] differ as to the specific period needed for acquisitive prescription to occur. Some [still] have suggested 100 years, while others opt for 50.
. . . Acquisitive prescription . . . states that after all nations [who have legitimate claims] have acquiesced [given in] to one nation's de facto control of territory for a period of time, often fifty years, that nation gains legal [and lawful] title to that territory.
Now, as a possession of 50 years, though originally based on injustice, gave a valid claim to the Saxons, so the prescription of 500 years, during which the English kings held supreme dominion in Ireland, removes the original defect in their title -- namely, the injustice of their [the English] invasion.
The shorter suggestion given in an international arbitration commission concluded, "A right unasserted for over forty-three years can hardly in justice be called a 'claim.'" Even "thirty years has been suggested as the minimum [for sovereign prescription], while fifty years have received sanction of many writers." This shorter period was also suggested by Sir Robert Phillimore, the great 19th century publicist. In modern times, the 50-year date has received relative acceptance, and an even shorter time period has been judicially endorsed:
. . . In 1970, the Swiss Government expressed the view that a lapse of 20 to 30 years was required. . . . [Such that] the lapse of more than 30 years [no longer] constitute[s] a bar against presenting a claim. . . . In contrast, the arbitrators in Loretta G. Barberie held 15 years to constitute an unreasonable delay giving rise to prescription.
Whatever the exact length, the more modern period is shorter than the more ancient view. In the early 17th century, it was known and stated that, ". . . Sixty years prescription [is] sufficient to deprive a lawful [deposed] King of his Princely right, and give it to a . . . usurper [or actual possessor]. . . ." (emphasis added) To lose one’s deposed "Princely right" is to forfeit all hereditary rights and entitlements. Once lost, the deposed and his or her House becomes common and have no sovereign right higher than any other commoner. No regal rights are retained once internal and external de jure sovereignty is lost. In other words, eventually the de facto ruler can:
. . . get a lawful [full and complete] right to the kingdom, because . . . he reigned peaceably sixty years . . . [that is] either sixty years prescription, or peaceable [that is, uncontested] possession is sufficient to give . . . a true and lawful right to the kingdom. . . . (emphasis added)
The case for a shorter period of 100 years is not settled. Nevertheless, after 100 years, a case for prescription is complete and final. Any sovereign claim that arises after this period of time is legally and morally barred. The claim is precluded on the irrefutable basis of being good for the benefit of all mankind. "It is necessary to put a limit to disputes about national ownership as it is to close legal controversies between individuals.” Wars over territory can create a disturbing amount of anguish for both soldiers and civilians.
The time-honored ancient legal bar of prescription was enacted by right reasoning, and it forms an important protection and safeguard for justice. For example, if any royal claimant has been:
. . . sleeping on their rights for nearly a half century [50 years], we are of opinion that the consideration of such a case, even if we could ascertain with reasonable certainty what it was, would do violence to every principle of sound policy and open the door for the admission of any claim, however stale and obscure. . . .
The full and complete expiration of a sovereign claim after 100 years of neglect is an integral part of the fundamental rules of prescription in all nations, both internationally and domestically. U. S. Supreme Court Justice Noah Haynes Swayne (1804 - 1884) explained that:
Statutes of limitation are vital [crucial] to the welfare of society and are favored in the law. They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence. They promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs. An important public policy lies at their foundation. They stimulate to activity and punish negligence. While time is constantly destroying the evidence of rights, they supply its place by a presumption which renders proof unnecessary. [That is] mere delay, extending to the limit prescribed, is itself a conclusive bar [ending all discussion on the matter].
For immemorial prescription, the absolute bar is one hundred years, but less time is required for "ordinary" prescription. "‘Limitation’ means the extinction of stale claims and obsolete titles [through the passage of time]."
Great lapse of time is known to produce certain inevitable results, among which are the destruction or the obscuration of evidence, by which the equality of the parties is disturbed or destroyed, and, as a consequence, renders the accomplishment of exact or even approximate justice impossible. Time itself is an unwritten statute of repose. Courts of equity constantly act upon this principle, which belongs to no code or system of municipal judicature, but is as wide and universal in its operation as the range of human controversy. A stale claim does not become any the less so because it happens to be an international one, and this tribunal in dealing with it can not escape the obligation of a universally recognized principle, simply because there happens to be no code of positive rules by which its action is to be governed. . . .
As a result:
. . . a claim which originated before nearly all of the oldest of them were born, and which is presented at a time when it is impossible to say whether it is well founded or not, [in other words] the delay being without excuse or justification [being of long neglect] . . . we accordingly reject the claim and dismiss the petition.
". . . Prescription . . . underlies, varies from, antedates and, as Phillimore says, forms the model for municipal limitation regulations. . . ." In other words, limitation laws all over the earth grew out of the ancient doctrine of prescription. The sense of obvious justice, fairness, and equity therein is universally accepted and is thus a part of the generally accepted principles that comprise modern as well as ancient law.
A critical reason why 100 years of acquiescence or implied consent is a vital part of immemorial prescription is because there is absolutely no competent person living who can declare from memory what really happened so long ago. For example, a deposed monarch might have ceded, renounced, abdicated, sold, mortgaged or given his kingdom or the territory to the present possessor or someone else informally or formally through a lost treaty or other missing record. After 100 years has passed, there is no one alive who can say with absolute certainty that a deposed sovereign didn’t relinquish a claim if there is no evidence that a protest occurred. Thus, the whole and complete truth cannot be determined. The only thing that is absolutely certain in such a situation is that the present sovereign, no matter how he or she obtained sovereignty, has ruled the kingdom or territory for over 100 years, and the reign was undisturbed by protest. Therefore, all evidence to the contrary (that is, that a protest by the dispossessed sovereign actually occurred) must be made manifest to the world before 100 years pass away. If this does not happen, the juris et de jure conclusion is that the present sovereign in possession (originally the usurper) has the greatest right of all to rule. This conclusion is final. Vattel explained this well in the following:
The right of usucaption [prescription] properly signifies that the bona fide possessor [the usurper] is not obliged to suffer his right of property to be disputed after a long-continued and peaceable possession. . . . Nothing can be more equitable than this rule. [For example] if the claimant [the original owner or his heirs] were permitted to prove his property [present his case after 100 years of neglect], he might happen to bring proofs very convincing indeed in appearance, but, in fact, deriving all their force only from the loss or destruction [or purposeful hiding] of some [important] document or deed which would have proved how he had either lost or transferred his right [and therefore is the guilty party]. Would it be reasonable that he should be allowed to call in question the rights of the possessor, when by his own fault [his own neglect] he has suffered matters to proceed to such a state?. . . If it be necessary that one of the two should be exposed to lose his property, it is just [and right that] it should be the party who is in fault. (emphasis added)
Juris et de jure is a conclusive presumption of law which cannot be rebutted or argued by any new or old evidence. It is final. It is, in effect, a statute of limitations. No change is possible. One hundred years of acquiescence and neglect marks the end of rights for one and the beginning of a fullness of rights for the conscientious usurper.
The universal principle is that immemorial prescription ends all controversy. That is, "When a person's right is extinguished by prescription, he cannot assert it either judicially or extra-judicially. It ceases to exist so far as he is concerned." Though unwarranted disputes may still occur, ". . . sovereignty is proved and the title acquires absolute [immutable] validity." "To object that sovereign rights will thus be arbitrarily destroyed [by prescription] is an unwarranted assumption, since those rights [after so long a period of neglect] cannot reasonably be shown to [still] exist."
The rule, long settled . . . is that long acquiescence [lack of protest] . . . and the exercise of sovereignty and dominion over it [by the usurper] is conclusive of the latter's title and rightful authority. That rule is . . . decisive.
The Justifications Identified for the Failure to Maintain Rights
As has been taught, ". . . silence implies acquiescence [which creates the legal presumption of abandonment]; conversely protest preserves [a deposed or reigning county’s] rights." For "a sovereignty which is challenged must react, on pain of forfeiture." Otherwise, the penalty is the permanent termination of all royal and sovereign rights that the deposed party once had.
In the case of ordinary prescription [that is, international sovereign prescription that is accomplished in less than 100 years] . . . just reasons for . . . silence, as the impossibility of speaking, or a well-founded fear, &c., [can be entertained and can stop prescription from transferring all the internal sovereign princely and royal rights to the usurper]. . . . This method of defense against prescription, has been often employed [throughout the ancient world] against princes whose formidable forces, have long reduced to silence the weak, the victims of their usurpation. (emphasis added)
However, no excuse for a failure to protest is admissible after 100 years of negligence, which is immemorial prescription rather than ordinary prescription:
. . . If no clear evidence be brought to prove that the possession [by the subsequent government] is unjust [it will stands forever resolved for the possessing state after 100 years]. For without such evidence, every nations is considered as being possessed of good faith [or having the exclusive right to the royalty and sovereignty of the territory they have possess for so long].
. . . Two things are necessary [to demonstrate that a monarch has truly relinquished his royal rights], one is, that he should know that another possesses what belongs to him: and the other, that he should be voluntarily silent, tho’ he has full Liberty to speak. . . .
Grotius also taught that, ". . . it is hardly conceivable; that the Knowledge of his Right should for so many Years escape him, since Time affords so many Opportunities of knowing it." In other words, the excuse of ignorance is extremely questionable, even before 100 year has passed away; or as one scholar explained, "Ignorance of the fact [about one's claims] cannot be alleged between sovereigns, because national possessions are too notorious to be 'unknown.'" That is, "A clandestine exercise of State authority over an inhabited territory during a considerable length of time would [not only] seem to [but would indeed] be impossible." Hence, "Formal notification is not necessary. . . ." The excuse of fear is also discounted or invalidated as a viable justification after a long period of time. Christian Wolff (1679-1754), a prominent philosopher of law, declared that:
. . . it is not credible that in so great a space of time [100 years that] the other party [the dispossessed dynastic house] should not have obtained a knowledge of his right, or that no opportunity of questioning it had arisen.
. . . in the course of a long time [many years], it is reasonable to imagine, that he [the original possessor] might . . . by some means or other [like moving out of the country] be able to remove his fears, or at least to find some opportunity of declaring his right without any danger.
Length of time, therefore, determines his silence or neglect [to make a protest] to be a mark of his intention to relinquish his right, as it affords a reasonable presumption, that such silence or neglect was not owing . . . to fear [or any other formerly valid reason].
In other words, all excuses are extinguished after 100 years. Vattel explains:
If a Nation has kept silence through fear, through a sort of necessity, the loss of its [deposed sovereign] rights is a misfortune which it must . . . endure, since there was no avoiding it [after immemorial prescription takes place]. And why should it not bear that loss . . . [especially after 100 years of being guilty of making no effort to keep the claim alive]. . . .
In conclusion, dynastic rights and sovereignty are unequivocally lost and:
Most writers in international law including Hugo Grotius and L. Oppenheim, argue that an uninterrupted span of fifty to one hundred years is required before title is prescripted.
As seen earlier in the modern era, the transfer of internal legal sovereignty, ". . . the rule of thumb appears to be fifty-years," rather than 100 years. But after 100 years the loss is final. Only "in the case of ordinary prescription," can the above elaborated excuses be made. Once immemorial prescription takes place, that is, once 100 years of silence on the part of the former ruler has occurred, "this is what forms the absolute presumption, or juris et de jure [which means there is a unrebuttable presumption] of its being abandoned, and upon which another [the usurper or possessor] is legally entitled to appropriate the thing abandoned. . . ." Thus, ". . . Prescription immemorial secures [and firmly establishes] the possessor's right, and it cannot be taken from him. . . ." ". . . The law of nature prescribes [for] us to take [this fact] for an incontestable truth" Thus, in regard to kings and princes, ". . . an hundred years is confessed to be sufficient for Prescription. . . ." This finalizes the transfer of all regal, sovereign and dynastic rights.
Rules and Laws of Succession
Succession rules are another critically important area in regard to whether a sovereign claim is authentic or false.
In Brierly’s concise exposition of international law five modes of acquisition of sovereignty of territory are mentioned mainly occupation, prescription, cession, conquest and accretion, and he should have enunciated another one, which he later deals with extensively, namely succession.
Montesquieu describes some of the good and bad aspects of succession as follows:
By the constitution of Russia the Czar may choose whom he has a mind for his successor, whether of his own or of a strange family. Such a settlement produces a thousand revolutions, and renders the throne as tottering as the succession is arbitrary. The right of succession being one of those things which are of most importance to the people to know, the best is that which most sensibly strikes them. Such as a certain order of birth. A settlement of this kind puts a stop to intrigues, and stifles ambition. . . .
When the succession is established by a fundamental law, only one prince is the successor, and his brothers have neither a real nor apparent right to dispute the crown with him. They can neither pretend to nor take any advantage of the will of a father. There is then no more occasion to confine or kill the king's brother than any other subject. . . .
There is a far greater incentive to ambition [intrigue and murder] in countries where the princes of the blood are sensible that if they do not ascend the throne they must be either imprisoned or put to death, than amongst us [in the Kingdom of France], where they are placed in such a station as may satisfy, if not their ambition, at least their moderate desires. (emphasis added)
Dynastic wars were such a major and destructive problem in Europe that international law first focused on them. This was an attempt to alleviate and prevent the anguish and ruin they brought. To protect all nations, Burlamaqui declared that:
Among several males or several females in the same degree, the eldest ought to succeed. It is birth, which gives this right; for the crown being at the same time indivisible and hereditary, the eldest, in consequence of his birth, has a preference, of which the younger cannot deprive him.
In other words, ". . . the crown does not pass to the successor in consequence of the pleasure of the deceased king. . . ." That is, unless it is a patrimonial kingdom. Pufendorf explained that:
Kings who hold their kingdom as a patrimony [that is, they own it as a personal possession], can dispose as they please in regard to the succession; and their disposition will be respected . . . especially in the case of one who founded or acquired the kingdom. In doing so it will be permitted, if one so chose, to divide the kingdom among several children, daughters ever being not excluded; or even to name as heir an adopted son, or a natural son, or one who is connected with the king by no tie of blood at all.
[Such] a prince could give a binding ruling on the future fate of his possessions: he was also entitled to do it during his lifetime, in particular by dividing them between or among his sons or other relatives. Such a partition of princely domains by the present ruler was in old days also a valid title of acquisition of territory in favour of the person thus assigned.
In short, a patrimonial king has the complete power to dispose of his throne during his lifetime to whomever he wants since he truly owns the kingdom or principality. However, he can do this only if there are no succession rules or family statutes to prevent him. The following are a few examples of the power of a patrimonial right.
King Leopold II of Belgium transferred the Congo Free State, which was his patrimony, to Belgium during his life-time by means of an inter vivos deed dated 28 November 1907. If King Carlos II of Spain had not made his famous will, the throne of Spain would have passed according to the law of succession in Spain to the Austrian Habsburgs rather than the Philip, Duke of Adjou, a grandson of the reigning King of France, Louis XIV, who became the next King of Spain. As an alternate successor, he named his cousin Charles. King Carlos III of Spain gave the entire Kingdom of the Two Sicilies to his third son, Prince Ferdinand, who became the King of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1759. These kings were patrimonial sovereigns and had the perfect right to alienate their kingdoms.
As time advanced, succession began operate with greater stability and continuity by birthright or birth order according to the unique rules of each royal house. These family statutes typically became the constitution or supreme law for each royal House. Public international law recognizes that the dynastic rights of succession of a deposed crown are just as valid, legal and legitimate as the dynastic rights of a House that currently reigns over a territory. If the rules of prescription are followed, then a deposed House remains sovereign:
. . . [For] hereditary monarchy, this right [to continue sovereign forever] is indissolubly linked to the person of the members of the reigning family in the established order of succession. It can only die out [provided it is properly maintained] by the death of all its members, who, themselves, or their descendants, could have been called to the crown by virtue of that order of succession.
Grotius declared, ". . . Sovereignty cease[s] when he who possessed the right is taken away and leaves no successor." If no succession takes place, because there is no lawful heir, the right of sovereignty dies out. Nothing can be passed on, for ". . . no one can convey to another a greater right than he himself possesses."
No matter what kind of succession rules exist, father to son, a legal will, rotation or "kin-right," etc. in a deposed monarchy, if it is not followed, and no one succeeds, then that House is well on its way to prescriptive extinction. Being without a head, it is simply a matter of time. No succession means no protest, no public use of the exalted title and arms. Preservation of rights will be neglected. That is, if no one is the Chief and Head of the House, then no one is making sure that regal titles, etc. and protests are maintained in each generation. This is a serious oversight, because failure to preserve a claim not only mortally wounds a House; it ceases to exist as a sovereign body.
In summary, succession rules and House laws are vitally important to determining a valid royal claim, and they are also of chief importance in ensuring that the natural law of prescription preserves these rights.
Debellatio: The Complete and Total Subjection or Conquest of another Country
Debellatio is another way sovereignty can be destroyed and terminated. It means the complete and utter subjugation of a state. Debellatio takes place when a nation has been so decimated and ruined by war that there is no one to take over the reins of government. This can happens through political capitulation, the sovereign gives up through abdication, renunciation, cession, the acceptance of an unconditional vassalage or through official acquiescence and unconditional subservience. However, debellatio does not take place if there is a government-in-exile or an heir to the throne still exists, who holds the highest right to rule over the conquered nation. For example, Kuwait did not experience debellatio after being taken over, because the rulers went into exile and still existed and protested against the illegal takeover.
[Eyal] Benvenisti, perhaps the leading contemporary scholar of the law of occupation, has convincingly argued that debellatio "has no place in contemporary international law," because it is based on "an archaic conception that . . . " was implicitly rejected by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, whose limits on belligerent occupation make no exception for situations involving unconditional surrender.
Debellatio was acceptable when war was permitted as a method of acquiring title to new territory. However, in the modern era since World War II, the use of force is no longer acknowledged as a legitimate entitlement for such a purpose. This change was made most clear in the Charter of the United Nations. In 1970, reconfirming this view, the United Nations General Assembly declared as a body that it was a general principle of international law that "no acquisition of territory resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal." Earlier in 1924 the Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, it was made illegal to wage aggressive wars against any other member of the Covenant, which at one time included 58 nations.
But even before this time, it was recognized that debellatio rests on raw power, force, and coercion. And there is nothing noble, moral, or ethical in destroying another nation. It is a brutal and vicious act of violence. Hence, it cannot be rationally considered to be acceptable to the conscience of good people. International law since 1648 has focused on protecting innocent people from aggressors, so the violent destruction of a whole nation should never be tolerated. To do otherwise is simply unethical and unreasonable. "This is similar to a social order according to which petty thievery is punished, but armed robbery [and murder] goes free." This would be out of harmony with the law of all nations, since "the [real] ultimate foundation of international law [or any kind of genuine law] is justice. . . ."
Contrary to the past, where conquest and debellatio were considered to be a legitimate way to obtaining territory, modern belligerent occupation now cannot legally yield so much as ". . . an atom of sovereignty in the authority of the occupant." This is a confirmation of the jus cogens (compelling law) principle of international law, which bars the acquisition of territory through the use of threat or force.
If debellatio does not take place, which happens in many, if not most cases, the laws of belligerent occupation, instituted in 1907 by the Hague Conventions require that the occupier return full and complete sovereignty back to the rightful government of the afflicted country. This is in accord with the natural law of prescription, where a legitimate government-in-exile or the deposed monarch or his successors maintain their internal de jure right to rule, provided that the proper protests have been waged.
However, the legal right of proper ownership restoration in international law does not always occur in the real world. Some territories remain in the governance of a usurper, and they are never returned to the proper sovereign. Nevertheless, it is recognized by Vattel and the early publicists, including modern international court findings, that the de facto possessor does not acquire internal sovereignty rights by prescription over a territory or nation so long as the de jure non-territorial sovereign keeps up his claims and protests. And, "no recognition of . . . the exiled government . . . is necessary." What is valid is valid, whether it is acknowledged or not.
Obviously, true debellatio could take place much more readily before aggressive wars of conquest were outlawed in 1945. In most historical situations, a treaty of peace, or a conditional surrender, stopped all conflict before such a devastating ruin ever took place. Even if a complete subjection of the country took place, if a legitimate heir to the throne was still alive or a legitimate government-in-exile was set up, debellatio could not be validly declared. In other words, debellatio can only take place if there is no legally qualified person or national sovereign organization (an exiled government) left to carry on the rightful government.
In fact, there is the legal and ethical obligations to restore the crown. Pufendorf stated:
. . . [When a] forcible Invader hath . . . driven out a Monarch, and settled himself in his room . . . the Obligation to Restitution doth not expire, till the expell’d Prince hath quite abdicated, or relinquish’d his Claim to the Kingdom: And this he is presumed to have done, as other Inclinations, . . . if in a long course of time he hath made no Effort towards the recovering of his Crown.
Or, failed to preserve his rights through the prescriptive use of his regal titles and/or the national symbols of his supremacy, that is, his sovereign coat of arms. This right to be reinstatement can be held by a royal collateral line (that is, if that line legally held succession rights). In other words, in a monarchy, the existence of a recognized royal collateral line would stop debellatio. But a non-sovereign collateral lines, who do not hold any succession rights, cannot rightfully claim something they were never legally and lawfully given. Specifically, a junior House line cannot have a sovereign claim if the senior line fails unless the junior line holds genuine succession rights after the elder line. Such a line are not lawful or rightful heirs to the government ship of the former kingdom or principality.
