Epilogue: (Volume I)
We have visited a number of very significant subjects to the future of mankind, such as sovereignty, natural law, the perfect society, governments-in-exile, deposed royal houses, examples of what is truly lawful and right, broken promises, the origins of society and nations, democracy, exemplary leadership, the proper role of government, the illegitimacy of revolution, and the justification of rightful and needed revolution. Each is an issue of great meaning and heavy consequences that make or break a kingdom or nation. However, there is one that is so critical to the rule of law in regard to non-territorial sovereignty that its inner workings cannot be ignored. Volume II of this book, therefore, discusses this imperative principle in great detail. It is probably the most comprehensive book on the subject that has ever been written. It is of such great importance that de jure internal sovereignty cannot exist in a dispossessed royal house or government-in-exile without the legal provisions that comprise prescriptive law, because prescription is the legal right to continue to hold sovereignty on a de jure non-territorial basis. No other law holds this right. It is the law of supremacy and sovereign ownership. That is:
Prescription [is] . . . another word for possession, proprietary right, and, indeed, ownership: [in other words] a lawful title of possession . . . , a right [not the actual power, but the right] to control its affairs and, to that end, to command its population. . . .
In short, if prescription is operative, it means the great privilege of sovereignty can be owned in the here and now for the stability and peace of society and among the family of nations. However, no prescriptive entitlement means no legal right of supremacy remains on a lawful basis. In addition, prescriptive rules are the only way for the dispossessed to keep the de jure sovereign rights alive and well. It remains intact only as long as it is properly maintained. The mandatory work required to preserve rights must be provable by official public records. There must be conclusive, factual evidence to show that such has taken place on a consistent basis. Family fairy tales, private records, inference stacking, guesswork, hunches, historical assumptions, or suppositions are not proof, evidence, or facts. They are all unacceptable and ineffective in preserving rights. Only by consistently implementing the requirements of prescription and being able to prove that the basic essentials were faithfully discharged can a royal house or deposed government legally function and hold on to the highest and most important secular right on earth. This is sovereignty that is legally valid, legitimate and binding even though it is non-territorial.
Without sovereign ownership provided by the rules of prescriptive law, nothing can be perpetuated or passed onto the next generation or the subsequent officers of a legitimate government-in-exile. In other words, without prescription, hereditary rights permanently evaporate and disappear after 50 to 100 years of neglect; that is, if those rights have not already been lost earlier by other legal means.
The point is:
. . . [Prescription] becomes indefeasible [legally impossible to change] by the long length of time. On that ground the highest authorities on international law hold that national possession may prescribe. . . .
[It] is the loss of an inherent right [the right of sovereignty]. . . . . . . [This transfer of sovereign rights] is incontestable [and permanent]. . . . It means that, If the possessor gains, it is because the [former] owner loses. In other words, the only way the new possessor can gain full and complete sovereignty is if the dispossessed sovereign house loses all its rights to them. When a loss has to fall on one of the two . . . parties [as it does automatically in prescriptive loss], it is right that it should fall on the one neglecting its right. That is, the loss falls on the one that acquiesced and/or abandoned its claim and all the responsibilities that normally go with it. In other words, the one who is derelict, careless, and guilty is the one who loses.
A prescriptive transfer is so complete that every single royal right, privilege, entitlement, prerogative or privilege once possessed by the former deposed house is lost. This leaves them empty handed of everything regal or grand that they once held. Neither they nor their posterity have any right to any future claim on the land or its people.
Immemorial prescription . . . is a true [full and complete] title to property, as firm and valid as the best [kind of title on earth], for, if [this] . . . is not to be respected . . . as a genuine [authentic] title, no nation could be safe in the possession of its domain.
. . . Certainly if [100 years on the throne or] so long a possession does not give a good Title, and a prescription against [or better title than] all other Pretenders, most of the Royal Families [or republics] in Christendom will be [in serious trouble from this would motivate numerous pretenders, impersonators, and scoundrels who have, in the past, created confusion, wars, revolutions and a great deal of harm]. . . .
Prescription rightfully takes away old stale claims so past royal houses are no longer a threat; that is, those that have not been maintained, their rights are legal and lawful nullities or no longer sovereign entities or royal houses. Therefore, proscription legally protects the established kingdom or government from:
. . . pretender[s] . . . by the common sense of all men [by giving to the possessor, of a hundred years, a perfect] . . . just and good title [to the particular land and its people].