If a rightful line exists, but fails to maintain or perpetuate their rights after deposition, then their acquiescence and silent subservience to the possessor’s rule, after 50 to 100 years, amounts to the same thing as a total subjugation or subservience to the nation’s new government. This would be an act of desertion of rights and responsibilities or, in effect, an abandonment or unconditional surrender. It is the equivalent of debellatio only it takes a long period of time.
In investigating a claim of royalty, history must be consulted, because true debellatio may have erased any right to the crown.
Dereliction or Abandonment
The dereliction or abandonment of regal or governmental rights can occur in a number of different ways. The first and most common is by the neglect of a deposed government or monarchy long enough to create prescriptive transfer. Alternatively, a sovereign or sovereign government can simply abandon a territory. This could in most cases be a crime against the people of that land if they are left to fend for themselves. The final way is merely to abandon a terra nullius, which is an empty territory or "no man’s land."
When abandonment occurs, a vacuum of sovereignty eventually means the prescriptive loss for the sovereign entity that abandoned it. This kind of dereliction of duty or desertion of a reigning government:
. . . frees a territory from the sovereignty of the present owner-State. It is effected through the owner State [its rightful government or monarchy] completely abandoning [the] territory with the intention of withdrawing from it for ever, thus relinquishing sovereignty over it. Just as occupation requires, first, the actual taking into possession (corpus) of territory, and, secondly, the intention (animus) of acquiring sovereignty over it, so dereliction requires, first, actual abandonment of a territory, and, secondly, the intention of giving up sovereignty over it.
The intention of abandonment is obvious if the sovereignty of the nation or state officially announces the withdrawal and the surrender of a territory. If there is no renunciation or obvious animus, which is a required element, abandonment can be proved by 50 to 100 years of negligence on the part of the former government. As demonstrated, there are many examples and immemorial prescription cannot be overturned.
It is only when a territory is really [and truly] derelict that any State may [legally] acquire it through occupation. . . . [History often shows], when such occupation of a derelict territory occurs, the former owner protests and tries to prevent the new occupier from acquiring it.
If this protest or agitation continues, the right is not lost by the occupier. However, if the former sovereign or state eventually neglects its rights long enough, then prescription would provide a legitimate title to the occupying government. The point here is that sovereignty can be lost. That is, ". . . in cases of Prescriptive Acquisition . . . the former possessor loses [all its rights], because the new one gains [the entire former ruler’s sovereign rights]." Because all royal privileges are merely appendages to the rights of sovereignty, the loss of the right to rule means the loss of all royal honors, titles, rights, and privileges. For example:
The last kings of France of the first race surrendered to government and [gave their] authority to the mayors of the palace: thus becoming mere phantoms, [therefore] they justly lost the title and honours of [the exalted] dignity of [kings because] they had abandoned the functions [thereof].
Although the above kings, the Merovingians, lost their crowns through Papal intervention, prescription still sustained and hallowed the forfeiture edict of the Pope of that time. This meant that the loss of all the royal entitlements once held by the Merovingian dynasty. "Grotius . . . lays down dereliction or abandonment as the basis [the core principle or foundation] of prescription."
General Prescriptive Rules and Principles
. . . Prescription, when it passes the memory of man [100 years], and is not disputed by any other [legitimate] pretender, gives, [by natural law and] by the common sense of all men . . . a just and good title [to the possessor of the land].
By the rules governing the principle of good faith, prolonged inaction on the part of [the deposed monarchy or government-in-exile] which at one time might have been in a position to contest the claims of the prescribing sovereign [the usurper] gradually comes to be viewed as acquiescence. . . . [Hence, the deposed] are estopped from contesting the prescribing sovereign's [the usurper’s or possessor’s rightful] title.
"Acquiescence occurs in circumstances where a protest is called for and does not happen or does not happen in time [to stop the prescription]." However, as Emerich de Vattel declared, ". . . prescription . . . has no foundation if the proprietor has not really neglected his right." He explained:
The presumption [of the permanent forfeiture of rights] is [always] referable to some fault of the [deposed] claimant [such as, abandonment or neglect]. [However] incapacity, disability, want of legal agencies, prevention by war, well-grounded fear, and the like are not faults. Abandoned or neglected property or rights only are prescriptible.
Vattel further explains:
After showing that "immemorial prescription" [transfer of title after 100 years of uncontested and uninterrupted possession] confers an indefeasible title [a title not capable of being lost, undone, voided, annulled or cancelled] because it is founded upon a possession the origin [or evidence] of which is lost in oblivion . . . .
He then declares that:
In cases of ordinary prescription [that is, prescription of less than 100 years – not immemorial] the same argument [of indefeasibility] can not be used against a claimant who alleges just reasons for his silence, as the impossibility of speaking, or a well-founded fear, etc., because there is then no longer any room for a presumption that he has abandoned his right. It is not his fault if people have thought themselves authorized to form such a presumption, nor ought he to suffer in consequence. He cannot, therefore, be debarred the liberty of clearly proving his property [that is, if the case is less than 100 years old]. (emphasis added)
In ordinary international prescription, ". . . the delayed presentation of the claim [to royalty or the governing right and prerogatives, when] the imputability [responsibility] of this delay [can be ascribed] to the claimant render[s] the presumption conclusive and the examination of the merits of the case unnecessary. The action is then said to be prescribed." ". . . The delay gives rise to the presumption against the existence of the alleged right forming the basis of the claim." That is, the claim is treated as null and void, because ". . . long lapse of time inevitably destroys or obscures the evidence of the facts. . . ." Vattel made the legal point that, ". . . when by his own fault he [the former ruler] has suffered matters to proceed to such a state that there would be danger of mistaking the truth [because evidence is lost or obscured after a long period of time], prescription operates and resolves such facts against him."
The presumptions arising from the delayed presentation of a claim are, however, only presumptions of fact and are rebuttable [arguable]. They do not constitute a sufficient reason for barring an action, unless the second element justifying prescription is also present – imputability [placing the responsibility] of the delay to the negligence or laches of the claimant.
"Laches or negligence are therefore indispensable to justify prescription." "Laches is derived from the French 'lecher' and is nearly synonymous with negligence." It is used, "In addition, or as an alternative, to the principle of acquiescence, international tribunals have applied the doctrines of extinctive prescription and laches to bar a claim on the basis of undue delay." "Undue delay" means a failure to make the proper protest to keep de jure rights alive, safe and faraway from the potential of permanent loss. Laches is similar to "statues of limitations" only it is not statutory, but part of equity law. It comes from the Latin expression vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit, which means "equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights." In other words, neglect to assert a claim makes one vulnerable to its loss either inside an international court or outside of it as was done for centuries or millenniums of time in the distant past.
But it must be remembered that, "It is 'ordinary [international] prescription' [which is] subject to be rebutted . . ." or challenged, not immemorial prescription, which cannot be overturned. As explained in the following, immemorial prescription is final and it transfers royal and sovereign rights or obsolete claims to protect the peace of all nations in full harmony with the highest law on earth – the law of nature:
It would be absurd to say that natural law recognised any right of property [or sovereignty] which tended to disorganize human society. . . . If a proprietor have neglected [that is, abandoned] his property [including a right to rule an ancient kingdom or principality] so long that to permit him to vindicate it would be to compromise the rights of others, the law of nature forbids [such a] vindication [or action]. The right of property [or ownership of sovereignty] is not to be considered . . . infinite [or immune from loss], that, at the hazard of every inconvenience to human society, it may be neglected or reclaimed according to caprice [fad or whimsical notion]. For what other end than the tranquility, security, and general advantage of mankind, does the law of nature ordain that the right of property [including the ownership of sovereignty] shall be protected [and maintained] wherever it exists? . . . [The] law equally ordains, that whoever for a long period and without sufficient reason, neglects his right, shall be presumed to have abandoned and renounced it altogether. This is that absolute presumption, juris et de jure [something that cannot be argued against], of dereliction, which affords a fair and legal ground for the enjoyment of it by some else. This absolute presumption . . . [of] the law of nature requires [this] should be received as incontrovertible [that is, something that cannot be annulled or changed]; and for the sake of preserving order and peace among men. Thus, a title is established in the person of the possessor, as absolute and equitable in every respect as any other title of property; which titles all arise from, and are sustained by, the same rational principle. Supported by this presumption, the bona fide possessor holds a right under the sanction of the law of nature; and that same law which inculcates the stability and certainty of rights in general, does not permit a possession so qualified to be disquieted [overturned or rebutted] . . . And such are the simple and obvious dictates of nature and reason, upon . . . [the] structure of the law of Prescription. (emphasis added)
The 100 years of neglect by the original government or royal dynasty is established as a just and equitable end of royal or republican non-territorial claim for three major reasons:
(1) Possession is legally powerful:
. . . It is a settled principle of the law of nations that a state of things which actually exists and has existed for a long time should be changed as little as possible."
A state which has actually exercised sovereignty over a territory should keep the territory, abstract titles notwithstanding. Provided the state of affairs exists long enough, the evidence in favour becomes overwhelming.
[This is exemplified in] the maxim e facto oritur jus [a right arises from the fact], which is at the root of the notion of prescription in all systems of law.
There is the expression that "possession is nine-tenths of the law." The U. S. Supreme Court declared, "That possession, or as it is called in books on international law, usucaption [or prescription], for a long period of time is the best [the highest] evidence of a national [or sovereign] right." This means, on an international level, that the possessor, who has de facto control over the kingdom or nation, has a distinct and powerful advantage over the dispossessed royal house or deposed government.
Outside of court, in sovereign prescription, because of legal presumptions, the burden of proof rests mainly on the non-possessor to provide evidence that the internal right to rule exclusively belongs to the non-possessor. This becomes even more difficult to demonstrate with the passage of time. Facts become obscure, and eventually the evidence becomes so completely uncertain and questionable that it can no longer support a non-territorial claim. Since the claim cannot be proven, this leads to the next reason.
(2) After 100 years, there is no way of proving that sovereign rights were never sold, mortgaged, disposed over through secret or explicit treaty, ceded to the usurper or to someone else, or else eliminated through another mechanism. It is simply impossible to know if critical information has been lost, willfully withheld, or destroyed. Hearsay, both in written and oral form, is unreliable. There must be a living witness or testator to historical events for claims as important as sovereignty. But, after 100 years, this is simply not possible, so it’s easy to understand why 100 years became the outer limit for prescription to occur. This is expressed in the following citations:
The most obvious meaning of time immemorial is a time of such duration, that the memory of no man living can of itself, when unassisted by any external evidences, go back beyond it.
. . . Not because there can be no Monument . . . [or] some writing concerning it [the sovereign claim] . . . but because there is no Man living who remembers a Thing belonged to any other than the Possessor, and those from whom he inherited it. . . .
(3) After 100 years of the deposed royal House and/or government-in-exile being neglectful, immemorial prescription occurs. In this context, neglect means having no involvement, connection, or association with the sovereign claim. It is failing to make a public protest and not using the exalted titles and heraldic arms publicly. Essentially, it is publically [through silence] and juridically abandoning the sovereign right.
Possession . . . for time immemorial, if the meaning of the words is rightly explained, seems to be the most equitable time of possession [by the usurper] for acquiring a prescriptive right.
". . . It is reasonable that [the loss] should fall upon him who has neglected his rights," not on him who has been faithful and responsible in carrying out the burdens of governing and maintaining law, order, and justice for a 100 years. Prescription is just, and it is fair. In contrast, it is patently absurd to expect that a deposed sovereign right that was abandoned and deserted should forever continue. Simply put, a negligent House loses everything after 100 years of inaction.
The following is an example of a prescriptive right obtained through time from the obvious neglect and abandonment by the former ruling House. Consider the case of Prince Azeem Jah in India:
Independently of treaty and of every other right, his Highness Prince Azeem Jah is entitled, by the international law of prescription or prescriptive usucaption, to succeed to the dignity of Nawaub of the Carnatic with all the rights and revenues thereof. . . .
Now, throwing out of view altogether that his Highness Prince Azeem Jah is the rightful successor to a dignity of which we have record for 150 years back from the present time, and for how far beyond is probably unknown, there is the fact, sufficient of itself, that he is the rightful successor to a dignity which has endured, without interruption, in his father's house and family for a period of fifty-four years, and through three successive sovereigns. It signifies little, therefore, by what title that dignity was originally acquired, or whether any record of its origin even remains. Nay, the fact that the distance of time is so great that the Company have had a difficulty in knowing what the facts really were, is just one of those cogent reasons upon which this most just and salutary law [the law of prescription] is mainly founded. . . . The long and undisturbed possession by his family of this hereditary sovereign dignity has nurtured his Highness Prince Azeem Jah in a state and position, and into prospects and hopes from which, if he [were] . . . compelled to [forsake it] can only be [done] by doing . . . violence to all the feelings of humanity [concerning what is just].
Here is how it works:
If the crown were to be claimed and settled in a given dynasty by right of prescription, it would be because for a sufficient time the right had continued undisturbed.
[Even] if a tyrants successors have held sovereignty for a long period of time, such as a hundred years, then, here as in other matters, the prescription of so long a period can serve as a title [or inviolable and recognized right to rule]. (emphasis added)
All fully legitimate sovereign nations on the earth today without exception holds their right to rule and govern based on the rules of prescription in international law. In fact, ". . . if all prescriptive rights were to be removed following wars between sovereign princes, there would be 'not one Lawful [and legitimate] King or State in all Europe.'" Prince Talleyrand explained:
A lawful government . . . is always one whose existence, form and mode of action, has been consolidate and consecrated by a long succession of years. . . . The legitimacy of the sovereign power results from the ancient status of possession, just as, for private individuals, does the right of property.
"Prescription was the basis of the original membership of international society [as created in 1648 at the Peace of Westphalia]. . . ." And even:
Today the norm of territorial prescription [historical right] together with its companion, nonintervention, constitute foundations of international society proclaimed by the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, and other international covenants. (emphasis added)
Prescription is inseparably connected to the rights of sovereignty being legitimate for all nations. This is due to the following, "If we look to history, we shall find few governments [if any] that have a claim to legitimacy as having been [truly] lawful in their origin."
Most new governments were created through some sort of sedition, treason, or usurpation. Long prescription creates legal legitimacy and the right to rule for these parties, and it heals the wrongs of the past.
Only one theory of political obligation is logically coherent and fits the facts, that of "prescription," [also sometimes referred to as] historical right, and custom. The rights of governments, of whatever description and over whatever peoples and territories, are founded, and can be founded, only upon their inheritance or assumption of existing rights.
The right to rule held by all presently constituted countries on the earth originally came ". . . by a successful employment of force, confirmed by time, usage, [and then by the rules of] prescription. . . ." Again, no court declared the right of sovereignty for nearly every, if not all, nations currently extant. Prescription, as a juridical act, gives legitimacy without a formal or official decree. It is simply a matter of two conditions: (1) a long period of time ruling from time immemorial or one hundred years or less, and (2) the failure of the deposed government to properly protest the usurpation.
. . . Immemorial possession . . . of territorial sovereignty is generally recognized and indeed cannot be dispensed with. It has been generally acknowledged as an essential and undeniable legal foundation of the territorial status quo [of all nations].
In other words:
The peace of the world, the highest and best interests of humanity, the fulfillment of the ends for which states exist, require that this doctrine [prescription] be firmly incorporated in the code of international law.
Hugo Grotius wrote that not having prescription would be "a very great inconvenience," because ". . . the disputes [and claims] about [the rights of deposed] kingdoms and [deposed] boundaries would never be at an end, which is . . . contrary to the common sense of nations." In other words, "Prescription is even more important and necessary between nations than between individuals." The consequences are just too serious.
Prescription was especially appreciated in the days when conquest was considered lawful because if deposed royal sovereignty was never eliminated, ". . . The right Heirs . . . or deposed Princes . . . might upon this pretense [their right to rule] make war upon the Prince in Possession and his Heirs to the world’s end." The anguish of war over territories would never end, which is again why prescription obliterates the title of a royal House or government-in-exile after 100 years if proper protests are not made.
The fact that prescription has dominion and legal supremacy over deposed dynasties and governments-in-exile, and has done so from time immemorial, gives the great advantage of having a valuable tool to measure every claim of sovereignty. Ancient natural law that ". . . is binding over all the globe, in all countries and at all times . . . [and this higher law is so powerful that], no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this. . . ." The "Rule of Law [is] the principle that . . . even a ruler [including a deposed monarchy], must follow the law." If a royal claimant operates outside of the law (especially prescription), he or she is, in effect, an outlaw. Therefore, that claimant is illegitimate due to the perpetration of a crime against the necessary law of all nations. "The Rule of Law is the principle that all people and institutions [including deposed royal houses] are subject to and accountable to [that] law. . . ."
The dominion of law is the rule of true justice, fairness, and equity. It is not based on whim, caprice, or mere opinion. The law of prescription cuts to the essence of the validity of a sovereign claim and clearly demonstrates their invalidity. This is why many royal imposters, whether there is an intent or not to deceive, will construct false theories to prescription or rewrite history. These imposters may appear to be legitimate, but they are really only "whited sepulchers, which indeed appear beautiful outward[ly]. . . ." (Matthew 23:27) Prescription is of immeasurable help, because the truth is revealed through it. Thus, it can unify all persons interested in true and genuine nobility and royalty under one banner. This improves the good name of true monarchy and nobility everywhere, since it dispels false claims.
The Immediate Loss of Sovereignty
There are three basic international law concepts or principles that profoundly impact de jure sovereignty. Each of these concepts is very similar to each other, but there are important differences. Here is a good explanation:
Waiver, acquiescence and extinctive prescription are legal concepts entailing the same effect – they lead to the loss of a right or claim. . . . All three concepts should be considered as having acquired an autonomous status under present-day international law.
1. "Waiver can be defined as the voluntary renunciation of rights or claims."
The concept [of waiver] is based on the principle of consent and is firmly established in international law. . . . [It] extends to all types of rights or claims . . . [which] would include the loss of the right to . . . territorial sovereignty, or waivers of immunity from jurisdiction.
2. ". . . The concept of acquiescence is similar to that of implied waiver [or implied consent, implied abandonment or the implied renunciation of all rights]." In acquiescence, ". . . the claimant State [or deposed monarch or his successors] has failed to assert its [or his] claim and that it thereby has implicitly accepted its extinction." ". . . Both implied waiver and acquiescence are based on the same rationale, namely the idea that a certain statement may be inferred from conduct, be it action or inaction."
3. Extinctive prescription happens when ". . . a State [or dispossessed king or his rightful successor] that does not present claims . . . within a given period of time permanently loses its right to do so, even where it has not acquiesced in their extinction."
In summary, "waiver, acquiescence and extinctive prescription are legal concepts entailing the same effect – they lead to the loss of a right or claim." "Once the conditions for any of them are met, the claimant State’s [or regal] right . . . ceases to exist."
Although acquiescence and prescription take a long time to take effect, other forms of the loss of sovereign rights can happen quickly. As mentioned earlier, a declaration of renunciation or abdication, a treaty of cession, or the recognition of a competing entity’s true and rightful sovereignty can cause a prompt and immediate forfeiture of all rights for a claim to some territory, kingdom, or principality. In these situations, as Samuel Pufendorf wrote, ". . . then there’s no need of waiting for the Term of Prescription [50 to 100 years], since the Right is immediately transferred on the other Party." (emphasis added) He gave another example of immediate loss and that in such a situation prescription is unnecessary for the full right to the supreme power is already transferred:
. . . If a City or Country hath on any occasion whatsoever discarded the Sovereignty it once stood under, and set itself up for a free independent State, upon Supposition that it hath transacted the Affair in a friendly manner with its former Lord, and hath by him been acknowleddg’d for a free Commonwealth, it immediately commendeth such, with the full Right of Liberty, and need not wait for the tedious Confirmation of Prescription and Use.
Another important legal international principle also creates an instantaneous or instant waiver of the right to rule:
More than thirty years ago it was observed that the doctrine of estoppel did not appear to have received much attention in the sphere of international law . . . , but the marked increase since then in international judicial and arbitral activity has provided substantial grounds for the modern tendency to consider estoppel as one of the "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."
The above was declared in 1958. Now, over 50 years later, estoppel has been clearly adopted as a legal doctrine in international affairs. "Estoppel is now a firmly established rule of international law and is being invoked and applied in an increasingly wide variety of contexts. . . ."
. . . [It] is a rule of international law that bars a party from going back on its previous representations when those representations have induced reliance or some detriment on the part of others. . . .
". . . [In international law, the] requirements [for estoppel are that] the statement [whatever it is] is clear, voluntarily given, and relied upon."
Practitioners in international law, particularly those involved as counsel in long-standing territorial disputes, are aware that arguments founded on notions of estoppel, and acquiescence figure prominently in the armour of weapons at their disposal.
These concepts are powerful tools to conclude disputes regarding sovereignty. They can be applied to both modern and historic situations because they have been part of the law of nations since the 16th century. In addition, they reflect the natural law requirements of good faith in international relations. Vattel writes:
Every proprietor . . . who expressly omits things [or fails to protest] . . . without renouncing his right, sufficiently indicates, by that means [or by that omission], that he would not preserve it at least, if he does not make an express reservation [to the contrary].
When anything is transacted, in which a man is concerned, if he is present [or knows about it] at the time, and does not contradict it, the presumption from his silence is, that he consents to it. If goods are shipwrecked, or cattle have strayed, and the owner neither sends out to look for them, nor endeavors by any means to recover them, the most obvious construction of his neglect is, that he despairs of finding them, and disregards or gives up any claim that he had to them. In like manner, if he suffers another to keep possession of his goods, without laying claim to them, when he both knew where they are, and is at liberty to claim them, this neglect is fairly presumed to be a mark of his intention to part with them; and when the owner has thus relinquished them, they become the property of the possessor, as the first occupant of them.
That is, if no objection is made to a usurpation, then it is legally interpreted to be an act of approval or consent. Vattel explained:
People have doubtless a right to consider as true what he [another person] sufficiently evinces [demonstrates clearly or proves] on occasions where he ought to declare the truth; consequently they [can] lawfully presume, that, he has abandoned his right [by his silence]; and if he would afterwards resume it, they many [rightfully and ethically] oppose . . . him.
Acquiescence, recognition, and the principle of estoppel are associated legal terms. They ". . . are not strictly speaking, modes of acquisition. . ." nor do they intrinsically have the authority to transfer sovereign ownership. However, they are separate, but similar, principles that are highly material to the actual loss and transfer of sovereignty. For example, both recognition and acquiescence can create an estoppel, which would then have the legal competence to bar a State or other sovereign entity [including a de jure sovereign] from reneging on an international commitment or official statement.
If a reigning government officially recognizes a deposed monarch’s lawful right to rule a territory, this has the effect of legally and lawfully stopping prescription for the deposed House, even if the de jure non-territorial sovereign has not officially protested the usurpation of its authority. (For more information, please see: "Recognition of the Deposed by the Reigning Government or Recognition by the Reigning Government for the Deposed Ruler, Both have Profound Legal Consequences either Way" in Chapter IV). However, the recognition by the reigning government must be official, be it in writing, through a diplomatic corps, by written policy, declaration, repeated public statements, or through an official representative.
The essentials of estoppel are:
(a) The statement of fact must be clear and unambiguous.
(b) The statement of fact must be made voluntarily, unconditionally, and must be authorized.
(c) There must be reliance in good faith upon the statement either to the detriment of the party so relying on the statement or to the advantage of the party making the statement.
"Representations or admissions lacking the [above] essentials of an estoppel . . . do not bind a party conclusively." In conclusion:
In international law . . . the principle [of estoppel] can operate on the level of substantive law. . . . Substantive estoppel [as an obligatory law] governs the creation, modification and extinction of subjective rights; it is a source of obligations. Thus, if a party by conduct creates a legitimate expectation of renunciation to a certain part of territory, it will not be able to claim that part of territory in court in a delimitation or territorial dispute. In this situation, the loss of the right concerns the merits of the dispute: it is the territory at stake which is forfeited. Estoppel thereby governs the extinction of the title, not simply the evidence which may or may not be presented. . . . [This] form of estoppel would be applicable . . . outside a judicial proceeding.
Of course, there is procedural estoppel in international law, but this is not the form that is generally relevant to the loss of royalty and sovereignty. Procedural estoppel is not substantive. Rather, it pertains to the handling of evidence in court. In contrast, substantive estoppels are, in effect, laws that govern the loss of rights both in and out of court. Recognition by the deposed sovereign of the new government’s sovereign right to rule the land creates an immediate loss of rights through substantive estoppel. This is a serious mistake that has far-reaching consequences. (See "Recognition of the Deposed by the Reigning Government or Recognition by Reigning Government by the Deposed Ruler: Both have Profound Legal Consequences either Way" in Chapter IV)
The following situation demonstrates the legal consequences of another form of immediate forfeiture. It is the failure to protest at the appropriate time to ensure that a loss of sovereign rights would not take place. It demonstrates the legal principles of waiver, acquiescence, failure to protest, the establishment of an estoppel or preclusion, and the resulting consequences on sovereign and royal rights.
If the [heir apparent] . . . by means of a Will or other provision [such as a cession or other official act of the sovereignty] has lost his or her hereditary right [and] has failed to protest against the Will or provision, a prescription of public law [called estoppel] sets in against every later questioning of such a public legal disposition on behalf of the descendants. . . .
In other words, an official act that would terminate sovereignty for a royal House cannot destroy the rights of a living heir unless the heir accepts it without officially voicing his or her firm and irrevocable opposition. A failure to protest results in the heir and his or her heirs in perpetuity irrevocably losing the regal rights that the House once had. This occurs because the once-royal House loses all sovereign rights. Once gone, the House simply does not have the legal authority to re-establish these rights since it is no longer sovereign. Only through tacit estoppel, which in this case is where the sovereign entity that has de facto control of the former sovereign’s territory acknowledges that the former sovereign has a valid claim (even if de facto control is not returned), does estoppel prevent the former sovereign’s complete forfeiture of all regal rights if the former sovereign doesn’t formally protest on his or her own.
This book has already discussed how regal rights can be transferred. These methods involve cession, renunciation, recognitions, etc. But the important thing to remember and understand is that some legal principles have the unmitigated power to destroy or terminate sovereign royal or governmental claims on an immediate and irretrievable basis. Hence, great care is needed to keep sovereignty intact, since, in these precise situations, it is relatively easy to lose sovereignty on an irreparable basis. One must not be careless about something so precious. Sovereignty is by far one of the most valuable and important secular possessions one could have on earth. Immediate forfeiture is a very real threat to its maintenance. No sovereignty means no public international sovereignty right to honor others with knighthoods, titles, etc.
The Basic Identifiers of False Claims
Since it is part of the law of nature and an active principle of modern international law, prescription remains binding and important to all mankind. But it is especially relevant and meaningful to the deposed. Prescription recognizes that dispossessed monarchs, their successors, and legitimate governments-in-exile have rightful non-territorial sovereignty that is real and certain, and which deserves the full respect and recognition of all nations. Unfortunately, it does not receive open acknowledgement from the government with de facto control over the territory over which the sovereign once reigned.
This can readily be seen in the case of the non-territorial sovereignty of the Tibetan government-in-exile. No nation has openly recognized them as an official government with which they have diplomatic relations, but many nations unofficially recognize the Tibetan government-in-exile’s sovereign claim as legally valid in addition to being morally and ethically right. One of the great treaties of the past validated and proclaimed these important principles as valid for all in similar situations.
Treaties are part of the "Arbitrary Law of Nations," which are built on the law of nature. They require a nation in good faith and integrity to keep its promises inviolate. This is a moral and universally recognized law. Most treaties, however, are unremarkable and are only applicable to the nations who are signatory. In contrast, others treaties proclaim binding international doctrines that are universal milestones significantly impacting the future:
. . . There are rather few such treaties which could establish general rules or . . . create objective international law. The most important of these are: the acts of the Congress of Vienna (1815); the Paris Declaration on the Law of Naval Warfare (1856); the Geneva Conventions (1856 and 1906); the General Acts of the Hague Peace Conference (1899 and 1907); the London Declaration on the Law of Naval Warfare (1909); the League of Nations Treaty (1919); and certain declarations of the Washington Conference (1921) etc. (emphasis added)
The Congress of Vienna was one of these important treaties. It reiterated some of the most important principles of prescription as it affects deposed monarchs. In fact, "dynastic sovereignty, resting on prescription acquired perhaps in its final [most pronounced] definition at the Congress of Vienna (1814-15). . . ." This unique congress explicitly recognized that the heads of former ruling houses were equal or equivalent to regnant or reigning heads of state. This is not a new idea. It has been a part of prescription from time immemorial; but it was officially acknowledged internationally in 1815. This united decision is probably the most significant treaty ever made in regard to deposed monarchs and by implication for legitimate governments-in-exile, because it officially recognized by treaty law, what was known in the rules of prescription, that overthrown rulers -- the mediatized monarchs – the dukes, princes and counts of the former Holy Roman Empire in this case, which were:
. . . formerly ruling houses . . . maintained their dynastic rights even when they lost [de facto] sovereignty over territory. It meant that even if they no longer ruled, they were still 'equal' in dynastic dignity to the luckier families that did retain sovereignty over lands. . . .
In other words, apart from any court hearing, ". . . in a hereditary monarchy, the right to rule remains with the [deposed] royal descendant until he has lost it through the long [non-court] process of prescription." The German royal families were specifically mentioned. "These mediatized German royal families have the [full and complete regal] rights of equality of birth with the reigning sovereign houses. . . ." They ". . . transmit their titles and their privileges of 'royal' blood to all their legitimate descendants. . . ." They are true royal houses with de jure internal non-territorial sovereignty.
This is a great truth. If a royal House maintains a valid claim, under the laws of prescription, the regal claim can last forever, provided that the House fulfills its obligations. However, as Johann Wolfgang Textor declared, dynastic sovereignty can slip away into oblivion. He wrote:
I can only repeat what I have said above about the prescription of Kingly [dynastic] sovereignty; namely that it is completed by such a number of acts as to enable us to be morally certain of the King's intent to surrender and cede his right and power. This cannot be wisely settled by reference to any precise period of time alone, but also by other indications and inferences and of consent to the surrender.
"[It is a] . . . vital point that Prescription rests upon the implied consent of the former sovereign to the new state of affairs." (emphasis added) Without implied consent, there can be no transfer of royal and/or sovereign rights. Hugo Grotius wrote that:
It is plain from what has been said, that one King [the usurper] may acquire a Right of Sovereignty, to the Prejudice of another King [the deposed monarch]. . . . Thus the true and undoubted [deposed] Sovereign of any people may lose the Sovereignty. . . .
If a royal House loses internal sovereignty and de facto power, it loses the royal prerogative and every other dynastic and royal right. This loss includes all titles, honors, and the right to honor others (commonly known as the fons honorum) in the name of the deposed kingdom or de jure principality. It is clear that the failure to preserve the rights of sovereignty ruins everything royal or grand that a House once had:
. . . Such a King as this loses, by the Law of Nations, not only the possession of, but also his right to, his regalities [that is, his royal rights and prerogatives]. . . . (emphasis added)
Because of "prescription our kings and emperors [forfeit or] have lost all those true and ancient imperial rights [of regal rulership or all dynastic entitlements]. . . .” In other words, prescription can turn a royal House into merely a once-royal House. The story of Andreas Palaiologos, or Palaeologus, is a good example of this principle of loss. As discussed in the sub-section in this chapter entitled "The Buying and Selling of Sovereignty," he sold all his imperial rights to rule the dispossessed Byzantium Empire to Charles VIII of France in 1494. All the rights to the Empire were therefore rightfully and legitimately claimed by France. "Not until Charles IX in 1566 did the imperial claim come to an eventual end through the rules of extinctive prescription as a direct result of desuetude or lack of use." Thus Andreas Palaiologos lost all the entitlements by the principle proprietary conveyance and France lost all the rights to the title and sovereignty of the dispossessed Empire of Byzantium.
The only thing that a descendant of a once-royal House may claim is to have illustrious ancestors. When prescription changes a royal House into a once-royal House, the usurper receives all the internal legal sovereignty that the negligent family juridically abandoned by their flagrant disregard for their rights.
. . . [De facto] possession [by the usurper] for time out of mind [time immemorial which is 100 years], uninterrupted and unchallenged [by the deposed monarch], conveys absolute ownership. A right may thus be transferred from king to king or from people to people by dereliction [neglect]. . . . [Thus] the rights of sovereignty may be so acquired [by the one and forfeited by the other]. (emphasis added)
In other words:
The modes of acquiring Kingdoms [not merely territories, but whole kingdoms] under the Law of Nations are: Election, Succession, Conquest, Alienation and Prescription." (emphasis added)
In fact, barring the other means just mentioned, ". . . Immemorial prescription [is] required for acquiring a [whole] Kingdom or territory or province." That is:
. . . [Whole] Kingdoms may be transferred from one Prince to another by Conquest, or a long Usurpation; and when there is no better title extant, the King in Possession, or his Heirs, may have a good title by long possession, tho’ it began by Usurpation at first.
. . . The state that can show such "a display of State authority" in the period leading up to the "critical date" (the date on which the location of territorial sovereignty is decisive) can defeat any other claim whatever its basis. It has, however, to be a "peaceful" display of such authority, i.e. without protest of interested states of the sort that prevents prescription, and of sufficient duration [100 years or at least 50] to establish a prescriptive title.
The date when the prescriptive time period begins is always when the government-in-exile or deposed royal dynasty fail to use their regal and exalted titles and their national arms, or they fail to protest when it is appropriate to. This is when the metaphorical clock starts ticking. As seen earlier in this book, the critical dates are 50 years for the ordinary prescription of sovereign rights and 100 years for immemorial possession. Immemorial possession, of course, is final and absolute. "Evidence of events after this [the immemorial possession] date had no legal significance."
When analyzing the validity of a sovereign claim, prescription always clarifies who is the rightful legitimate sovereign. It provides the answer on who has the internal legal right to rule over a territory, nation, or kingdom. Prescription is ultimately not about external recognition in international law, which is immaterial to the chief concern or interest of prescription. Instead, prescription deals with the internal or domestic legal entitlement to rule and govern a territory. It is never a question of recognition, equality, independence, or any other external dimension of the law.
Sovereignty is the key component in determining the validity of a royal or government-in-exile claim. Although discussed earlier in this book, a brief review of the identifiers of a loss of sovereignty is appropriate. The general guidelines are as follows:
(1) The appearance of royalty is not proof of anything, nor is recognition by external parties or court findings: (a) Appearances can be an illusion and present a false and deceitful picture. (b) External recognition is a matter of public opinion, and the public can be in error. It was very popular at one time to believe that the world was flat, but that did not make it real. (c) Civil courts in commonwealth countries operate on a preponderance of the evidence. This can mean that the victorious party has achieved as little as a very slight edge, or the metaphorical 51%, in succeeding over the other party. This is an unacceptably low threshold for something as important as internal de jure sovereignty. This fact and others make a reliable determination of rightful sovereignty almost impossible. (See the sub-chapter "Why Courts Findings are Most Often Unreliable and Invalid Sources for Determining Authenticity of Deposed Claims" in Chapter VI.)
(2) A determination must be made of whether the supposedly deposed kingdom or principality in question actually existed in real history. Furthermore, one must determine if the territory every had sovereignty or else had its history rewritten by the claimant or other party.
(3) Another evaluation is whether the claimant or his or her ancestors have openly and/or officially recognized the usurping government as legitimate and rightful. If the claimant or his or her ancestors have done so, this action immediately invalidates the claim and may also invalidate the claim of his or her dynastic heirs (See Chapter III and IV in this volume on the subject of recognition -- the most pertinent being "Certain kinds of Official Recognition can have Profound Legal Consequences" in Chapter IV). It simply creates a situation of estoppel and preclusion where the claim can no longer be upheld. The recognition of the usurper’s sovereignty has the immediate legal consequence of forfeiture for the dynast making the recognition. But the invalidation can only occur for the entire royal House if no one in the House immediately challenges the recognition by the now-former dynast. If House members did not take action to contradict the recognition, the whole House terminates their rights. Once these rights are extinguished, prescription cannot help a House that has already lost its rights through a clear and unequivocal statement recognizing the right of the subsequent government to rule.
(4) If any of the 12 ways that sovereignty can be lost apply, as formerly discussed in the sub-section in this Chapter entitled, "Twelve Ways to Permanently Lose Royal Sovereignty Rights," then the claim is false. For example, was some House rule not followed? For example, did a morganatic marriage occur or did the claimant and his or her ancestors change religions? There is no sovereign or royal right leftover after such forfeitures.
(5) A House that has lost its royal rights cannot restore itself to rights it no longer possesses. (You cannot give yourself rights that you do not own.)
(6) If the territory in question was lost over 100 years ago, the following questions need to be answered. Were the royal titles and the symbols of national sovereignty consistently used by the deposed House over the years? In addition, were diplomatic (public or official) protests made when required? Was the territory ever sold, ceded, or is there anything else that the House may have done that would impact the claim?
(7) Is the claimant actually the rightful heir according to the last known valid House rules or authorized constitution? For example, if the House has salic law, is the claimant the firstborn son of the firstborn son all the way back to the deposed king or sovereign prince?
(8) If a claimant can not or will not provide tangible proofs beyond mere oral traditions and outside recognitions, then there is no solid evidence to substantiate the claim. Therefore, the claim cannot be legally recognized as valid. The point is, no concrete proof is the equivalent of a legal and ethical nullity. As such, it is no better than make believe or fantasy. Similarly, if the proof for a claim is founded on inference stacking (a common intellectual flaw in reasoning), there is little likelihood that it has any truth to it. Inference stacking is reaching conclusions based on unproven suppositions built on hunches founded on guesswork. It is merely conjecture and cannot support a valid claim. Nevertheless, it is a practice often employed by pseudo-royals, who stretch the truth as far as they can.
In sum, a valid claim must be provable by undisputable facts that are conclusive and sure. Otherwise, a claim is no better than a fable or an imaginary friend. The burden of proof is always on the claimant to prove a royal claim to be genuine.
A word of caution is necessary for assessing sovereignty for an ancient entity. The words sovereign or sovereignty have not always had the same meaning as we now us them. From the medieval era to as late as the 1800's, the application of these words, ". . . could be ‘a husband in relation to his wife,’ ‘a mayor or provost of a town,’ ‘the superior of a monastery,’ among other possibilities." In other words, one must be careful in how one interprets the words sovereign or sovereignty in the period in which they were written.
In investigating sources, it must be remembered that the 500 most-used words in the English language contain as much as 14,000 definitions. Clearly, one must be careful to understand the proper context in which a word is used. In addition, word meanings can change over time, so one must factor this into the analysis. As mentioned above, the words sovereign and sovereignty have undergone change. Part of this confusion stems from the definitions given by Pope Gregory VII:
Gregory VII [1015-1085] endeavored to render almost all the states of Europe tributary to him. He maintained that Hungary, Dalmatia, Russia, Spain, and Corsica, were absolutely his property, as successor to St. Peter, or were feudatory dependencies of the Holy See. . . .
"In addressing the council assembled at Rome on the occasion [of deposing Emperor Henry IV (1050-1106), he declared]:"
Act now, I beseech you, fathers [bishops] and most holy princes [cardinals], that all the world may understand and know that if you have power to bind and loose in heaven, you have the same power on earth over each and every one to take away and to grant, according to deserts, empires, kingdoms, dominions [or principalities], dukedoms, marches, retinues, and the possessions of all men.
He boldly declared that, "[Royal or sovereign] power is not superior to the priesthood, but is subordinate and is required to obey it [in secular things]. . . ." Of course, this is completely in opposite to what the Jesus the Christ and his Apostles taught concerning the relationship that church leaders should have in regard to secular rulers. Thus, it is not surprising that centuries later, Pope Gregory VII’s philosophical doctrine was retracted. But his views have caused a lot of confusion in regard to the definition of the word sovereignty, especially in ecclesiastical circles. (See the following in Volume II: the sub-section "Imperial and Papal Dethronements" in Chapter II, Appendix II, and the sub-chapter "Orders of Chivalry and Sovereignty" in Chapter V).
The OED [Oxford English Dictionary] defines "sovereignty" [in Medieval times] as somebody "who has supremacy or rank above, or authority over, others; a superior; a ruler, governor, lord, or master."
This outdated definition is obviously far too inclusive to be effective for determining true regal rights, especially since this book examines sovereignty as it relates to secular power. Therefore, within the context of this book, it is inappropriate to equate every vertical relationship that has some authority attached to it as sovereignty. The Oxford English Dictionary also contains the meaning of sovereignty as it is used within this work:
The recognized supreme ruler of a people or country under monarchical government; a monarch; a king or queen. Having superior or supreme rank or power . . . holding the position of a ruler or monarch.
As said above, in assessing a claim of sovereignty, it is vital to be highly cognizant of how the words sovereign or sovereignty can be misleading. To ensure that official historical documents are not misinterpreted, one must remember this different meaning when reading about historical "sovereignty" of a man over his wife, an abbot over his church, a husband and wife over their children, or an organization or religious order. Catholic fathers (barring the Pope), powerful governors, and church leaders or military commanders were not sovereign. Even such titles as prince or king are no guarantee of sovereignty. As seen earlier in this book, such a person might have been a puppet, figurehead, or ceremonial leader rather than one truly holding the supreme right to rule.
In conclusion, de jure internal non-territorial sovereignty either exists for a claim or it doesn’t. There is no such thing as partial sovereignty in a de jure non-territorial claim. Simply put, either the claim is valid or it has been completely and fully terminated, and it is now ipso jure or legally null and void. If a claim cannot be verified or confirmed to exist, in harmony with prescription, it is of no legal or lawful value. The claim is legally wishful thinking and nothing more.