Thus, . . . Prescription hath power to ratify and confirm the Titles of . . . Princes. . . . It can also destroy them . . . Prescription being sufficient to extinguish an Original [old or stale] Right. How it works in prescription is that the, . . . legal rights . . . arise [become permanent for the possessor] from the destruction [ruin or termination] of the legal rights of others [the deposed who fail to protest]. . . . . . . [So] prescription is a means of acquisition [for the one] . . . and of a loss for the primitive owner [the deposed sovereign], who the possessor has substituted [or replaced].
. . . As gain and loss are terms of relation, and of a reciprocal nature [in other words] by whatever method one man gains an estate, by that same method or its correlative some other man has lost it. As, where the heir acquires by descent, the ancestor has first lost or abandoned his estate by death; where the lord gains land by escheat, the estate of the tenant is first of all lost by the natural or legal extinction of all his hereditary blood; where a man gains an interest by occupancy, the former owner has previously relinquished his right of possession; where one man claims by prescription or immemorial usage, another man has either parted with his right by an ancient and now forgotten grant, or has forfeited it by the supineness [showing blameworthy indifference] or neglect of himself and his ancestors for ages ; and so, in case of forfeiture, the tenant by his own misbehavior or neglect has renounced his interest in the estate; whereupon it devolves to that person who by law may take advantage of such default; and, in alienation by common assurances, the two considerations of loss and acquisition are so interwoven, and so constantly contemplated together, that we never hear of a conveyance without at once receiving the ideas [that one losses and one gains].
Thus, . . . The dominion [or the sovereign right of a royal house or government-in-exile] . . . is acquired and lost by prescription [and other methods of transfer]. This is a very serious matter because such conveyances are final, complete and incontestable. In prescription, it is an established legal reality that cannot be altered after a certain amount of time. At this point, it cannot be passed down to ones descendants for it no longer exists as a family right or lawful heritage. A father cannot pass onto his heirs something he does not have or no longer possesses. This makes prescription of paramount importance to the future of dispossessed nobility and royalty because it is the protecting and preserving side of prescription that makes non-territorial sovereignty possible and therefore capable of being inherited.
In consequence of these legal verities, if a claimants ancestors have lost their rights, then he or she is not a royal personage nor is he or she the personification of the glory of a former kingdom or principality. Instead this person is merely a commoner like everyone else. The individual would, therefore, have no lawful right to function as a fountain of honor or be honored for something he or she is not. One cannot restore a right that one does not possess. What his or her royal ancestors have lost no longer exists in the family. The past is gone forever and all the rights were transferred to the subsequent ruling powers that now govern the former lands. This heavy consequence is the result of a neglect to maintain this sacred and priceless privilege. It is why prescription is so crucial and vital to the future of former ruling royal houses and to legitimate dispossessed governments. For this reason, Volume II was written that the rule of law might become better known, admired for what it is, and prevail in the earth. For, without it, there is not much good left over. For one thing, without widespread knowledge, insight, and understanding of prescription, the world will have more fakes and impostors than can be counted, who will make nobility and royalty, something admirable, into a revolting joke as more and more quacks and low-life's claim nobility and try to impose their false status on others. Natural law is the bedrock, the anchor, or compass needed to enable mankind to stay on track. It is the only solid ground we have, the only true foundation that is sturdy enough to support a magnificent future, along with all the other ideals and good that it has to offer.
 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, 2007, p. 62.
 Richard Wild, Institutions of International Law, 1850, vol. 1, no. 74.
 Sir Travers Twiss, The Law of Nations considered as Independent Political Communities: on the Right and Duty of Nations in Time of Peace, 1861, p. 177; Note: Through prescription . . . a right [of sovereignty] may be established by long exercise of the power or that the same [dynastic] right [of a former ruling house] may be extinguished by prolonged failure to exercise the same power. (Journal of the Rocky Mountain Medieval and Renaissance Association, Volumes 10-12, 1989, p. 39).
 Venezuela, Case of Venezuela in the Question of Boundary Between Venezuela and British Guiana, vol. 2, 1898, p. 253.
 Ibid., p. 206.
 Reference unknown.
 Don Antonio Riquelme, Elements of Public International Law, 1849 as quoted in Venezuela, Case of Venezuela in the Question of Boundary Between Venezuela and British Guiana, vol. 2, 1898, p. 280.
 Gilbert Burnet, The History of the Reformation of the Church of England, 1681, pp. 299-300.
 F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition, Ronald Hamowy, ed., 2011, p. 251.
 Sir George Buck, The History of the Live and Reign of Richard the Third, 1647, p. 144.
 Francis Brokesby, The Life of Mr. Henry Dodwell, 1715, p. 261.
 Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest: the Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law, 1996, p. 27.
 Don Antonio Riquelme as paraphrased in Ibid., p. 280.
 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 2, G. Sweet & John L. Wendall, eds., 1854, p. 235.
 Ibid., p. 279.
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