It is also important to understand that having royal ancestors is simply not remarkable or extraordinary. For example, two of the editors of this book are typical American citizens. By exploring various patrilineal and matrilineal lines, they both have demonstrable royal ancestors who at various times ruled Britain, England, Wales, Scotland, Wessex, Kent, the Holy Roman Empire, France, Sweden, the Byzantine Empire, Spain, Portugal, and the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. This may sound impressive, but statistically speaking "everyone of European ancestry is descended from Mohammad and Charlemagne." The conclusion of the study is that all humanity is related, or biologically connected, many times over in the mix of those few whose posterity survived for thousands of years down to the present. Two other studies conclude that "Edward III is a common ancestor of well over 80% -- probably over 95% -- of the living English-descended population of England." And "if you have any descent from British folk of the last 900 years, you must be a descendant of [William the Conqueror]. . . . Mathematically, it is virtually certain that we are all cousins and probably much more closely than we think, except perhaps to Aborigines of Australia, Eskimos, and other such isolated peoples." Royal ancestry means nothing more in terms of sovereignty than one has illustrious ancestors along with millions of others.
If a claim cannot be upheld by solid reliable evidence passing all the above tests of legitimacy, or is based on conjecture or inference stacking, it is null and void.
 John HO. Ingram, Claimants to Royalty, 1882, Introduction, p. vii.
 Ibid., pp. v-vi.
 José Faur, The Horizontal Society, 2008, p. 194.
 Jonathan Mayhew, "On the Righteousness of Rebellion," A Library of American Literature: Literature of the Revolutionary Period, vol. 3, Edmund Clarence Stedman and Ellen Mackay Hutchinson, eds., p. 75.
 Edmund Burke, The Works and Correspondence of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, vol. 4, 1852, p. 172.
 Anthony Ellys, Tracts on the Liberty Spiritual and Temporal of Protestants in England, 1767, p. 504.
 Roger Acherley, The Britannic Constitution: Or, The Fundamental Form of Government in Britain, Supplement, 1727, pp. 10-11.
 John M. Court, Biblical Interpretation: The Meanings of Scripture-- Past and Present, 2003, p. 160; Note: "The history of England, from the establishment of monarchy to the present times, demonstrates, amid all the variety of events, this fact, that the crown is hereditary, but limited, and not indefeasible." (John Adolphus, The Political State of the British Empire, vol. 1, 1818, p. 137)
 Fritz Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages: Studies, S. B. Chrimes, tran., 2005, pp. 195-196.
 The British Constitution Vindicated, 1716, title page; Note: "There is no divine, imprescriptible, indefeasiable right in any family of mankind to rule others." (The Metropolitan: A Monthly Magazine, Devoted to Religion, Education, Literature, and General Information, vol. 2, no. 1, 1854, p. 41)
 Walter Percy Workman, The Questions set at the Matriculation Examination of the London University, June 1880, p. 189; Note: "It is absurd, in fact, and anti-Christian, to suppose that any right of superiority [such as royalty] founded on mere natural descent [outside of anything else] is indefeasible [cannot be forfeited]. . . ." ("The New French Dynasty," A Monthly Magazine, Devoted to Religion, Education, and General Information, vol. 2, 1854, p. 41)
 Encyclopaedia Britannica; Or, a Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and Miscellaneous Literature, vol. 8, "Hereditary, no. 3," 1797, p. 475.
 Andrew Vincent, Nationalism and Particularity, 2002, p. 17.
 Stephen Holms, "Jean Bodin: The Paradox of Sovereignty and the Privatization of Religion," Religion, Morality and the Law, 1988, p. 10.
 Edward Andrew, "Jean Bodin on Sovereignty," Republics of Letters: A Journal for the Study of Knowledge, Politics, and the Arts, vol. 2, no. 2, June 1, 2011, p. 84.
 Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law, 1998, p. 54.
 F. Peter Collingridge, The Civil Principality of the Vicar of Christ, 1889, p. 90.
 Jean Bodin, Bodin: On Sovereignty, Julian H. Franklin, ed., p. 112.
 Amos Kendall, Autobiography of Amos Kendall, William Stickney, ed., 1872, p. 597.
 James Wilford Garner, Introduction to Political Science, 1910, pp. 249-250.
 Jean J. Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, Thomas Nugent, trans., vol. 2, chapter 7, no. 53, 1763.
 Sir Henry Maine, International Law, 1890, p. 58.
 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 2008, p. 113.
 Amos Kendall, Autobiography of Amos Kendall, William Stickney, ed., 1872, p. 596.
 Daniel Philpott, "Usurping the Sovereignty of Sovereignty," World Politics, vol. 53, January 2001, p. 298.
 Ibid., p. 301.
 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, 1999, p. 24.
 Daniel Philpott, "Usurping the Sovereignty of Sovereignty," World Politics, vol. 53, January 2001, p. 321.
 Ibid., p. 321.
 Ibid., p. 317.
 Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648, 2003, p. 228.
 Oliver Jütersonke and Rolf Schwarz, "Slicing up the cake: divisible sovereignty in the pre and post-Westphalian order," European Standing Group on International Relation (SGIR), Turin Conference 2007, p. 15, 2012: http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/Schwarz-divsov_and_westphalian_order.pdf.
 Ibid., p. 1
 Sir Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law, its Connection with the Early History of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas, 1906, p. 107.
 Mikulas Fabry, Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States since 1776, Structure of the Book, 2010, p. xi.
 International Association of Democratic Lawyers, 2nd International Conference of Lawyers on Indochina, 1971, p. 114.
 Walter Raleigh, The General History of the World, 1901, p. 270.
 Kaleni Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1991, pp. 91-92.
 Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, chapter 10, no. 18.
 Jam‘iyah al-Mi?riyah lil-Qanunal-Dawli, The Egyptian Society of International Law, vol. 42, 1986, p. 165.
 Albert Von Ruville, Back to Holy Church: Experiences and Knowledge Acquired by a Convert, G. Schqetensack, trans., 1913, p. 149.
 William Cullen Dennis, Chamizal Arbitration: Argument of the United States of America, 1911, p. 114; Note: ". . . Prescription [loss] of the sovereign rights of the princeps [the royal king or ruling prince], do so through the knowledge and acquiescence [of the same] . . . , which is thus tantamount to his concession [that is, his silence or implied agreement to the voluntary surrender all of those internal de jure rights]." (Joseph Canning, The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis, 1987, p. 118). (emphasis added)
 Edward Smedley and Hugh James Rose, Encyclopaedia Metropolitana; or, Universal Dictionary of Knowledge, vol. 2, 1845, p. 714.
 Viscount Henry St. John Bolingbroke, Letters, on the Spirit of Patriotism: on the idea of a Patriot King, 1749, p. 122.
 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, 2007, p. 62.
 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, note by Jean Barbeyrac, ed., Book II, chapter 4, no. 13.
[50 Heinrich von Treitschke, Politics, vol. 2, Arthur James Balfour, trans., vol. 2, 1916, p. 75.
 Francis Barrymore Smith, Radical artisan, William James Linton, 1812-97, 1973, p. 220.
 John Lynch, Cambrensis Eversus , vol. 3, part 1, Matthew Kelly, ed., 1851, p. 45.
 Ibid., p. 11.
 John Ryan, Ireland, vol. 1, 1928, p. 68.
 Eelco Nicolaas van Kleffens, Academie de Droit International de La Ha, vol. 82, 1954, p. 85.
 Edmund Burke, The Works of the Rt. Honorable Edmund Burke, vol. 2, 1834, p. 460.
 Westster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary, "Sovereignty," 1984, p. 1112.
 John Bouvier, Bouvier's Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia, vol. 2, 3rd revision, 8th ed., Francis Rawley, ed., "De jure Divino," 1916, p. 1760 and Sir Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, Johann P. Sommerville, ed., 1991, p. 283.
 Sir Robert Filmer quoted in James Tyrrell, Bibliotheca Politica, 1694, p. 127.
 Ibid.; Note: ". . . Robert Filmer . . . in his Observations upon Aristotle’s Politiques (1652) [observed] that usurpers who have reigned for so long that "the knowledge of the right heir be lost" [because they failed to protest and to keep their rights alive] are to be regarded as rightful kings. . . . [In other words] Conquest, according to the providentialist rationale, is merely a sign of divine approval. Thus if a monarch, including a usurper, manages to establish effective control and government over a certain period of time (one generation, three generations, or a century, depending on the texts one consults), then this indicates a divinely legitimated title. The providentialist theory is based on the postulate that war constitutes a kind of judicial procedure in a situation in which there is no legitimate judge to settle competing claims. According to this view war is a kind of trial [trial by combat], in which victory is the divinely ordained proof of the justness of the victor’s claim." (Yves Winter, Conquest: Political Concepts: A Political Lexicon, Conquests, 2013: http://www.politicalconcepts.org/issue1/conquest/#fn-15-51).
 Sir John Elliot, De jure Maiestatis: or Political Treatise of Government, vol. 1, 1882, p. 104; Note: ". . . it is generally said, the sovereign power cannot be acquired by prescription: [but] that is true only of a prescription less than 100 years." (John Lynch, Cambrensis Eversus, vol. 3, Matthew Kelly, ed. and trans., 1852, p. 43.
 John Bramhall, The Works of John Bramhall: with a Life of the Author and a Collection of his Letters, vol. 3, 1844, p. 318; Note: If "prescription" takes place, then ". . . an absolute [a full, complete and unlimited] right has accrued to that [usurping] state. . . ." (John Norton Pomeroy, Lectures on International Law in Time of Peace, Theodore Salisbury Woolsey, ed., no. 117, 1886, p. 120). It takes all rights away from the former deposed ruling family that were negligent for over 100 years.
 William Oldys and Thomas Park, The Harleian Miscellany, vol. 8, 1811, pp. 161, 163.
 Ibid., p. 159; Note: "State practice, interpretive works, and decisions of international tribunals unanimously agree that long-continued possession and effective control, combined with declarations [or obvious acts] of sovereignty, eventually confer title by prescription. The length of time required varies according to circumstances – for example, whether any protests or challenges are lodged. . . ." (Thomas Flanagan, First nations? Second Thoughts, 2000, p. 61).
 Christoph A. Stump, “The” Grotian Theology of International Law, 2006, p. 189.
 Raj Kumar Pruthi, The Political Theory, 2005, pp. 229-230.
 Sir Robert Filmer, The Free-Holders Grand Inquest, 1679, pp. 154-155.
 Gordon J. Schochet, The Authoritarian Family and Political Attitudes in 17th-Century England, Patriarchialism in Political Thought, 1988, p. 157.
 Eelco van Kleffens, Recueil Des Cours, Collected Courses, 1953, vol. 82, 1968, p. 85.
 Ibid., p. 86.
 Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law: being the substance of a Course of Lectures on Grotius de Jure Belli et Pacis, 1754, p. 129.
 Geoffrey P. Miller, The Ways of a King, 2011, p. 235.
 Warren W. Wiersbe, Bible Exposition Commentary, 2003, p. 247.
 Flavius Josephus, The Antiquities of the Jews, William Whiston, trans., Book 6, chapter 7, no. 1.
 Sir Robert Filmer, The Free-Holders Grand Inquest, 1679, p. 144.
 James Daly, Sir Robert Filmer and English Political Thought, 1979, p. 121.
 Samuel Puffendorf, Of the Laws of Nature and Nations, 4th ed., Basil Kennett, trans., Barbeyrac, ed., Book 4, chapter 12, no. 11, note 5, 1729.
 John Neville Figgis, The Theory of the Divine Right of Kings, 1896, p. 5; Note: "There is reason [outside of the faulty Divine Right of Kings for] the acceptance of this rule by the nations; for . . . without the strict application of primogeniture, a King will not devote the same pains to the care of his Kingdom’s interests, seeing that after his death the throne may go, not to his children, but to his brothers or perhaps collaterals of even remote degree. Nations of latter times, then, showed their wisdom" by following primogeniture, because actual experience has demonstrated that Kings feel a keener or more deeply felt desire and motive for promoting the long-term welfare of the commonwealth when their own children will succeed them. (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations,  chapter 9, no. 33, 1916). Primogeniture makes the eldest legitimate son, the heir apparent to the throne unless in rare instances where this would be inappropriate.
 Ibid., p. 44.
 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
 Ibid., pp. 255, 260.
 Fritz Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages, S. B. Chrimes, trans., 1956, p. 11.
 Ibid., p. 69.
 Ibid., p. 12.
 J. P. Summerville, The Divine Right of Kings, 2013: http://faculty.history.wisc.edu/sommerville/367/367-04.htm.
 Samuel Puffendorf, The Law of Nations and Nature, Jean Barbeyrac, trans. & ed., Book 4, chapter 12, no. 11, note 4 (1); Note: "Every de facto sovereign therefore is de jure sovereign, except in certain rare cases, viz., where there is adverse claimant, who has been de jure sovereign; who has been unjustly and sinfully deposed; and who has not yet lost his right." (Nicholas Patrick Wiseman, ed., The Dublin Review, Vol. 77, no. 5, 1875, p. 44).
 Vladimir Duro Degan, Sources of International Law, 1997, pp. 21-22 and Wlater Ullmann, A History of Political Thought: The Middle Ages, 1970, pp. 110-115.
 Matthew Henry, Thomas Scott, The Comprehensive Commentary on the Holy Bible: Genesis-Judges, William Jenkins, ed., 1835, p. 745.
 Joseph Parker, The People's Bible: Discourses upon Holy Scripture, vol. 1, 1885, p. 265.
 John Asgill, The Succession of the House of Hanover Vindicated, 1714, p. 7.
 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
 Maurice Cranston, “From Legitimism to Legitimacy,” Legitimacy, Athnasios Menlakis, ed., 1986, pp. 36, 39 as quoted in Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, 2000, p. 142.
 Bering Sea Tribunal of Arbitration, Fur Seal Arbitration: Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration, no. CCLVIII, 1895, p. 45-46.
 Ibid., p. 47.
 Thomas Flanagan, First Nations? Second Thoughts, 2000, p. 61.
 Thomas Joseph Lawrence, Principles of International Law, 1901, p. 166.
 "In spite of denials of validity of title by prescription by some writers, who lay themselves open to the imputation of mistaking their own theories of what is just and fitting for public law of the civilized world, there can be no doubt that long-continued possession of territory gives good title to it in International Law . . . and even in cases where possession was originally acquired by illegal and unlawful acts. . . . The same reasons which justify, even compel, the recognition of prescription as a valid ground of title of private property by the municipal law of all civilized peoples supports its admission into International Law." (Thomas Joseph Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 1895, p. 159). (emphasis added).
 Jacques Maritan, "The Concept of Sovereignty," The American Political Science Review, vol. 44, no. 2, 1950, p. 348.
 Henry A. Yeomans, "Divine Right of Kings," Cyclopedia of American Government, vol. 1, Andrew McLaughlin and Albert Hart, eds., 1914, p. 605.
 John Neville Figgis, The Theory of the Divine Right of Kings, 1896, p. 261.
 Philipp Melancthon (1497-1560), "Art.18: Melancthon’s Letter to Dr. Troy, " The Annual Review, and History of Literature, vol. 4, Arthur Akin, ed., 1806, p. 263.
 William A. Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights, 2nd ed., 2012, p. 19.
 Henry Reed, English History and Tragic Poetry: As Illustrated by Shakspeare, p. 161.
 Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648, 2003, p. 226.
 Lord Macaulay, "Frederic the Great," Literary and Historical Essays Contributed to the Edinburgh Review, 1913, pp. 649-650.
 Karl-Heintz Spiess, "Lordship, Kinship and Inheritance among the German High Nobility in the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period," Kinship in Europe Approaches to Long-term Development (1300-1900), David Warren Sabean, Simon Teuscher and Jon Mathieu, eds., 2007, p. 70.
 Walter A. Shumaker, George Foster Longsdorf, The Cyclopedic Dictionary of Law, "rex debet esse sub lege quia les facit regem," 1901, p. 808; Note: ". . . For it is by the law of their kingdoms that Kings exercise their sovereign power. . . ." (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, chapter 14, no. 8).
 Michael Curtis, Three Against the Third Republic: Sorel, Barres and Maurras, 2010, p. 243.
 K. L. Bhatia, Textbook on Legal Language and Legal Writing, 2010, p. 374.
 Boleslaw Adam Boczek, International Law: A Dictionary, 2005, p. 250.
 Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, vol. 1, chapter 9, no. 24.
 J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective: State Territory, 1970, p. 297.
 Samuel von Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, Book 7, chapter 8, no. 8.
 Ibid., nos. 8-9.
 Estoppel is a legal technique whereby state deemed to have consented to a state of affairs cannot afterwards alter their position. Although it cannot found title by itself, it is of evidential and often of practical importance. (Malcolm Nathan Shaw, International Law, 5th ed., 2003, p. 439)
 Forest E. Barber, OAE, "No Longer Royal," The Augustan, vol. 18, no. 2, April 1976, p. 66 and no. 3, July, 1976, p. 81.
 Samuel Masters, "The Case of Allegiance in our Present Circumstances Considered," A Collection of State Tracts, vol. 1, 1705, p. 326.
 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Book 1, chapter 4, no. 2.
 Fritz Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages: Studies, S. B. Chrimes, tran., 2005, p. 195.
 Ramesh Chandra Majumdar, Ancient India, 2003, p. 145.
 Merrill C. Tenney, The Zondervan Encyclopedia of the Bible, vol. 5, revised ed., Books of Samuel, VII, A, 2010.
 Willliam Barclay (1546–1608), a prominent Scottish jurist, as paraphrased in James Gordon, History of Scots Affairs, 1841, vol. 1, p. xviii.
 Richard Grelling, The Crime, vol. 3, Alexander Grey, trans., 1918, p. 264; Note: "If our kings are oblig'd to rule according to Law, and have only so much power as the law gives them, if it was the Peoples choice that prefer'd them before others, and so entail the Crown upon their Race [a particular family], upon certain Terms and Conditions; then certainly if they break these Conditions, and so entail the Crown upon their Race [this family] and instead of a legal government they usurp [that is, manifest] an absolute and Tyranical Power, it is a clear and self-evident Consequence, that they forfeit their right to the Crown." ("A Vindication of the Proceedings of the Convention of the Estates in Scotland," A Collection of State Tracts, Publish'd during the Reign of King William III, vol. 3, 1708, p. 455). (emphasis added)
 Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, John Pauley Bate, trans., chapter 10, no. 19.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 1, chapter 4, no. 55.
 Op.cit., Fritz Kern, p. 101.
 George Ballantyne, A Vindication of the Hereditary Right of His Present Majesty, King George III to the Crown of Great Britain, 1743, p. 25.
 Sir Walter Scott, The Life of Napoleon Buonaparte, Emperor of the French, vol. 3, 1828, p. 266.
 "France and Germany," The Saturday Review, (23) vol. 598, no. 23, April 13, 1867, p. 450.
 Henry Marshall, Ceylon: a General Description of the Island and Its Inhabitants with an Historical Sketch of the Conquest of the Colony by the English, 1846, p.163.
 Donald Obeyesekere, Outlines of Ceylon History, 1911, p. 310.
 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1, Herbert Broom and Edward Alfred Hadley, eds., chapter 3, no. 3, 1869, p. 228.
 "The New French Dynasty," The Metropolitan: a Monthly Magazine, devoted to Religion, Education and Literature, and General Information, vol. 2, no.1, February 1854, p. 41; Note: "If he becomes instead of a father a murderer, instead of a shepherd a butcher, instead of a prince a tyrant, the providences are no longer bound to obey him. . . . The right of succession does not hold in these circumstances. The [people] resume their original rights. . . ." (Ernst Heinrich Kossmann and Albert Fredrik Mellink, Texts Concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1974, p. 229) This was the law in the Netherlands.
 Robert Bissel, "The Life of Edmund Burke," The National Quarterly Review, vol. 37, Edward Isidore Sears, ed., 1873, p. 304.
 Sir Thomas Craig, The Right of Succession to the Kingdom of England, 1703, p. 182.
 Ibid; Note: As in most lands and among most monarchies, ". . . Hereditary sovereignty passes, with all its rights, [generally] from one eldest son to another, unless the possessor forfeits his title by being guilty of some crime. In such a case, the . . . succession [goes to], either one of [the] younger brothers, or a cousin; but these must be chosen from the same branch, as the lawful branch cannot be deprived of this right, unless all those [all of the branch] are condemned [found guilty] who compose it." (Encyclopaedia Londinensis, or, Universal Dictionary of Arts, Sciences and Literature, vol. 4, "China,"1810, p. 450).
 "A Vindication of the Proceedings of the Convention of the Estates in Scotland,"A Collection of State Tracts, Publish'd during the Reign of King William III, vol. 3, 1708, p. 458.
 Quoting M. Symmons in Samuel Rutherford, Lex, rex, or, The Law and the Prince, (written 1644), 1910, p. 42.
 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., 1846, p. 565.
 George L. Craik & Charles MacFarlane,The Pictorial History of England During the Reign of George the Third, vol. 4, 1864, p. 522.
 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 4, no. 10.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book II , chapter 12, no. 196.
 Ibid., no. 197.
 "Government of the Indian Empire," The Edinburgh Review, Sydney Smith, ed., vol. 159, no. 325, January 1884, p. 38, Note: ". . . The right to rule was a gift (mandate) bestowed by Heaven (tien), the supreme moral force or god of the universe. This gift [of sovereignty] was conditional and could be withdrawn when a king failed to adhere to virtuous ethical conduct, or failed to promote the welfare of his subjects; the Mandate [of Heaven or supremacy] would then be conferred on a more suitable person. . . . The theory was used throughout Chinese history to justify dynastic changes." (Jay P. Anglin and William J. Hamblin, World History to 1648, 1993, p. 75).
 Winston Lan Lo, An Introduction to the Civil Service of Sung China, 1987, p. 3.
 Hozumi Yatsuka, "The Religious, Volkisch Family State," Japan's Holy War: the Ideology of Radical Shinto Ultranationalism, Walter Skya, ed., 2009, p. 66.
 Ibid., p. 67; Note: "The Oriental nations . . . as soon as a king or a royal race had been dethroned, he or it lost all their sanctity [all their dynastic royal rights to internal de jure sovereignty as well as the de facto right to ruler]; [such] was an understood mark of a celestial malediction [a divine denunciation]; the new monarch (though a usurper), and the new dynasty (though sprung from nothing), for the same reason [no legal hereditary right remains after dispossession] received immediately all [not some, but all] the prestige of power [all the royal rights and all sovereign privileges]; this feeling, carried to excess, contributed to the insecurity of eastern dynasties [such as the Byzantine and Chinese Empires], and offered a premium to rebellion [which is why there were so many acts of sedition in these dynasties]." ("The New French Dynasty," The Metropolitan: a Monthly Magazine, devoted to Religion, Education and Literature, and General Information, vol. 2, no.1, February 1854, pp. 40-41).
 Charles Gutzlaff, "Art. 5: A Sketch of Chinese History: comprising a retrospective of the Foreign Intercourse and Trade with China," The American Quarterly Review, vol. 17, Robert Walsh, ed., 1835, pp. 104-105.
 Ibid., p. 104.
 Adel M. Sabit, A King Betrayed: the Ill-fated Reign of Farouk of Egypt, 1989, p. 71.
 Kjetil Fosshagen, "The Perfect Sovereign: The Sacralized Power of the Ottoman Sultan," Hierarchy: Persistence and Transformation in Social Formations, Knut Mikjel Rio and Olaf H. Smedal, eds., 2009, p. 201.
 Charles de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, vol. 1, Thomas Nugent, trans., 1900, p. 61.
 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Book 3, chapter 20, no. 44; Note: ". . . Only rights and rightful claims can pass over to others [or be ceded, sold or willed to another]. . . ." (The Law Times: The Journal and Record of the Law and the Lawyers, vol. 46, November 8, 1868, p. 65).
 Prince De Talleyrand, Memoirs of the Prince De Talleyrand, vol. 2, Duc De Broglie, ed.,  2006, p. 120.
 Sir John William Salmond and Glanville Llewelyn Williams, Jurisprudence, 1947, p. 515, 519.
 Stephen J. Davis, "Law and Order in Stirlingshire, 1637-1747," Ph.D. Thesis, University of St. Andrews, 1984, p. 250; 2013: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2684.
 Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, 1680, trans., 1916, chapter 9, no. 22.
 Oliver Jütersonke and Rolf Schwarz, "Slicing up the cake: divisible sovereignty in the pre and post-Westphalian order," European Standing Group on International Relations (SGIR), Turin Conference 2007, p. 2, 2012: http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/Schwarz-divsov_and_westphalian_order.pdf and Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Book 1, chapter 3, nos. 21.2-21.3.
 Reference unknown.
 John C. Calhoun, "Disquisition on Government," Works, vol. 1, 1851, p. 146.
 Kathleen Davis, Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization Govern the Politics of Time, 2008, p. 49.
 Jean Boden, The Six Bookes of a Commonweale, , vol. 2, 1962, p. 2, Note: "By a sovereign government we mean . . . [it] is not itself subject to any superior Government." (Henry Wager Halleck, Halleck’s International Law or Rules regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War, 3rd ed., Sherston Baker, ed., 1893, p. 67)
 Charles Mcilwain, "Sovereignty in the World Today," Measure, vol. 2, 1950, p. 112.
 Hugh Clark and Thomas Wormull, An Introduction to Heraldry, 1854, p. 207.
 The Penny Cyclopaedia of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, vol. 20, "ROYALTY," 1841, p. 211.
 Luther Calvin Saxton, Fall of Poland: containing an Analytical and a Philosophical of the Causes which Conspired in the Ruin of that Nation, vol. 1, 1851, p. 74.
 Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, John Pawley Bate, trans., chapter 9, no. 23,  1916.
 Henry Wager Halleck, Elements of International Law and Laws of War, 2009, p. 44.
 Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations,  vol. 2, John Brown Scott, ed., John Pauley Bate, trans., vol. 1, chapter 9, no. 18, 1916, p. 81.
 The Encyclopaedia Britannica: a Dictionary of Arts, Sciences and General Literature, vol. 13, "International Law," 1890, p. 192.
 Ibid., no. 22. p. 82.
 Senator White, “Indians,” Register of Debates in Congress, April 21, 1830, p. 375.
 Treaty of Georgievsk, 1783, 2011: www.westminster.edu/staff/martinre/Treaty.html.
 Alina Kaczorowska, Public International Law, 4th ed., 2010, p. 195.
 Alexander Del Mar, The Middle Ages revisited: or, the Roman Government and Religion and their Relations of to Britain, 1900, p. 308; Note: ". . . The Byzantine's saw in the imperial power the terrestrial image of the omnipotence of God. . . . He possessed full executive powers over all people [including all vassals], could put anyone [including vassal kings] to death without trial. . . . No one was so important or so rich to be beyond the reach of the emperor's hand. Nobility, wealth, rank [even the rank of king], or reputation was no defense against the imperial will." (Aleksandr Petrovich Kazhdan, People and Power in Byzantium, 1996, pp. 145-146).
 Byzantine Aristocracy and Bureaucracy, 2011: www.music.us/education/B/Byzantine-aristocracy-and-bureaucracy.htm.
 Mark C. Bartusis, The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204-1453, 1992, p. 359.
 Sinisa Malezevic, The Sociology of War and Violence, 2010, p. 105.
 Greorio F. Zaide, World History, 1994, p. 157.
 Francis Harry Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd ed., 1986, p. 48.
 Irfan Shahîd, Byzantium and the Arabs in the Fourth Century, 2006, p. 511.
 Shinasi A. Rama, "Continuity or Metamorphosis: Realist Theories and the Anomaly of Medieval International Politics," Albanian Journal of Politics, vol. 1, issue 2, 2005, p. 110.
 Andrew Horton, Bones in the Sea quoted in Patricia Storace, "Marble Girls: An American Poet finds a home in Greece," Travelers' Tales Greece: True Stories, Larry Habegger, Sean O’Reilly and Brian Alexander, eds., 2003, p. 23.
 Irfan Shahîd, Byzantium and the Arabs in the Sixth Century, 1995, p. 473.
 Francis Dvornik, The Slavs in European History and Civilization, 1962, p.376.
 George Ostrogorshky, History of the Byzantine State, J. M. Hussey, trans., 1956, p. 633.
 Op.cit., Infan Shahîd., p. 107.
 Ibid., p. 388.
 Alexander Del Mar, A History of the Monetary Systems of France, and other European States, 1903, p. 68.
 Ibid., p. 69.
 Lenormant, Money of Antiquity as quoted in Ibid., p. 68.
 The Middle Ages Revisited: Or, The Roman Government and Religion and Their Relation to Britain, 1986, p. 262; Note: "Minting [was] an essential mark of Sovereignty." (Phillip Grerson and Mark Blackburn, Medieval European Coinage; Volume I, The Early Middle Ages, 1800, p. 262)
 Irfan Kawar, "Procopius on the Ghassanids," Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 77, no. 2, April-June 1957, p. 81.
 Op.cit., Infan Shahîd., p. 69.
 Isabel De Madariaga, "Tsar into Emperor: the Title of Peter the Great," Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe, Robert Oresko, G. C. Gibbs and H. M. Scott, eds., 1997, p. 353.
 James M. Redfield, The Locrian Maidens: Love and Death in Greek Italy, 2003, p. 162.
 Op.cit., Irfan Shahîd, p. 112.
 Irfan Shahîd, Byzantium and the Arabs in the Fourth Century, 2006, pp. 381, 520 and Irfan Shahîd, Byzantium and the Arabs in the Sixth Century, vol. 2, part 2, 2009, pp. 107, 340.
 Razmik Panossian, The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars, 2006, p. 59.
 Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. 4, 1879, p. 231.
 Johann Von Gardner, Russian Church Singing: History from the Origins to the Mid-Seventeenth Century, p. 20.
 Paul Butler, Approaching the New Millennium, 1998, p. 218; Note: "But a people that has passed under the dominion of another is no longer a state, and can no longer avail itself directly of the law of nations. Such were the nations and kingdoms which the Romans rendered subject to their empire. . . . They were in every thing obliged to follow the orders of Rome; they dared not of themselves either to make war or contract alliances; and could not treat[ies] with nations." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 1, chapter 1, no. 11)
 Doron Mendels, The Rise and Fall of Jewish Nationalism, 1992, p. 196.
 Hugo Grotius, On the Rights of War and Peace, an Abridged Translation, Book 1, chapter 3, no. 21(3).
 Charles Mcilwain, "Sovereignty in the World Today," Measure, vol. 2, 1950, p. 112.
 Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, B. Blackwell, ed., Book 1, chapter 10, 1955, p. 42.
 David Jayne Hill, A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe, vol. 2, 1914, p. 516.
 Trevor A. Dennis, “The Principality of Sealand: Nation Building by Individuals,” Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law, vol. 10, Fall 2002, p. 266.
 Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Book 1, chapter 3, no. 21.10.
 Quoting Vatel in Frederick G. Whelan, "Time, Revolution, and Prescriptive Right in Hume’s Theory of Government," Utilitas, vol. 7, no. 1, May 1995, p. 103; Note: "Implied consent [evidenced by silence or neglect] . . . raises a presumption that the consent [or approval] has been given [to abandon and forsake all rights]." (Walter A. Shumaker and George Foster Longsdorf, The Cyclopedic Dictionary of Law, "Consent," 1901, p. 191)
 (Lloyd Jones, “Custom and Manners of the Welch Nation,” The Deseret Weekly, vol. 51, no. 18, October 9, 1895, p. 545)
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 1, chapter 16, no. 199.
 (John Dee, Limits of the British Empire, 2004, p. 62)
 Sir Thomas Craig, Scotland’s Sovereignty Asserted, George Ridpath, trans., 1695, pp. 370.
 François Pierre Guillaume Guizot, The History of Civilization, vol. 3, William Hazlett, trans., 1901, p. 39.
 Trevor Bryce, The Kingdom of the Hittites, 2005, p. 49.
 The Popular Encyclopedia: or, Conversations Lexicon, vol. 4, "Legitimacy," 1862, p. 428.
 Pasquale Fiore, International Law Codified and its Legal Sanction: or, The Legal Sanction, 1919, p. 429.
 Richard J. Meyer, Official Portraits and Unofficial Counterportraits of "At Risk" Students, 2010, p. 3.
 Aikaterine Christophilopoulou, Byzantine History, vol. 1,1986, p. 353; Note: "Since there was no familial succession to the throne, imperial power was never considered as belonging to a particular family, thus automatically excluding all outsiders from ascension to the throne. . . ." (Aleksandr Petrovich Kazhdan & Giles Constable, People and Power in Byzantium, 1982, p. 146). (emphasis added).
 Lynda Garland, Byzantine Empresses: Women and Power in Byzantium AD 527-1204, 1999, p. 64.
 Nele Maes, "The Dynastic Role of the Empresses of the Macedonian Dynasty. Birth, Life, and Death of an Imperial Lineage (867-1056)," Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta: Philomathestatos: Studies in Greek and Byzantine Texts Presented to Jacques, 2004, p. 391.
 George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, trans. J. M. Hussey, 1956, pp. 632-633.
 Gilbert Dagron, Emperor and Priest: The Imperial Office in Byzantium, 2003, p. 14.
 Aleksandr Petrovich Kazhdan and Giles Constable, People and Power in Byzantium, 1982, p. 146.
 Robert Bator, Daily Life in Ancient and Modern Istanbul, 2000, p. 26.
 Explore Byzantium: Meet the People: The Imperial Court and Aristocracy, 2012: http://byzantium.seashell.net.nz/articlemain.php?artid=mtp_emperor.
 Nadia Maria El-Cheikh, Byzantium viewed by the Arabs, 2004, p. 88 and H. T. Norris, in "Shu'ubiyyah in Arabic Literature," The Cambridge History of Arabic Literature, 'Abbasid Belles-Lettres, ed., 1990, pp. 31-47; Note: "Although several families managed to establish ruling dynasties [in the empire], Byzantium did not fully develop the notion of hereditary rule. Many able and ambitious men (and at least one woman) from very humble beginnings managed to rise to the top over those who had a 'better' claim in terms of their family background. The Byzantine idea that the Emperor was ultimately selected by God also, perversely, helped successful rebels and usurpers: If you were able to depose the existing Emperor and rule in his place you obviously had God's approval -- otherwise He would never have allowed you to succeed." (Imperial Court and Aristocrisy, 2011:http://byzantium.seashell.net.nz/articlemain.php?artid=mtp_emperor). (emphasis added).
Since "[The] texts reflect this lack of juridical clarity [in succession], which, in itself, partly explains the legitimacy . . . and vitality of usurpation." (Nadia Maria El-Cheikh, Byzantium viewed by the Arabs, 2004, p. 88 and H. T. Norris, in "Shu'ubiyyah in Arabic Literature," The Cambridge History of Arabic Literature, 'Abbasid Belles-Lettres, ed., 1990, pp. 88-89). There were about 90 emperors from over thirty different families in the thousand year period and 29 deposed emperors. "Thirteen were banished, eight were blinded, and twenty-one were murdered." (Robert Bator, Daily Life in Ancient and Modern Istanbul, 2000, p. 26). The instability of rulers can be traced directly to a lack of a legally established hereditary succession, which left the imperial office open to any ambitious man who was close to the throne. The Byzantium record of usurpation contrasts negatively with the Holy Roman Empire, which only had about 30 emperors (kings) from five different families in a thousand years and only 7 were deposed.
 Sir Henry Sumner Maine, Dissertations of Early Law and Custom, 1883, p. 133.
 Aleksandr Petrovich Kazhdan & Giles Constable, People and Power in Byzantium, 1982, p. 146.
 Op.cit., Nele Maes
 George Finley, The Byzantine Empire, Part 1, A.D. 716-1057, vol. 2, 1877, p. 284.
 Donald MacGillivray Nicol, The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261-1453, p. 188.
 John F. Haldon, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World 565-1204, 1999, p. 11.
 Econ Flaig, "How the emperor Nero lost acceptance in Rome," The Emperor and Rome: Space, Representation and Ritual, Bjoern C. Ewald and Carlos F. Norena, eds., 2010, p. 279.
 Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, 1832, p. 69.
 Fritz Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages, S. B. Chrimes, trans., 2005, p. xix.
 William and Robert Chambers, Chamber’s Information for the People, vol. 1, 1842, p. 118.
 Harold Damerow, Holy Roman Empire, 2013: http://faculty.ucc.edu/egh-damerow/holy_roman_empire.htm.
 Hugo Grotius, Online Library of Liberty: Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, January 22, 2010, note 3, p. 432: 2012: http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/1718.
 Jacob Leib Talmon, Myth of the Nation and Vision of Revolution: Ideological Polarization in the Twentieth Century, 1991, p. 34.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 1, chapter 5, no. 69.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 1, chapter 5, no. 69.
 (Charles Loyseau, (1564-1627), Traité des Ordres, 1610, quoted in Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to1800, vol. 2, Earnest Baker, trans., 1934, p. 363.
 Peter Haidu, The Subject Medieval/Modern: Text and Governance in the Middle Ages, 2004, p. 160; Note: "Although technically still a part of the empire (which would last in name until 1806), these [German] principalities gained all the trappings of sovereign statehood." (Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, 1994, p. 29)
 Samuel von Pufendorf, The Present State of Germany, Michael J. Seidler, ed., Edmund Bohun, trans, chapter 5, no. 5,  2007; Note: In 1601, it was stated, "Today . . . there are many princes, many lords, indeed, as far as jurisdiction is concerned, many emperors." (Scipio Gentilis, De Iurisdictione, Book 3, vol 3, III, chapter 18, 1601, p. 404) "The royal qualities [were] attributed to the various grades of princes [in the Holy Roman Empire] made . . . [them] more comparable to emperors than to the Roman provincial praesides [governors] with whom they had
been traditionally linked." (Richard Roy Beneri, “Inferior Magistrates in Sixteenth-century Political and Legal Thought,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, December 1967) As true monarchs, holding full internal sovereignty, the German princes were "petits roys," which literally means lesser royals having the authority of emperors within their own lesser proprietary estates. (M. H. Schonerat, Le Tocsin, 1839, p. 240)
 Heinz H. F. Eulau, "Theories of Federalism under the Holy Roman Empire," The American Political Science Review, vol. 35, no. 4, August 1942, p. 663; Note: ". . . Every nobleman [duke, prince, count, etc.], however modest his standing, is king in his own territory; every [independent] city exercises royal power within its own walls." (Conrad von Soest, 1408, as quoted in H. S. Offler, "Aspects of Government in the Late Medieval Empire," Europe in the Late Middle Ages, Hale, Highfield, and Smalley, eds., 1965, p. 220.
 François Guizot, The History of Civilization from the Fall of the Roman Empire to the French Revolution, vol. 3, 1879, pp. 359-360; Note: "The royal qualities [were] attributed to the various grades of princes [in the Holy Roman Empire] made . . . [them] more comparable to emperors than to the Roman provincial praesides [governors] with whom they had been traditionally linked." (Op. cit., Richard Roy Beneri) In other words, ". . . their dignity [rank, and status] was [that of a] ‘royal’. . . ." (Ibid.)
 D. C. Skemer, "The Myth of Petty Kingship and a New Periodization of Feudalism," Belgian Journal of Philology and History, vol. 51, issue 51-52, 1973, p. 270;
 R. W. Dyson, Natural Law and Political Realism in the History of Political Thought: From the Seventeenth to the Twenty First Century, vol. 2, 2007, p. 167; Note: "The Treaty of Westphalia gave virtually all the small states in the heart of Europe sovereignty, thus formally rendering the Holy Roman Emperor politically impotent [similar to a committee chairman of some 300 plus independent little sovereign nations loosely connected together]. . . ." (Thorbjorn L. Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory, Manchester University Press, 1992, p. 71)
 Alfred Bradley Gough, "Westphalia, Treaty of," The Encyclopaedia Britannica: a Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, Literature and General Information, 11th ed., vol. 28, Hugh Chisholm, ed., 1911, p. 558; Note: "[The prince’s] powers included regalia [emblems of royalty and prerogatives], rights of majesty (iura maiestatis [the right to be honored and protected in their regal prominence]) and rights of empire (iura imperii [the imperial right to rule]) which they might have acquired either from the emperor [directly by ennoblement] or by prescription. . . ." and "Their hereditary independence rendered them virtually immune to the emperor's superiority, even though it may have originated by imperial concession." (Ibid.)
 James Tyrrell, Bibliotheca Politica: or, An Enquiry into the Ancient Constitution of the English Government, 2nd ed., 1727, p. 128.
 W. W. Willoughby, "The Prussian Theory of Monarchy," The American Political Science Review, vol. 11, no. 4, November 1917, pp. 621-622; Note: A whole kingdom or principality may be obtained by a ". . . prince, who has purchased it, or received it in exchange, or acquired it by any title whatever." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book III, chapter 13, no. 198)
 Harold J. Laski, "The Law and the State, " Harvard Law Review, vol. 31, no. 1, 1918, p. 146; Note: This is why the Austrian Emperor Francis II testified, "A prince can, if he wishes, cede a part of his country and all of his people [to create a new state or enlarge an existing one]." (Guglielmo Ferrero, The Reconstruction of Europe: Talleyrand and the Congress of Vienna 1814-1815, 1941, p. 261)
 Robert H. Jackson, "Boundaries and International Society," International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory, Barbara Allen Roberson, ed., 1998, p. 161.
 John Norton Pomeroy, Lectures on International Law in Time of Peace, Theodore Salisbury Woolsey, ed., no. 117, 1886, p. 133.
 Oliver Jütersonke and Rolf Schwarz, "Slicing up the cake: divisible sovereignty in the pre and post-Westphalian order," European Standing Group on International Relation (SGIR), Turin Conference 2007, p. 4, 2012: http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/Schwarz-divsov_and_westphalian_order.pdf; and Peter Haggenmacher, Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste, 1983, p. 538.
 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Book II, chapter 4, no. 4.
 Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. 1, no. 215, 1920, p. 377.
 François Velde, The Holy Roman Empire, 2013: http://www.heraldica.org/topics/national/hre.htm#Sovereignty.
 John Nichols, The Gentleman's Magazine, vol. 240, January-June 1876, p. 176; Note: "In the Middle Ages Europe was long acquainted with Patrimonial States. Marquisates, duchies, kingdoms, and even empires were sold from hand to hand, mortgaged, bequeathed or transferred by deed of gift." (Thomas Alfred Walker, A History of the Law of Nations, vol. 1, 1899, p. 158).
 Oscar William Coursey, The Philippines and Filipinos, 1914, p. 101.
 Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 13, issue 2, "Paltinate," 1810, p. 665; Note: ". . . State territory being the patrimonium [property owned] of the head of State [the king or sovereign prince who ruled], it was not uncommon to sell the territory of one State to another, to transfer it as a marriage gift, or to dispose of it in the will of the reigning monarch." (Yehuda Zyi Blum, Historic Titles in International Law, 1965, p. 1).
 Henry Wager Halleck, International Law: Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War, 1861, pp. 128-130 and Charles Henry Butler, The Treaty Making Power of the United States, vol. 1,1902, pp. 75-76; Note: "The Landgrave of Thuringia in 1801 sold the Marquisate of Lusatia to Bnrchard, Archbishop of Magdeburg. . . . Robert of Normandy, as is well-known, mortgaged his duchy to his brother William Rufus. The successive adoptions of heirs by Joanna of Naples were the prolific source of serious trouble. Charles VIII. of France in 1494 bought the Empire of Constantinople from the titular Eastern ruler, Andrew Palaeologus." (Thomas Alfred Walker, A History of the Law of Nations, vol. 1, 1899, p. 158 and Robert Ward, An Enquiry into the Foundation and History into the Law of Nations in Europe, 1795, n. 155).
 Op.cit., Henry Wagner Halleck, pp. 126-127, 74.
 Ibid., pp. 127, 74.
 Thomas A. Walker, A History of the Law of Nations, vol. 1, 1899, p. 297.
 Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, , vol. 2, John Pawley Bate, trans., chapter 9, no. 19, 1916; Note: "[Venice as a republic] by purchasing dynastic rights, either before occupying a territory or afterwards, as an act of legalization [would buy the territory and its sovereign rights]. . . . Venice preferred to be on the safe side [legally] by buying the pretended rights of all claimants. . . ." (Eric R. Dursteler, A Companion to Venetian History, 1400-1797, 2013, p. 140)
 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 6, no., section 7.
 George Grafton Wilson, Handbook of International Law, 1910, p. 85.
 Ibid., p. 84.
 "Isle of Man," A New British Atlas: Comprising a Series of 54 Maps, Constructed from the Most Recent Surveys and Engraved by Sidney Hall, 1836, p. 155.
 Joseph Blocher, The Market for Sovereign Territory [June 1, 2012]; 2015: http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/06/the-market-for-sovereign-territory.html.
 Jean W. Sedlar, A History of East Central Europe: East Central Europe in the Middle Ages, vol. 3, 1994, p. 42.
 Richard Wildman, "Institutes of International Law," The Law Library, vol. 68, April, May & June 1950, pp. 50-51.
 Jean J. Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, 5th ed., Thomas Nugent, trans., part 2, chapter 7, no. 51; Note: "As long as the proprietary state was legitimate, there could be no question that the sovereign or his family was entitled to alienate or liquidate parts of the natural heritage of his fief and cache it in a convenient financial center elsewhere in the world." (W. Michael Reisman, "Harnessing International Law to Restrain and Recapture Indigenous Spoliations," The American Journal of International Law, vol. 83, 1989, p. 57) (emphasis added) Note: A whole kingdom or principality may be obtained by a ". . . prince, who has purchased it, or received it in exchange, or acquired it by any title whatever." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book III, chapter 13, no. 198).
 A. A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, 324-1453, Vol. 2, 1952, p. 590
 Isabel MacBeath Calder, Activities of the Puritan Faction of the Church of England, 1625-33, 1957, p. 59.
 David Potter, A History of France, 1460-1560: The Emergence of a Nation State, 1995, p. 33.
 François Velde, The Holy Roman Empire; 2015: http://www.heraldica.org/topics/national/hre.htm#Sovereignty.
 The Imperial Nobility and the Constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, 2013: http://www.mindserpent.com/American_History/religion/pope/prince_elector/constitution
 Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principles of Politic Law: Being a Sequel to The Principles of Natural Law, Mr. Nugent, trans. & ed., chapter 7, no. 53(1), 1752.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 14, nos. 214-215.
 "Guelf and Ghibelline," The Saturday Reviewof Politics, Literature, Science, and Art, vol. 37, no. 957, February 28, 1874, p. 271.
 Arthur O’Leary, Mr. O’Leary’s Defense; containing a Vindication of his Conduct and Writings, 1787, p. 99.
 Arthur O’Leary and John Wesley, Essays and Tracts: In which is introduced his correspondence with the Rev Arthur O’Leary in which is introduced His correspondence with Rev. John Wesley, 1832, p. 149.
 Taken from an article in the British Critic written by John Foster, "Lord Straford," The Electronic Magazine of Foreign Literature, Science and Art, vol. 2, August 1843, p. 487.
 Cardinal Morn, Occasional Papers, 1890, p. 73.
 "Power of the Pope," New York Times, July 28, 1871.
 Charles Newdegate, A Glimpse of the Great Society, 1880, pp. 85-86; Note: "[The Pope] has disposed of principalities, kingdoms, countries known and unknown . . . history exhibits to us a great number of temporal sovereigns . . . deposed by him." (Frederic Shoberl, Persecutions of Popery, 1844, p. 178). (emphasis added).
 However, many, if not most, European Royal Houses are descendants in one way or another from this illustrious dynasty.
 John Alberger, Monks, Popes, and their Political Intrigues, 1871, p. 309; Note: ". . . But suppose that such an unhappy deposed prince have a son, or lawful and right heir, and he also not to be touched or spotted with his father’s crime, shall not he at least succeed, and be invested into that princely estate. Neither will this [go] down with them: heresy is a leprosy, and hereditary disease . . . never to be restored either in himself, or his posterity. . . . Their conclusion therefore is, that for heresy, as above is understood, a prince is to be deposed, and his kingdom bestowed by the pope at pleasure; and that the people, upon pain of damnation, are to take part with him whom the pope shall so constitute over them. ("The Trials of Robert Winter, Thomas Winter, Guy Fawns, Jenn Grant, Ambrose Rookwood, Ron. Keyes, Thomas Barns, and Sir Everard Digby, at Westminster, for High Treason, being Conspirators in the Gunpowder-Plot : 3 Jac. 1. 27th Jan. A. D. 1606," Tracts (Chiefly Rare & Curious Reprints relating to Northamptionshire), chapter 8, 1870, pp. 12-13)
 Alfred Plummer, Reusch’s Beitrage zur Geschichte des Jesuitenordens, The Critical Review of Theological & Philosophical Literature, vol. 4, Stewart Dingwall Fordyce Salmond, ed., 1894, p. 242.
 The Ladies’ Repository: a Monthly Periodical Devoted to Literature and Religion, D. W. Clark, ed., vol. 18, September 1858, p. 563.
 James Craigie Robertson, Plain Lectures on the Growth of the Papal Power, 1876, p. 149.
 John McClintock & Joseph Ripley Chandler, "The ‘Dublin Tablet’ on Mr. Chandler’s Doctrine," The Temporal Power of the Pope, 1855, p. 148.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Joseph Chitty ed., Book 1, chapter 12, note 32.
 Issac Barrow, Treatise of the Pope's Supremacy, 1680, p. 7.
 "Popes have acknowledged new dynasties to the prejudice [or elimination] of legitimate sovereigns from the times of Pepin to those of Napoleon III." (Guglielmo Rapinet, Lectures on the British Constitution and on the Government of Malta, 1883, p. 11).
 Charles Davis, "Ptolemy of Lucca and the Roman Republic," Renaissance Thought, Robert Black, ed., 2001, p. 145.
 P. A. Hayman and John Williams, "Westphalian Sovereignty: Rights, Intervention, Meaning and Context," Global Society, vol. 20, issue 4, 2006, p. 522.
 Kevin Butcher, Roman Syria and the Near East, 2003, p. 38.
 James Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire, 1873, p. 250.
 The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 2001: www.dutchcivillaw.com/legislation/constitution022.htm.
 Chambers's Encyclopædia: a Dictionary of Universal Knowledge, "Oldenburg," 1889, p. 685.
 Samuel Masters, "The Case of Allegiance," A Collection of State Tracts, vol. 1, 1705, p. 326.
 Amos J. Peaslee, Constitutions of Nations, 1956, p. 310; Note: These same requirements were recognized in other lands, for example, in Imperial France ". . . should a French prince contract a marriage without the consent of the head of the Empire, he should be divested of his hereditary right, and the same forfeiture should extend to his offspring. . . ." (William Deans, A History of France from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, vol. 2, 1882, p. 794).
 Paulo Midosi, Portugal, or Who is the Lawful Successor to the Throne, 1828, pp. 122-123.
 Appletons' Annual Cyclopedia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1863, vol. 3, 1870, p. 462 and A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783-1919, p. 615.
 Heads of State of Britain and the United Kingdom: The Role of British Monarchs in Imperial History; 2014: http://www.britishempire.co.uk/biography/britishroyalty.htm.
 Melville Henry Massue, Marquis de Ruvigny et Raineval, Legitimism in England (1897); 2014: http://www.jacobite.ca/essays/ruvigny.htm.
 (Maey Kennedy, Questions raised over Queen’s ancestry after DNA test on Richard III’s cousins, December 2014: http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/questions-raised-over-queen%E2%80%99s-ancestry-after-dna-test-on-richard-iii%E2%80%99s-cousins/ar-BBgePqi?ocid=mailsignout)
 Freiherr von Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, issue 13, vol. 1, no. 364, p. 187.
 Robert H. Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, 2007, p. 62.
 Monarchist World Magazine, #2, August 1955. (This reference could not been confirmed, but the statement itself is accurate and therefore was included).
 Professor Johann Werlhof (1660-1711) quoted in Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, vol. 2, Jean Barbeyrac trans., ed. and writer of the notes, Richard Tuck, ed., book 2, chapter 4, no. 1, note 5, , 2005.
 Ibid., commentary on note 5, p. 1735.
 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, vol. 2, Jean Barbeyrac trans., ed., & writer of notes, and Richard Tuck, ed., book 2, chapter 4, no. 1, note 5, , 2005; Note: "[Prescription] is based on the assertion by a usurper of an adverse right for such a long time, uncontested by the true owner of the right, as to give rise to the presumption that the latter has given up such right in favor of the former." (Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 4, 1974, p. 2).
 Gabriel Bonnot de Mably quoted by Vicente Santamaria de Paredes, A Study of the Question of Boundaries between the Republics of Peru and Ecuador, Harry Weston van Dyke, trans., 1910, p. 295; Note: "If any such [government] did ever constitute a Monarchy, it was by Virtue of a universal Consent by . . . Usage and Prescription proved and implied [over time]. . . . [That is] long Continuance is equivalent to a formal Election: So that this Tenure and Right . . . [creates a legally binding] implicit [or implied] Choice of the People." (Richard Baldwin, "A Treatise of Monarchy," part 1, chapter 3, section 4, 1689, The Harleian Miscellany, or, A Collection of Scarce, Curious, and Entertaining Pamphlets and Tracts, vol. 6, William Oldys and Edward Harley Oxford, eds., 1745, p. 306).
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 141.
 Upendra Nath Mitra, The Law of Limitation and Prescription in British India, 2nd. ed., 1889, p. 31.
 Francis Canavan, The Political Economy of Edmund Burke: the Role of Property in his Thought, 1995, p. 66.
 John Henry Merryman and Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Tradition, 3rd ed., 2007, p. 77.
 Ibid., p. 76.
 Linda J Pike, Encyclopedia of Disputes Installment, vol. 10, “Territory, Acquisition,” 2014, p. 496.
 J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Prespective, vol. 3, 1970, p. 347.
 Noel Cox, Anglicans/Dynastic Law; 2015: http://en.allexperts.com/q/Anglicans-943/2010/12/Dynastic-Law.htm.
 Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, Denis Mazeaud, European Contract Law: Materials for a Common Frame of Reference: Terminalogy, Guiding Principles, Model Rules, 2008, p. 98.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 141; Note: "All sorts of prescription by which rights are acquired or lost are grounded upon this presumption, that he who enjoys a right is supposed to have some just title to it, without which he [would] not been suffered to enjoy it so long; that he who ceases to exercise a right has been divested of it for some just cause; and [as a fiscal example] that he who has tarried so long a time without demanding his debt, has either received payment of it, or been convinced that nothing was due him." (Jean Domat (1625-1696) as quoted in Loretta quoted in United States Congress, "Limitation and Prescription," The Miscellaneous Documents of the House of Representatives for the Second Session of the Fifty Third Congress, vol. 3267, issue 4, chapter 69, 1895, p. 4186).
 Alan McCormack, The Term "Privilege": A Textual Study of Its Meaning and Use in the 1983, 1997, p. 336.
 List of Legal Latin Terms, Wikipedia; 2015: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_legal_Latin_terms.
 Online Dictionary, conclusive presumption; 2015: http://onlinedictionary.datasegment.com/word/conclusive+presumption.
 Noel Cox, Anglicans/Dynastic Law; 2015: http://en.allexperts.com/q/Anglicans-943/2010/12/Dynastic-Law.htm.
 Larry May, Aggression and Crimes against Peace, 2008, p. 144.
 Harvard Law Review Association, Harvard Law Review, vol. 23, 1910, p. 556.
 Christian Wolff (Freiherr von), Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum,  vol. 2, no. 364, 1934, p. 187.
 Jessup Worldwide Competition for International Law, "Bench Memorandum 2010," p. 12.
 Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest, 2003, p. 69.
 Lord Macaulay, "Frederic the Great," Literary and Historical Essays Contributed to the Edinburgh Review, 1913, pp. 649-650 and Ibid.
 Adam Smith, "Lectures on Jurisprudence," Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, vol. 5, Ronald L. Meek, David D. Raphael and Peter G. Stein, Eds., 2004, p. 72
 Ibid., p. 70.
 Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael and P. G. Stein, eds., 1982, p. 37.
 James Q. Whitman, The Verdict of Battle: the Law of Victory and the making of Modern War, 2012, p. 117.
 Frederick G. Whelan, "Time, Revolution, and Prescriptive Right in Hume’s Theory of Government," Utilitas, vol. 7, no. 1, May 1995, p. 110.
 Ibid., p. 119.
 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., 1978, p. 556.
 Thomas Flanagan, First nations? Second Thoughts, 2000, p. 61.
 Monsignor Bernard O’Reilly, "Territorial Sovereignty and the Papacy," The North American Review, vol. 158, Lloyd Bryce, ed., 1894, p. 218.
 Senate Committee, "International Law in General of the Aboriginal People of Australia," The Australian Year Book of International Law, vol. 10, 3.37, 1981, p. 217 and G. J. L. Coles, "The International Significance of a Treaty," Identity, vol. 4, no. 2, January 1981, p. 32
 Richard Zouche, Iuris et Iudicii Fecialis, sive, Juris Inter Gentes, et Quaestionum de Eodem, vol. 2,  Thomas Holland, ed., J. L. Brierly, trans., 1901, p. 78.
 Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter, eds., Four Seminal Thinkers In International Theory: Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant & Mazzini, 2005, p. 45.
 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: a Treatise, vol. 1, 1905, no. 243; Note: "[Even in modern times] the international tribunals have laid down that the possession must be undisturbed, uninterrupted or unchallenged [by the original government-in-exile or deposed monarchy]. In absence of them [that is, without being undisturbed, uninterrupted or unchallenged], the claim of prescription will not be allowed." (Surya Prakash Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law, 1997, p. 110).
 Adam Smith, "Lectures on Jurisprudence," Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, vol. 5, Ronald L. Meek, David D. Raphael and Peter G. Stein, Eds., 2004, p. 72.
 Fritz Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages, S. B. Chrimes, trans., 1956, pp. 195-196.
 Ibid., p. 196.
 Ibid., p. 87.
 John Wilkes, compiler, Encyclopaedia Londinensis or Universal Dictionary of Arts, Sciences and Literature, vol. 11, 1812, p. 727.
 Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 4, no. 11.
 Alban Butler, The Lives of the Fathers, Martyrs, and Other Principal Saints, vol. 4, note 2nd paragraph, 2006, p. 417.
 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: a Treatise, vol. 1, 1905, p. 294; Note: It is not by court decree but by legal fact that prescription is established. The first example is about the 1795 wrongful takeover of Poland that lasted a hundred years:
". . . Whether Prussia, Austria and Russia have now a good title by prescription to hold their respective formerly Polish territories, although the three partitions of Poland were wrongful and unlawful acts, must, I doubt not, be answered in the affirmative. For all members of the Family of nations have now silently acquiesced in the present condition of things, although as late as 1846 Great Britain and France protested against the annexation of the Republic of Cracow on the part of Austria [but did not protest about the take over of Poland]. In spite of the fact that the Polish nation has now yet given up it hope of seeing a Polish State re-established on the former Polish territory, the general conviction among the members of the Family of Nations is that the present condition of things is in conformity with international order [that is, with the rules and principles of prescription in international law that do not require any involvement with court]." (Ibid., p. 295).
With the defeat of the Prussian, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, Poland became an independent Republic by the decree and intervention of the Allied armies.
"When, to give another example, a State which originally held an island male fide [in bad faith] under the title by occupation, knowing well that this land had already been occupied by another state, has succeeded in keeping up its possession undisturbed for so long a time that the former possessor has ceased to protest and has [by this means] silently dropped the claim, the conviction will be prevalent among the members of the Family of Nations that the present condition of things is in conformity with international order [that is, with the fact of long, undisturbed possession . . . that in the interest of stability of order the present possessor [the usurper] should be considered the rightful owner of a territory [or a whole country as the case may be]." (Ibid., pp. 295-296).
 Andrew T. Guzman, International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis, 2008, pp. 178-179.
 Peter H. Kooijmans, "The International Court of Justice: Where Does It Stand?," The International Court of Justice: Its Future Role after Fifty Years, A. S. Muller, D. Rai & J.M. Thuránszky, eds., 1997, pp. 407-409.
 Erik Bruel, "Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret.," Nordic Journal of International Law, 2005, p. 200
 Daniel K. Gibran, The Falklands War: Britain Versus the Past in the South Atlantic, 1998, p. 42.
 S. K. Verma, An Introduction to Public International Law, 1998, p. 121.
 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, 6th ed., 18.104.22.168, "Peaceful display," 2007, p. 159.
 Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Journal of the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Issue 1, 1988, p. 8; Note: "As there is no central political authority above, and no such International Court as could exercise jurisdiction over, the Sovereign States, State differences, unlike differences between private individuals, cannot as a rule be obligatorily settled in courts of justice. The only way in which a settlement of State differences through a verdict may be arrived at is that the conflicting States voluntarily consent to submit themselves to a verdict of one or more umpires chosen by themselves for that purpose." (Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. 2, 1906, p. 15).
 Jessup worldwide Competition for International Law, "Bench Memorandum 2010," p. 12.
 "Prescription in International Law," Harvard Law Review, vol. 17, no. 5, March 1904, p. 346.
 Robert Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, vol.1, no. 259, 1854, p. 221.
 Lowell S. Gustafson, The Sovereignty Dispute Over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, 1988, pp. 34-35.
 Publications in Contemporary Affairs (PiCA), "An Analysis of the Dispute over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands from the Perspective of International Law," 2011: www.thepicaproject.org/?page_id=750. (Angel M. Olivieri López, Key to an Enigma: British Sources Disprove Claims to the Falkland/ Malvinas Islands, 1995, p. xi and Christopher Bluth, "The British Resort to Force in the Falkland/ Malvinas Conflict 1982: International Law and Just War Theory," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 24, no.1, 1987, p. 9.
 Jean-Pierre Cot, "Chronique de jurisprudence internationale, Affaire du Temple de Preah Vihear," Annuaire Francais de Droit International, 1962, p. 389 and Marcelo G. Cohen, Possession Contestee et Souverainete Territoriale, 1997, p. 492; Note: To stop prescription from transferring title, all. "The State [or deposed entity] with title is only required to show that there has been no tacit abandonment of its right or acquiescence in the rival claim." (Robert Ywedall Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 30). In other words, "No amount of activity on the part of the ‘precripting’ State would avail, without the passivity and inaction of the original sovereign. It is this, amounting in the end to tacit abandonment, surrender, or acquiescence, that constitutes the operative factor in the acquisition of a title by prescription." (Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (1901-1982) quoted in Robert Ywedall Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 30).
 Lowell F. Gustafson, The Sovereign Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, 1988, pp. 35-36; Note: "Although prescription may allow a state to acquire title to territory that it has seized by force, it requires the acquiescence of the former sovereign." (Yehuda Z. Blum, Historical Titles in International Law, 1965, p. 7).
 Malcolm Nathan Shaw, International Law, 5th ed., 2003, p. 427.
 Ibid., pp. 438, 441.
 Op.cit., Lowell S. Gustafson, p. 35; Note: "It can be stated that the acquiescence [a tacit or implied agreement or acceptance of the possessor’s status by] the dispossessed claimant . . . is a condition sine qua non of acquisitive prescription. . . ." (Adrián F. J Hope, "Sovereignty and Decolonization of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands," Boston College International & Comparative Law Review, vol. 6, no. 2, article 3, May 1, 1983, p. 432). Sine qua non is by definition an indispensable action, ingredient or condition without which prescription, in this case, cannot take place. In other words, ". . . Prescription must be evidenced by . . . the presumed acquiescence of the former sovereign." (Henrik Andersson, "East Goes West: The Chinese view on state sovereignty; in line with the West or a notion of their own?," Master’s Thesis, University of Lund, Spring Semester 2004, p. 31). ". . . [The] legal effect [of protest] is to present or keep alive a claim or preclude an interloping adverse possessor from acquiring title by prescription." (Op.cit., Adrián F. J Hope, p. 417). That is, it stops any prescriptive title transfer or preserves the former sovereign’s internal de jure title to sovereignty.
 Gerard Cohen-Jonathan, "Les iles Falkland (Malouines)," Annuaire Francais de Droit International, 1972, p. 240.
 T.M.C. Asser Instituut, Netherlands International Law Review, vol. 30, 1983, p. 35.
 Angel M. Oliveri López , Key to an Enigma: British Sources Disprove British Claims to the Falkland / Malvinas Islands, 1995 p. 32; Note: "While British possession had been effective in the sense of being continuous, open, and notorious, at the same time the Argentines had protested continuously against that possession. In short, British possession had not been peaceful, and this aspect of the law must be fulfilled before title can flow from acquisitive prescription." (Daniel K. Gibran , The Falklands War: Britain Versus the Past in the South Atlantic, 1998, p. 41).
 Thomas Alfred Walker, A Manual of Public International Law, Part II, no. 13, 1895, p. 34.
 Edwin Maxey, International Law with Illustrative Cases, 1906, p. 147; Note: ". . . a rule of thumb for [modern-day international prescription] appears to be 50 years." (James A. Wolfe, "Mississippi Boundary Case: The Role of International Law in Federal-State Relations," German Yearbook of International Law, vol. 26, 1983, p. 100). (emphasis added).
 John O’Brien, International Law, 2001, p. 225.
 Adrián F. J Hope, "Sovereignty and Decolonization of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands," Boston College International & Comparative Law Review, vol. 6, no. 2, article 3, May 1, 1983, p. 436.
 Op.cit., John O’Brien.
 Ibid., p. 442.
 Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from the Six Books of the Commonwealth, Julian H. Franklin, ed., 1992, p. 112; Note: ". . . it is generally said, the sovereign power cannot be acquired by prescription: [but] that is true only for a prescription less than 100 years." (John Lynch, Cambrensis Eversus, vol. 3, Matthew Kelly, trans. and ed., 1852, p. 43).
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 142 and in part: "Conversazione at South Kensignton," Journal of the Society of Arts and the Institutions in Union, vol. 6, no. 289, June 11, 1858, p. 470; Note: ". . . Prescription is based on the theory that a State which has maintained order in a territory and developed it, is entitled to sovereignty over it against the former possessor whoh had neglected that territory." (Eugene Ortolan as quoted in Yehuda A. Blum, Historic Titles in International Law, 1965, p. 13).
 "Conversazione at South Kensignton," Journal of the Society of Arts and the Institutions in Union, vol. 6, no. 289, June 11, 1858, p. 469-470.
 American Bar Association, Section of International Law, The International Law News, vol. 31, 2004, p. 100.
 Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, Judge Stephen Schwebel, Professor Shabtai Rosenne and Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña, Legal Opinion on Guatemala’s Territorial Claim to Belize, November 2001, p. 29: Note: ". . . There is no doubt that, in international practice, a state has been considered to be the lawful owner even of those parts of its territory of which originally it took possession wrongfully, provided that the possessor has been in undisturbed possession [for a long time]." (L. F. L. Oppenheim, Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. 1, 9th ed., Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts, eds., 2000, p. 706).
 Alina Kaczorowska, Public International Law, 4th ed., 2010, p. 264.
 Ibid., p. 151.
 Montserrat Gorina-Ysern, OAS Mediates in Belize-Guatemala Border Dispute, American Society of International Law, December 2000, 2011: http://www.asil.org/insigh59.cfm.
 Op.cit., Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, Judge Stephen Schwebel, Professor Shabtai Rosenne and Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña, p. 68.
 The whole article: Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, Judge Stephen Schwebel, Professor Shabtai Rosenne and Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña, Legal Opinion on Guatemala’s Territorial Claim to Belize, November 2001, 2011: http://bze-icj.com/Legal%20Opinion.pdf.
 Case of John H. Williams v. Venezuela, decision of the Commissioner, Mr. Little, December 5, 1885, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol 29, 2012, p. 290.
 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. 29, Case of John A. Williams v.Venezuela of 5 December 1885, Commissioner Little, 2012, p. 291.
 Alan McCormack, The Term "Privilege:" A Textual Study of Its Meaning and Use in the 1983, 1997, p. 336.
 John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law, vol. 1, no. 698, 2009, p. 347.
 Foreign and Comparative Government, The American Politicial Science Review, vol. 50, no. 2, June 1956, p. 577.
 The Electric Law Library, Juris et de jure, 2011: www.lectlaw.com/def/j050.htm; Note: "If it [the possessor or usurper] can provide evidence of a long period of continuous, peaceful, public administration, in which the previous occupying State showed no interest, the current occupying State is then in a position of acquisitive prescription." (Jean-Pierre Cot, "Chronique de jurisprudence internationale, Affaire du Temple de Preah Vihear," Annuaire Francais de Droit International, 1962, p. 389 and Marcelo G. Cohen, Possession Contestee et Souverainete Territoriale, 1997, p. 492). Note that prescription takes place by virtue of circumstances and proof, not by court decree. Court is not required, it is voluntary.
 Constantin Fasolt, The Limits of History, 2004, p. 124.
 John McHugo, "How to Prove Title to Territory: a Brief, Practical Introduction to the Law and Evidence," Boundary & Territory Briefing, vol. 4, no. 2, 1998, p. 5.
 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
 Quoting Japan Weekly Mail in Captain F. Brinckley R.A., "The Story of the Riukiu (Loochoo) Complication," The Chrysanthemum, vol. 3, no. 3, March 1883, p. 141; Note: ". . . Under the doctrine of prescription the original title holder must have acquiesced. . . . [In other words] the claim to territory must be uncontested [undisturbed by protests or the rightful use of exalted titles and national arms from the deposed ruling house or an exiled government]. If a third State [that is, the original sovereignty] disputes the claim of the State claiming title by prescription, title to the territory is imperfectible [it is incomplete and it remains defective because the former government or royal house holds all the rights to non-territorial sovereignty]." (Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th ed., 1997, p. 150; Randall Lesaffer, Argument from Roman Law in Current International Law: Occupation and Acquisitive Prescription, European Journal of International, vol. 16, 2005, p. 51 and John C. Duncan, Jr., "Following a Sigmoid Progression: Some Jurisprudential and Pragmatic Considerations regarding Territorial Acquisition among Nation-State," Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 35, no. 1, Winter 2012, p. 21).
 Howard Nenner, Restoration, Ideology and Revolution: papers presented at the Folger Institute Seminar "Political Thought in the Later Stuart Age, 1649-1702," 1990, p. 400.
 The Home Encyclopaedia, Compiled and Revised to Date from the Leading Encyclopaedias, vol. 19, “York, House of,” 1895, p. 6423.
 A Collection of State Tracts, Published during the Reign of King William III, 1707, p. 537.
 Great Britain Public Records Office, Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, of the Reign of Mary, 1553-1558, 1861, p. 403.
 Rocky Mountain Medieval and Renaissance Association, Journal of the Rocky Mountain Medieval and Renaissance Association, vol. 10-12, 1989, p. 39.
 Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, B. Blackwell, ed., Book 1, chapter 10, 1955, p. 41.
 Joseph Canning, The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis, 1987, p. 119; Note: "Certainly custom [immemorial prescription] with the presumed or express consent of the princeps [the monarch] can confer rights reserved to him [over a territory or sovereign entity]; and such custom if it exists from time immemorial has the force of an imperial [or national right]." (Ibid., p., 118.
 Bartolus (1313-1357) as quoted in Von der Heydte, "Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in International Law," American Journal of International Law, vol. 29, 1935, pp. 448-449.
 Richard H. Trame, Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo, 1404-1470, 1958, p. 154.
 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology, note 283, 1997, p. 183.
 Ken MacMillan, Sovereignty and Possession in the English New World: The Legal Foundations of Empire 1576-1640, 2006, p. 182; Note: ". . . The explicit language of discovery and prescription played a key [and important] role in the formal debates over sovereignty and possession [for new world claims] in the seventeenth century." (Ibid., p. 181).
 Ibid., p. 187.
 "The Administration and the Country," The American Review, vol. 3, no. 3, March 1846, p. 231.
 Ibid., p. 183.
 Geoffrey Barraclough, The Origins of Modern Germany, 1984, p. 287-288.
 The French Idea of Freedom: The Old Regime and the Declaration of Rights of 1789, Dale Van Kley, ed., "Glossary," 1994, p. 360.
 The Compleat History of the Treaty of Utrecht as also that of Gertruydenberg, containing all the Acts, Memorials, Representations, etc. relating to the Negotiations there, vol. 2, 1715, p. 214.
 Ibid., p. 29.
 The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c. 350 – 1450, J. H. Burns, ed., 1988, p. 510.
 The New Cambridge Modern History: The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years War 1609-48/59, vol. 4, J. P. Cooper, ed., 1970, p. 30 and J. Bardach, "Gouvernis et Gouvernants," Recueils de la Soc. J. Bodin, vol. 25, 1965, p. 281.
 Encylopaedia Britannica; or A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and Miscellaneous Literature, vol. 17, 6th ed., "Poland," 1823, no. 156.
 Ibid., p. 114.
 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: a Treatise, vol. 1, 1905, p. 295.
 British Parliament, "Debate in the Lords on the Address relative to a Union with Ireland," Cobbett’s Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803, April 11, 1799, vol. 34, William Corbett, ed., 1819, p. 778.
 George Payne Rainsford James, The History of Charlemagne, 1832, vol. 1, p. 306.
 Jeff Shantz, "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen," Encyclopedia of the Age of Political Revolutions and New Ideologies, 1760-1815, Gregory Fremont-Barnes, ed., p. 191.
 Daniel Patrick O’Connell, International Law, 1965, p. 487.
 Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Jean Barbeyrac, ed., Book 2, chapter 4, commentary on no. 12.
 Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, Book 2, part 2, chapter 3, no. 10; Note: ". . . Usucaption and prescription are much more necessary between sovereign states than between individuals. Their quarrels are of much greater consequence; their disputes are usually terminated only by bloody wars; and consequently the peace and happiness of mankind much more powerfully require that possession on the part of sovereigns should not be easily disturbed, -- and that, if it has for a considerable length of time continued uncontested, it should be deemed just and indisputable." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book II, chapter 11, no. 147).
 Robert Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, vol. 1, no. 219, 1854, p. 27; Note: ". . . there seems to follow this most unfortunate conclusion, that controversies concerning kingdoms and the boundaries of kingdoms, are never extinguished by any lapse of time; which not only tends to disturb the minds of many and perpetuate wars, but is also repugnant to the common sense of mankind. Grotius, Be Jure Belli ac Pacis, bib. II. Cap. IV. § 1." (John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, vol. 1, 1906, p. 293).
 Surya Prakash Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes, and International Law, 1997, p. 108 and J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Prespective: State Territory, vol. 3, 1970, p. 382.
 Frederick Edwin Smith, International Law, 4th ed., revised and enlarged by James Wylie, 1911, p. 71.
 Sir Robert Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, vol. 1, no. 256, chapter 13, p. 300; Note: "Prescription is therefore based on two fold practical considerations of the passage of time and the implied acquiescence [or consent] of the dispossessed sovereign [prince or king who was deposed by treachery]." (John O’Brien, International Law, 2001, p. 210). Note also: ". . . The existence of the rule of prescription in international law had been constantly affirmed by the eight international arbitral courts, which before 1902 had passed upon the question of prescription in international law." (Moore, pp. 1205, 3130, 3139, 3210, 4181, 4199 et seq. vol. 1, p. 31) (Hans Wehberg, The Problem of an International Court of Justice, Charles G. Fenwick, trans., 1918, p. 30).
 The Encyclopedia Americana, vol. 1, "Annexation," 1985, p. 10; Note: ". . . Provided the territory has been under effective control of a State and that has been uninterrupted and uncontested for a long time, international law will accept that reality." (Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law, 2nd ed., 2010, p. 38).
 Amos S. Hershey, The Essentials of International Public Law, note 9, 1918, p. 181.
 B. Waters, "New Kings on Old Thrones," Pearson's Magazine, February 1898; Note: "But if a tyrant's [or usurper's] successors have held sovereignty for a long period of time, such as a hundred years, then, here as in all other matters, the prescription of so long a period can serve as a title." (Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty:Four Chapters from the Six Books of the Commonwealth, Julian H. Franklin, ed., 7th. ed., Book II, chapter 5, no. 608, 2004, p. 112). (emphasis added). Note also: "But if the tyrant’s children and relations hold on to the tyranny [hold on to the de facto rule of the nation] transmitted by their forbearers for a very long stretch of time, say one hundred years in unbroken succession, and govern the commonwealth with justice, then that regime since the prescription of long time has legitimizing force." (Jean Bodin, Bodin on Sovereignty, Julian H. Franklin, ed., Book 2, chapter 1, no. 608, footnote, 1992, p. 112) (emphasis added).
 L. C. Green and Olive Patricia Dickason, The Law of Nations and the New World, 1989, p. 95.
 Isaac Butt, The History of Italy, from the Abdication of Napoleon I, vol. 1, 1860, p. 124.
 N. Bailey, The Universal Etymological English Dictionary, 1737, "POSSESSION"; Note: ". . . Immemorial prescription . . . can be defined as a prescription the beginning of which no living person witness [exists]. . . . These conditions require three generations, which means about 100 years. This led several writers to say that the immemorial prescription must have lasted at least 100 years. This period is also the longest normal span of human life and it is impossible to fix a more convenient term of years. Hence we consider generally . . . 100 years as the term applicable to immemorial prescription." (Gabriel Baudry-Lacantinerie, Albert Tissier, Charles Aubry, Jean Cabonnier, Louisianna State Law Institute, Prescription: Traité Théorique et Pratique de Droit Civil, vol. 28, nos. 1-815, 4th ed., 1924, p. 12).
 Samuel Johnson, Works of Samuel Johnson, LL. D., vol. 12, Arthur Murphy, ed., 1824, p. 231.
 James Daly, Sir Robert Filmer and English Political Thought, 1979, p. 121.
 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book I, chapter 22, no. 266.
 United States Supreme Court Records and Briefs, March 14, 906, no. 222. p. 57.
 John Lynch, Cambrensis Eversus , vol. 3, part 1, Matthew Kelly, ed., 1851, p. 11.
 Ibid., p. 43; Note: : ". . . An extremely long period of use is required [for immemorial prescription], perhaps as long as 100 years and at least 50 years." (Tanja Joona, "Legal Challenges in the Arctic," ILO Convention 169, end note 15, p. 184.
 Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from the Six Books of the Commonwealth, Julian H. Franklin, ed., 2004, p. 112; Note also that it is not exactly 100 years, but about 100 years: "Tis indeed observed by the most eminent professors of the law, that Time Immemorial is not the same exactly with a hundred years; tho= they do not often very much differ, because the life of man is often computed at a hundred; and this term of years is what does usually make up three Ages or Generations of Men; which three Generations, or Time immemorial, the Romans pleaded against Antiobus, when they shewed him, that he demanded of them Cities, to which neither he, nor His Father, nor his Grandfather, had ever pretended to have a right." (Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 4, no. 7).
 Michael Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Latter Middle Ages, note 3, 1963, p. 427; Note: Samuel Johnson (1709-1784), considered to be one of the most distinguished man of letters in English history, wrote that "about a hundred years was sufficient to establish a continuing right to the throne. . . ." (Robert Folkenflik, "Johnson’s Politics," The Cambridge Companion to Samuel Johnson, Greg Clingham, ed., 1997, p. 103) (emphasis added).
 "A Justification of the Present War against the United Netherlands," The Harleian Miscellany: a Collection of Scarce, Curious, and Entertaining Pamphlets and Tracts, vol. 7, 1810, p. 595.
 "Art. III, -- Prescription and Limitation," The Jurist, or Quarterly Journal of Jurisprudence and Legislation, vol. 2, 1829, p. 392.
 John Westlake, International Law, Part 1, Peace, 2nd ed., 1904, p. 346; Note: "Among the proofs of prescriptive possession may be mentioned publicity, long continued (though not necessarily immemorial [that is not necessarily 100 years of]) occupancy, absence of interruption, and the use of the state's resources upon the land." (Theodore S. Woolsey, "Prescription," The Universal Cyclopaedia, vol. 9, Charles Kendall Adams, ed., 1900, p. 456)
 John William Salmond, Jurisprudence: or The Theory of Law, 2nd ed., 1907, p. 152.
 Alan McCormack, The Term "Privilege": A Textual Study of Its Meaning and Use in the 1983, 1997, p. 336.
 Sir Thomas Egerton [1540-1617], The Speech of the Lord Chancelor: Sir Thomas Egerton, 1978, p. 23.
 Pasquale Fiore, International Law Codified and its Legal Sanction, no. 1078, 1918, p. 428; Note: "The great majority of the writers insist that possession is confirmed by time immemorial, though not defined. Some, however, such as Savigny, construe immemorial to be two generations, because of the possibility of securing the direct testimony of the present owner from his own knowledge and from that acquired from his predecessor. Other writers, such as Fiore, David Dudley Field, Bourgeois and Renault, prescribe the period of a half century." (Don Vicente Santamaria de Paredes, A Study of the Question of Boundaries between the Republics of Peru and Ecuador, 1910, p. 293).
 Christoph Bluth, "The British Resort to Force in the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict 1982: International Law and Just War Theory," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 1987, p. 8; Note: "The length of time required for acquiescence has never been determined by a tribunal, but most writers on international law suggest that fifty years or more without interruption are required for the acquisition of title by prescription to occur." (Ibid.) (emphasis added).
 Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, vol. 1, 1922, p. 116.
 Quincy Wright, The Enforcement of International Law through Municipal Law in the United States, 1915, p. 24; Note: "Grotius demanded a continuous possession during one hundred years. Vattel [merely] stated that it must be a possession for 'many years. . . .' Great Britain and Venezuela recognized a fifty year prescription [between nations]." (Louis M. Bloomfield, Egypt, Israel, and the Gulf of Aqaba in International Law, 1957, p. 103) (emphasis added).
 Lowell S. Gustafson, The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, 1988, p. xii; Note: "Most writers in international law, including Hugo Grotius and L. Oppenheim, argue that an uninterrupted span of fifty to a hundred years is required before title is prescripted." (Lowell S. Gustafson, The Sovereignty dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, 1988, p. 34) (emphasis added).
 Ibrahim Al Abed and Peter Hellyer, United Arab Emirates: a New Perspective, 2001, p. 187; Note: "The concept of immemorial possession was received into Castile in its Roman law form. It was defined as one hundred years of 'quiet and peaceful possession without any contradiction.'" (John Edwards, Christian Córdoba: The City and its Region in the Late Middle Ages, 1982, p. 17) (emphasis added).
 Op.cit., Lowell S. Gustafson; Note: "Adverse holding or prescription during a period of fifty years shall make a good title." (Alexander Marie Stuyt and T.M.C. Asser Institute, Survey of International Arbitrations, 1794-1989, no. 207, 1972, p. 212) (emphasis added). "For fifty years they held uninterrupted possession . . . and adverse possession confers a valid title by prescription on nations as on individuals." (Isaac Grant Thompson, The Albany Law Journal, vol. 20, p. 466) (emphasis added).
 John Lynch, Cambrensis Eversus, Seu Potius Historica Fides in Rebus Hibernicis Geraldo Cambrensi Abrogota, Matthew Kelly, trans. & ed., vol. 3, 1852, p. 39.
 United States and Venezuelan Claims Commission, 1889-90, Opinions, p. 79; Note: "In speaking of the usurpers of a throne, writers on the Laws of Nations [have declared that] . . . to legitimatize the right of the former [a territory that was stolen or usurped], Lessius tells us that forty years suffice; ad hoc sufficiunt quadriginta anni cum titulo. . . . [However] Grotius, Puffendorf, Suarez and Navare, [contend] that une possession seculaire is sufficient to remove the blot [of usurpation], because, in the lapse of one hundred years [immemorial prescription], all the guilty are supposed to be dead and the punishment duly inflicted by a Supreme Power [that is, by God]. This is the general principle of prescription, in public matters. . . ." (William Walton, A Reply to the "Exposé des droits de sa majesté très fidèle " Donna Maria II, 1830, pp. 148-149) (emphasis added).
 Arnold Bennett Hall, International Law, 1910, p. 27.
 Venezuela, Case of Venezuela in the Question of Boundary Between Venezuela and British Guiana, vol. 2, 1898, p. 302.
 Christian J. Tams, "Waiver, Acquiescence and Extinctive Prescription," pp. 18-19, University of Glasgow, 2009: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1414188.
 David Morrison Rogers, English Recusant Literature, 1558-1640, vol. 280, 1969, p. 158.
 Ibid., p. 134.
 Thomas Joseph Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 5th ed., 1910, p. 159.
 Garcia Cadiz Findlay in John H. Williams v. Venezuela, No. 36, United States and Venezuelan Commission, convention of December 5, 1885 in the case of Ann Eulogia Garcia Cadiz, now Case of Ann Eulogia known at Loretta quoted in United States Congress, "Limitation and Prescription," The Miscellaneous Documents of the House of Representatives for the Second Session of the Fifty Third Congress, vol. 3267, issue 4, chapter 69, 1895, p. 4186; Note: the conclusion of international courts throughout the 20th century are that ". . . 50 years is a measuring stick that multiple cases have used as a standard . . ." for prescription to eliminate the rights of one and give it to others. (Richard Stubbs, "Strengthening the Efficacy of Acquisitive Prescription in International Law," BYU Prelaw Review, vol. 28, 2014. p. 61)
 Noah Haynes Swayne in United States Supreme Court, Wood v. Carpenter p. 101 U. S. 139; Note: "While international proceedings . . . are not bound by . . . statutes of limitations, they are subject to the same presumptions as to payment or abandonment as those on which statutes of limitation are based. A government can not any more rightfully press against a foreign government a stale claim [from a former ruler] which the party holding [the exiled government] declined to press when the evidence was fresh than it can permit such claims to be the subject of perpetual litigation among its own citizens. It must be remembered that statutes of limitation are simply formal expression of a great principle of peace which is at the foundation not only of our own common law but of all other systems of civilized jurisprudence." (Francis Wharton, A Digest of International Law of the United States, appendix, vol. 3, 1886, p. 239 and Report of International Arbitral Awards, Spader et. al. case, 1903-1904, vol. 9, 2006, pp. 223-224) Justice does not permit old derelict claims neglected for over 100 years from disturbing the present or the future.
 Yehuda Z. Blum, Historical Titles of International Law, 1965, p. 6.
 Op.cit, Garcia Cadiz Findlay.
 United States-Venezuela Claims Commission (1885) as quoted in Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 2006, p. 375.
 "If anyone claiming a prescriptive right were able to show that he and his ancestors had been in continuous and uninterrupted possession back beyond the reach of memory, or, as the original legal formula had it, to a 'time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary,' there would be no need to go further to demonstrate how and on what basis the right was obtained." (Howard Nenner, The Right to be King: the Succession to the Crown of England, 1603-1714, 1995, p. 51).
 Emerich de Vattel, Law of Nations, Book II, chapter 11, n. 141; Note: No ". . . upstart-family, can possibly have any confirmed title to the usurped throne, for at least, one hundred years to come." (Quote by the translator of the book, Polybius, A Translation of a Fragment of the Eightieth Book of Polybius, Emmanuel Louis H.A. de Launay, ed., note, 1806, p. 7) (emphasis added).
 Upendra Nath Mitra, The Indian Law of Prescription and Easements, 1907, p. 2.
 Surya Prakash Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes, and International Law, 1997, pp. 118-119.
 Harvard Law Review Association, Harvard Law School, Harvard Law Review, vol. 17, 1904, pp. 346-347.
 John Fischer Williams, Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, vol. 3, 1925-1926, p. 114; Note: "[Title to territory is abandoned] by letting another country assume and carry out for many years all the responsibilities and expenses in connection with [ruling] the territory concerned. Could anything be imagined more obviously amounting to [or be obviously identifying] acquiescence . . . [and] abandonment? Such a course of action [abandonment], or rather inaction, disqualifies the [deposed] country from asserting the continue existence of the title [of internal de jure sovereignty]." (I. C. MacGibbon, "Estoppel in International Law," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 7, 1958, p. 509).
 Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, Sovereignty Over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, H. L. Sutcliffe and M. McDonald, trans., 2000, p. 88 and Marcelo G. Cohen, Possession contestee et souverainete territorial, 1997, p. 492.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 144.
 Ibid., no. 150.
 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Book 2, vol. 2, chapter 4, no. 5(3).
 Ibid., no. 6.
 Richard Wildman, Institutes of International Law: International Law in Times of Peace, printed in The Law Library, vol. 68, 1850, p. 51.
 Max Huber, the Arbitration Judge of the Isle of Palmas case quoted in George Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law, 5th ed., vol. 1, 1967, p.80.
 Vladimir D. Degan, Sources of International Law, 1997, p. 353.
 Chistian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum: The Translation, Joseph H. Drake, trans., 1934, p. 187.
 Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, vol. 1, chapter 8, no. 2, 1754, p. 64
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 150; Note: "Would it be reasonable that he [the original sovereign or successor] should be allowed to call in question the rights of the [prescriptive] possessor, when by his own fault [neglect or dereliction] he has suffered matters to proceed to such a state. . . . If it be necessary that one of the two should be exposed to lose his property, it is just it should be the party who is in fault [the deposed monarch, or his successors, who acquiesced and therefore abandoned the exalted status and right of de jure sovereigns]." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 141).
 Lowell S. Gustafson, The Sovereignty Dispute Over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, 1988, p. 34 and Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 4, no. 7 and Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: a Treatise, 1920, pp. 526-529.
 James A. Wolfe, "The Mississippi Voundary Case," German Yearbook of International Law, vol. 26, 1983, p. 100.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 144, 1805, Pomroy edition.
 Ibid., no. 141.
 Ibid., no. 143.
 Ibid., no. 140.
 Richard Janeway, The Case of Protestants in England under a Popish Prince, if any shall happen to wear the Imperial Crown, vol. 25, 1681, p.10.
 Acad'mie de Droit International de La Haye, Recueil Des Cours/Collected Courses, 1999, p. 101.
 Charles de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, vol. 1, Thomas Nugent, trans., 1900, p. 61.
 Jean J. Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Political Law, vol. 2, part 2, chapter 3, no. 3(34:6).
 Ibid., no. 3 (35:7).
 Samuel Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to the Natural Law, Book 2, chapter 10, no. 6.
 J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Prespective, vol. 3, 1970, p. 322.
 Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord (prince de Bénévent), Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand, vol 2, Duc de Broglie, ed., Raphael Ledos de Beaufort, trans., 1891, 1891, p. 120.
 Hugo Grotius, On The Law of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 9, no. 1.
 Ibid., Book 3, chapter 16, no. 1.
 Kevin Jon Keller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law, 2011, p. 114 and Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, 2004, p. 92.
 Peter Malanczuk and Michael Barton Akehurst, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th revised ed., 1997, p. 152.
 Krystyna Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law, 2nd ed., 1968, p. 555.
 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 1949, p. 340.
 Pitman B. Potter, Introduction to the Study of International Organization, 1925, p. 183.
 Lassa Oppenheim, "The Legal Relations Between an Occupying Power and the Inhabitants," Law Quarterly Review, vol. 33, 1917, pp. 363-364.
 Ernst Wolff, "The International Position of Dispossessed Governments at Present in England," The Modern Law Review, vol. 6, no. 4, December 1943, p. 208; Note: "Recognition of a state under international law has nothing to do with the internal sovereignty of the state. . . ." (Bankole Thompson, The Constitutional History and Law of Sierra Leone, 1997, p. 80).
 Samuel Freiherr von Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and Nations: Eight Books, Book 7, chapter 8, no. 4.
 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: a Treatise, vol. 1, 3rd ed., Ronald Francis Roxburgh, 1921, p. 405: Note: "The owner state completely leave a territory with the intention of withdawing form it forever, thus relinquishing sovereignty over it. Dereliction requires, first, that the territory actually be abandoned and, second, that the owner demonstrate genuine intention to relinquish its sovereign claim. In effect, dereliction is necessary before the process of prescription can lawfully occur." (Christopher C. Joyner, International Law in the 21st Century: Rules of Global Government, 2005, p. 46).
 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: a Treatise, vol. 1, 3rd ed., Ronald Francis Roxburgh, 1921, p. 405.
 Robert Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, vol. 1, 2nd ed., 1871, p. 308.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 1, chapter 4, no. 55.
 George Bowyer, Commentaries on Universal Public Law, 1854, p. 90; Note: "In the case of abandonment, there is no usurpation [no theft] of sovereignty since there are no contemporaneous [concurrent or] competing claims." (James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed., 2008, p. 230).
 Printed in 1688 from Quarto: "An Inquiry the Measures of Submission to Supreme Authority," The Harleian Miscellany; or, A Collection of Scarce, Curious, and Entertaining Pamphlets and Tracts, William Oldys and John Malham, ed., 1810, p. 206.
 Georg. Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law, 1976, pp. 35-36; Note: "The essence of prescription is the removal of defects in a putative [assumed] title arising from usurpation of another’s sovereignty by the consent and acquiescence of the former sovereign." (Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed., 2008, p. 146).
 Erzsébet Csatlós, "The Legal Regime of Unilateral Act of States," Miskolc Journal of International Law, vol. 7. no. 1, 2010, pp. 33-60, 2.2.6. Acquiescence; Note: "Title based on prescription without acquiescence [legal abandonment] of the former owner [who protests and uses his exalted regal titles and arms] is akin to title based on conquest." (Lowell S. Gustafson, The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, 1988, p. 35). The deposed monarch or his successors, must have legally abandoned the kingdom or principality by dereliction or neglect for a long period of time before the usurper can lawfully appropriate all the regal rights and privileges of internal sovereignty held by the former ruling dynasty.
 John Bassett Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party, vol. 4, 1898, p. 4195.
 Ibid.; Note: "The conqueror [or revolutionary] is not a successor of the deposed sovereign, but he is a usurper according to the international law and the law of nations, and this is not altered by a subsequent renunciation on the part of the former legitimate ruler, which only removes the claim to the restoration of his possession, but cannot convert the usurpation into a succession, in accordance with public [international] law." ("Prussian State Trials," The Law Times: The Journal and Record of the Law and the Lawyer, vol. 46, no. 1339, November 28, 1868, p. 64).
 Ibid., pp. 4195-4196.
 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 2006, p. 382.
 Ibid., p. 380
 Ibid., p. 381
 "From the ‘Lectric Laws Library’s Lexicon: Latches, Doctrine of," 2011: www.lectlaw.com/def/l056.htm.
 Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment, 2009, p. 525.
 United States-Venezuela Claims Commission (1885) as quoted in Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 2006, p. 380.
 Paraphrazing some of Vattel in Mark Napier, Commentaries on the Law of Prescription in Scotland, 1839 as quoted in The Legal Observer, Or, Journal of Jurisprudence, weekly, vol. 18, 1839, pp. 262-263.
 Malcolm Nathan Shaw, International Law, 5th ed., note 89, 2003, p. 426.
 D. P. O’Connell as quoted in Parliamentary Debates: Official Report, vol. 22, 1981, p. 518.
 James Leslie Brierly, The Law of Nations: an Introduction to the International Law of Peace, 1955, p. 157.
 United States Supreme Court, Records and Briefs of the United States Supreme Court, vol. 217, 1908, p. 392.
 Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law: being the substance of a Course of Lectures on Grotius de Jure Belli et Pacis, 1754, p. 133.
 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, vol. 2, Jean Barbeyrac trans., ed., and writer of notes, and Richard Tuck, ed., book 2, chapter 4, no. 1, note 5, , 2005.
 Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, vol. 1, chapter 8, no. 8, 1754, no. 8, p. 67; Note: After 100 years of negligence on the part of the once royal house or government-in-exile, "It is the bona fide possessor alone whose prescription will stand the test of conscience." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 150). A matter of conscience was a matter of utmost importance as it was a matter of law and justice or what is right and true.
 Richard Wildman, "Institutes of International Law," The Law Library, vol. 68, April, May & June 1950, p. 51.
 British Parliament House of Commons, "Papers Relating to the Nawaubs of the Carnatic," Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons, vol. 46, 1861, p. 141; Note: "It must be clear that it is uninterrupted and undisturbed possession implying full acquiescence on the part of the foreign and dispossessed claimant, which in theory [and practice] serves to rob it of its rights and to lodge them in the actual occupant." (Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, vol. 1, 1922, p. 194).
 Howard Nenner, The Right to be King: the Succession to the Crown of England, 1603-1714, 1995, p. 51.
 Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from the Six Books of the Commonwealth, Julian H. Franklin, ed., 2004, p. 112.
 Clare Jackson, Restoration Scotland, 1660-1690, 2003, p. 202; Note: ". . . Prescription . . . for the peace of society, ought to take place, . . . [for] without admitting this principle, there would be few or no legal rulers now existing in the world, as most sovereignties may be traced backwards to manifest usurpation." (George Campbell, "Alarms in 'Regard of Popery: An Address to the People of Scotland,'" , Tracts for the People, designed to Vindicate Religious and Christian liberty, 1840, p. 29).
 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, 2007, p.65; Note: "Prescription should be understood as a claim or title or right to something based on long use or enjoyment of it. It also contains the further idea of ex injuria jus oritur: an act of violence and injustice, by lapse of time and some degree of acceptance, could give rise to rights." (Wight 1977: 163). (Robert H. Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, 2007, p. 62). Talleyrand declared: "The legitimacy of Kings, or rather governments, is the safeguard of nations; the legitimacy of a government is the effect of long possession, as prescription is a title to private property." (Walter Alison Phillips, The Confederation of Europe: a Study of the European Alliance, 1813-1823, 1920, p. 88).
 Barbara Allen Roberson, International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory, 2002, p. 163.
 Ibid., p. 167.
 The Popular Encyclopedia: or, Conversations Lexicon, vol. 4, "Legitimacy," 1862, p. 429.
 R. T. Allen, Beyond Liberalism: The Political Thought of F.A. Hayek & Michael Polanyi, 1998, p. 203.
 John Randolph, American Politics, Thomas Valentine Cooper and Hector T. Fenton, eds., Book III, 1892, p. 20; Note: "Good faith" is not required in international prescription. It is just the opposite. ". . . The International Law doctrine of uti possidetis is indifferent to the way sovereignty was acquired. . . ." (Laurence Henry, Book Review, European Journal of International Law, vol. 15, 2004, p. 1064).
 J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, vol. 3, 1970, p. 382.
 John Norton Pomeroy, Lectures on International Law in Time of Peace, Theodore Woolsley, ed., 1886, p. 121-122.
 Hugo Grotius, Of the Rights of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 4, no. 1.
 Andrés Bello, Derecho Internacional, 4th ed., 1886, pp. 42- 43.
 James Tyrrell, Bibliotheca Politica: or, An Enquiry into the Ancient Constitution of the English Government, 2nd ed., 1727, p. 95.
 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1979, p. 23.
 Kassaye Amare Engida, Fundamentals of Civic and Ethical Education, 2006, p. 275.
 Dictionary.com, Rule of Law, 2013: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/rule+of+law.
 Christian J. Tams, "Waiver, Acquiescence and Extinctive Prescription," University of Glasgow, 2009, p. 1, 2013: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1414188.
 Ibid., p. 3.
 Ibid., p. 12.
 Ibid., p. 13.
 Ibid., p. 15.
 Ibid., p. 17.
 Ibid., p. 1.
 Ibid., p. 2.
 Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, Book 4, chapter 12, no. 8, 1710.
 Ibid., Book 7, chapter 7, no. 5.
 I. C. MacGibbon, “Estoppel in International Law,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol.7, issue 3, July 1958, p. 468.
 Emmanuel Voyiakis, Estoppel in International Law, Oxford Bibliographies Online , 2013: http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0058.xml;jsessionid=072611F4A681A459B7B8571775B679A8; Note: "International law has long recognized the doctrine of estoppel, a principle which prevents states from acting inconsistently to the detriment of others." (Megan L. Wagner, "Jurisdiction by Estoppel in the International Court," California Law Review, vol. 74, issue 5, article 6, October 1986, p. 1777) ". . . It obliges a State to be consistent in its attitude to a given factual or legal situation . . ." to encourage finality, stability and predictability. (Iain MacGibbon, “Estoppel in International Law,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 7, 1958, pp. 458, 468) As such, estoppel is one of the ". . . most powerful and flexible instruments to be found in any system of court jurisprudence." (Sir Frederick Pollock, The Expansion of the Common Law, 1904, p. 108) In fact, in one form or another, it ". . . is recognized by all systems of private law" as a principle of equity and justice. (Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, 1927, p. 205)
 Megan L. Wagner, "Jurisdiction by Estoppel in the International Court of Justice," California Law Review, vol. 74, issue 5, October 31, 1986, p. 1785.
 I. Sinclair, "Estoppel and Acquiescence," Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice, Malgosia Fitsmaurice, ed., 1996, p. 104.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 146.
 Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law: Being the Substance of a Course of Lectures on Grotius De Jure Belli et Pacit, 1832, pp. 63-64.
 Op.cit., Vattel.
 Peter Malanczuk, ed., Akekurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, 1997, p. 154 as quoted in Nuno Sérgio Marques Antunes, Rachael Bradley, and Clive H. Schofield, Estoppel, Acquiescence and Recognition in Territorial and Boundary Disputes, 2000, p. 6.
 D. W. Bowett, "Estoppel before International Tribunals and its Relation to Aquiescence," British Yearbook of International Law, vol 33, 1957, p. 202; Note: "The essential condition of the operation of the rule of preclusion or estoppel, as strictly to be understood, is that the party invoking the rule must have ‘relied upon’ the statements or conduct of the other party, either to its own detriment or to the other’s advantage." (Gerald Fitzmaurice, Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear , Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and the Discipline of International Law, John Graham Merrills, Ed., 1998, p. 63.)
 Robert Kolb, "General Principles of Procedural Law," The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary, 2nd edition, Andreas Zimmermann, Karin Oellers-Frahm, Christian Tomuschat and Christian J. Tams, editors, 2012, p. 307 and "The Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vibear (Cambodia/Thailand)," International Court of Justice Reports, 1962, pp. 6, 32.
 Jacob W.F. Sundberg, Regarding Dethroned Princely Houses and their Legal Rights, September 15, 2006, p. 4, 2013: http://www.mocterranordica.org/Sund_Eng.pdf; see Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book II, chapter 11, nos. 145-146; Vienna Convention from 1969 on the law of treaties, art. 31.3(a); Note: "The law of Estoppel is [part] of a class of incontestable [or conclusive] rights. . . ." (Melville Madison Bigelow, A Treatise on the Law of Estoppel, Or of Incontestable Rights, 6th ed. revised, 1913, p. 4)
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, "Preface and Preliminaries."
 Evgeny Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, P. Beirne & R. Sharlet, eds., 1980, pp. 168-183, 184-185.
 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, 2007, p. 64.
 "A Glossary of European Noble, Princely, Royal, and Imperial Titles," 2011: www.heraldica.org/topics/odegard/titlefaq.htm.
 John Augustine Ryan and Francis Joseph Boland, Catholic Principles of Politics, Rev. ed., 1940, p. 94
 Frederick Adams Woods, "Sovereigns and the Supposed Influence of Opportunity," Science New Series, vol. 39, no. 1016, June 19, 1914, p. 904.
 The Encyclopædia Britannica: a Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, 11th ed., Hugh Chisholm, ed., vol. 22, "Prince," 1911, p. 343.
 Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, chapter 10, no. 18, 1680, p. 90.
 Malcolm Nathan Shaw, International Law, 5th ed., 2003p. 427; Note: "The doctrine of prescription and acquiescence 'is founded upon the supposition, confirmed by constant experience, that every person will naturally seek to enjoy that which belongs to him; and the inference fairly to be drawn from his silence and neglect [is] . . . his intention to relinquish it.'" (Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law: with a Sketch of the History of the Science, vol. 1, 1836, p. 206).
 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 4, no. 11.
 Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, chapter 10, no. 19, 1680, p. 90.
 Quote from Hermann Conring (1606-1681) in Constantin Fasolt, Past Sense — Studies in Medieval and Early Modern European History, 2014, p. 364.
 Andreas Palaiologo; 2015: http://www.saciol.com/o/g/andreas_palaiologos and David Potter, A History of France, 1460-1560: The Emergence of a Nation State, 1995, p. 33.
 "Prescription has been defined to be that right which may arise from long, honest and uninterrupted possession, though, before such possession, some other person or persons, and not the possessor, had the ownership. The doctrine of prescription rests altogether on the presumed dereliction of the former owner." (David Hoffman, Legal Outlines, vol. 1, 1829, p. 197).
 Thomas A. Walker, A History of the Law of Nations, vol. 1, 1899, p. 296.
 Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, chapter 9, no. 5, 1680, p. 77.
 Ibid., no. 24, 1680, p. 82.
 James Tyrrell, Bibliotheca Politica: or, An Enquiry into the Ancient Constitution of the English Government, 2nd ed., 1727, p. 94.
 David John Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 1998, p. 198.
 John McHugo, "How to Prove Title to Territory: A Brief Introduction to the Law and Evidence," Boundary & Territory Briefing, vol. 2, No. 4, 1998, p. 10.
 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: the Evolution of an Idea, 2007, pp. 19-20.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Bela Kapossy and Richard Whatmore, ed., Book 1, chapter 12, no. 157, Note.
 Op.cit. Robert Jackson, p. 19.
 Ibid., p. 20.
 The Atlantic, The Royal We, May 2002; 2014: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/05/the-royal-we/302497.
 Ian Mortimer, The Perfect King: The Life of Edward III, 2007, pp. 433-440, 503 and "Physics News Update," No. 428, American Institute of Physics, 1999.
 Arden H. Brame, Jr. II, "Are You and I Really Causins? . . . or . . . How Many Ancestors Did We Have is A.D. 1 and in 1700 B.C.?," The Augustan Society Omnibus Book 7 in The Colonial Genealogist, XII:4, issue 46, 1986.
If you have any questions or comments, please contact us at: