Chapter Five: (Volume I)
ORIGIN AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF SOVEREIGNTY
Chapter Table of Contents
Traditional international law accords a very strong and fundamental position to governments deposed by a usurper. The essence of the natural law, upon which international law is based, is twofold: might does not make right and it is ultra vires to overthrow what God in his providence acting through the course of history has revealed to be the natural constitution of a particular nation.
The international law concerning de jure sovereignty arose from the historical situations in which monarchs were unjustly dethroned by a usurper. In order to appreciate the very strong positions that de jure legitimate governments have under international law vis-à-vis usurping de facto administrations, it is necessary to have an understanding of the moral right to authority possessed by sovereign royal houses under the natural law. Needless to say, a traditional republic legitimately established under the natural law has the same moral and legal right to de jure sovereignty as that possessed by a sovereign royal house, but its moral right to authority is more directly demonstrated organically by the governments from the position of sovereign royal houses.
Sovereign Royal Houses
The moral position of royal houses to de jure sovereignty is derived from the origin of the nation out of the family as the most basic unit of society. Fatherhood was naturally important in the development of kingdoms. The patriarchal nature of kingship is obvious and is scripturally supported as a natural, even divine, development in the history of mankind:
Even the Power which God himself exerciseth over Mankind is by Right of Fatherhood, he is both the King and Father of us all; as God hath exalted the Dignity of Earthly Kings, by communicating to them his own Title, by saying they are gods [Psalms 82] – so on the other side, he hath been pleased as it were to humble himself, by assuming the Title of a King to express his Power, and not the Title [like President or Prime Minister] of any popular Government; we find it is a punishment to have no King, Hosea 3:4 and promised, as a Blessing to Abraham, Gen. 17:6. that Kings shall come out of Thee. (emphasis added)
“All Power on Earth is either derived or usurped from the Fatherly Power, there being no other Original to be found of any Power whatsoever. . . .” “The Right of Fatherly Government was ordained by God for the preservation of mankind. . . .” This is the natural beginning.
Origin of the Nation Arising Out of the Family
Historically, anthropologically, and socially the nation originated out of the family, which is the basic and most fundamental unit of society. The family is, by far, the most important organization in all ages. It is no less than the brick and mortar of civilization. Strong families equal a strong nation. A state or kingdom can only be as strong as its essential component parts. Hence, the family has been called the matrix, even the headwaters or fountainhead of all humanity. The highest, most elementary form of human society known to nature is the family, which includes the extended family consisting of parents, children, grandchildren, and other immediate blood relations. This organization constitutes one definite, well-defined unit. “The family is frequently referred to as the social cell out of which the community develops. The metaphor accurately describes the relation of the family to the body politic.” The term family also includes supporters, retainers, and followers as well as blood relations:
Aristotle wrote that the first human association is between male and female, the second between master and servant and that both of these arise from the natural wants of man, and the two together form the family. The term family has a wide scope of meanings and does not always refer to a little group of parents and children. Consanguinity is usually the identifying and unifying element in the family, but in ancient times other persons than those united by blood – ties were considered members, and as such, had definite rights and obligations. The old Roman type of family, for example, included not only the blood relatives, but also slaves and servants, comprising in all, a large social group. In primitive times the family was usually a large group.
Nature itself demonstrates that the family is the basic or organic unit of society. This is true of the natural family as well as of the supra natural family formed by those who enter religious communities. We find the familial organization of society implicit in the social nature of man:
He is a social being in a twofold sense. He is a sexual being, that is, male and female. Men and women are coordinated for the sake of propagation and preservation of their kind as well as for mutual help and completion. For a better and higher life they do and must form the community of marriage and family, consisting of man and wife, parents and children. Each human being is man or wife, father or mother, son or daughter, each is in some way the member of a family. And even where we “leave father and mother, brother and sister, for the kingdom of heaven,” we enter a spiritual community that speaks of itself as a family, where we are brothers and sisters. Thus even where the natural form of the family is sacrificed, the spirit of the family, the moral order and the affectionate bonds of the family, are still a kind of prototype. The plurality of the families and their mutual coexistence now lead to a second and higher form of social life, to the political community. Its end is to produce a sovereign order of peace and justice under the protection and furtherance of which the preceding and pre-existing forms, the family and the person, can live and function according to their own essence.
Indeed, the natural purpose of human existence is exclusively found and circumscribed in, by, and through the family:
The Schoolmen called it vita economica: life around the house, the homestead of the family. Its end is the preservation of kind in the procreation of children and in their care and education by the parents. Apart from the care for material economic goods, that embraces the care for spiritual goods, the education of the mind and of the will to the virtues, individual and domestic, to charity and to obedience, to piety and to sacrifice, to justice and to love. There exist, therefore, original rights for the parents in order that they may fulfill their duties: the right of the parents to define the education of their children; the right of the sacredness of the family’s home; the rights of paternal authority.
Nature of the Family
Among the most interesting and informative studies of the family made in modern times are the various social and anthropological analyses undertaken by Sir Thomas Innes of Learney (1893-1971), the Lord Lyon King of Arms, who was the chief judicial officer of Scotland responsible for maintaining the scientific study of the recognized families comprising the Scottish Nation and the organization of such families through anthropological family totems, which are objects or living things that a group regard with special awe and reverence. Sir Thomas has eminent practical experience and anthropological knowledge concerning the family systems, which are known in the Highlands of Scotland as “Clans.” (The term is interchangeable with that of “Families.”) He speaks of the family or clan as being a social group consisting of an aggregate of distinct families actually descended or accepting themselves as descendants from a common ancestor:
The word “clan” or clanna simply means children, i.e. the descendants of the actual or mythical ancestor from whom the community claims descent, in so far as these remain within a tribal group which, as a social, legal, and economic entity, is treated as a unit. In the Middle Ages, law and custom did not treat of individuals, but of groups. The earliest groups were personal and pastoral, but as soon as a group settled, the territorial influence of the land which it had occupied affected its structure. Both the group and the land were called after the chief, who in theory was actually owner of the whole group and of the land of the group, with absolute power over every member, though in practice along with a “family council,” for hereditary and familial rule (i.e. monarchial and clan systems) are always more “constitutional” and free than the sway of republican electees of any description.
Membership in such a family was symbolized in the possession of certain family totems or symbols that represented both the whole family and the individual’s place within the family through slight variations of the basic family totem, known as marks of cadentry. Possession of such totems seemed to be universal to family groups in all times and places.
Possession of a totem undifferentiated by such marks of cadency indicated the founder or eponymous of the family, that is, the one who gives his name to a family and/or place. Adoption into the family was accomplished through “bonds of manrent” (a covenant of vassalage, loyalty, and full acceptance) and was a recognized feature of family law. This was responsible for the rapid multiplication and expansion of certain ancient families. In Europe, the science of families, their organization, their position within the whole community, and the study of their totems or symbol is known as heraldry. In Japan, such totems are known as “mons.” The use of such hereditary totems or arms is very important for the identification of the family and indicates their origin from a common parent. In Europe, such heraldic totems are a symbol of both the recognized family itself and of the individual within the family. Heraldry is, thus, the anthropological science of the family and its organization.
These totems were a very useful device for illustrating the family itself as a distinct group as well as the organic or natural (as opposed to artificially created) organization or conduct of a business within itself. A schematic diagram of such totems by Sir Thomas very clearly illustrates how the family is organized. The plain or undifferentiated totem indicates the founder or eponymous of the family, while the totems differentiated by various marks of cadentry illustrate the various descended branches of the family and the sub-branches within each of these. Thus, each member of the family has his or her own distinct variation of the basic family totem. As new members are added to the family through birth (or adoption), a differentiated version of the basic totem is assigned to each individual and represents his/her exact place within the family and the relationship that exists with other members. A person familiar with the family totem system of heraldry can actually “read” an individual’s totem and ascertain what family he/she belongs to and the position held within it. It would not be out of place to say that the individual differentiated totem represents the person himself, while the basic design of the totem represents the entire family. (See Chart below).
A careful examination of this schematic totem diagram shows that the family was organized on the basis of a pyramid. It will be noted that the individual totem descends from father to son. So it can be said that the son “represents” the father. The basic or undifferentiated totem attributed to the founder or eponymous of the family descends (in normal circumstances) to his eldest son as his representor. The whole idea of a family necessarily connotes a biological and hereditary group clustered around a hereditary stem of the founder or eponymous.
The family grows in expanding branches from the founder downwards. Each branch group forms its own community within the family and the individuality of each group is indicated by marks of cadentry or differences on the basic family totem. Nevertheless, the blood of all flowed in each member and was often renewed by marriages between members of different branches within the family, giving the family (and later the nation) its own distinct features.
The authority of the father or eponymous over his children was not conferred upon him by some other human person or persons or by an election. It did not exist in another before he received it in the first instance. The father’s authority can only exist in himself. It springs not from some external source but from his position as father, of which it is a natural and inseparable attribute. As this authority is the natural attribute of the position of the father, it must be regarded as residing ultimately in God, the Author of Nature, and conferred by Him on the father who has the legitimate natural right to its possession and exercise.
As this authority springs naturally from the father’s position in the family – just as the attributes of a body spring from the inner nature of the body – and is not conferred on him by anything external to himself, we may declare that the father’s authority is conferred directly on him by God under the natural law, which is discoverable by all men in all times through the use of self-evident rightful reasoning. In essence, then, the father’s authority over the family arises from his designation by God’s revelation of Himself through His providential direction of human affairs: The father receives his paternal authority over the child from God under the natural law by the fact that a child is born to him. In this case, the designation of paternal authority came naturally from God, who normally chooses to reveal His will to man by directing natural and historical circumstances. There is no supranatural designation of the father through a vision or miraculous intervention. God acts just as directly and obviously when He acts through the natural law as He does when He reveals His divine will through Revelation.
In this case, the father’s authority over the family comes immediately and directly from God under the natural law. Thus, the father’s authority over the family under the natural law (the natural order or being of things in the universe) is “by the grace of God.” This natural order of things is specifically supernaturally confirmed by God in the Fourth Commandment (Fifth Commandment in the original Bible) on honoring thy father and mother, but it would nevertheless be just as binding on all men in all times under the natural law, even if it had not been divinely revealed.
A fatherless or orphaned family is an imperfect group. Without unity at its center or core, it would have soon dissolved, having no one in authority over it, and would have not been able to resist disintegrating pressures from without. The father is indeed the link connecting all members of the family and their branches to each other. In his person, therefore, the father represents the integrity or unity of the family, as a distinct social group. As Sir Thomas anthropologically explains this situation, “continuity under the bond of kin embodied in the preservation of the parental tie is the whole basis of the clan concept.” Thus, a fatherless family is a sorry organization, alien to the whole idea of civilization, wherein the father is the sacred embodiment and personification of the family as its founder and leader. Hence, the question of succession to the father is necessarily of the utmost importance and widest interest to all members of the family. The importance of the father to the continuance of the family as a viable organization can clearly be seen from the anthropological and sociological analysis of his position within the family:
All tribal groups and all subdivisions of these are conceived, by the men who compose them, as descended from a single male ancestor, or sometimes a matriarch. Not only was the tribe or sept named after this eponymous, but the territory it occupied derived from him the name by which it was most commonly known. Upon the death of the eponymous, one of his descendants became the “Representor” of him and of the group which was “his,” i.e. within his patriarchal potestas. The successive chiefs were the judges, public officers, and representors of the group, and the very name king or king means the head of the kindred. This chief or primitive “King” formed the centre and sacred embodiment of the race, i.e. the supreme individual of the race giving to its race – ideal the coherence and endurance of personality. Whilst the chief’s influence was personal and tribal, he owned an official estate or earbsa which descended only along with the chiefly office, and for these territorial chiefs and chieftains to achieve the rank of aire deisa it was necessary to be “the son of an Aire and the grandson of an Aire,” and to hold “the property of his house,” or at all events the principal dwelling-place. Sir George Mackenzie explains (expressly in relation to undifferenced arms) that:
“By the term ‘chief,’ we call the representative of the family, from the French word chef or head, and in the Irish (Gaelic), with us the Chief of the Family is called the Head of the Clan.”
The ceann cinnidh or clan chief – or more properly the “Head of the Clan” . . . is thus in nature precisely the same as the chief of the family. Both are the living individual who represents the founder of the tribe, and who is the sacred embodiment of the tribe itself. (emphasis added)
The father or patriarch is, therefore, the parental representative of the founder and the sacred embodiment of the family group. The successor of the founder or eponymous thereby acquires authority over the entire family in loco parentis. The maintenance of the family as a working institution depends on this. The family is community-based on the assumption of heredity and a “parent and child” nexus. As Sir Thomas states, the constitutional authority of the successor of the founder or eponymous of the family was derived from his “representing” the eponymous. The patria potestas was not derived from the “children” any more than the chief’s derived from his clanna. Thus, it appeared that the patriarch or chief of the family took the place of the original father:
Whilst the chief, or chieftain, “was the law,” as Lord Aitchison has expressed it, he derived his patriarchal authority not from his children but from the parental relation to the community, as Sir George Mackenzie so emphatically illustrated in his treatise on the Scottish monarchy.
The nature of this parental succession is that what passed from patriarch to patriarch was the “family community” as a “going concern.” That is, “the public responsibility comprehended in the term family.” In many tribal communities it lay with the patriarch to determine which member of the family, natural or adopted, should succeed to the public office of the patriarchate. “It was nevertheless strictly hereditary and by whatever means ascertained . . . the ‘head of the central or stem family was the chief’ of the clan.”
This family principle emphasized the patriarchal chiefly element in which the chief was the parent, ruler, landowner, and proprietor on behalf of his clanna or children. This parental aspect is implicit in the very term clanna, which negates at the idea of “elected chiefs.”
Since the clan chief represented the founder of the family, he succeeded, upon his predecessor’s death, to the insignia of the eponymous that represents the original, self-derived, parental authority of the founder. The succeeding patriarch or “representor,” and he alone, was entitled to bear the plain or undifferentiated totem of the family. Any other course would have wrecked the whole value of totem symbolism (heraldry) and in warfare (where members of the family bore their particular totem on a shield) would have rendered it a danger to the entire family survival. In the course of time, possession of the plain or undifferentiated family totem represented parental succession to the original founder as the family patriarch, who, as Sir Thomas stated, was the “representor” or sacred embodiment of the family itself. The patriarch or chief was looked on by members of the family exactly as a father, corresponding, thus, to his actual constitutional position as “representor” of the founding father:
In every respect the chief was regarded by the members of his clan not as a master or landlord, but as a friend and the father of his people. To quote the description of the similar organization in olden France:
He commanded the group surrounding him, and, in the words of ancient documents, “he reigned.” The family became a fatherland designed in ancient documents by the word patria, and was loved with the more affection because it was a living fact under the eyes of everyone.
Thus, anthropologically, the patriarch or chief “reigned” over the family, and Sir Thomas describes how family chief succeeded family chief in the same manner as in a royal house. He strongly supports the historical analysis comparing a chief to a sovereign prince and the description of family chiefships as “little sovereignties”.
The mode of succession to the office of patriarch or chief as the “representor” of the eponymous or founder of the family was hereditary, being derived in Scotland from “a combination of the pictish order of succession, the Hebraic Code (Numbers 27: 4 and 8; 36: 3), and the Roman gens” as follows: “by which ever was at the time being the next descendent, that is, a son or a daughter, a nephew or a niece, the nearest then living. Failing there, however, the next heir begotten of . . . a collateral stock [would be chosen to succeed].”
This mode of succession seems generally to be written into the hearts of men in all times and places. It is the embodiment of the organic idea that the first-born son or daughter is naturally ordained to represent the father after he is called from this world to the next. This arises from the idea that since the first-born is the first child to be given to the father and thereby the closest to him in generation, he or she is naturally intended to succeed the father. This is true even in egalitarian America, which unlike Europe has no laws on this subject. Witness, for example, the very common occurrence although more common in the past of the first-born working to support the mother and younger children in the event of the premature death of the father. There are no civil laws compelling him to do so, and he is legally free to abandon the mother and younger children to go off on his own. Yet he does not do so out of the moral conviction that it is his obligation as successor of the father as the head of the family due to his position as the first-born to so provide for them. Moreover, the mother and younger children look to the first-born in these circumstances in expectancy of support. This moral conviction, written so strongly on the heart that it defies even the written positive law derogating from it, is what we call natural law, which is riveted in the heart of all good men, unless that person was unworthy.
Hereditary succession seems to be the mode of succession designated for the family by the natural law. However, it was not immutable primogeniture, and in the case of an unsuitable son, the succession could be designated by the incumbent patriarch to a more suitable son. This is “a useful and age-old patriarchal principle.” In Scotland, this practice of designating the successor is known as Tanistry, and it was a form of testamentary succession as opposed to intestate primogeniture succession. Moreover, if the heir proved to be a very unsuitable or incapable person, the family would use its influence to get him to resign in favor of a more suitable nominee, which was usually the next heir of the line.
This Scottish mode of succession came to be known as the Law of Arms since the family totem was incorporated on the war shields of family members, and it later evolved into our present coat of arms. The Law of Arms applied to all recognized families other than outlaw bands living on the extremities of recognized family groups. It appears that hereditary succession under the Law of Arms, including intestate primogeniture succession and testate designation of the heir from the central or stem family group, was the normal mode of succession, and it completely precluded succession by election. The only time when election was admitted was in the rare instance when the central or stem family became extinct. At this point, the chiefs of the various branches of the family gathered and selected one of their number as patriarch. This renewed the hereditary nature of the “representor” in his branch. To elect the chief or patriarch in the normal course of events would be completely contrary to the essential nature of the family and its natural dignity.
Both the succession and the government of the family were indicated by its essential nature. Each branch of the family was founded by the younger sons as they came off the main line. At the head of these branches would be a sub-chief or chieftain whose relation to the members of that branch is the same as that of the patriarch to the whole family. “The chieftain is simply ‘representor’ of the ‘first raiser’ of the branch.”
The chieftain or sub-chiefs would receive a variation of the basic family totem that would represent his branch, and all members of his branch would bear a variation of its version of the family totem. The chieftain sub-chief representor of each branch of the family formed a branch government of the respective family and served as a councilor or advisor of the family patriarch over all the branches. The following illustration explains how the family is organized and governed along natural or organic lines: (See Chart below).
Patriarchal government was always what would be today termed “constitutional” in practice and did not involve the absolutist arbitrary irresponsibility so popularly supposed by revolutionary propagandists against monarchy and/or a patriarchal government:
Whilst the supreme, and parental, power lay in the chief, as hereditary and reigning ceann-cinnidh (subject, of course, to superior chief or king, in matters “wherein these stood patriarchally” in relation to him), he was entitled to, and fortified by, the advice of his council. A chief was no tyrant for an hereditary monarchy always tends to be in practice “constitutiona1,” however absolute it may seem in theory. As Mrs. Grant of Laggan says:
Nothing can be more erroneous than the prevalent idea that a patriarchal chief was an ignorant and unprincipled tyrant. . . . If ferocious in disposition, or weak in understanding, he was curbed and directed by the elders of his tribe who by inviolable custom were his standing council without whose advice no measure of any kind was decided. (emphasis added)
Indeed, as Sir Thomas points out, one of the principal duties of the family council was to see that the patriarch “never forgot” his duties “to look after the preservation of the family and family property of which he is the representative” and to maintain the patrimony of the family “to be handed on in its integrity to the next heir.” The family council, organically composed of the branch chieftains, functioned to ensure that the patriarch or chief of the family, possessing supreme parenta1 authority over the family, “was permeated with the feeling that he was directly responsible not only for his own destiny, but also for that of his kinsfolk.”
The family council was an organic “aristocracy” of the family due to its derivation from the “representors” of the natural biological branches of the family, and it served not in derogation of the authority that the patriarch or “representor” of the whole family held, but the council naturally served as advisors and counselors. The family council was a recognized feature of family organization throughout Europe:
In the greater continental houses, such as those of the princely and countly families of Poland, etc., these “councils” not long ago were formal and stately gatherings – in the full panoply of a “family parliament” which deals with the administration of the family estates, trust funds, investments, and so forth, including arranging matrimonial and testamentary affairs, and occupations of members of the family. Indeed, in Scotland, such family councils operated in many such matters at any rate well into the nineteenth century; and in the annals of county families transactions are recorded as decided on, and careers of children settled by deliberation of, and decision in, such family councils well into the middle of the century. Whilst the ultimate “family laws” were made by the chieftain, be it observed that if he were “prodigious and misguided” it was competent for the family councillors to resort to the next higher chief, or to the king, to have the incompetent chef de famille put under “interdiction,” or, if necessary, in ward.
The above illustrates the complete constitutional organization of the family as an on-going natural community of people going back “from time whereof the memory of man was not.”
Derivation of the Nation from the Family
The family does not remain static. The children of the eponymous marry and add new branches to the family. This, in turn, begets an environment in which the division of labor and exchange become possible. Out of this grows a higher or more developed life and culture. A military organization is created for providing protection from enemies without. Likewise, an economic organization is created to barter for supplies from without. Above all, a juridical organization arises in the form of the patriarch and his family council. This provides a body of common law for organizing and directing the resources of the family community. Aristotle refers to this expanded family as the “village community.” It represents a distinct advance on the simple family out of which it sprang, and it represents also the first distinctive shape in the development of the State out of the family. A natural law analysis indicates that the simple family thus widens into an expanded family of the village community, which in turn acquires the self-sufficiency necessary to evolve into the State:
The family was not the only possible origin of the State, but it was the most natural origin. “The most natural form of the village,” writes Aristotle (and, we may add, since the most natural so also the commonest form), “appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of children and grandchildren.” It is, therefore, right to speak of the State as normally originating in the family through the medium of the village-community.
The nuclear family thus grew into something more than a mere family. It grew into a tribal group or clan of persons related to each other by blood. “The whole group would be characterized by a community of blood, and as a rule by a common name.” As pointed out earlier, there would be a common totem as the symbol of the unity and integrity of the tribe and its descent from a common founder.
Intermarriage would solidify different allied tribal units into a single homogeneous group. Certain marked physiological and psychological characteristics would appear, such as (1) a common speech; (2) a common religion; and (3) an identity of economic needs. All of this would produce a common life and spirit with identity of hopes, of interests, of professions, and of dislikes. The common history of the group would produce a common tradition and common sympathies arising out of the same triumphs and sufferings in the past. When the degree of cohesiveness was so great as to create a permanent tendency to complete self-dependency from other communities, the expanded family-tribe was then a nationality:
Nationality in its fullest sense may therefore be defined as any large community descended from a common stock and possessing such a large number of common characteristics and interests as makes it racially one and distinct and sets up in it, or at least in such portions of it as occupy a distinct territory, a permanent tendency to political unification under a distinct ruler.
Nevertheless, in the political understandings of peoples, generally “the most potent element going to constitute a nationality is accepted to be identity of blood and the recognition of a common descent.” As the extended family evolved into a nationality, so, too, the original organizational structure of the family evolved to meet the needs of the growing community:
When the family group, therefore, has grown and developed into a tribal society, we have the beginning of “political” organization. Size itself is of some importance and the multiplication of persons within a group would give rise to the necessity of some form of quasi – government. Customs and traditions, developed through centuries, become part of the daily life of the people, the warp and woof of their mode of existence. Authority is necessary for the observance and maintenance of customs. The line of demarcation, however, between the parental authority of the family and the political authority of the State, is not easily discernible. (emphasis added)
However, like all things in nature, the origin of the State out of the extended family was not a sudden occurrence. Its evolution was one of gradual growth and the result of a very long process of development. Each stage of its growth was the result of the conscious effort on the part of the family to meet the growing needs of the community. The state was therefore a natural or organic growth, growing to some extent as plants grow, spontaneously and independently of the contrivance of reason or human plan. It nevertheless grew in response to a divinely implanted purpose within itself in the same way that an acorn grows into an oak tree. Thus, from a single family it extended itself into a larger body of kindred into a nationality that became the state or nation, accompanied all the while by recognition of superiority in an individual or in some part of the greater family as specifically representing the original parent. The State retained the constitutional form of the family out of which it evolved:
Having developed out of the family, the State would, in the beginning, and for a long time afterwards, retain the outward forms of the family organization, for instance, the monarch might be the patriarch of the community, and it would retain these forms for one particular reason, viz. on account of the strength and the rigidity which the family organization imparted to society.
In this connection, it can be observed that:
. . . in those cases where we are able to trace the history of states further back, the starting point seems not to be a condition of universal confusion but a powerful and rigid family organization. The weak were not at the mercy of the strong, because each weak man was a member of the family, and the family protected him with an energy of which modern society can form no conception. . . . (emphasis added)
The origin of the state must be traced back to the family as the original social group from which, in turn, tribal and village life developed through kinship and land ownership, and it resulted gradually in the formation of political society. The state, therefore, developed out of the family to achieve the practical ends of mankind:
From all this it is clear that the State is a natural institution, an integral portion of the design of nature, and not a product of chance or convention of any kind. It is natural, first, because it is founded on the most natural of all social institutions, the family. Secondly, it is natural because it grew out of the family naturally, the State being nothing more than the natural expansion of the family. As the family developed, without formally aiming at the State, it approached nearer and nearer to the condition of a State. The State was only the flower that marked the coming to maturity of the expanding family.
More complete historical, sociological and anthropological proofs for the natural law origin of the State in the family are to be found in Fr. Cronin’s text, The Science of Ethics, vol.2, footnotes covering pages 478-479.
When the extended family evolved into the nation and developed its forms, it divided up the territory of the nation on a military basis, usually among the chieftains and sub-chieftains of the extended family. These territorial divisions were known as “marches” and “counties,” from which were derived the titles of marquise/marquess and count for their chiefs. The really great chieftains were called leaders or “dux,” from which come dukes, while the smaller units were known as baronies. In time, these leaders came to adopt or were granted their own totem to distinguish their branch of the nation and their territories. The national totem remained the symbol of the nation and continued to be used by the central or stem part of the greater family of the nation whose chief, the patriarch, was known as the king. The national totem or symbol continued to be used as the insignia of the national army and for other national purposes; the leaders of the nation would incorporate it into their military pennons or banners to identify their nationality. This complete historical development gives us the institutions of the modern European nations and other nations as well.
It can be seen from this exhibition that the nation extended into being naturally from the eponymous family through the providential direction of the natural historical circumstances that gave rise to the nation and designated its institutions. In this natural organic development of the nation, we can see the omnipotence of God revealing Himself in history through secondary course. This is not to say that God founded the nation by a direct divine intervention. In our Judeo-Christian tradition, this occurred only twice in the instance of King Saul and King David. However, even here, God chose for the most part to work through natural historical circumstances to reveal His will – intervening miraculously only in very extreme circumstances. Theologically, God normally works not through direct intervention but in secondary causes through the direction or providential guidance of human circumstances to accomplish His will. His providential direction of revealing Himself in secondary causes through historical circumstances acts as a divine demiurge to indicate His design for the natural order of things. The natural law is no less God’s will than Revelation and is discoverable by men through the use of right reason; in this case, His direction is seen in the historical development of the nation and organic or natural evolution of its institutions.
Invalidity of Other Theories of the Development of the Nation
Alongside the natural law theory of the origin of the nation from the extended family is the theory that gave rise to the French Revolution of 1789, the Communist Russian Revolution of 1917, and is cited in the justification of proletarian revolution everywhere. This is the theory of the origin of the state promulgated by Thomas Hobbes, perfected by Jean Jacques Rousseau, and applied in practice by Robespierre, Lenin, and Chairman Mao: The social contract theory under which the authority of the state is exclusively derived from a social contract by the masses. Under this theory, the authority of the state is originally vested in the proletariat and could have only been conferred upon the rulers through a compact between members of the proletarian masses.
This is diametrically opposed to the natural law theory whereby the authority of the patriarch arises naturally through his position as the representor of the eponymous or founder of the family that later extended itself into the nation. His authority arises not from any external source (i.e., the consent of the proletarian masses) but from his position as the representor of the original or founding patriarch. As this authority is the natural and inseparable attribute of the position of the patriarch, it must be regarded as residing ultimately in the Author of nature and conferred by Him on the patriarch, who has the legitimate right from his patrimonial position to its possession and exercise. As this authority springs naturally from the patriarch’s position as representor of the founder of the extended family or the nation, we can say it is not conferred on him by anything socially external to himself. Birthright gave him his honor and privilege. Thus it can be said that the patriarch’s authority is conferred on him “by the grace of God” by birth.
Needless to say, the social contract theory of popular sovereignty rejects God, regards Him and religion as superstition or “the opiate of the people,” and bases governmental authority solely on the consent of the masses. But, as was shown:
Natural authority is never derived from the “consent of the governed.” The most basic natural authority in society is the authority of parents in the family. Parents are not elected by their children. Parents do not hold authority over their children because their children have voluntarily contracted, or otherwise consented, to being under their authority. Parental authority is natural, derived from the very nature of the institution of the family, and reinforced by millennia of prescription and precedent.
According to Hobbes, man lived in a “state of nature” that could best be described as dog-eat-dog where every man was every other’s enemy, a condition directly contrary to the idea of brotherhood, even of blood, between men. The “state of nature” theory more properly describes a condition of supreme chaos and anarchy rather than that of man (even primitive man) endowed with a divine spark called the conscience and the potential for right reason. The “state of nature” theory is one of extreme competition between men in which no conception of brotherhood or social responsibility could be possible; as such, it is appealing to liberal capitalists. In this condition, men kept “their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another.”
In summary, man in the “state of nature” is not a rational being, but he is literally an animal devoid of all obligations towards himself or others and without rights or duties. He is in a state of continual warfare and uses whatever means he can to attain his immediate end. In short, he obeys the law of the jungle and is an enemy to God, right reasoning, and everyone else. No unethical action can be condemned for such, because man has no ethical ideal written on his heart, no notion of what is just or unjust, or innate conception of right or wrong. This atomistic individualism is the Liberte (license to do anything) of the 1789 French Revolution. It is in direct contradiction to the natural law theory of man’s existence under which man, by virtue of his creation by God has both natural divine rights and obligations. Under the “social contract” theory as promulgated by Hobbes and approved by Rousseau, man moves from this state of supreme chaos to form a society by giving up his atomistic individual rights to form the state. (Note the difference in terminology: the organically evolved nation vs. the man-made state.)
The “social contract” theory of popular sovereignty was amplified by Rousseau. According to Rousseau, political power (sovereignty) is a mere human convenience existing by an agreement between men. It derives not ultimately from God but from the sum of individual sovereignties on the State. Therefore, everyone might regard himself as a founder of the State and interpret the terms of the contract as he chooses; for, according to Rousseau, “each one is united to all, but nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before.” This idea is criticized as being absurd in theory and politically dangerous, because if any individual refused to yield his share of sovereignty and independence, government would become entirely impossible. Respecting the essential nature of the society created by the “social contract,” Rousseau declares, “The social order . . . does not come from nature, and must, therefore, be founded on convention; since no man has a natural authority over his fellow men and force creates no right, we must conclude that convention, forms the basis of all legitimate authority.”
The chaotic “state of nature,” which supposedly existed before men founded the “social contract” erecting the State, is lacking in historical foundation and is purely imaginary in character. It does not consider the family, which is the root foundation of all society. In other words:
Both Hobbes and Locke were wrong . . . in believing individualism to be man’s natural state, and society to be the artificial creation of individuals contracting with one another. Society is man’s natural state because the family, which is the building block of society, society in miniature, is prior to the individual. It is the individual, isolated and alienated from society, who is unnatural.
For those who accept the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, a complete refutation can be found in Scripture, which depicts man as a fully rational, family-oriented being. In the one instance when the individualistic freedoms of the “state of nature” were exercised, the incident of Cain and Abel, the former was driven into exile and branded with a special mark of iniquity on the ground that he was indeed “his brother’s keeper.” Anthropologically and historically, the alleged “state of nature” theory is untenable:
Now it will not be necessary here to attempt to criticize the theory of the state of nature regarded as a survey of the actual early history of man, since that theory is now disproved utterly by what is known of the origin of the State, and it is not now regarded as worthy of consideration by any school of writers. Before the State appeared, primitive men were organized (as primitive societies are organized even now) into societies held together by a force which was far stronger than that of the unifying forces present in any State, vile the force of the blood-tie and of the authority either of the pater-familias, or of the combined heads of the tribe. In many cases the whole community would consist of a single family composed of parents, grandparents, children, grandchildren, and the collateral relations – all governed by a patriarch; in another case three or four of these tribal units would combine under the joint rule of their numerous heads; but at no period was humanity made up of isolated individuals, living under no ruler, and aiming at no sort of common good. The tribes that constituted the earliest societies were organized under their respective heads not only as families but also as incipient States. (emphasis added)
Likewise, regardless of the physical or bodily evolution or of social conditions, man has always known the natural law that gave him rights and imposed obligations. Even in his primitive state, man has always had right reason written upon his heart, thereby enabling him to discern right and wrong. This faculty of reason is what distinguished man from the animals, who do indeed live in the “state of nature” so described. Moreover, if an individual was so lacking in conscience that he did not bother to reason, his family members would take measures to ensure that his reason was righted:
Now this theory of universal war and universal unmorality is wholly imaginary and wholly false. In the period that proceeded the appearance of the State, individual was not at war with individual, because, being members of one family, their interests were largely the same. Each community consisted, then, of one immense family. Wives or husbands were, of course, taken from outside. In some cases the wife came to live with the man’s family; in other cases the man went to live with the woman’s family. But in every case the community constituted a single family unit. Their interests, therefore, were common, their land was common in the sense that it was vested in the family or the head of the family, and, as one eminent modern sociologist tells us, they defended one another in case of aggression from without with a fierceness and determination that are unknown today. Within the family community, if disputes arose, they were decided by the head, i.e., the patriarch. The patriarchal theory of ancient society or something akin to it is now universally accepted. As Sidgwick explains, it “emerges spontaneously” from what we know of the family basis of society in the past. The theory of the war of all with all is, therefore, far less applicable to the early period here in question than to the condition of society today.
Again, it is absurd to say that before the State appeared there were neither rights, nor laws, nor “mine” and “thine.” In that period men were ruled by the natural law just as they are now. There are innumerable laws and rights that have no dependence on the State, e.g. the law of fidelity between husband and wife, the right of the parent to the respect of the child and of the child to the support of its parents. Before the State arose there was also a “meum ac tuum.” A man had a right, at least, to the things produced by his labour. In the primeval period, therefore, it is untrue to say that rights did not exist. Indeed, as Kant remarks, unless in that period there existed rights of justice the State would not have been deemed necessary for enforcing these rights, and it was the enforcing of these already existent rights that, according to many defenders of the social-contract theory, was the primary and essential purpose of the State in its first beginnings. Neither is it right to say that before the State arose there was nothing to secure the enforcement of men’s natural rights. The reason and conscience of man must always have been operative, and where these were not sufficient there was available the strong rule of the pater-familias, which, as against the individual delinquent, could count in every case on the loyal support of the whole tribal community. (emphasis added)
Thus, the primitive family constituted a natural organic society governed by the head of the family, who enforced moral social conventions discerned through the use of right reason as binding on the entire extended family.
Men, says [Sir John] Spelman [(1594–1643), a prominent English Historian], were never at any time free from subjection of some kind. Man is not born free, he is born into subjection, if only to his parents. The notion that government was deliberately set up by a mob of free people is absurd.
History does not afford a single instance in which a State has really been formed by a contract or compact between individuals. “For practical politics this theory is in the highest degree dangerous, since it exposes the state to the caprice of individuals” or mob psychology. Indeed, this theory was one of the major contributing factors to the French Revolution of 1789. The most evident reasons for its invalidity are: (1) that primitive man would have scarcely known how to draw up a political contract a la eighteenth century “enlightenment” of Rousseau, having nothing in, their experience upon which to model such a contract; (2) moreover, men in such an atomistic individualistic state of continual unconscionable warfare with one another, knowing no moral bounds or limits, would have scarcely been likely to meet peacefully and adopt political conventions or a moral code to govern their mutual relations, even if they had the sophisticated model propounded by the eighteenth century “philosophers”. In sum, the theories of Rousseau, Hobbes, and all the rest are illogical and influenced by the cultural conditions of their own time:
A contract-made State would be exceedingly difficult in the primeval period, first, because in that period men had no experience of the State and no idea of what it was like, whereas now there are States of every model to be copied; and secondly, because in the primeval period it would have been difficult to superimpose on the family organization another organization independent of the first and ruled by a different head. To primeval man the superseding of the great tribal organization based on the permanent link of the blood-tie, by another organization based on a mere temporary will-act of the citizens, would seem a wholly superfluous and absurd procedure.
The founding of a State by contract would, therefore, be exceedingly difficult in ancient times. On the other hand, the expansion of the family into the State was a normal, a necessary, and a natural procedure. The family had to expand into the tribe, and the tribe, granted that it progressed at all, had to expand into the condition of a State. It is for this reason that Aristotle speaks of the family origin of the State as “most in accordance with nature” and, therefore, as the normal manner in which the early States must have appeared. Where, therefore, the authors of the social – contract theory err is in representing as normal and universal a procedure which, if it ever existed, could never be more than accidental and exceptional.
But they are guilty of a further and more important misrepresentation still. As we have already pointed out, the authors of the theory of a primeval “state of nature” in which neither law nor rights obtained, for the most part do not regard this condition as an historical reality. Neither do they consider the social – compact as an historical reality. Their sole purpose in developing this second part of the theory is to show that the authority of the State is based upon the consent of the citizens. Now in the next chapter it will be shown that the – authority of the State, even where the State is founded, as in exceptional cases it has been founded, by compact on the part of the citizens, is never based or grounded upon such contract, but on nature, i.e. the natural necessities which it is the essential purpose of the State to supply. The State may in particular instances take its rise, as marriage and the family take their rise, in contract, but the authority of the State, just like the authority of the family, is grounded on nature, on the natural position of the ruler in one case and the parents in the other; and, therefore, the theory of the social-contract is wrong, not only as an historical account of how the State must necessarily have arisen in the beginning, but also as a theory of the ground of political authority. (emphasis added)
The greatest difficulty for those of the Judeo-Christian religious tradition concerning the social contract theory of popular sovereignty is the implicit denial in this theory that there is a genuine order in the universe that constitutes the end of human existence, and that this order, which exists independently of human will or positive law, is revealed to man in the form of the natural law that arises from the order of the organic nature of things themselves. The natural law, as the basic and critical norm for all written legal systems, is monistic, while the social contract theory of popular sovereignty is pluralistic, arising out of the wills of the proletarian masses contracting to create the peoples’ republic. Under the former theory, justice, fairness and equitable rights exist as immortal realities. Under this later pluralistic theory all order and law is purely man-made and essentially arbitrary according to whim.
The Rousseauist theory is that by obeying the duly formed “general will” (volonte generale) in a majority decision, we actually obey only our own will, though perhaps an improperly informed will, if we belong to the out-voted minority. The Rousseauist’s doctrine is that the essence of law is the arbitrary will of the majority constituting the “general will” (volonte generale) of the whole society, which can do anything since it does not accept the natural law as a higher moral law governing the State. In our own time, Chairman Mao terms this “thinking with the masses.” Rousseau and the individualist philosophers of the French Revolution identify the wills of individuals with the “general will” as their justification of coercive political authority.
Thus, the social contract theory of popular sovereignty legitimizes the absolute power of the will of the majority. This is the essence of positivism, where the exclusive criteria of law is that it emanates from the legislative organ in a constitutionally prescribed form. Popular sovereignty creates a new leviathan: the absolute sovereignty of majorities. Indeed, the rulers of such States employ Caesarian plebiscites to legitimize actions that are otherwise clearly immoral (i.e., Nazi Germany and the various Communist States). Popular sovereignty substitutes for traditional Christian monarchy limited by natural law and the Scripture (and by papal authority in Catholic monarchies), and the democratic absolutism of majority votes to decide ultimate questions of truth and matters of right and wrong. Under the Rousseauist theory of popular sovereignty, the “general will” can never be wrong because it is democratic.
The theory of popular sovereignty was severely criticized by Pope Leo XIII in the encyclical Diuturnam illud:
The Pope criticizes it because it is so utterly individualistic. It presumes that political authority originates wholly in the free consent and makes this the exclusive and sufficient cause of political authority. It argues that political authority is nothing else than the sum of the conceded rights of the individuals, which consequently can be demanded back again at the arbitrary will of the individuals. Leo XIII says that a stable basis of political life would be impossible under such a theory, and the consequence would be permanent disorder. Furthermore – and this is its deistic or even atheistic basis – this theory denies that political authority has any relation, either as concerns origin or exercise, to God and God’s will or to eternal and natural law; it practically and theoretically places a majority decision in the place of God. Therefore its basis is a rationalism that regards human reason as the autonomous source of all truth and morality. It is this kind of philosophical justification of popular sovereignty that Leo XIII again and again refutes, pointing out that it leads to the disease of communism, the gravedigger of state, and civilization. (emphasis added)
Leo XIII is undoubtedly correct because if the bourgeoisie have the “right” under the social contract theory of popular sovereignty to overthrow the legitimate Christian monarch and establish a secular republic, the proletarian masses constituting the actual majority of the population have an even greater right to overthrow the bourgeoisie laicist republic and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat through destructive mass revolutions of an atheistic and materialistic character. Acting under the concept of the “general will,” an elite segment of the proletariat, the Communist Party, assumes direction of the proletarian masses on the grounds that the wills of individual members of the proletariat, who may be opposed to the revolution, are uninformed, tricked by bourgeois propaganda, and are opposed to their own class interests. The “general will” of the proletariat, properly informed by the study of proletarian science (i.e., the doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Chairman Mao), must necessarily favor their own class interests in the form of a violent revolution against the bourgeois.
In essence, under the “general will” concept of popular sovereignty, the Communist Party has the right to assume leadership of the proletariat and create a revolution even against the actual opposition of the majority of the proletariat: a rationalistic analysis of the proletariat’s economic situation vis-à-vis the bourgeois must necessarily lead the proletariat to oppose the bourgeois in its own best class interests. Proletarians who do not favor the revolution are simply misinformed and acting contrary to their class interests. Due to this misinformation, their opinions simply cannot constitute a portion of the general will, which, according to Rousseau, is to be formed on a rational analysis of a given situation rather than on ignorance. Since a rational analysis of the proletarian class position must necessarily lead them to overthrow the bourgeois, the Communist Party may assume leadership in their name as well as a part of the informed general will, while working to educate them in the principles of proletarian science. An analysis of the writings of the leading Communist theoreticians will support this thesis. In other words, these theories can justify the wholesale slaughter of innocent people. The protective and caring nature of the de jure patriarchal or familial sovereignty, under natural law, is subverted by the Godless philosophies of popular sovereignty and social contract theory into a horrible tyranny that is so vile that it was used to justify horrible crimes against humanity.
Sadly, a major philosophical change took place in the minds of many people:
The thrones of the old European dynasties had been shaken by the hurricane of the French revolution. The divinity that was wont to hedge [fortify] a king was no longer visible to the popular eye. Stripped of his purple, each monarch of an old house stood naked, as it were, in presence of the world – a very man and nothing more. The prestige of royalty, that had for so long a time held dazzling elevation, was debased and extinguished for ever. We may say for ever; since the old sentiments of loyalty and veneration for kings, though they still exist, exist in [a] different degree to that which distinguished them in the last century. In saying this, we allude more particularly to the continental nations, which, ere they were reached by the hot breath of anarchy from France, were accustomed to look upon their sovereigns with a sort of religious awe. Viewing them as the vice-gerents of God, the people would have considered they had violated a religious duty, if they failed in the respect due to the representatives of the Most High. We can have but faint conception now of the all but adoration that used to be paid by the German people to a German king. The literature of the period bears abundant testimony of the fact. The literature of the present day bears equal testimony to the change. In the old sentiment . . . the people trusted, and their princes rarely abused: even confidence misplaced was seldom followed by confidence withdrawn. In the new sentiment there is more of caution and worldliness. The people see nothing in the powers that be but as existing by accident: that they are ordained of God, never enters their thoughts, or enters but to be denied. The people have become watchful and suspicious, rather than submissive and trusting. If obedient, they are obedient by force of law, and not by persuasion of the Gospel. They no longer leave politics exclusively to the consideration and conduct of the chiefs of the state: they consider such chiefs but as their own agents, whose acts must be vigilantly scanned, examined, criticized, and condemned, if need be. In short, the French revolution created on the continent a permanent party against royalty; it made kings subject to the many-headed tyrant [of the mob]; it gave distrust for content, exchanged Volney for the Bible; and taught the people, while sitting at home, to presume to know “what is done i’ the Capitol.”
Gone was the idea that we should pray “for kings, and for all that are in authority; that we may lead a quiet and peaceful life in all godliness and honesty.” (1 Timothy 2:2). Or that the people should submit themselves “to the king, as supreme . . .” and “Thou shalt not revile . . . nor curse the ruler of thy people,” but instead “honour [that is, obey, give homage, deference, distinction, and acclaim to] the king,” or rightful ruler. (Exodus 22:28) (1 Peter 2:13, 17)
A major problem with the so-called right of self-determination in popular sovereignty is that the people can be propagandized with the false idea that they are the real sovereigns to the point that they feel so empowered that what is actually legal, lawful, and right no longer matters. Therefore tolerance for minor flaws typical of all government becomes too big to swallow. Since they consider themselves to be supreme with no law above them, they exercise unrighteous dominion – a dominion without ethical standards. This flawed philosophy of revolution was used against the great and legitimate royal houses of Europe. Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755), one of the great French philosophers, asked, “Why, then, lay the blame on royalty, as though the inconveniences which are relied on to attack this system are not the same in any form of government?” That is, they did not want law, they wanted license to do according to the more base desires of mankind. Therefore, they fabricated excuses for sedition.
The philosophy and politics of the French revolution began “. . . under the sign of a crime. A crime was committed in France in 1793. They killed a good and entirely likable king who was the incarnation [or embodiment] of legitimacy.” This crime was replicated over and over again in the blood bath that followed the corrupt and vicious philosophies they espoused. As one author concluded, “The condemnation of the king is at the crux of our contemporary history. It symbolizes the secularization of our history and the disincarnation of the Christian God.” Or, as Edmund Burke declared about the French Revolution, that it was “. . . the most extensive project ever launched against all religion, law, property, and real civil order and liberty.”
The Political and Philosophical Fiction of Popular Sovereignty
Sooner or later, every foundation is exposed for what it really is. Popular sovereignty is a rejected theory that declares that the people are, or should be, the real sovereigns of all nations and should rule – they have the supreme right above all rulers and magistrates. This, of course, is the philosophy of revolution, as explained earlier. In fact, “The [French] Revolutionaries elite ‘invented’ the ‘myth’ of popular sovereignty with the intention of gutting and replacing the myth of ‘the Divine Right of Kings.’” The reason why it is a myth is because it has never been realized or applied anywhere on earth, nor could it be. The state is not subject to its citizens. In every government, the real decisions are made behind closed doors by the appointed rulers. The people are not supreme or sovereign in any nation on earth and never have been. For example:
The legislative body, according to this theory [the theory of popular sovereignty], is the people, and the people are always the true sovereign [according to this view]. But the legislature obviously is not the people. The people are legally bound to obey the legislature’s commands until these are repealed by the legislature itself, no matter how oppressive or unpopular they may be. The people may of course force the repeal of such unpopular laws in time, but until the legislature sees fit to act, the people will disobey them at their peril. Popular sovereignty is, in fact, possible only in a pure democracy without representative institutions. . . . As usually employed, the phrase “popular sovereignty” contains a contradiction in terms; for, whether we like it or not, in choosing a legislature we are choosing a master, and because we choose it, it is no less a master than a monarch with hereditary title.
Popular sovereignty is the rule of the people, and it is sometimes called pure democracy. It is nothing more or less than mob rule, which is never productive of good government or ever could be, because it is founded upon fads, popularity contests, whimsical and frivolous thoughts, and impulsive, reckless reasoning instead of good old common sense, fairness, and due process. The “rule of law” was designed to protect the people against popular sovereignty. The rule of law “. . . has two [main] functions: it limits government arbitrariness and power abuse, and it makes the government more rational and its policies more intelligent.” The key reason why scholars do not believe in popular sovereignty is, according to Bo Li, that:
. . . without the rule of law as a limit, popular will [is] . . . corrupted by passions, emotions and short-term irrationalities. [In other words, it is corrupted by absurdities]. As such, [legal scholars] . . . demand rule of law because it helps us to behave according to our long-term [best] interest[s] and [according to good] reason.
Under immediate or direct democracy, all kinds of terrible oppressions and atrocities flourish, which is the natural result when there are no laws limiting the greed and avaricious ambitions of man. The poor tyrannize the rich, those who have little or no property rob those with property, and one set of citizens arbitrarily rule over or even enslave the weak and defenseless. The founding fathers in America:
. . . regarded [“popular sovereignty”] as both their greatest accomplishment and their most serious [or dreaded] liability. For then as now, the ideal of rule by the people was exalted even as the reality of popular sovereignty was despised . . . [because it would create, according to [James] Madison [1751-1836] . . . the mortal diseases under which popular governments [democracies] have everywhere perished.
. . . It had turned out that individual rights were as insecure in a regime ruled by popular legislatures [in colonial America] as they had been under . . . [the whims of a dictator].
. . . fell into disrepute as a reaction to its ideological uses [in the French revolution] in justifying terror and lawless dictatorship. In the last two centuries, it lost its foundational role in political theory, and disappeared from serious discussion.
Pope Pius VI, commenting on the horrors and foolishness of the French revolution and popular sovereignty, declared:
. . . After having abolished the monarchy, the best of all governments, it [the French Revolution] had transferred all the public power to the people – the people . . . ever easy to deceive and to lead into every excess. . . .
Jean J. Burlamaqui (1694–1748) declared:
Indeed it would be subverting all government, to make it depend on the caprice or inconstancy of the people. It would be impossible for the state to be ever settled amidst those revolutions, which would expose it so often to destruction. . . . An opinion [like popular sovereignty] . . . cannot [logically] be admitted as a principle of reasoning, or of conduct in politics.
Popular sovereignty is a nice-sounding ideal, but it is really sovereignty at its worst, akin to a mindless, unthinking mob. “We may [rationally] question whether popular sovereignty is merely a fiction, a myth or a slogan [in any case it is] without much substance or reality.” There is nothing solid or stable or promising about it. Yet the myth of popular sovereignty, which has never truly existed anywhere on earth in all the history of mankind, still governs much of our thinking today. It is, nevertheless, out of harmony with the law of nature, right thinking or even good old common sense.
Referendums exemplify the unsound reasoning so typical of popular sovereignty and mob rule. The use of such for anything of real importance is considered to be a grave mistake, as it is a well-known, researched fact that most people do not have the time or interest to spend hours identifying the deep, hidden issues or long-term ramifications of the proposals put before them. Most voters are not educated in Statecraft; in fact, they usually vote for very shallow reasons, like a good slogan or political spin on a subject, good looks, a most pleasing personality, a great command of speech, or a nice smile. The real issues are missed because of clever manipulations, demagoguery, or on account of the fact that a favored basketball player or celebrity promotes one popular fad over the other.
Referendums also tend to promote a kind of tyranny of the majority – a short-sighted, portentous, mob mentality along biased philosophical, religious, or ethnic lines, thereby allowing prejudice to rule and reign. Popular sovereignty (majority rule), is like having a nation composed of three citizens, two wolves and one lamb voting on what kind of meat they should eat for lunch and dinner that day. Popular sovereignty is an open invitation to numerous forms of malevolent mischief.
The general populace are not angelic, nor always wise, thoughtful or knowledgeable. In fact, “according to Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), human life would be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ in the absence of political authority [or any kind of government that maintains law and order].” All civilized societies must maintain an expensive police and justice system in order that freedom and decency might have a chance of being maintained and upheld. The guilty must be punished to protect society from the rabble who have little or no conscience or integrity.
Jean J. Burlamaqui quoted Magabyses’ comments in a debate that took place thousands of years ago about what kind of government they should establish in ancient Persia. This discussion of powerful men ultimately resulted in the re-establishment of monarchy and the reign of King Darius. Magabyses declared soberly:
I believe [Otanes] is wrong in endeavouring to persuade us to trust the government to the discretion of the people; for surely nothing can be imagined more stupid and insolent, than the giddy [or whimsical] multitude. Why should we reject the power of a single man, to deliver up ourselves to the tyranny of a blind and disorderly populace? If a king set about an enterprise, he is at least capable of listening to advice; but the people are a blind monster, devoid of reason and capacity. They are strangers to decency, virtue, and their own interests. They do every thing precipitately, without judgment, and without order, resembling a rapid torrent, which cannot be stemmed. If therefore you desire the ruin of the Persians, establish a popular government.
Government must be built on a more solid and stable foundation than the whimsical ideas of the thoughtless crowd.
Referendums, as a form of popular sovereignty, are likewise as reckless and irresponsible way of governing a nation. They can be especially dangerous in the wrong hands. The wording created by biased government officials can be expressed in a way that manipulates and promotes hidden agendas for special interest groups rather than what would be best for the whole nation. The long-term consequences of the proposal can easily be clouded by obscure wording. Is it any wonder that those who advocate insurrection and revolution like referendums? They can be used along with intimidation, propaganda, and/or ballot box tampering to promote their seditious ideas.
Citizen-initiated referendums are especially problematic as they prove, far too often, to be ill-conceived, knee-jerk, emotional responses to highly complex issues. As a whole – poor, short-sighted solutions generally result from such as no one is held responsible, and accountability is utterly lacking. Government by whims and fads is no government at all. It is anarchy creating confusion and disarray. It is unstable. Instead of developing unity and sound decisions, referendums tend to promote a politic of divisiveness, conflict, and harm. On the other hand, representative democracy is generally structured to facilitate compromise, moderation, and the general good of all. In sum, the use of referendums can be highly destructive of the best interests of any nation. But the worst thing about any kind of broad use of referendums is that they tend to bypass the checks and balances established to protect and safeguard our freedoms – the most precious thing we have on earth.
Referendums have also been used to unlawfully and illegally overthrow monarchies, even when those kings were lawful and a genuine benefit to the people. No matter what label was used to justify this treachery, it was an act of treason against the crown and scepter of their nations. The point is, “. . . When once the people have transferred their right to a sovereign [i.e., a monarch], they cannot, without contradiction, be supposed to continue still masters of it.” “. . . Sovereignty [whether a deposed monarch or reigning republican government] cannot lose title to its territory without its consent . . . [that quality] is an invariable and necessary attribute of . . . sovereignty.” In other words, “. . . they [the people] that are subjects to a monarch cannot without his leave [his permission or consent] cast off monarchy.” The legal position of a legitimate monarch is impervious to deposition when permission is not freely authorized or given. The point is, under the doctrines of public international law, a ruler who is deprived of the government of his country by either an invader or revolutionaries using any kind of coercive means, such as, an unauthorized referendum, remains the legitimate de jure Sovereign of that country. As quoted before, Hugo Grotius makes it very clear that:
Contracts, or promises obtained by fraud, violence or undue fear [perpetrated by a government or some other unlawful force] entitle the injured party to full restitution. For perfect freedom from fraud or compulsion, in all our dealings, is a RIGHT which we derive from natural law and liberty.
By natural law and the laws of justice, fairness, and equity, a forced referendum against a rightful government is null and void or empty of legitimacy. It also needs to be clear that the right to do this no longer belongs to the people:
. . . When the people have once transferred the ruling power [whether overtly or tacitly], they cannot licitly [legally and lawfully] revoke it at will. If they have set up a hereditary monarchy, they are obliged to leave the ruling authority with the monarch and his heirs; and the succeeding generations are likewise bound by this original transfer and compact.
. . . The nation has divested itself of all jurisdiction, by giving itself up to a sovereign [a king or prince]; it has submitted to the reigning family; it has given to those who are descended from that family a right which nobody can [legally] take from them; it has established them its superiors, and can no longer judge [or condemn them] them.
In other words:
. . . if all the people of the whole realm by common and voluntary consent, for themselves and their posterity [which is legally or incontestably presumed after 100 years of acquiescence], do transfer and surrender the government of themselves and their state into the hands of some chosen man, to be governed by him and his heirs for ever, . . . it cannot reasonably be maintained that there remains in anyone a right to alter the arrangement. [That is] the right of succession is “a thing impregnable [or unalterable] by any Parliament [or people].
In both Roman and the more ancient Mosaic law, a free person can voluntarily subject himself to the legal control of another human being. It was called ius voluntarium humanum. “In the same way a people can submit itself irrevocably to one person or several persons.” That is, a whole people may give up their rights to a hereditary prince, patriarch, king, or a constitution. This same general principle can be seen in part when a person joins the military. The act of doing so means that the individual involved gives up certain personal rights to become legally subservient or subject to the military authorities of their country. They become indentured servants. By this same principle, the people can give up their individual rights, either overtly or tacitly, over a long period of time by acquiescence to the government. And by this principle, “. . . Sovereignty does not lie in the hands of the . . . people.”
Without discussing the metaphysical question about the nature of the contract entered into by a nation and the family of its sovereigns, it is clear that such a contract can be broken only by mutual consent, and is in force as long as there remains a single member of that family able and willing to govern.
The law that creates kings is called lex regia in ancient Roman law:
Lex regia . . . was an irrevocable and complete grant of power by which “the control of the state is transferred for all time to the [monarch or] emperors. . . .” [It meant that] “all power was transferred to the prince by the people, who were thereby stripped of every vestige of sovereignty.”
Julius Caesar may have been able to dominate at Rome after his victory at Pharsalia, but this was a matter of fact and not of Law; it, however, became a matter of Law and irrevocable when the people consented to his domination. Why? Because the people by its consent transferred to the Prince the right and power which was in itself.
In other words, “. . . the single will of the people, without the consent of the prince, cannot [legally] deprive [him or] his children. . . [of the crown].” This is because the people no longer have any trace of sovereignty left. In other words, if the kingdom is taken over by rebels through a plebiscite, referendum, by war, insurrection, or some other unlawful and ethically repugnant means, they have no lawful right to take over:
Cannot the usurping government be legitimized at any time by the consent of the people? The answer of these writers is a decided negative.
The people have no right to legitimize the government of the usurper [created by illegal methods], since ruling authority is not in their hands. It rests with the deposed monarch. . . .
The point is, as quoted before:
In a hereditary monarchy, the right to rule remains with the royal descendant [who has been dispossessed] until he has lost it through the long process of prescription. Until that process is completed, the authority does not lie with the people, and cannot be conferred by them upon by the usurper.
. . . Where sovereignty as a whole has been usurped rather than transferred voluntarily, the rule of prescription determines when it has becomes legitimate [not the people].
A convention [created by a referendum or some other means] . . . formed by a people to reform their government, is either legitimate, or it is not legitimate. It is legal, if its proceedings and its convention are sanctioned by the concurrence of the constituted authorities of the state. It is illegal, if its assemblies and acts [are] an insurrection of the people against the prince or the rulers who are invested with power. (emphasis added)
This kind of treachery has occurred over and over again, that is:
It is, undoubtedly, possible that a constitution, thus viciously [that is, illegally and wrongfully] formed, and of unsanctioned origin, may maintain itself. But let us not mistake the position; if the law promulgated under such a convention, during a revolution, become, subsequently, obligatory on a nation, and it a new power assumes the right of ruling over the people, it is not the illegal and usurped authority of this convention that this is to be attributed; it is to be ascribed to that prescriptive authority which length of time gives to establishments, by a sanction they could not [lawfully] derive from any will of a [revolutionary or rebellious] people. (emphasis added)
The theft and ruin of a decent lawful government is rightfully labeled as treason or treachery of the worst kind. This whole issue can be boiled down to the simple fact that:
The people, as an aggregate of individuals, are not sovereign, and the only sense in which they are sovereign at all, is when organized into a state, or body politic, and acting through its forms.
Popular sovereignty, taken to its extreme, undermines all lawful authority and is counterproductive to the whole purpose of sovereignty in maintaining the rule of law, good order, and common decency in the land. Consider the following:
. . . [Is it] not absurd for an individual to say to the state, “I disown you; I am my own state; I ask noting of you, and I will concede you nothing. I am a man; I am my own sovereign, and you have no authority over me but by my consent. That consent I have never given; or if I have heretofore given it, I now withdraw it. You have, then, no right over me, and if you attempt to control me, you are a [usurper and an enemy of this state of my own].”
Once proclaim the absolute sovereignty of the people, acting without reference to political organisms . . . that the people are “sovereign,” that is, making each individual a sovereign, and you can exercise through the state no authority over any man, not even to punish him for the greatest social offense, without his consent.
If the people were supreme, they could dismember any republican or democratic state and dispose all good and rightful kings or sovereign princes. They could divide the nation up into little countries at will and destroy the rightful government. It would bring about all the dangers and wrongs of the political doctrine of self-determination, which threatens the very existence of nations. (See Chapter IV, the section entitled “Self-Determination and Restoration”) The point is:
The people in a legal or political sense, properly speaking, have no existence, no entity, therefore no [political or governmental] rights, no sovereignty, save when organized into [a] body politic; and then their action is legitimate only when done in the forms which the body itself has prescribed.
. . . All action done in opposition to that organism [that rightful sovereign government], no matter how many are engaged in it, is the action of [a] mob, disorderly, illegal, and to a greater or less degree criminal, treasonable in fact, and as such legitimately punishable.
In summary, popular sovereignty is like pie in the sky. It is a myth or a fantasy. It promises what it cannot deliver. The honest truth is that the people must always answer to, and are subject to, higher authorities in all governments and in all nations on the earth. If the people were truly sovereign, then the government would have to consult the people on everything: whether to go to war or not, whether to raise or lower taxes, whether to allow abortions or not, whether to dispense with the government altogether. The fact is that the people do not control the government, the government controls them. They have no important part in the actual administration of any government entity and, therefore the people “. . . do not form a definite organized agency [or organ or sector] of government.” Instead they have representatives, magistrates and officers who rule over them even if the country is labeled as democratic. Because of this fact, “. . . it would be absurd to attach the prerogatives of sovereignty to the electorate. . .” when they do not have any such rights or privileges.
The myth or legal fiction of popular sovereignty needs to be understood for what it really is. It is a falsehood that was carefully crafted and used to create seditions and insurrection to overthrow the great dynasties of Europe. The very idea of popular sovereignty has been used to confuse the people and somehow justify and foment unwarranted revolutions ever since. The point is:
. . . [The] popular sovereignty that emerge[d] in the mid-nineteen century is linked neither to universal reason [of the people] nor to individual expressions of consent. Instead, it is completely national . . . [fabricated with a political agenda in mind].
“The claim of popular sovereignty . . . [that the people] resolve directly any concrete issues of public life – is . . . a myth. . . .” It just doesn’t happen, the theory so flawed that it should be dead and buried as it has no place in the real world. Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865), the great U. S. president of the American Civil War, observed:
. . . [If popular sovereignty is] the basis of all legitimate political power in American democracy . . . [then] mobs, [the] direct embodiments of the people’s original power [should be promoted]. . . . Lincoln answer[ed this idea] that mobs commit injustices, for they “substitute the wild and furious passions, in lieu of the sober [impassionate more careful] judgment of Courts.” But injustices are not the worst danger that mob rule poses. The “indirect consequences” overshadow the direct, for mob violence weans every element of the community from its [benevolent] obedience and attachment to law. Some men, the “lawless in spirit,” having never rendered obedience except through “dread of punishment,” become “lawless in practice:” “Having ever regarded Government as their deadliest bane, they make a jubilee of the suspension of its operations; and pray for nothing so much as its total annihilation.” Others, “the good men,” who love tranquility, who desire to abide by the laws and enjoy their benefits, become disgusted with a government that proves unable to protect their persons, families, and property. Their “feelings . . . become more or less alienated” from government. Without “the attachment of the people” free government cannot stand. . . . The intoxication induced by popular sovereignty could be the undoing of the regime based on [such a flimsy and unstable foundation as popular sovereignty provides.]
As in ancient Greece, so today, popular sovereignty, without checks and balances, was and is rejected for a higher and more effective style of government where true sovereignty was and is the “rule of law” instead of the fickle and unruly and lawless sovereignty of the people. “The realization [came] that popular sovereignty needed to be modified. . . [as it was] required to bring order into the states.” Therefore, “written guidelines were [discovered to be] needed to give the law precedence over the uncontrolled sovereignty of the people.”
Abraham Lincoln, even though he spoke of the United States as a “government of the people, by the people, for the people,” remarked that popular sovereignty “has been nothing but a living, creeping lie from the time of its introduction till to-day.” “The sovereignty of the people exists in name only.” That is, ". . . sovereignty of the people [does] not exist, even in the purest democracy, for in the purist democracy, there had always existed a medium or channel by which the sovereignty of the whole was exercised." In other words, “. . . In a democracy, Legal Sovereignty generally resides in a group of persons who enjoy the powers of legislation [not the people].”
Certainly the people have legitimate and important rights that are basic and inalienable and must not be suppressed or altered. Life, liberty, and property are indispensable to the basic human rights and the happiness and well-being of all people. The citizens or subjects of a nation have influence, and should have influence, but sovereignty is always legally vested in some form of government empowered entity.
Basis of Political Authority over a Nation
In opposition to the social contract theory of popular sovereignty threatening all political stability through its destructive individualism, with its declamation of active resistance to legitimate governments and the establishment of an anarchic right to permanent revolution, the Judeo-Christian religious tradition declares that true political authority of the nation should ultimately be grounded in God, who, if allowed, designates the natural constitution of the nation under the natural law through secondary causes by His providential guidance of natural historical circumstances. The government, coming about naturally through God’s revelation of His omnipotence in history, is thus designated as the legitimate government of that nation, and it has the full moral authority from the Roman Catholic Fourth Commandment (Fifth in the King James Version) to honor thy father and mother and command the obedience of its subjects under pain of sin. With this in mind, the question arises as to how a particular government is legitimately and authentically derived from God:
How do those authorities get their right from God to demand and to enforce obedience and loyalty; how can we be morally obliged to obey; and how does our moral and legal duty to obey originate? Obedience is morally possible only when the authority in the last resort is from God and when its demands are in conformity with the objective end of that necessary community the body politic. This principle seems obvious as long as citizens believe in God. (emphasis added)
God, the Basis of all Legitimate Sovereignty
Under Judeo-Christian political philosophy, both the nation, in the form of the political existence of a distinct people, and the political authority of its sovereign grew out of the natural law and is thus founded in God, the Supreme Authority and the Lawgiver of the universe. Therefore, political authority is ultimately of divine origin. Christian political philosophy gets its program from two sacred texts: (1) Christ’s reply to Pilate (John 19:11): “Thou shouldst not have any power against Me unless it were given thee from above. Therefore, he that hath delivered Me to thee hath the greater sin.” (John 19:11) (2) St. Paul’s admonition: “Let every soul be subject to higher power: for there is no power but from God and those that are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God.” (Romans 13:1)
Thus, the legitimate government of a nation has the right to obedience from its citizens, who have no right to withhold the same, when the legitimate government issues commands within the scope of its sovereignty. The citizens also do not have the right to subvert and undermine the legitimate form of government designated for them by God through the unfolding of His natural law through time.
The purpose of political authority is to serve the common good. Fundamental to it is the insight that nature – the world – is designed for man as the way to eternity. This world must be “in order” so that, with the help of grace, men can achieve the salvation of their souls and manifest the glory of God.
The sovereign, that is, the preserver of the rule of law and the unity of order who carries the sword, has always been regarded by Christian political philosophy as the bearer and protector of a grand moral idea. Hence, it grants the sovereign authority the right in extreme emergencies to demand the sacrifice of goods and even life to preserve the moral order so necessary for the subjects to achieve their eternal end:
Authority appears thus as a mirrored reflection of the divine might of God, the Establisher and Protector of the general order in the universe. When St. Paul wrote his admonitions, his authority’ must have meant the regime of the pagan Caesars. Nevertheless, he upheld that authority. Even where the person in authority is morally corrupt, an infidel and a sinner, even there, through that sordid humanity, shines a reflection of the divine majesty by which the rulers rule.
The Judeo-Christian theory that the authority of the sovereign rests upon the natural law has a two-fold significance: (1) It saves the sovereign and his legitimate authority from becoming an unnatural supranatural competitor of the Church, which is a separate entity; (2) It maintains that the authority of the sovereign does not originate in sin. Instead, it gets its dignity and legitimation, its power to bind in conscience, and its claim for loyalty (irrespective of religious affiliation) from the social nature of the family and so, in the last resort, from God – the Creator of all nations, the Ordinator of good order in the world.[cxxvii]
Sacred Scripture tells us that the political authority of the sovereign (monarchical or otherwise) is ultimately grounded in God, the Author of nature and its law. Indeed, the wisdom of God cries aloud: “By Me Kings reign, and Princes decree just things. By Me Princes rule, and Nobles impose justice on the world.” (Proverbs 8:15-16) God the Father, Creator of the universe, acting as He normally does through His fatherly guidance of the affairs of men through the secondary causes of natural historical circumstances through which He reveals His omnipotence, designates the governments He intends for men: “The Most High ruleth over the kingdom of men and giveth it to whomsoever He will.” (Daniel 4:22)
The organic government, arising in an unbroken chain of historical development, is by prescription that which was Providentially designated by the natural law through secondary causes to be the legitimate government for that particular nation: “Behold, the Lord hath anointed thee to be Prince over His inheritance.” (I Kings 10:10) The government so organically designated can be one of the three traditional forms: monarchy, aristocracy, or polity (republic), depending on the providential direction of the nation in its organic historical development. It legitimately acquires the full rights of sovereignty:
You, O king, king of kings, to whom the God of heaven has given sovereignty, power, strength and glory – the sons of men, the beasts of the field, the birds of heaven, wherever they live, He has entrusted to your rule, making you king of them all – you are the golden head. (Daniel 2:37-38)
Subjects and citizens are thus enjoined to obey and respect the legitimate political authority of their nation: “Fear God, Honor the King.” (I Peter 2:17) The legitimate ruler, thus, has the right to command his subjects to do all things lawful under the natural and divine positive (Scriptural) law: “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s.” (Luke 20:25) The indefeasible right herein conveyed upon the legitimate designated government is obvious as long as citizens believe in God. For as Pope Leo XIII declared:
“God is the natural and necessary principle of authority in Civil Government;” and again, “the Church teaches that Civil Power comes from God.” The next paragraph declares that, “God is the fountain of all human authority:” and elsewhere, “the origin of all power and dominion is derived from one and the same Creator and Lord of the Universe.”
Even though there is a divine right to have governments. It should, however, be observed that the power of even a legitimate ruler is not unlimited. The same Authority that has designated the ruler has also set moral limits upon the exercise of his power. Both the natural law and the Sacred Scriptures of our Judeo-Christian heritage restrict the scope of the ruler’s sovereignty:
Sovereignty is the constituent element of the State and has its origin with the State in the natural law. St. Paul says, “All authority is from God.” And Pope Leo XIII states: “But as no society can hold together unless some one be over all, directing all to strive earnestly for the common good, every civilized community must have a ruling authority, and this authority, no less than society itself, has its source in nature, and has, consequently, God for its author. Hence it follows that all public power must proceed from God.” Just as the authority in the family comes from the natural law, because it is necessary for the existence of the family and the family, in turn, is indispensable for man’s welfare, so too, authority is necessary for the existence of the State and is supplied by God through the natural law. . . .
While sovereignty is usually explained in terms of “power”, its proper conception is “authority.” No power can be exercised ethically without legitimate authority. Sovereignty, understood in the proper sense, is the legal authority that gives existence to the State.
Sovereignty may be defined as the supreme legal, political and physical power of the State to do everything that the State has a moral right to do. When the moral qualification is omitted from the definition it readily comes to be ignored in thought and practice. Legal omnipotence insensibly passes into complete and unqualified totalitarianism. (emphasis added)
Thus does the natural law proclaim a “Bill of Rights” binding in conscience on Sovereigns and subjects alike. When the people choose to be moral, it can provide a far better protection for the legitimate rights of each individual person then a written constitution could ever provide as demonstrated over and over again in countries where corruption rules and human rights are ignored even when it is against the law of their land to allow such atrocities. Natural law is the highest and most important law of all and a safeguard if followed for the best good and benefit of any nation that follows it. Ethical and moral considerations touch on what is most important for:
The natural law is above the civil law, is deeper and more fundamental; it is itself the ground [or rightful origin] of the civil law and gives to the civil powers all their authority. The civil law, therefore, cannot act in contravention of the natural law, and laws enacted in contravention of nature are invalid from their very foundation. (emphasis added)
As Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780), the highly respected English jurist, declared, “. . . no human legislature has [rightful] power to abridge or destroy [natural law principles of life and liberty]. . . .”[132
Political Authority over Nations Arising from God’s Providential Revelation of His Omnipotence through the Course of History
As we have seen, the legitimate government of the Nation derives its authority indirectly from God, although it is immediately grounded in nature. Political authority bears the same relation to Divine Authority that paternal authority does. Both derive ultimately from the Author of Nature, but, immediately, they rest on the requirements of nature itself.
The entire question of how legitimate political authority over a nation is naturally derived from God has been expertly analyzed in modern times by a series of highly skilled moral theologians: Fr. Michael Cronin in The Science of Ethics, and Karl Ludwig von Haller in Restoration der Staatswissenchaften. Also, the moral writings of the following brilliant Jesuit publicists are especially noteworthy: Fr. Tapparelli d’Azeglio, S.J., in Saggo Theoretico del diritto Naturale; Fr. Victor Cathrein, S.J., in Moral Philosophie; Fr. Meyer, S.J., in Institutiones Juris Naturalis; and Fr. Liberatore, S.J., in Institutiones Ethicae. Particularly applicable to this question are the encyclicals Mirari vos Arbitamur of Pope Gregory XVI and Quanta Cura and The Syllabus of Errors of Pope Pius IX.
There are two ways in which the legitimate government of a particular nation is providentially designated: (1) through the extension of the family into a nation through the course of history; and (2) the settlement of completely unrelated people on a territory nullis. The next two sub-sections elaborate these two means separately:
Legitimate Government Providentially Designated by the Extension of the Family into a Nation
The State normally arises out of the family extending, growing, and expanding itself into a nation through the formation of a unique, individual nationality. The authority of its head, the patriarch, naturally enlarges and expands in the same manner:
We saw that the State in its earliest beginnings was a development out of the family, that the first kings were patriarchs or fathers of tribal families, the first councils the elders of the tribes. The family village – community, as we saw, glided imperceptibly into the position of a State; the head of the village – community became imperceptibly, as the community expanded and took on wider and wider functions, the head of the State. Henceforth his authority was more than domestic; it became political as well. And in this way and not through compact, political authority came first to be vested in the supreme ruler in the case of most States.
The political authority of its Head over the entire society vests not in the society itself but in the position of the ruler, just as the authority over the family vests in the father due to his position in the family rather than with the individual family members themselves:
Now in one sense only is it right to say that political authority is an attribute of society taken as a whole, viz. that political authority lies somewhere in society, just as domestic authority lies somewhere in the family. But domestic authority though present in the family, is a natural attribute, not of the family as such, but of the parents’ position in the family, and, so, domestic authority vests in the parent alone. So also political authority is properly an attribute, not of society as such, but of the position of ruler within the social body, and, therefore, political authority vests in the ruler only. Whatever person or body occupies this position of ruler, in that person or body is vested, and exclusively vested, the fullness of political authority. . . .
But in whatever hands this power is placed it rests there by right of nature and on the authority of the Author of nature, because it is a natural attribute of the position of ruler. (emphasis added)
This political authority is not like money or furniture that must exist first before it can be received by its owner. Rather, it is an attribute of the ruler due to his position as patriarch over the whole community comprising the nation, and, as such, it exists within himself as conferred by God through His providential direction of the nation in its historical development:
Political authority, as we said, is of the nature of an attribute attaching to the position of the ruler, and, therefore, it is not necessary to suppose that the occupant of that position receives his authority from some other person; it springs naturally from that position just as the attributes of a body spring from the inner nature of the body and are not conferred on it by anything external to itself. And, in this, political authority follows the same law and principle as the authority of a father over his child or of a master over his servant. The authority of a father over his child is not conferred upon him by some other person. Neither did it exist in another before he received it in the first instance. A father’s authority can only exist in himself, and it springs, not from some external source, but from his position as father, of which it is a natural and inseparable attribute. So also the authority of governments is not to be regarded as, in the first instance, resting in somebody, and then as conferred by them upon the government. It is an attribute of the position of ruler and springs naturally from that position. In one sense only should we speak of the authority of the ruler as residing necessarily in some other person before the ruler receives it. Being a natural attribute of the position of ruler all political authority must be regarded as residing ultimately in the Author of nature and as conferred by Him in every case upon all those who have a legitimate right to its possession and exercise. (emphasis added)
Therefore, the political authority over a nation is an attribute that attaches itself to the ruler through the occurrence of the providential historical development of the nation, just as parental authority attaches itself to the father by the fact that a child has been born to him and that he receives his parental authority from God through the natural occurrence of this event. His authority over the child does not derive from any (implied) consent of the child and exists independently from the wishes of the child. In the same fashion does the legitimate ruler receive his authority directly from God. “He takes away kingdoms and he establishes them.” (Daniel 2:21) “By me kings reign . . . By me princes rule. . . .” (Proverbs 8:15-16) “Over every nation he set a ruler.” (Ecclesiasticus 17:14)
As the nation itself organically developed out of the family, likewise, the position of its ruler organically developed out of the patriarchal father, who was the representative of the eponymous or first – founder of the family, that, through its providential direction during the course of time, naturally developed into the nation. The patriarch was then already in natural possession of the political authority of the community at the point in time when the nation definitively emerged. This fact of possession was based on the position of the patriarch as representative of the nation’s founder. This fact, therefore, gives the ruler a clear chain of title to political authority over the nation naturally valid against and above any other claim.
Nature requires that there should be a ruler; but she is satisfied with any method that effectively furnishes one, provided it does not violate an existing natural right or contravene the essential requirements of authority. She will not be satisfied, for instance, with foisting somebody, as ruler, on a community already provided with a governing authority, for the nature of the State does not admit of many rival supreme authorities – the supreme authority, as we shall see presently, is necessarily one. But from this we are led to a genuine title of political authority, and one which is perhaps the oldest in point of history, viz. the fact of possession, the fact that some one is actually exercising control of the community in some capacity other than that of political rulership when the State first comes into being. As we saw when treating of the origin of the State, even before the self-sufficing State appeared, society was already to some extent organized and presided over by the head of tribe, or a group consisting of the various heads of different tribes. Gradually and imperceptibly this patriarchal society, if we may so describe it, developed into or became the State, so that when eventually the condition of self-sufficiency was reached, and the State as a result came into being, it was already provided with a ruling head exercising over the community the fullness of authority in regard, not only to its domestic needs, but to all its needs. . . .
The fact that the family head was in actual possession, governing the community in all its relations when first the degree of organization required for a State was reached, was itself a sufficient title of authority. It was, in fact, probably the only title that could confer cohesiveness and enduring strength upon society in the earliest periods of human history. (emphasis added)
Please note that this patriarchal organization of government arising out of the family is not the “Divine Right of Kings” theory that claims that God, through a miracle, directly confers the supreme authority on a particular person and his heirs. In our Judeo-Christian tradition, this occurred only in the cases of Saul and David. In non-Christian nations, such as Japan, the divine right theory claims that the ruler descended from some god, such as the sun, in the case of the Japanese Emperor. While this is anthropologically impossible, the Emperor is undoubtedly the representative of the original eponymous, or founder, of the Japanese nation and thereby legitimately acquires his political authority through this natural means. The unbroken historical sovereignty of the entire line of 127 emperors of Japan “unbroken from Ages Eternal” demonstrates a legitimacy derived from over 2,500 years of prescriptive rule from about 550 BC.
The Japanese Imperial Family demonstrates that States emerged from the extension of the primordial founding family into the clan, the clan into the tribe, the tribe into the ethnic nation, and the ethnic nation into the modern state. In the same manner the father of the founding family became the chieftain of the Clan, the chieftain became the chief of the Tribe, the chief then became the high chief of the Ethnic Nation, and the high chief became the king of the modern state.
The continuing existence of the Japanese Imperial Family for over 2500 years since 550 BC evidences that typical pattern of emergence of the founding father into the present-day king. It shows that monarchy is the form of State most in accordance with Natural Law.
The opposing “Social Contract” theory, of Rousse and Voltaire upon which the French Revolution is based, has never been historically demonstrated as fact. This theory was used to provide an excuse for the French Revolution, which turned out to be a bloodbath of cruelty and injustice – worse than any king perpetrated on the nation.
Some other examples of natural continuity, rather than “Divine Right of Kings,” or “Social Contract” are demonstrated in what was said about the Kingdoms of Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. Many more examples could be cited, but, for our purposes, these four examples, plus that of Imperial Japan, just mentioned are more than sufficient:
(1) “As to the right, by which his majesty [the Danish king] holds this sovereignty, it is a better title, than most princes can shew for their kingdoms and principalities; it is a prescription truly immemorial; we cannot tell the time when we had it not, nor by what degrees we arose up to it.”
(2) “. . . from Hugh Capet, the Succession in the Kingdom of France, has remain’d inviolably in his Heirs, now above Six Hundred years; And ‘tis certain that that Tract of time . . . is [more than] enough for Prescription [to hold good], whether as to a Kingdom or Country, even from the Sacred History. . . .” A few hundred years later, it was said:
The rights of Louis XVJ1I are founded on . . . a prescription of a thousand years. . . . No other dynasty ever reigned so long over any nation, nor has been so identified with its rise, its progress in civilization and prosperity, and its glory. . . . The last king, one of the most virtuous of his race, fell the victim of a horde of murderers and robbers who usurped the sovereign power and expelled the other members of the royal family.
(3) “The Netherlands title of sovereignty, acquired by continuous peaceful display of state authority during a long period of time probably going back beyond the year 1700, therefore holds good.”
(4) “. . . The Kings and Queens of England, (by immemorial Prescription, continual Usage and Possession, and also by Acknowledgments of all the Kings, Princes, and States of Christendom) have always had the Sovereign Propriety of the British Seas; and Her Majesty, by Right of Her Sovereignty, hath Supreme Command, and Jurisdiction over the Passages of Her Seas, and Fishing therein, beyond all Contradiction.” From William the Conqueror, England has enjoyed more than:
. . . Twelve Hundred Years, in quiet, and peaceful possession. . . . If Right of Prescription, Succession of Inheritance, Continual Claim, Matter of Fact, Consent of History, and Confessions, even from the Mouths and Pens of our Adversaries, be of any Moment to the Asserting [of] a Title, Her Sacred Majesty may be Presumed to have as good a Title to that, as the most Absolute Monarch [of] this Day. . . .
Rightful sovereignty indefeasibly belongs, by the rules and principles of prescription, to the Japanese Emperors and these other monarchs, and their successors just as much as it would have if their ancestors received it through direct revelation. Time consistently confers an immemorial legal right of possession.
De jure sovereignty, as set forth here is the designation theory under which the political authority is transferred to its holder immediately by God working through the “secondary causes” of the natural historical evolution of the nation out of the family. God’s glory, will, and power are manifested, through the organic processes of nature, no less directly than if it came through miraculous occurrences; so while the monarch does not rule by “Divine Right” in the sense that his ancestor was designated as king through a miracle, as were Saul and David, he can indeed through the providential direction from the patriarchal position of its eponymous or founder, truly be said to rule “By the Grace of God.”
Thus, as the Scottish constitutional expert, Sir George Mackenzie (1636-1691), observed with respect to the Scottish monarchy, the ruling authority of the King is derived from his position as the representative of the eponymous of the Scottish nation in whose position he rules in loco parentis:
Our kings derive not their power from the people . . . (but from) the right of paternal power which is stated in them; . . . for every man is born subject to his own parents, who, if they were not subject to a superior power, might judge and punish them . . . and do all other things that a king could do, as we see the patriarchs did in their own families.
Sir Thomas Innes of Learney, the Lord Lyon King of Arms, official social anthropologist of the Scottish nation, specifically finds that the organically-formed nation and its government is derived from the social nature of the family, and that the principle of the royal power is, therefore, a family one:
The feudo-clannish Scottish nation was one great social pyramid based on a concept of family blood relationship, or again, to quote Brentano, “the State is a large family composed of all the private families, and the principal is the ‘father of all the fathers.’” This has been described as the truest definition of the medieval French monarchy and it is likewise the precise definition of the Kingdom of Scots and the tribal sovereignty. It was a fact recognized in Scotland over a century ago, when George IV was toasted in 1822 as “Chief of Chiefs – The King.”
Among the Celtic people:
The blood of the original founder of the family was held to flow in the veins of his successive representatives, and to perpetuate in each chief the right of supreme authority over the descendents of his own line, who formed his children and subjects, as he became by right of birth their sovereign ruler and lawgiver. A nation consisted of a union of several such tribes, having a single chief chosen over them. . . . With the family and blood of this chief of chiefs most of the inferior chieftains claimed a [blood] connection more or less remote. This supreme chiefdom, or right of sovereignty was hereditary, insofar as the person possessing it was chosen from the blood royal of the king deceased; but it was so far elective that any of his kinsmen might he chosen by the nation to succeed him; and as the office of sovereign could not he exercised by a child, the choice generally fell upon a full grown man, the brother or nephew of the deceased, instead of his son or grandson.
Monarchy is the first and original form of government; it grew naturally out of the family. The social contract theory of popular or proletarian sovereignty contradicts this historic fact. There is no historical proof for the social contract theory. It is an abstract idea rather than a concrete one that can be demonstrated historically.
Fr. Cronin makes it very clear that the testimony of history indicates that monarchy is the form of government most in accord with nature, arising out of the historical development of the nation from the extension of the family. This rules out the social contract theory of the sovereignty of the masses as an ordinary means under the natural law for the basis of the political authority of the nation:
Such is the testimony of history and of all recent sociological enquiry into the origin of political rule amongst primitive peoples. Here is no trace of anything in the nature of social – compact. The first political rulers derived their authority at a time when such a compact would have been almost unthinkable, a period when any attempt to superimpose upon the family or tribal organization based upon the tie of blood another organization based upon a wholly different principle, viz. popular election to power, would have been exceedingly difficult, if not wholly impossible. And yet in those days the rulers of States wielded the sceptre on titles as legitimate and with an authority quite as effective and convincing as any ruler of the present day. (emphasis added)
Fr. Cathrein points out that in the original family community, the patriarch was the one man fit to govern because the people would not submit to any other man. This is also because he possessed sufficient physical and, more importantly, moral power. His position as the representative of the founder gave him the loyalty of the family.
Writing at the end of the French Revolution, the famous Catholic political philosopher, Joseph, Count de Maistre, confirms that through the providential direction of human affairs in history, God designates the ruler and form of government which is valid in morality and law:
One of the grand errors of an age, which professed them all, was to believe that a political constitution could be written, . . . [In other words] that which is most fundamental and most essentially constitutional in the laws of a nation is precisely what cannot be written.
. . . The essence of a fundamental law, is, that no one has the right to establish it; now, how can it be above all if it is a human creation? . . . A compact is not a law, and binds nobody, unless there is a superior authority by which it is guaranteed. . . .
It is necessary that the origin of sovereignty should manifest itself from beyond the sphere of human power.
. . . As to legitimacy, if it should seem in its origins to be obscure, God explains Himself by His prime minister in the department of the world.
The form of government that evolved is what may be referred to as the natural constitution of the nation. It is natural because it organically comes into being through the historical evolution of the nation out of the extension of the family; it is a nation’s constitution because it is the original form of government of the family out of which the nation is derived and, as de Maistre points out, divinely confirmed through time.
We must now distinguish between the natural and artificial constitutions of the nation. The natural constitution of the nation is that which arose in the first instance through the providential guidance of the nation in its historical development and by which a ruling authority is for the first time placed over a people. This is the constitution designated for that particular nation by the natural law. The natural constitution for each nation must, of course, be ascertained on a case-by-case study of the providential development of that nation to ascertain the legitimate form of government (monarchy, aristocracy, or polity [republic]) divinely ordained for that nation through the natural law. Any claim that can be legitimately put forward to the ruling authority of that nation is natural because it does not depend on mere human convention like the titles set forth in the various artificial or written constitutions and, more importantly, it organically arose through the divine guidance of that nation in its development through which process God reveals Himself and His will for that nation in history. The natural law is satisfied with any act or natural historical method that effectively designates a ruler over the people, provided that it offends against no existing right and is in harmony with the essential idea and attributes of the nation. In so doing this makes possible the beginnings of valid state organization.
This is the principle by which the original title of political authority is determined and under which the nation came into being under a definite political authority in the first instance.
With respect to the natural or organic constitution of a nation designated by the natural law, Count de Maistre correctly observes that since the natural constitution has evolved into being through God’s providential guidance of the nation in time, it cannot really be written. The best that can be done is to set forth as much of the natural constitution into a written artificial constitution. Even so, this process is open to the error (1) of failing to record accurately the natural constitution; and (2) of regarding the artificial constitution to be the legitimate constitution in place of the natural constitution:
Every thing brings us back to the general rule – Man cannot create a constitution; and no legitimate constitution can be written. . . . It is only when society finds itself already constituted . . . that it is possible to make known, or explain, in writing, certain special articles; but in almost every case these declarations or explanations are the effect or cause of very great evils, and always cost the people more than they are worth.
Although the modern age often fails to appreciate the keen wisdom of Count de Maistre, the greatest drawback with modern written constitutions is their complete failure to recognize (1) God as the source of legitimate sovereignty over the nation and (2) that the scope of sovereignty exercised by the nation is circumscribed by the moral, natural law (and the Sacred Scriptures for Christian Nations), and (3) that any law or judicial decision enacted or rendered contrary thereto is ultra vires and ipso facto-invalid from their very foundation. The genocide legislation of Nazi Germany and the abortion legislation of the liberal capitalist states are excellent examples of the type of immoral legislation that can be perpetuated under the purely secular positivist artificial constitutions of modern-day states.
Such constitutions implicitly proclaim that “God is dead.” At the very least, to be morally valid an artificial constitution should proclaim that, “no law shall be passed contrary to the natural law, to the Sacred Scriptures (for Christian Nations), and to Canon Law (for Catholic Nations).” More importantly, if the artificial written constitution does not accurately reflect and articulate the institutions established by the natural original constitution, the citizens will instinctively sense that the new institutions are illegitimate and without moral force to bind them. Witness the great instability of the European (and Latin American) republics whose “legitimacy” is based simply upon successful high treason against the legitimate Christian monarchs of their countries. Such de facto governments have no moral basis for denying recourse to revolution to any group of aggrieved citizens, such as the proletariat, having themselves destroyed the moral basis of legitimacy through the initial revolution. Secularists, anti-clericals, and liberal atheists may deride Count de Maistre as much as they wish, but it cannot be denied that the havoc wrought by popular revolutions over the past two centuries has validated the essence of his thesis through time.
Thus, Fr. Meyer declares that, in our age, we ought to beware of defending doctrines that lend support to the ever increasing opposition to the monarchical form of government. Indeed, Fr. Meyer states that it is morally wrong to abrogate even a written artificial constitution or to make a change in its essentials unless the process obtains the consent of the ruler and of all the civil classes of the community. Under the opposite principle, “All stability of public institutions will be rendered impossible, and there will be a sort of permanent and legal right of revolution.”
The right of revolution is a right to lawless bloodshed of innocent people. Amongst modern revolutions, the vast majority do more harm than good for their countries. It is intolerable that society be founded on such an unstable and unnatural foundation. Unless there is the uncoerced consent of all to change, the root of the tree becomes corrupt and its branches and legitimacy wither and decay in the process.
In this connection, it is to be emphasized that the highest moral natural law, while requiring the maintenance of the natural institutions of the nation, does not require the constitution of the nation to remain static. We have seen how the nation is an extension of the primordial family founded by its eponymous or founding father. As the family gradually extended itself into the nation, the patriarch, as the representative of the eponymous, was assisted in the government by the branch chiefs of the family. In time, these branch chiefs became the titled magnates of European realms and formed the upper part of the council assisting the king. This later council of Lords evolved into upper Parliament. The untitled portion of the nation also selected its representatives to assist the king in the lower portion of the Parliament. Nevertheless, the king, in his position as patriarch or representative of the eponymous always retained what we now call “sovereignty” over the nation. To the organically arising natural constitution of the nation was added the supernatural, spiritual conscience, whereby the superiors of religion also participated in the council advising the king as to the morality of issues facing the nation. A combination of these three institutions gives us the traditional Three Estates (King or monarchy, House of Lords, including Spiritual nobles, and the Lower House of Commons). These naturally developed into the modern legislative bodies of those European nations still preserving the traditional forms of their natural constitutions. It is noted that we are speaking of a legitimate natural evolution of organic institutions rather than a violent revolution severing the chain of the historical continuance or prescriptive nature of the nation.
The resulting de facto government of revolution violates the essence of the nation’s natural constitution and can never, therefore, be regarded as morally legitimate because its moral basis only rests on successful high treason. However, it may have to be tolerated for a time to avert even greater evils. It is, nevertheless, the moral duty of all good citizens to work for the restoration of the natural constitution that the revolution has so wantonly destroyed, thereby repairing the break in their nation’s chain or organic, prescriptive continuity.
In conclusion, the union of throne and altar is necessary to achieve man’s natural and supernatural end: to know, love, care, and serve God in this world in order to be happy with Him forever in the next, which should be acceptable to all by virtue of self-evident right and sound reasoning.
If one accepts the positivist, individualistic scientific theories of social contract and popular sovereignty promulgated by Hobbes, Rousseau, Voltaire, and later by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, man is an isolated atom in the Universe, one denies the natural law, that insists on a person’s moral relation to his progenitors. If one denies this moral relation, then Christian monarchy is obviously as much of a superstition as is the Christian religion itself.
Legitimization by Prescription
A major distinction must be made between domestic or municipal prescription, and international law. The former often requires “good faith,” that is, the possession was not obtained by fraud, duress or coercion. International prescription does not require that the country or territory was obtained in “good faith,” but it might have been obtained illegally, and ultimately healed by a long period of uncontested rule. In most ages of the earth, few, if any, origins of new governments were innocent. In our day and age, nearly all nations have committed wrongs in the creation of their countries. For example, since the 19th century, the great royal houses were unjustly robbed of their thrones. These were despicable acts, not merely of acts of treachery, but also of treason. Throughout the years of history, thousands of hereditary dynasties have illegally and unjustly been dethroned and brought to ruin by myriads of usurpers. In fact, “. . . There have been so many usurpations by [illegal] conquest in all kingdoms [and nations, such] that all kings [and every republic] are usurpers, or the heirs and successors of usurpers [and traitors]. . . .” (emphasis added) David Hume (1711-1776), a well-known Scottish philosopher, observed:
It is certain, that if we remount to the first origin of every nation, we shall find that there is scarce any race of kings, or form of a commonwealth, that is not primarily founded on usurpation and rebellion, and whose title is not at first worse than doubtful and uncertain.
“. . . You can hardly point out in Europe a single kingdom which was not originally acquired by injustice.” That is, “. . . few governments that have a claim to legitimacy [in the here and now were] . . . lawful in their origin.”
Wretched, indeed, were the condition of kings, if there were no possible means, either by length of time or some more easy principle of absolving them from the guilt of their predecessors, who had either founded or extended their kingdoms by unjust acquisitions. No king on the face of the earth can be pronounced guiltless, if we must take into account the injustice in which the foundations of his kingdom were originally laid. . . . [However] long continued possession obliterated the original stain of injustice.
There has to be a way of healing the past, because most, if not all, present sovereign entities have some illegitimacy and wrongfulness in their past origins.
. . . St Augustine likened states to “fair thievish purchases” – to large-scale robberies. His dictum may be taken to apply to all titles to rule, if, as Ascham and Hume suggest, we were to pursue them to their origins. But the principle of prescription applies. Hence H. T. Dickinson writes, in summarizing David Hume’s view, that “the legitimacy of any government depends not on its origins but on prescription” – in Hume’s own words, on “long possession.”
This prescriptive legitimacy must be taken as a moral enhancement of a legality already resting upon the possession and effective exercise of government. . . .
“For if such a long undisputed [unprotested] possession cannot make a right [to rule] to a country, it is impossible there should be any end of wars between kings and princes.” “. . . It is, [therefore] necessary that matters should be finally decided and put upon a definite and permanent basis.” In summary, “. . . ‘Prescription’ . . . was in practice the most important criteria [on earth] to legitimize the State, irrespective of its origins.” Stated in another way, “. . . Title to the exercise of the royal power [or any other kind of sovereignty] arises only by prescription.” If followed, it makes the usurper’s right to rule legal and legitimate provided that the displaced sovereign acquiesces to it. Again, “. . . In some degree every civilized nation must ultimately fall back upon a prescriptive root [or beginning] of title.” This is because, as stated, current nations are the result of some kind of theft or treachery in wrongfully ruining prior governments. To become legitimate, long, undisputed, unprotested, valid possession must occur. In other words, “Government[s] arose from conquest; prescription lies at the basis of the hereditary titles claimed by usurpers’ successors.”
In the congressional record, one U. S. congressman named Roberts explained that the protective nature of prescription and how it provides validity, that is, the best and greatest right to rule and govern. He explained that sui juris means to have full legal rights and capacity, and, for a nation, or kingdom that would have unimpaired sovereignty. He then declared:
I would be glad to know if any nation has, or ever had, a better title to be juri sui juris than the fact of being so, and of always having been so? than a present position, fortified by a prescription that knows no beginning: that runs back as far as memory or tradition goes, and beyond, to where it is lost in that oblivion in which unknown times and their memorials are all buried and lost!. . . .There never was, there never can be, any better title to the right of being sui juris [or sovereign]. To the validity of such a title, its acknowledgment by other sovereignties is not necessary; but . . . a right in present possession, fortified and sanctified by such a prescription as this is, stands on higher ground, much higher, than any acknowledgment by other sovereignties could place it. Unquestionably, then, [such] nations are sui juris [that is, sovereign, which means “. . . to be subject, within itself, to no law but the law of its own making. . . .]” (emphasis added)
It “. . . is even more important and necessary between nations than between individuals.” Sovereign or international prescription through the laws of justice and time conveys all rights to the usurper or possessor, provided the former royal house was guilty of abandonment through acquiescence or implied agreement with the new government in power. Such sovereign transfer does not need the political recognition of other nations; it is a sure and solid title to sovereignty as can ever be had by any nation, kingdom, or empire. Prescription corrects mends and heals bad beginnings, such that:
. . . the guilt incurred, in founding kingdoms or extending their dominions, is obliterated by prescription. . . . There can be no doubt that the guilt of invasion, which cleaves to the soul of the conqueror, does not rest on the consciences of his successors, who can plead long continued possession as their claim to his inheritance.
“Prescription . . . [is] a right or title to anything [including the highest right or entitlement on earth to the sovereign throne of a kingdom], grounded upon a continued possession of it [that was] beyond the memory of man.” In summary, “The most satisfactory title . . . of sovereign dominion [on earth], is that by Prescription.” There is no greater, more perfect, or more preeminent title above it, as shall be seen. But there is another reason that prescription has a positive impact other than by law. It fits with the psychology and nature of man.
The foundation of government -- that is, of the duty to obey in the subjects -- has by many been sought in what Lawyers term Prescription; that is to say, in long and indeed immemorial usage or possession. There can be no doubt that this gives great weight and authority to every government, and consequently materially strengthens its power. Not only immemorial possession of the supreme power, or the existence of any government so long that no record remains of its beginning, but even long possession, or the existence of any government for a known long period of time, gives great strength and stability to that government, even the date and circumstances of whose beginning are ascertained. Men have a natural tendency to acquiesce in whatever they find established, and the longer the period of the establishment the more ready and cheerful will be their acquiescence. This disposition has its origin to a great degree in habit and the association of ideas, because we naturally like to lean towards what we have always been accustomed to, and what is mixed up with all our recollections, connected with all our feelings and pursuits, and related, as it were, to all that belongs to us. . . .
[Thus] a government long established is, in point of fact, strong and powerful by the force of prescription -- that is, because men more easily conform to what has been the order of things time out of mind.
Providential Designation of a Republic as a Legitimate Form of Government
It is evident that not every state arises in the natural manner. In certain instances the state comes into being not through the extension of the family into the nation (thereby creating a distinct ethnic nationality) but through the settlement of completely unrelated peoples sharing no common history, religion, or kinship, on a territory nullis or uninhabited land. They may, in fact, be divided by these various things that normally and naturally unite a nation. Possibly the only factor unifying them is that they fled their original fatherlands to escape from political and religious persecution where, possibly, they may have indeed been warring against each other over these very matters. Being common victims of persecution, they can perhaps agree only to disagree peacefully on such fundamental issues that normally unite a nation and give it homogeneity.
Therefore, the providentially-guided historical circumstances raising these disparate peoples into statehood designate a form of government entirely different from that designated by the natural law through the normal extension of the family into the nation. Having no common eponymous or founding father (except possibly Noah!), ties of kinship, or even a common religion to unify them, it would appear that the form of government indicated by the social nature of the family, monarchy, would be automatically excluded by the complete lack of historical circumstances indicating such to be the natural constitution of the nation.
Indeed, the people themselves, by immigrating to a new land under such conditions, have cut themselves off from the family ties that bound them to their respective Old World patriarchs. Cut from such ties, these immigrants were, so to speak, founders of their own families in the traditional sense.
Therefore, when the time came for them to erect themselves into a state, they could properly discern that through the providential guidance of their historical development, a republican form of government (a polity in the Aristotelian and holistic sense) was designated by God, through secondary causes, as their natural constitution. This providential guidance was placed into a written or artificial constitution in an accurate a manner as possible.
This is almost exactly the way in which the government of the United States of America came into existence. (The legitimacy of its origin vis-à-vis the Hanoverian dynasty of George III will be discussed in the next section). Other legitimate republics, such as Switzerland, came into existence in a somewhat similar fashion. There, the people isolated in remote mountain villages of tribal communities did not develop in the manner of their neighbors. Historical circumstances guided them into forming semi-sovereign independent Cantons, each based on geographical unity. Later, when outside pressures threatened the entire community of Cantons, they united into a loose Confederation for their common protection. Switzerland, nevertheless, remains divided by those factors that normally distinguish the unity of a nation. It has four distinct language groups with the Catholic Church being the religion of the state in some Cantons and the Protestant Faith, the established religion in others.
A polity or legitimate republic is, nevertheless, not a license to run riot. The scope of its sovereignty is as much limited by the natural law and Scriptural Revelation (if it be Christian) as a monarchy. The majority in a republic cannot do whatever they please simply because they are a majority, just as a king cannot do whatever he pleases simply because he happens to be king.
Nevertheless, due to its less organic nature, a legitimate republic has a greater need to have the Authority of God over it and the natural law limitations on the scope of its sovereignty spelled out in writing than does a Christian monarchy.
In the latter, the Authority of God over the nation is quite visibly evident in many ancient monarchies. Above the arches of the monarch’s crown rises the Cross, which is symbolic of the true source of all kingship, power, and earthly dominion. The orb, surmounted by a cross, symbolizes the sovereignty of Christ over the world. The sceptre, the ensign of kingly power and justice, is itself surmounted by a dove, symbolic of the Holy Spirit, that guides the monarch in ruling the nation. The spurs with which the monarch is invested at his Coronation are the emblems of Christian knighthood and chivalry and, thus, of devotion. The Sword also designates such devotion by which the monarch swears to “do justice, stop inequity, protect the Holy Church of God, and to help and defend widows and orphans.” In his Coronation, so like the Consecration of a bishop, the king swears a solemn oath promising “to the utmost of my power to maintain the Laws of God (natural and revealed law) and the true profession of the Gospel.” Through this oath, the king irrevocably binds himself under the pain of eternal perdition to rule the nation under the natural and revealed (through Sacred Scripture) laws of God. History has shown that the Christian monarchs of Europe have kept this oath even at the cost of their heads. The monarch receives his crown with the words, “God crown you with a crown of glory and righteousness, that by the ministry of this our benediction, having a right faith and manifold fruit of good works, you may obtain the crown of an everlasting faith by the gift of Him whose kingdom endureth forever.” Finally, the king is enthroned with the unction to “Stand firm,” the ceremony commands, “and hold fast from henceforth the seat and state of royal and imperial dignity, which is this day delivered unto you, in the name and by the authority of Almighty God, and by the hands of us the bishops and servants of God.”
It is thus seen that the royal regalia and the ceremony of Coronation are full of the symbols and the innermost aspirations of Christianity, with God as the fount of all sovereignty.
The workings of God (though present) are not so visibly manifest in a legitimate republic. The republican Head of State is an elected party politician and may be an unscrupulous individual devoid of all moral restraint and ruling solely for the benefit of himself and his party. It cannot be presumed that the elected official will govern according to the laws of God and protect the rights of all people. Indeed, the oath taken by the republican chief executive may not even mention God, much less contain a promise to govern according to the laws of God and the Gospel precepts.
Therefore, the natural and revealed laws, incorporated into the natural constitution of any legitimate state, must be spelled out with far more specificity in a written or artificial constitution. When this is done successfully, the constitution, the supreme law, then takes the position of a monarch as the representative of the nation. The constitution as a statement of the ideals upon which the republic is legitimately founded; in essence, it becomes the eponymous of the state and, like a king, the sacred embodiment and personification of the nation.
There is, nevertheless, great wisdom in what de Maistre says about the failure of a given written constitution to incorporate adequately all of the provisions of a natural constitution. Therefore, one must look beyond the mere written provisions of the artificial constitution to determine adequately the natural constitution in its entirety as a doctrine and a body of principles constituting the sacred embodiment of a legitimate republic.
For the United States, in addition to its written Constitution, one must look to other documents of constitutional import to discern that body of principles constituting its sacred embodiment as a nation. Specifically, this would include the 1776 Declaration of Independence, which in former years could be recited verbatim by every American schoolboy. The Declaration specifically cites the violation of the Rights of Englishmen as legitimate grounds for severing their allegiance – “For abolishing the free system of English laws. . . .” These Rights were found in the English common law as well as in earlier English documents of constitutional import, such as the Magna Carta of 1215, the Petition of Rights of 1629, and the Bill of Rights of 1689.
The English common law itself incorporates many of the provisions of what we speak of as being the natural constitution of the nation. Christianity is a part of the common law, and the existence of God has always been assumed in English law. In America, Christianity has been judicially declared to be a part of the common law; the common law draws it subsistence from Christianity; in addition Christianity is definitely part and parcel of the common law; and that the Bible is the foundation of this law. Speaking nationally on this issue, the United States Supreme Court declared, “This is a religious people, not Christianity with an established church and tithes and spiritual courts, but Christianity with 1iberty of conscience to all men.”
With respect to the position of the natural law in the body of common law, we could not do better than to turn to Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, which records the common law in its most accurate form. Blackstone declares, “When the Supreme Being formed the Universe, and created matter out of nothing, he impressed certain principles upon that matter, from which it can never depart, and without which it would cease to be.” Respecting man’s position in the Universe, Blackstone states, “Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his Creator, for he is an entirely dependent being” (Note how different this is from the social contract theory that is without God). With respect to such laws, Blackstone observes, “This will of his Maker is called the law of nature.” Blackstone proceeds to declare that the natural law is discoverable by men through the use of right reason. “There are the eternal immutable laws of good and evil, to which the Creator Himself, in all his dispensations, conforms; and which He has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions.” Finally, Blackstone declares that all human laws contrary to the natural law are null and void ipso facto:
This law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course, superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe in all countries, and at all times: No human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force and all their authority, immediately or immediately, from this original.
The findings of a U. S. Court concurred and reiterated this important understanding:
The laws of nature . . . emanate from a higher authority than any human government. They are written upon the hearts of all men; exist before governments are organized . . .”and are binding all over the globe, in all countries and at all times.”
All of the above, together with the written 1787 Constitution, constitute the real or natural constitution of the United States of America, and this takes the place of a monarch as the representative of the sacred embodiment of the nation. However, it is to be observed that a legitimate republic requires the constant vigilance of its people to see that its natural constitution is maintained. In a monarchy, this task is performed by the king, irrevocably bound to do so by his Coronation Oath and by the spiritual advice and power of the First Estate of the realm. (In Catholic monarchies, the Pope can, in extreme cases, intervene.) Where republican courts are independent of the head of state and the legislative body, they can be relied, in part, to do this. Nevertheless, there is always the danger that the wrong type of person, a positivist perhaps, might be appointed to the bench of a republican court as a judicial activist instead of supporting the rule of the supreme law of the land.
The real constitution of a legitimate republic, incorporating not one but a series of documents of constitutional import as the best human attempt to reduce the natural constitution of the nation to writing, then becomes what it known by moral theologians as a “status contract.” This binds all succeeding generations and cannot licitly be revoked at will. In the opinion of the moralist Suarez, a political community is a moral person, that constitutes through an indefinite number of generations; consequently, the act of one generation in designating the real constitution binds all those who come afterwards.
At the moment of institution of a legitimate republic, the people designate the constitution as the instrument of political authority. Authority and power are transferred immediately from God, the source of all authority and power, to the political institutions named in the constitution. To the extent that the various written documents of constitutional import reflect accurately the natural constitution of the nation, it is illegitimate to attempt to overthrow or alter this status contract. In fact, it may be regarded as treason to do so. As St. Robert Cardinal Bellarmine, S.J., declared, the action of the people in determining its institutions must be understood as the beginning of a reign. “Nor is it permissible without grave crime to oppose a legitimate government or to agitate sedition and rebellion.” Therefore, rebellion and sedition are not lawful once the people have designated the political institutions which are then endowed (in the same manner by which a patriarch receives his power by virtue of his position) with sovereign power by God. The idea of the “status contract” is that the authority of the legitimate republic must be firmly established and inaccessible to the irrational vacillating caprices of the masses. The real constitution of the nation described as accurately as possible in the various constitutional documents then acquires the same legitimate position as a monarch:
It means that the people have a right to the status politicus as it was agreed upon for perpetuity. That is the meaning of the old formula of all these political status contracts, that they are concluded forever, that they are beyond the arbitrary will of the parties. The idea is that the status and the objective end of necessary political life should control the subjective wills, and that the status is never at the mercy of the arbitrary will of individuals. Of course, this is nothing strange. Lincoln in his first inaugural address expresses the same philosophy when he says that in the contemplation of universal law the Union of the States is perpetuity and that this perpetuity is implied, if not express, in the fundamental law of all national governments. (emphasis added)
Therefore, although the moral authority of a legitimate republic is not so visibly evident as in a monarchy (where the king is the patriarchal representative of the eponymous or founder of the nation), it is nevertheless the same as the designated government under the natural constitution of its nation. Although the term is seldom used, a legitimate republic, like a monarch, does, indeed, rule “by the Grace of God.” Both legitimate republics and monarchies alike have the same moral position in international law.
Problems with Democracy
First, there are many theories and applications of the term democracy, however, like any government; if corrupt people are in power, the people will be used, looted, plundered in one form or another. For example, without a constitution and supreme laws that cannot be broken, democracy can be like two wolves and a lamb voting on what to eat for lunch, which might just be the defenseless minority – the lamb. The problem here is putting the enormous life and death power of government to enforce their decisions can degenerate into using mass liquidations, secret police, and labor camps.
Democracy as a governmental system has “spawned [or promoted] . . . autocratic and centrally consolidated government [in other words, big government or extremes in government and thus] . . . more and more groups have been given the opportunity to help themselves to the liberty and property of others.” That is, socialism, or legalized theft, has prevailed. “Democracy [unfortunately] has been the fountainhead of every form of socialism . . . .” This includes all the horrors of Soviet communism, Italian fascism, and Nazi nationalistic socialism. “Thirty-three democracies descended into tyranny during the 20th century [alone] by failing to uphold constitutional protections [of freedom].” Democracy has a terrible track record, because it is a flawed system. In fact, Karl Marx declared that “Democracy is the road to socialism.” Likewise, Leon Trotsky wrote, “Communism needs democracy like the human body needs oxygen,” It is the stepping stone needed for tyranny, which is why the founding fathers of the United States created the rule of law, or checks and balances, to stop corruption. Checks and balances are to make corruption a “high risk” and “low profit” venture, so that what is right and good might prevail and abound in the land. As a warning, Ronald Reagan stated:
One of the traditional methods of imposing statism or socialism on a people has been by way of medicine. It’s very easy to disguise a medical program as a humanitarian project. . . .
Without checks and balances, majority rule, like mob rule or rule by caprice, doesn’t protect the weak from the strong. It can disempower, control, and exploit the people into submission. The philosophy behind democracy is “might [the majority] makes right.” It creates a rule of men, not a rule of law or even common sense. For example, in a pure democracy, no one has any rights that do not fit with the current fads and whims or popular opinions – the temporary notions of the people. A republic, which is a democracy with a constitution and a type of representative government, can become factories of corruption, as in Nazi Germany, and vote itself into ruin beyond repair in an all-out effort to enrich itself off of the labors of others or to follow some oppressive agenda of a corrupt leader; but, it is more likely to remain safe than pure democracy, which has the mentality of a mob. Most people do not realize that “Fifty-one percent of a nation can establish a totalitarian regime, [create a police state] suppress [and plunder] minorities and still remain democratic.”
There is always grave danger whenever government power is involved in anything because of its immense power to force and coerce. But even with representative democracy (the safer type of government), there are some very real drawbacks. Winston Churchill once declared, “The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.” He was referring to voter ignorance as their indifference and lack of understanding are rampant and a well-know fact-of-life. Many vote for reasons as shallow and superficial as how good-looking someone is, the sound of their voice, their ability to articulate and present well, or because of a witty or humorous campaign slogan instead of any kind of deep understanding of the character of the person or his or her principles. In fact, there is no “will of the people” or mandate. It does not really exist. Public opinion is directed, manipulated and controlled by the press or propaganda machinery.
Walter Lippmann (1889-1974), an influential American political commentator in the early 1900s, presented the thought that democracy was doomed in the long-run to exploitation without clear and powerful checks and balances to curb statism and sinister ideologies from taking over:
If ordinary people were as stupid, prejudiced and easily manipulated as they seem, how could they be entrusted with the fate of the nation? . . . In his [Walter Lipmann’s] view, average citizens, buffeted by propaganda emanating from powerful [calculating] opinion makers, could no longer make the kind of informed, rational judgments that were needed to make democracy work.
One does not have to be a political scientist to smell the [foul] odor of politics. Political scientists merely affirm the commonplace when they define politics as a struggle for power, a lust for self-aggrandizement. We all know that this lust is couched in honorific terms, like “democracy” or “peace” or the “common good.” We know that politicians manipulate the unwary, mislead them by spin or misleading language – even outright mendacity [that is, corruption and treachery].
“. . . Popular sovereignty [democracy] has always been a standing invitation to anyone who wishes to take advantage of it.” People can be terribly manipulated, deceived, and mislead down the primrose path of deceit into supporting barbaric and unconscionable activities, that are hostile to freedom, life, and liberty. Sovereignty of “the people” has been and can so easily be exploited by the ruthless and power-hungry:
. . . not only in the French revolution but in revolutions that followed, including the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Chinese Revolution of 1949, and less consequential revolutions in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The popular sovereign turned out to be a dictator: Napoleon in France, Lenin and Stalin in Russia and Mao in China, among others. The population ended up in a position far closer to [slavery] than [democracy]. . . . In the name of the people, as in the name of God, monstrous acts can be threatened and carried out.
Baroness Margaret Thatcher, former Prime Minister of England, wrote in November of 1995 that, “those who imagine that a politician would make a better figurehead than a hereditary monarch might perhaps make the acquaintance of more politicians.” David Carr astutely wrote the following on elected officials in 2002:
I might remind you, Mr. O’Neill that it is not the Queen that is bleeding us white with taxes, it is elected politicians. It is not the Queen that is suffocating us with pettifogging regulations and laws, it is elected politicians. It is not the Queen who has traduced our civil liberties, it is elected politicians. It is not the Queen that has delivered us, bound hand and foot, to the fat Cardinals in Brussels, it is elected politicians. Given the choice between Queen Elizabeth and the gaggle of mendacious, thieving [bad people – the conniving politicians] that people like you have in mind to replace her, I know for sure which one I would take up arms for.
“What is history but the story of how politicians have squandered the blood and treasure of the human race [through fraud, waste and abuse]?”
The coercive power of government is always a beacon to those who want to dominate others – summoning the worst dregs of society to Washington [or some other capital] to use that power to impose their will upon others.
For example, Adolf Hitler, Ayatollah Khomeini, Fidel Castro, Warren Harding, Idi Amin, Muammar Qaddafi, and Saddam Hussein were all either popularly chosen or elected in democratic republics. Of course, some good men have been elected, but, as Albert Einstein said, “Force always attracts men of low morality.” That is, “. . . swarms of crooks, demagogues and despots [are attracted to it] as surely as horse manure attracts swarms of horseflies.” Hence, again, the great need for a powerful restraining power that limits and blocks unbridled passion. For, “The nation is free only when its deputies [its representatives and officials] are subject to restraint.” (emphasis added)
Benjamin Constant (1767-1830), one of the most important French political thinkers, orators and representatives, taught that legislators wanting to gratify their:
. . . need to act and to feel important . . . multiply [useless] laws [or pork and barrel projects] to deal with discovered or contrived problems – and fears. [And] being able to raise vast sums by taxes and borrowing enhances their sense of power, and moral responsibility wanes.
The point is, “Freedom requires tolerance of foolishness. . . . Without this tolerance for the freedom of others, no one’s freedoms are secure.” People do not grow or learn if they are coddled in cotton wool. People must be allowed to fail, so both they and society can move ahead. “The ultimate result of shielding men from their effects of folly is to fill the world with fools.” Yet:
As long as human beings are imperfect, there will always be arguments for extending the power of government to deal with these imperfections [which can only be done by force]. The only logical stopping place is totalitarianism – unless we realize that tolerating imperfections is the price of freedom.
These same powerful temptations for corruption exist now, if not more so, than they did in the past; only, it is much worse, as politicians obtain and use “insider information,” which regular citizens are denied or go to prison for doing. As a direct result, the legislators generally become millionaires, while the people are denied and held back. It is a game of unfair advantage or inequality. But this is not all. In fact, this is a minor thing in comparison with the following problem.
Democracy has turned out to be not majority rule as it is supposed to be, but rule by a well-organized and well-connected minority; that is, special interests groups, corporations, and lobbyists, who, with great sums of money, call the shots behind the scenes and under the table, making them and the groups they represent more powerful than any king that ever lived. In fact, being elected or re-elected to a gravy train or get-rich job, such as, being a legislator, costs so much hard earned money that, “. . . No one can be elected to national office who does not enjoy the support of one or more special interests – how could it be otherwise [with such enormous costs involved to be elected]?”
Thus the real powers-that-be may exercise their [secretive] power without any responsibility to the populace [because it is all hidden]. It is ironic [perhaps tragic] that this “un-democratic” way of doing business should be the stock-in-trade of all “democracies,” but there it is. Perhaps replacing the House of Representatives with a House of Lobbyists would help make government more accountable [and responsible to the people].
The point is:
Democratic societies are ruled by a ruling class, as all societies always have been. The mass of the people know that they are subjects [captives or pawns] . . . of a finite number of ultimate power-holders [perhaps even a shadow government]. . . .
Another significant problem is that modern technology has created a situation where corruption can be hidden from detection. This is especially significant in the crime of voter fraud. Joseph Stalin (1878-1953), mass murderer and Communist tyrant, is quoted as declaring that, “Those who cast the votes decide nothing. Those who count the votes decide everything.” Modern voting machines can be programmed to randomly make most votes go toward the candidate of their choice, even if the voter deliberately chose a different person. Manual recounts are, in some cases impossible, as there is no paper trail or way to hold anyone accountable if a crime was planned. In addition, votes are not recounted if one candidate gets most of the votes. Therefore, robbery of election result is not difficult to program into the system. Democracy has a lot of ways it can be ruined without great care and the rule of supreme laws that are enforced to override the degeneracy that otherwise can so easily beset it.
However, not only do modern democratic republics have great corrupting problems in the essential parts, but, through all history:
The story of republicanism, of those political regimes that tried to exist without a monarchy, is the story of systematic failure, the record not of survival and success but of decline and fall. Older republics rose proudly, only to disappear from history. . . . [This includes] all the republics of the ancient world and those of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance city-states. . . .
Democratic governments are, unfortunately, very good at: (1) high taxation to the point of extortion, (2) reckless and irresponsible over-spending, (3) fraud, waste and abuse of tax-payer money, (4) influence peddling, and (5) taking legalized bribes from special interest groups to raise money so that they can stay in power. Legislatures are not generally run by principle or guided by the supreme law of their lands, but they are run by professional politicians who, if they are to stay in office, must raise inordinate amounts of money. These irresponsible men, at least in the United States, create approximately 50,000 new laws a year and spend millions on foolish projects to bring money back to their states by attaching their dishonest designs onto bills that are likely to pass. Two real examples of some of their harebrained ideas are a $1 million to preserve a sewer in Trenton, NJ as a historic monument, and $219,000 to teach college students how to watch television or build an unnecessary and useless building or bridge.
Government is important, but it can be a hotbed of corruption without powerful checks and balances that cannot be defeated or compromised. A combination government can be an important and effective way to partially overcome these and other serious liabilities. Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780), a renowned and eminent English jurist and professor of law, wrote that the English Government consisted of “true excellence,” not perfection, but greatness, nonetheless. He wrote:
. . . all parts of it [the government] form a mutual check upon each other. In the legislature, the people are a check upon the nobility, and the nobility a check upon the people . . . while the king is a check upon both, which preserves the executive power from encroachments. And this very executive power is again checked and kept within bounds by the two houses. . . . Like three distinct powers in mechanics, they jointly impel the machine of government in a direction different from what either, acting by itself, would have done; but at the same time in a direction partaking of each, and formed out of all; a direction which constitutes the true line of the liberty and happiness. . . .
David Hume (1711-1776), a well-known Scottish philosopher and writer, concluded from decades of study, based on logic and the experiences of the ancients, that it should:
. . . be pronounced as a universal axiom in politics that a hereditary prince, a nobility . . . [House of Lords or a Senate], and a people voting by their representatives [a House of Commons, Representatives or Deputies, would] form the best monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy [available on earth].
In other words, a combination of all three types of government into one government, having a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy, would provide a better and safer arrangement then having only one type leading a nation. Each could provide an important check on each other to circumvent some of the corruption that would otherwise ruin one of the greatest privileges of mankind, that is, freedom and the right of property. Nevertheless, in such an arrangement, there is still the very serious problem that, “No man’s life, liberty or property are safe while the Legislature is in session.”
When former U. S. president Theodore Roosevelt visited Emperor Franz Joseph in 1910 and asked him what he thought the role of monarchy was in the twentieth century, the emperor reportedly replied: “To protect my peoples from their governments.” When royalty have veto power, it can stop or remove destructive legislation. In the Empire of Austria/Hungry, veto power extended for years after a law was passed, so that, if that law was found to be unjust, or caused harm, it could be summarily eliminated. Another intelligent check is seen in the power of the English monarchy:
The Government of the United Kingdom, (As well as Canada, Australia and 14 other countries) have NO mechanism for starting or stopping the business of Government. No session of Parliament can start without the Queen (Or in her other Realms, her Representative, Usually a Governor General) opening it via a Speech from the Throne, and the business of Government does not (technically) end until the Prime Minister goes to the Queen (Or, again, in her other Realms, her Representative, Usually a Governor General) to request that Parliament be disbanded and to request a writ be made to order a new election. . . . This use of Constitutional Monarchy ensures that any Government of the day is simply a ‘temporary holder’ of the Crown’s legal authority, and thusly, any Government who becomes too abusive of these powers can be removed with the stroke of a pen.
Burlamaqui, one of the fathers of international law, concluded after years and years of study as a legal scholar that:
This species of Monarchy, limited by a mixed government, unites the principal advantages of absolute Monarchy, and of the Aristocratic and popular governments; [while] at the same time it avoids the dangers and inconveniences peculiar to each. This is the happy temperament, which we have been endeavoring to find [or create].
“. . . Constitutional Monarchy means that the highest office in the land is beyond politics. It denies ultimate power to politicians and helps to keep political power under check. . . .”
Some of the worst bloodshed the world has ever known has been a result of overthrowing monarchies in the supposed attempt to make the world safe for democracy. Sir Winston Churchill explained in April of 1945 that:
This war [World War II] would never had come unless, under American and modernizing pressure, we had driven the Habsburgs out of Austria and the Hohenzollerns out of Germany. By making these vacuums we gave the opening for the Hitlerite monster to crawl out of the sewer on to the vacant thrones.
If we examine the fate of such countries as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan and Ethiopia, the Balkan states and others following the overthrow of their sovereigns, we see the level of mismanagement and devastation their republican systems have given them. On the bright side we can look at the positive evolution of the restored monarchy in Spain and Cambodia and to the healing that has taken place within Uganda since the restoration of their kingdoms.
“By their fruits ye shall know them,” the Bible says. That is, by judging results, behavior, and actions, you can usually judge things accurately. (Matthew 7:20) “Decolonization has worked best when independent countries have adopted, retained and recognized monarchy.” “Winston Churchill often described parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy as being imperfect – but the best that man had yet devised.” The loss of monarchy has often resulted badly:
What exactly, for instance, has France gained by the adoption of a republican regime for the fifth time [having lost its monarchy]? Does she count any more in the counsels of the world, or are her citizens any happier? . . . The stormy and checkered career of Germany since the conclusion of the First World War hardly encourages the belief that the Reich is better for the absence of an Emperor. . . .
The collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy was hailed as heralding the dawn of a new era in what had previously been the Austro-Hungarian Empire, yet for the next quarter of a century the worlds’ statesmen toiled in vain to find some solution to the problem of the Succession States until most of them were gobbled up by Soviet Russia.
Russia under Nicholas II, with all the survivals of feudalism, had opposition political parties, independent trade unions and newspapers, a rather radical parliament and a modern legal system. Its agriculture was on the level of the USA, with industry rapidly approaching the Western European level.
[In contrast] in the USSR there was total tyranny, no political liberties and practically no human rights. Its economy was not viable; agriculture was destroyed. The terror against the population reached a scope unprecedented in [human] history.
No wonder many Russians look back at Tsarist Russia as a paradise lost.
The idea that “mankind marches continually forward toward even higher levels of progress, is incorrect.” Since democratic republics took over, civilization has declined – there is increased exploitation and social decay, including “a change from limited warfare to total war, and the 20th century, the age of democracy, must be ranked also among the most murderous periods of all history.” It is [also] a well-known historical fact “. . . that the democratic idea led to the most destructive war ever fought in the Western Hemisphere.” The American Civil War resulted in 620,000 combat casualties and many thousands of unnecessary civilian deaths via war crimes. No war in the 19th century did more damage. It was much more violent and destructive than any of the Napoleonic wars or even all of them combined. “. . . Empirical evidence indicates that democracy promotes ethnic conflict,” because “majoritarian politics” tend to create all kinds of absurd laws and unfair policies that benefit a few at the expense of everyone else. “. . . Democracies [also] lead the world in crime statistics.” Of “the twenty-one most murderous nations on earth,” with only one exception, they were all democracies. The conclusion of one well-known author on democracy is that it unwittingly “contributes to crime, wasted lives, and a general decline of morality and culture.” It must be kept in mind that “the abuse of state power by government officials is usually the worst abuse of power that anyone can contemplate. . . . [It is] the most destructive and devastating power that exists.”
As will be seen in the next section, the governmental combination of monarchy, nobility, and democracy, generally has produced greater general stability, enjoyed greater unity and prosperity, and, above all, this form of government tended to protect the most sacred and beautiful freedoms that all men and women desire.
Constitutional Checks and Balances to Safeguard Freedom and Prevent Corruption
Wrongs have obviously existed in all ages of the history of the earth; however, by far, the worst predator and perpetrator of abuse has been government. That is:
Throughout history, states have existed as instruments for organized predation and exploitation. It doesn’t much matter which group of people happen to gain control of the State at any given time, whether it be . . . despots, kings, landlords, privileged merchants, army officers, or Communist parties. . . . Generally, the State has its inception in naked banditry and conquest. . . .
As a general rule, government is the most violent force on the planet. If one wants to get a true perspective on the historical record regarding who or what routinely produces the most violence and death, one should pick up a copy of R. J. Rummel’s book, “Death By Government.” Since the end of World War II, Communist China and Red Russia lead the pack when it comes to death and brutality; however, the US government has inflicted its share of carnage as well. For example, in Iraq and Afghanistan alone, the government in Washington, D.C., has killed over 800,000 civilians (and this figure is a conservative estimate noting the most credible resources possible).
Government is serious business and it is dangerous. It must be controlled and limited. If we fail to learn from the past, we are condemned to repeat it. To grow and improve or make headway as human beings, we need to learn some of the most important lessons of life and statecraft. Democracies and/or Republics, unfortunately, promote a great deal of graft, corruption, and secret crimes that could be eliminated and derailed merely by identifying the ways in which this kind of treachery normally takes place and instituting laws to correct them and/or prevent their development.
The constant hidden threat of the misuse of power and corruption in government must be recognized as a very real, persistent, and entrenched enemy. Thomas Jefferson observed, “Experience hath shewn, that even under the best forms of government those entrusted with power have, in time, and by slow operations, perverted it into tyranny.” Those who would force things must be curtailed. Government, after all, provides some of the greatest temptations to abuse and rob the people known to mankind; therefore:
The way to have good and safe government, is not to trust it all to one, but to divide it[s] [powers] among the many. . . . What has destroyed liberty and the rights of man in every government which has ever existed under the sun? The generalizing and concentrating of all cares and powers into one body.
Constitutional governments and constitutional monarchy are limited for the sake of being guardians of freedom rather than instruments of oppression. They have checks and balances integrated into their system to protect the people from tyranny and abuse as well as corruption, if it is properly organized and enforced. In the case of a limited monarchy, the king or ruling prince is still supreme or the highest of all, even though a constitution limits his power. Grotius wrote, “. . . Sovereignty does not cease to be such [it is not less] even if he who is [the supreme ruler or monarch] . . . exercise[s] it [and] makes promises [such as creating a constitution. . . .”
In the case of a constitutional or limited monarch, he holds all sovereignty in a dormant or inactive state. Though he obligates himself to follow certain ordained rules in a constitution, he is still the sovereign who holds all its full rights. He possesses all the power and glory of the nation even though it is in an inactive or dormant state. The fact that a monarch has agreed to restrict the exercise of his Sovereign Power by swearing to a constitution in no way derogates from the unalienable sovereignty residing in his person. Although a monarch may restrict the powers he personally exercises by granting a constitution, he, nevertheless, remains the source of power for all other branches and instrumentalities of his government. In other words, the constitution derives its force from his assent to it. He is the grantor of whatever rights the constitution bestows. The king or sovereign prince is not deprived of the power conferred upon him by his kingship merely because he has promised to exercise it in a certain way. That is, “. . . Each sovereign is omnipotent [all powerful] in the jural universe” that is, in the legal sense, even if he is limited by a constitution.
“Supremacy [the right, not the actual power to rule] means that one is subject to no higher authority, not that one’s authority is absolute and unlimited.” “. . . A holder of sovereignty need not be supreme [and absolute] in all matters.” Some things are wisely and intelligently delegated. A “limitation of the exercise of Sovereignty [can take place]. . . . Sovereignty may be limited in a quantitative sense [through checks and balances like having a mix of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy], but not [in] a qualitative one.” The king or ruling prince is still supreme. He has “. . . in his own person all the rights to sovereignty and royalty. . . .” No one else has this in its fullness, even though he does not exercise all power. It is an:
. . . extremely relevant [and important] fact that sovereigns need not have supreme authority over all matters within a territory. . . . [In fact] in practice, modern sovereigns have never had total license or absolute authority over everything.
“What can be said with almost certainty is that probably no state has ever exercised complete rule over its territory. . . .” Sovereignty is legally absolute in that the “right” is absolute, but the absolute exercise of it never happens and never will. But there are certainly men in history, such as, Hitler, who have exercised too much power. Such power is corrupting and dangerous to everything sacred, noble, and beautiful in life. Sovereignty was never meant to be free to do anything it wishes. The well-known legal philosopher Jean Bodin, who wrote extensively on the absoluteness of sovereignty, declared in 1576:
If . . . [sovereignty] means exemption from all law whatsoever, there is no prince [or king] in the world who can be regarded as sovereign, since all the princes of the earth are subject to the laws of God and of nature, and even to certain human laws common to all nations.
Sovereignty is not lawlessness or anything goes. It is a responsibility. Emerich de Vattel stated, “. . . there is a dignity and decorum that particularly belongs to the supreme rank,” and it is “the virtues which constitute the glory of princes.” “He [the royal personage] cannot neglect them without degrading himself, and casting a stain upon the state. Everything that emanates from the throne ought to bear the character of purity, nobleness, and greatness.”
. . . Virtue in princes has this advantage, that it is the surest method of inspiring their subjects with the like principles. For this purpose they need only show the way. The example of the prince has a greater force than the law. It is as it were a living law, of more efficacy than precept.
Sovereigns and public officials are responsible to provide an example worth emulating to help society be decent and law-abiding. When government instead gives the example of crime, there is not much hope in reforming the people or developing a just society.
Jean J. Burlamaqui, one of the founders or supporters of international law, wrote that, “Sovereigns ought . . . to regulate their outward behaviour in a manner worthy of their [high and exalted] rank and dignity.” Nobility, which includes royal persons, by definition, means the quality of having an exalted character and following ideals. Synonyms for nobility include brilliance, grandeur, grandness, majesty, magnificence, resplendence, splendor, stateliness, superbness, greatness, or being remarkable and extraordinary.
Government power provides one of the greatest temptations for corruption on earth. Politicians are not angels. They are vulnerable human beings. Checks and balances that cannot be altered, bypassed, or compromised must be applied as a protection and safeguard to everything precious and sacred in life.
In ancient Israel, the day came that the people requested that they be given a king. The problem was they wanted a king “like all the nations” around them. (1 Samuel 8:20) They demanded, “make us a king to judge us like all the nations.” (1 Samuel 8:5) The reaction of both the Prophet Samuel and the Lord to this request was a resounding, “No!” But why? The answer is, they wanted an absolute king like everyone else. This was not God’s plan. Cardinal Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621) describes how God at first refused to grant the Israelites a king. He declared:
All these incidents clearly indicate that God did not desire his people to have absolute kings as the Gentiles had them, because He foresaw that they would abuse such power.
The Lord later granted them kings, but they were to be limited or controlled by the rule of law and a separation of powers, which included the power of the High Priest or Levitical Priesthood, the influence of the Prophets, and the vote of the king’s council. In other words, it was a rule that had checks and balances. John Milton observed:
Aristotle . . . whom we commonly allow for one of the best interpreters of nature and morality, writes in the fourth of his Politics, chap. x. that “monarchy unaccountable, is the worst sort of tyranny, and least of all to be endured by freeborn men.”
In other words, the best, safest, and divine way to have kings, or any other kind of powerful ruler, is to have constitutional safeguards designed into the governing system to limit and separate the power of government. Note the following commandment:
18. And it shall be, when he sitteth upon the throne of his kingdom, that he shall write him a copy of this law in a book out of that which is before the priests the Levites:
19. And it shall be with him, and he shall read therein all the days of his life: that he may learn to fear the LORD his God, to keep all the words of this law and these statutes, to do them:
20. That his heart be not lifted up above his brethren, and that he turn not aside from the commandment, to the right hand, or to the left. . . . (Deuteronomy 17)
In the Mishnah, we find Rabbi Simeon writing about things considered sacred to the Jews. He wrote, “There are three crowns: The crown of Torah, the crown of priesthood, and the crown of royalty. . . .” Royalty and kingship were so sacred that they were mentioned as equals to the priesthood and the Torah itself, but kingship was not above them. The kings were to be followers of righteousness in their hearts and to the very core of their being. Hence, the God of heaven made this extremely important obligation. His creation was not the right of an unlimited scepter of absolute power. Such was never at any time authorized in this divine institution of monarchy.
In the community of Qumran about 200 B.C., what is most surprising is that “over a thousand years before the Magna Charta, the Dead Sea sectaries promote a constitutional monarch.” The king was “to have a council of thirty-six, consisting of twelve priests, twelve Levites, and twelve Israelites, which held veto powers over the king. He had to consult the council on everything. He could not declare war without its consent.” So even though “the book of Deuteronomy . . . prescribes a constitutional monarch,” which is different from the kinds of kings found round about, “. . . the Temple Scroll puts teeth into its laws [of limitation] by ordaining [that there should be with the king] an executive body that can enforce [the limits].”
In support of this, Flavius Josephus, a priest and scholar about 78 B.C., undertook a massive work in Greek explaining the history of the Jews. He explained that Moses prophesied, “. . . let him [the king] be always careful of justice and other virtues perpetually; let him submit to the laws, and esteem God’s commands to be his highest wisdom; but let him do nothing without the high priest and the votes of the senators. . . .” Again, kings should be limited and constrained by a keen desire to be righteous and obedient to God’s laws and, in addition, by a powerful council that had veto power. All of these things were to protect the people from abuse and ensure the best benefit and good of society. It was a divinely approved system.
If democracy were indeed the best form of government as some suggest, was it not strange that divine wisdom should have failed to discover the fact? In the history of the chosen people nowhere does God approve the democratic as the best form. . . .
But monarchy limited by an aristocracy and the consent of the people is mentioned in the Bible. This mix of monarchy, aristocracy, and representational government is considered the best that ever was, or ever could be, created for mankind. Many of the great minds of ancient days including Plato, Aristotle, Tacitus, Polybius, Cicero, and a number of others, all extolled the supremacy of having an aristocracy and democratic component with a limited monarch at the head. As food for thought, in the Associated Papers in London in 1793, Thomas Bull wrote:
They tell us that all Kings are bad; that God never made a King; and that all Kings are very expensive. But, that all Kings are bad cannot be true: because God himself is one of them; he calls himself King of Kings; which not only shows us he is a King, but he has other Kings under him: he is never called King of Republics. The Scripture calls Kings, the Lord’s Anointed; but who ever heard of an anointed Republic?
Adam Clarke (1762 - 1832), a widely respected and well-known Biblical scholar, took forty years to create his exhaustive commentary. On Samuel and kingship in Israel, he wrote that the children of Israel wanted an absolute king like the nations around them, but God, in His wisdom gave them the best kind of monarchy – a monarchy that was limited. Dr. Clarke explained that the kingly government of God is “where the king, the nobles, and the people, are duly mixed, each having his proper part in the government, and each preventing the other from running to excess, and all limited by law.” This is a perfect example of the great principle of “checks and balances,” which are extremely protective of freedom and important to the preservation of what is right and good. Dr. Clarke elaborated:
That the three grand forms of government which have obtained among mankind, viz., monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, have each certain advantages without which no state can be well preserved; but they have evils by which any state may be injured. That, from a proper mixture of these, the advantages of the whole may be reaped without any of their attendant evils.
In other words, if set up right, this kind of government works extremely well. Dr. Clarke concluded that this form of limited monarchy or “. . . kingly government, properly understood, is a good of the first magnitude to the civil happiness of mankind.”
The United States was created with this idea in mind with an Executive, a House of Senators, which were originally supposed to be chosen by the States, not the people, to protect States’ rights, and a House of Representatives elected by the people. As shown in a number of republics, however, through the years, it is obvious that this mix is right, but, if administered wrong, great harm occurs. What is profoundly needed is more checks and balances, not less. Thomas Jefferson said, “Sometimes it is said that man cannot be trusted with the government of himself. Can he, then, be trusted with the government of others?” We can learn from the past with the express desire that we do not repeat it, because the past is full of grave mistakes that have hurt mankind and crippled potential and progress.
Throughout history, states have existed as instruments for organized predation [predatory behavior] and exploitation. It doesn’t much matter which group of people happen to gain control of the State at any given time, whether it be . . . despots, kings, landlords, privileged merchants, army officers, or Communist parties. The result is everywhere and always the coercive mulcting [fining and taxation] of the mass of the producers – in most centuries, of course, largely the peasantry – by a ruling class of dominant rulers and their hired professional bureaucracy. Generally, the State has its inception in naked banditry and conquest. . . .
The point is, men need to be curtailed when put in positions of trust for the public good, because, as the old saying goes, “all power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Hence, the ancient scholar Publius wrote, “[A]mbition must be made to counteract ambition. . . .” Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755), one of the great political philosophers of the Enlightenment period, sums it all up very well. He wrote:
Liberty does not flourish because men have natural rights or because they revolt if their rulers push them too far; it flourishes because power is so distributed and so organized that whoever is tempted to abuse it finds legal restraints in his way.
Checks and balances make corruption unprofitable and far too risky, so much so, that what is right and good may prosper and abound.
It all boils down to this; in the words of Will Durant, “Without checks and balances [extremes eventually prevail], monarchy becomes despotism, aristocracy [the nobility] becomes oligarchy, [and] democracy becomes mob rule, chaos [or anarchy], and [then] dictatorship [fills the vacuum or void].” Hence, the injunction to protect what is of such great worth and importance, for on a personal and governmental basis, “. . . no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions. . . .” Mankind can never be free without constitutionally-limited government.
But there is another extremely important dimension that is indispensable to success and the future of mankind. It is well-expressed in the following two citations:
. . . Neither the wisest constitution nor the wisest laws will secure the liberty and happiness of a people whose manners are universally corrupt. Here therefore is the truest friend to the liberty of his country who tries most to promote its virtue, and who [will do] so far as his power and influence extend. . . .
If there be not [virtue in the people], we are in a wretched situation. No theoretical checks – no form of government can render us secure [safe or free]. To suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical [or an absurd] idea. . . .
Douglas MacArthur, the great general of all the armed forces of the United States, observed:
History fails to record a single precedent in which nations subject to moral decay have not passed into political and economic decline. There has been either a spiritual awakening to overcome the moral lapse, or a progressive deterioration leading to ultimate national disaster.
A country can only be as strong as the families that make it up. People, after all, are the bricks and mortar of society. If there is love in the home, there will be peace in the nation. No nation can get around the fact extolled by King David of ancient Israel, who declared that, “Righteousness exalteth a nation: but sin is a reproach to any people.” (Proverbs 14:34) You cannot build something great on something that is corrupt and broken. Lawless thugs, organized crime and a reprobate population can ruin anything.
There’s an old joke about what’s the best form of government for [the people in] an insane asylum? Democracy, a monarchy, socialism, communism, a limited representative system? Of course, the answer is, it doesn’t matter what form of government. If everybody is crazy, whatever form you have will get screwed up and all sorts of terrible things will happen.
Good people create good things:
It is what the unimportant [the people of the nation] do that really counts and determines the course of history. The greatest forces in the universe are never spectacular. Summer showers are more effective than hurricanes, but they are not remembered. The world would soon die but for the fidelity, loyalty, and consecration of those [the common people] whose names are unhonored and unsung. There is, therefore, no life however humble, but may take its place in the building of a braver and better tomorrow. It is so easy to exaggerate the importance of the [so-called] important and underestimate the importance of the [so-called] unimportant.
The common man or woman, though unsung, unhonored, and untitled can be classed among the truly great of this or any generation. They are not common, and can be beautiful and noble in many ways.
Virtue, or a deep and abiding love for the right, is an essential quality of a free, law abiding and motivated nation, which produces jobs and creates economic growth and prosperity. Such a standard of inner good makes safeguards, such as checks and balances with a separation of powers, work exceptionally well to the benefit and best good of the nation. “. . . Government can worthily perform its function only when obedience is enshrined in the hearts of the governed, that laws are vain without loyalty. . . .” Right reasoning and good hearts are the best way to preserve the greatest and most priceless things in life.
Buddha is attributed to have had the following experience in enlightening two kings about what was really important at a critical juncture:
It is reported that two kingdoms were on the verge of war for the possession of a certain embankment which was disputed by them. And the Buddha seeing the kings and their armies ready to fight, requested them to tell him the cause of their quarrels. Having heard the complaints on both sides, he said: “I understand that the embankment has value for some of your people; has it any intrinsic value aside from its service to your men?”
“It has no intrinsic value whatever was the reply.”
The Tathagata continued: “Now when you go to battle is it not sure that many of your men will be slain and that you yourselves, O kings, are liable to lose your lives?”
And they said: “It is sure that many will be slain and our own lives be jeopardized.”
“The blood of men, however,” said Buddha, “has it less intrinsic value than a mound of earth?”
“No,” the kings said, “The lives of men and above all the lives of kings, are priceless.”
Then the Tathagata concluded: “Are you going to stake that which is priceless against that which has no intrinsic value whatever?” – The wrath of the two monarchs abated, and they came to a peaceable agreement.
The moral to the story is embedded in the discovery of what was of greatest worth and embracing it so that all lesser concerns melt away into insignificance. Truth must prevail. People are more important than things, and the purpose of government is to bless and benefit mankind. However, this must be done in complete harmony with the highest law on earth, which are correct principles.
The Proper Role of Government under the Necessary Law of Nations
To be de jure, rightful and legitimate, a government must fulfill its proper role and function. To be more or less than what is rightful and lawful is to do serious harm in some way or another. Sir Winston Churchill declared:
. . . The Law of Nature or Reason taught “no one ought to harm another in his life, health, property or possessions,” so in a civil state any ruler who violated these rights forfeited his right to rule, for their protection was his sole reason for existence.
The lawful limit of government is expressed well in the Alabama State Constitution:
That the sole object and only legitimate end of government is to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property, and when the government assumes other functions it is usurpation and oppression.
President Grover Cleveland, the 22nd President of the United States, described one of the most important functions of government when he declared that “. . . though the people support the Government the Government should not support the people.” This introduces the concept of legalized plunder or legalized theft, which amounts to hidden usurpation, legal abuse, and oppression. Frederic Bastiat (1801-1850), a French political economist and theorist, wrote a very important book called The Law, where he explained just and unjust laws and how good laws can support a free and lawful society. He identified one very corrosive wrong foisted on the people by government in the name of charity and humanitarianism or what is called “social justice.” It is the various schemes that involve the redistribution of wealth or compulsory theft of property. He stated that:
When a portion of wealth is transferred from the person who owns it – without his consent and without compensation, and whether by force or by fraud – to anyone who does not own it, then I say that property is violated; that an act of plunder is committed!
How is the legal plunder to be identified? Quite simply: See if the law takes from some persons what belongs to them, and gives it to other persons to whom it does not belong. See if the law benefits one citizen at the expense of another by doing what the citizen himself cannot do without committing a crime. . . .
He strongly declared that, “It is impossible to introduce into society . . . a greater evil than this: the conversion of the law into an instrument of plunder.” Congressman Davy Crockett (1786-1836), a frontier folk hero, was so impressed by the following statement of Horatio Bunce, a farmer, that he recorded it for posterity:
The power and disbursing money [redistribution] at pleasure is the most dangerous power that can be entrusted to man. . . . You will very easily perceive what a wide door this would open for fraud and corruption and favoritism, on the one hand, and for robbing the people on the other. No, Colonel, Congress has no right to give charity.
Not only is theft wrong, even if legalized, but it is the primary road to totalitarianism, oppression and tyranny. Yet it is often promoted by very sincere idealistic people who taut the slogan term of “social justice.” The problem here is:
Most of the major ills of the world have been caused by well-meaning people who ignored the principle of individual freedom, except as applied to themselves, and who were obsessed with fanatical zeal to improve the lot of mankind-in-the-mass through some pet formula of their own. The harm done by ordinary criminals, murderers, gangsters, and thieves is negligible in comparison with the agony inflicted upon human beings by the professional do-gooders, who attempt to set themselves up as gods on earth and who would ruthlessly force their [charitable] views on all others – with the abiding assurance that the end justifies the means.
“We’re dealing with [one of] the oldest political error[s]: the belief that because everyone wants something, government should or must provide it.” Property is to be protected and not confiscated. Benjamin Franklin wrote an essay on the wrongs of public charity. He told a British friend, “I have long been of the opinion, that your legal provision for the poor is a very great evil, operating as it does on the encouragement of idleness. We have followed your example, and begin now to see our error, and, I hope, shall reform it.”
A survey of Franklin’s views on counter-productive compassion might be summarized as follows:
1. Compassion which gives a drunk the means to increase his drunkenness is counter-productive.
2. Compassion which breeds debilitating dependency and weakness is counter-productive.
3. Compassion which blunts the desire and necessity to work for a living is counter-productive.
4. Compassion which smothers the instinct to strive and excel is counter-productive.
A legalized theft program involves forced charity or coercion by increased government taxation and regulation; that is, it takes from the “haves” and gives to the “have nots.” This is the “Robin Hood” philosophy of socialism, communism, and welfarism. This is an obvious violation of the life, liberty and property, which is opposite to the proper role of government. Charity is a private affair, not a public responsibility. Ronald Reagan declared:
You and I are told increasingly that we have to choose between a left or right, but I would like to suggest that there is no such thing as a left or right. There is only an up or down –- up to a man’s age-old dream, the ultimate in individual freedom consistent with law and order –- or down to the ant heap totalitarianism, and regardless of their sincerity, their humanitarian motives, those who would trade our freedom for security have embarked on this downward course. . . .
. . . They use terms like the “Great Society,” or . . . we must accept a “greater government activity in the affairs of the people.” . . . They have voices that say “the cold war will end through acceptance of a . . . democratic socialism.” Another voice says that the profit motive has become outmoded, it must be replaced by . . . the welfare state. . . . [We must meet] “. . . the material needs of the masses through the full power of centralized government.” . . . A government can’t control the economy without controlling people. And they know when a government sets out to do that, it must use force and coercion to achieve its purpose.
No matter what the big government does, it excels in fraud, waste, and corruption, therefore, it must be limited to protecting us and not providing for us.
Ronald Reagan said it best. Big Government is never the answer it is the problem! It always masks itself at first as the savior, problem solver, and the defender of the poor and most needy. We saw this kind of seduction and bold takeover strategy by Castro in Cuba, Hitler in Germany, Mussolini and Stalin to name a few.
They don’t gain power so quickly by stating their plans to control all media, seize all guns, land and food supplies. They didn’t talk about the mass murders and torture to come once the seduction and distraction wore off. They engorged themselves on the societal worship they received while they planned their reigns of destruction and horror. Millions sat back and let them do it as they prayed for them!
Why do certain leaders and movements always morph into big Government?
It is the classic, narcissistic and ancient problem of mankind. Many wanna’ be leaders through out time translate Government and leadership into being served, not serving; being worshiped and submitted to not worshipping and submitting to God; controlling, demanding and dictating, not protecting our basic God given rights to freedom.
As there are always people with hidden agendas for power and control, there must be checks and balances to hinder and thwart corruption whenever it appears. It is a never-ending battle to follow correct principles and not establish counter-productive practices.
The proper role of government is not to divide up the pie equally through immense power and force, but the proper role of government is to provide incentive to create a bigger pie so that everyone may profit. That is, a rising tide raises all the boats in the harbor. Everyone is better off. Therefore, instead of burdening the people with taxation, legal theft, and the stranglehold of oppressive regulations, it is better to provide incentive, which can be summarized in the following simple formula:
1. Economic security for all is impossible without widespread abundance.
2. Abundance is impossible without industrious and efficient production.
3. Such production is impossible without energetic, willing, and eager labor.
4. This is not possible without incentive.
5. Of all the forms of incentive, the freedom to attain a reward for one’s labors is the most sustaining for most people. Sometimes called the profit motive, it is simply the right to plan and to earn and to enjoy the fruits of your labor.
6. This profit motive diminishes as government controls, regulates, and taxes increase all of which deny the fruit of success to those who produce.
7. Therefore, any attempt through governmental intervention to redistribute the material rewards of labor can only result in the eventual destruction of the productive base of society, without which real abundance and security for more than the ruling elite is quite impossible.
Private property is critical to prosperity:
When everybody owns something, nobody owns it, and nobody has a direct interest in maintaining or improving its condition. That is why buildings in the Soviet Union—like public housing in the United States—look decrepit within a year or two of their construction.
Nobody spends somebody else’s money as carefully as he spends his own. Nobody uses somebody else’s resources as carefully as he uses his own. So if you want efficiency and effectiveness, if you want knowledge to be properly utilized, you have to do it through the means of private property.
During the Communist days, the Soviet Union allowed each peasant family a little private land to do with it as they pleased, and anything the family members produced, they would keep. The profit motive allowed to them resulted in amazing productivity over the collective farms. “With only 3 percent of total sown area in the 1980s, they produced over a quarter of gross agricultural output, including about 30 percent of meat and milk, 66 percent of potatoes, and 40 percent of fruits, vegetables, and eggs.” This should have been an eye-opener to the Communist elite. Only very motivated people produce wealth and prosperity for a nation. The “profit motive” is the greatest motivation there is on earth. Ruin it, and you will ruin the future of any nation, kingdom, or empire. A newspaper article in South Africa accurately summarized the situation when it stated:
As has been shown worldwide, when you eliminate private enterprise you remove the incentive to work, to improve, to excel. When the opportunity for personal gain is removed, so is motivation and the need to achieve. An unfortunate human trait, but a trait nevertheless and one that lies at the root of the failure of socialism. Indolence does not feed people [or create greatness, happiness or wealth].
We must remember democratic capitalism has, over time, done more to reduce poverty than any other economic system. . . . Two years ago, The Economist estimated that one billion people had been removed from the ranks of extreme poverty over the previous twenty years because of trade and free-market capitalism. . . . In 2011, researchers at the Brookings Institute concluded that “…the world – even Sub-Saharan Africa – is in the midst of rapid poverty reduction. . . .”
The pursuit of profit is critical to a world that demands economic growth – a necessity to accommodate the natural growth in population and to allow for the eradication of poverty. Without profits, what incentives do people have to invest time, labor and capital? Without profits, businesses cannot expand and hire. Without profits, economies would grind to a halt, people would starve and disease would run rampant. . . .
It is government, not capitalism that abets inequality. Complexity in the tax code works to the advantage of big corporations and the wealthy. Regulation is supposed to aid the consumer, when in fact it too often is used to bar competition. . . .
Free market capitalism is not the issue. It is rules in developed economies that serve the wealthy and regulations designed to protect existing businesses. And it is regimes that ignore the rule of law and that do not honor property rights. Profits are not evil; they are necessary for the elimination of poverty, but they only work in societies where citizens have the rights of a free people. To blindly demean capitalism is to destroy the goose that laid the golden egg.
The proper role of government is to protect freedom and promote liberty. The right to life, liberty, and property are part of the natural law and from “. . . these three gifts from God proceed [in magnitude and importance far above] all human legislation, and [these things] are [far] superior to it.”
“The ownership of property is a natural right. . . .” Indeed, “. . . man is placed here under circumstances which render his possession of the earth indispensable to his very subsistence” as an individual and member of a family. “. . . [He] has a natural right to call that his, which he himself, by his own labor, has created.” And from the thunder and lightning of Mt. Sinai, we have the commandment, “Thou shalt not steal” and “Thou shalt not covet,” because ownership is sacred, for all time and all the ages of mankind. (Exodus 20:15 & 17)
Man . . . was fitted and intended by the author of his being for society and government, and for the acquisition and enjoyment of property. It is, to speak correctly, the law of his nature. . . . The sense of property is inherent in the human breast.
In regard to property:
Society is under law, and is as much bound to consult the right as is the meanest individual, and has no right to enact what is not in accordance with the law of nature, or the will of God.
In is so important that:
The [very] existence of society depends on the existence of property, for no man would work if the fruits of his labour were not secured to him, and no one would take any care of anything if he had no permanent and undivided interest in it.
Hence, property rights must be protected and safeguarded as an inviolate right.
[Mankind] . . . has three great rights, equally sacred from arbitrary interference: the right to his life, the right to his liberty, the right to his property. . . . The three rights are so bound up together as to be essentially one right. To give a man his life but deny him his liberty is to take from him all that makes his life worth living. To give him his liberty but take from him the property which is the fruit and badge of his liberty, is to still leave him a slave [or oppressed].
Edmund Burke taught that prescription, property, and the law of nature were inseparable:
For Burke, the fundamental “human right” was the right to the protection of property. . . . He argues that not even Parliament has the right “to violate property, to overrule prescription or to force a currency of their own [legal] fiction in the place of what is real, and recognized by the law of nations.”
. . . Prescription, [was] one of his [Burke’s] most cherished principles. Anxious above all to defend existing property rights, Burke appeals beyond the mere “municipal law” to “the law of nature itself.”
There can be no prescription old enough to supersede the law of nature, and the grant of God almighty; who has given to all men a natural right to be free. . . . The same law of nature and of reason is equally obligatory on a democracy, an aristocracy, and a monarchy. . . .
On the rights of mankind, he wrote:
Against these there can be no prescription; against these [sacred rights] no argument is binding: these admit no temperament [or curtailment], and no compromise: any thing withheld from their full demand is so much of fraud and injustice.
Revolutionaries (the so-called freedom fighters) generally have extreme ideas that are not in tune with the building of a civil, decent, and productive society. One of their many subversive doctrines is the idea of equality in all things instead of freedom, which they are supposed to be fighting for. But they are fighting against nature.
It is important to remember that there will always be inequality and unfairness in mortal life; similarly there will always be those who are poor. This seems to be in opposition to the idea that “all men were created equal,” but this refers to equality before the law, not equality in possessions and everything else, which is an impossibility. John Adams addressed this well when he wrote:
But what are we to understand here by equality [the idea that all men are created equal]? Are the citizens to be all of the same age, sex, size, strength, stature, activity, courage, hardiness, industry, patience, ingenuity, wealth, knowledge, fame, wit, temperance, constancy, and wisdom? Was there, or will there ever be, a nation, whose individuals were all equal, in natural and acquired qualities, in virtues, talents, and riches? [It is common sense that] the answer of all mankind must be in the negative. It must then be acknowledged, that in every state . . . for example, there are inequalities which God and nature have planted there, and which no human legislator ever can eradicate.
Men, not being equally talented, equally frugal or industrious, or equally energetic and motivated, will always experience unequal results. Equality of outcome is impossible. Success by definition means prosperity for some and lesser results for others. Even luck, or the lack thereof, is devisive. We are only equal in our legal rights, but not equal otherwise. It cannot be any other way without a system of wholesale forced theft and the elimination of the right of property and freedom. The following was written in 1854 in response to such subversive philosophies:
. . . You must settle the question [of] what is liberty, before you can determine whether any given government is or is not tyrannical and oppressive. For aught I know, you may regard as oppressive what I regard as wise and salutary restraint, and as tyranny, what I hold to be just and legitimate government. We must know what liberty is before we can know what violates it.
[Is liberty] the free and full exercise of all my rights as [a] man[?]. It is undoubtedly that, but is it nothing more? . . .
[The point is] in civil society they have or are [actually] supposed to have unequal rights, [because there are] special rights growing out of their special [and unique] relations, – the rights of husband and wife, of parents and children, rights of property, rights of position or rank, rights of office, &c. . . .
[What about] your rights as a scholar, as a gentleman, as a citizen, as a proprietor, and, if such you were, your rights as a magistrate, as a senator, as a sovereign prince. . . . [Are these to be thrown out as unequal and therefore inequitable?]
[For example] . . . during the term for which [a man] has been elected [president], has not General Pierce [14th President of the United States] certain vested rights which no other man in the world has – certain exclusive rights, which during that period no other man may claim or exercise? If you say No, you deny his exclusive right to officiate as President, and deny all civil authority, and all civil society, even democracy itself; for democracy [really a republic] asserts the right of the people to choose representatives to act in their name, and to clothe each of them with certain special and exclusive powers. If you say Yes, you must concede a class of rights . . . civil rights, or, in general terms, vested rights. . . .
. . . I look upon the man who seeks to rob me of my vested rights, whether he do it in the name of liberty or any other name, as a tyrant and a despot in heart and in deed. . . .
[That is] your [kind of] liberty would leave me only a small portion of my rights, and I demand a liberty which leaves me in full possession of all my rights. You claim the right in the name of liberty to dispossess me of all my vested rights [all that I own], and in so [doing] you make liberty a pretext for robbery and oppression.
All men have certain [specific] equal rights [by law], for all are equally men; but it does not follow from that fact, that all have a natural right to equality in all things. Even you yourself would shrink from so gross an absurdity. You do not pretend that all men have an equal right to be of the same height, and that those who are below a certain standard must be stretched, and those who rise above it must be lopped off. If it were so, your own head would be in danger. Neither can you pretend that all have a natural right to equality of intellect or genius. All have an equal natural right to property, but not therefore to equal property. All have an equal natural right to marry, but not therefore an equal right [to every man’s wife to do with her as they please, this is not a right, it is a crime]. . . . Every one has an equal right to be himself, but not to be another; an equal right to his own, but not that his own shall be equal to every other man’s own. . . .
I do John Smith no wrong when I employ instead of him Bill Thompson to be my coachman; I do no wrong to Peter Hagarty’s nephew in leaving my estate to my own nephew instead of leaving it to him, although by so doing I make my nephew a rich man, and leave Peter’s poor; for Peter’s nephew has no natural or acquired right to my estate. If he is suffering, I am bound by the common ties of humanity and religion to relieve him, but not to enrich him.
In other words, we must have unequal rights, (such as those held by as office holders, enforcement officers, magistrates, etc.), so that others can enjoy the freedom of law and order. This creates an atmosphere of safety and well-being in which to grow food, create businesses and jobs, and build a better future for the country as a whole. Special vested rights are essential, even critical, in any society.
It is a basic seminal principle that you cannot have personal or international freedom (the precious right of self-determination) unless you have the necessary resources or property to defend your freedom and fully experience and enjoy it. Without this right, both people and nations become subjects to other powers and lose their independence or the freedom to make their own free-will choices. Money, property, and resources are power. And “where an excess of power prevails . . . no man [no nation] is safe in his opinions, his person, his faculties, or his possessions.” In recognition of this incredibly important concept, “The United Nations has adopted more than 80 resolutions relating to permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and the principle has been incorporated into a number of multilateral treaties.” It can all be summed up as follows:
No government can be lawful and legitimate that does not protect life, liberty, and property. Confiscation or legalized theft, is still theft and it is a crime against humanity, unless there is a national emergency. In the event That such seizure must take place, then there must be fair restitution of some kind.
All truly lawful governments will place a high priority on protecting and defending these three great gifts of God to mankind, which includes the right of deposed monarchs and legitimate governments-in-exile to, at the very least, be protected in their lawful rights whether they are ever restored or not. “Might does not make right” and never will. It is important that what is right and true prevails above all other things for the future of mankind. Because the existence of a wholesome and uplifting society depends on the existence of property rights secured for the men and women who own property.
William J. H. Boetcker wrote the following maxims, based upon “right reason,” that are needed for responsible and realistic government. Unfortunately these are rarely followed because of false philosophies that promote the distribution of wealth, through plunder and theft. He stated the following very succinctly:
You cannot bring about prosperity by discouraging thrift.
You cannot strengthen the weak by weakening the strong.
You cannot help the wage earner by pulling down the wage payer [who creates jobs].
You cannot further the brotherhood of man by encouraging class hatred.
You cannot help the poor by destroying the rich [who create opportunities].
You cannot establish sound security on borrowed money.
You cannot keep out of trouble by spending more than you earn.
You cannot build character and courage by taking away initiative [the profit motive – the most powerful motivation on earth] and independence.
You cannot help men permanently by doing for them what they could and should do for themselves.
Right reasoning can create personal and governmental greatness and progress, but it must be built on the solid foundation of correct principles. Government is not license to commit crime and rob people; it is a responsibility to protect the sacred rights of its citizens and inviolately follow the known principles of “right reasoning.”
Advantages of Monarchy as a Form of Government
Although this study has established at some length the legitimate moral entitlement of a monarch to his throne, this pragmatic age also obliges us to demonstrate the “relevancy” of the same. The question of “relevancy” is, indeed, an interesting one. Far too often, particularly in the case of traditional institutions, it means satisfying an a priori set of prejudices of the liberal intellectual chic which dominates academia and the mass media
Fortunately, there exists a relatively prejudice-free system of value analysis advocated by Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal. The Lasswell-McDougal value system proceeds from the assumption that a value is a “desired event.” These value categories or “preferred events” gratify the desires and needs of men. While they suggest certain values to be considered, they admit that the list is not exhaustive. Moreover, they do not attempt to list values in relative order of importance as, in their opinion, the relative position of values may vary in the history of any culture. Nor do they assign a universally dominant rule to any particular value. In short, their value analysis system is an open-ended approach to analyzing the pragmatic relevancy of any given institution. Finally, unlike the natural law, it is deductive rather than intuitive; an analysis made under this system ought to be acceptable to even the liberal intellectual chic or most objective liberal scientific mind.
St. Robert Cardinal Bellarmine, S.J., made such a pragmatic value analysis of monarchy in comparison to republicanism and found it to be a “more useful” form of government as it better promoted the values of (1) order, (2) peace, (3) strength, (4) endurance, and (5) efficiency:
The first property of good government is order. The better the coordination, the better the government. In a monarchy there is no member except the one governing who is not subject to supreme power. This produces order. Therefore, one finds the greater order in the Catholic Church, in which the faithful are subject to pastors, pastors to their bishops, bishops to the metropolitan, metropolitans to the primate, primates to the Roman Pontiff, the Roman Pontiff to God. In an aristocracy there is order, indeed, in so far as the people are subject to their superiors, but, since the superiors are not subject to any higher unifying power, there is no order among them. Much less can order exist in a simple democracy [mob rule] in which all citizens are of the same condition and authority.
Another property of good government is peace. Peace is produced and maintained by a union of the members of a state in thought, feeling, and action. But men will be best brought to think, feel, and act alike when they obey, follow, and cling to one ruler, rather than to several. The history of the Romans, e.g. proves this fact; for, during the reign of kings or emperors, there were few dissensions, but, under the rule of the magistrates, the patricians were almost constantly in contention with the plebeians. Never did the Roman Empire enjoy greater or more constant peace than under Caesar Augustus, who established the first stable monarchy in Rome.
A third property of good government is strength and power. The greatest strength and power, however, is developed where there is the greatest and firmest union of members, which, as just noted, is best accomplished in a monarchy. Of the four great empires of the ancient world, three – the Assyrian, the Persian and the Grecian – were monarchies. The Roman State, though developed under popular dominion, was forced to resort to a dictator in the supreme moment of a crisis.
A fourth property of good government is stability and endurance. Since a monarchy is strongest and most powerful, it is best equipped to withstand external attacks and to avert internal dissolution. It is the least dividing and the most uniting form of organization, while simple aristocracy and democracy are, at most, only an attempt at unity which is seldom attained. Thus the monarchy of the Assyrians from Nino to Sardanapalus endured without interruption some twelve to fourteen hundred years. The kingdom of the Scythians, which is generally regarded as the oldest, lasted several thousand years. The most powerful republic of the Romans numbered scarcely four hundred and eighty years; but under the monarchs of the East, from Julius Caesar to the last Constantine, there was a period of fourteen hundred and ninety-five years. The Republic of Venice continued eleven hundred years, but it was not so old as the Kingdom of the Scythians or of the Assyrians, and, furthermore, it must be noted that it embodied [imitated] elements of monarchy and aristocracy.
A fifth property of good government is facility of action and efficiency in the administration. This again, is more easily attained in a monarchy. For it is easier to find one good man than many. It is easier to obey one ruler than several. A king who performs the same office constantly learns by experience, while he who rules only for a short while is often removed about the time he has learned to govern. The passing incumbent of an office is apt to look to his own emolument, while a more permanent ruler will be inclined to take a continued and personal pride and interest in the realm. When many rule, rivalry, ambition, contention, and – a shifting of responsibility arises, which impedes the best functioning of a government. To embody [imitate] enough of monarchy to insure these good results will, therefore, be most desirable. (emphasis added)
Although Cardinal Bellarmine was a cardinal of the Catholic Church and, indeed, a canonized Saint, there is nothing metaphysical in this analysis that would give a positivist grounds for rejecting it.
Being what he was, Cardinal Bellarmine observes that Christian monarchy possesses a metaphysical value as well. He concludes that, theoretically, it is the most perfect form of government as it is employed by the Creator of the Universe. It is in accord with the natural propensity of all creatures towards rule by one entity. Monarchy, after the direct rule of judges, was the government of God’s chosen people in the Old Law, and it is the predominant factor in the constitution of Christ’s Church in the New Dispensation or Testament. Hebrew, Greek, and Latin writers of ancient times, theologians, philosophers, historians, orators, and poets of all ages have recognized in monarchy a certain dignity and competence that cannot be denied. Monarchy in the hands of God, who combines in Himself absolutely all the qualifications required in an ideal ruler, is a perfect system of government.
Unknown to most Americans is the fact that most of the founding fathers of the United States believed in monarchy. For example, John Adams (1735-1826), who ranks as one of the greatest of American political thinkers of his time and the second president of the United States, and was on the committee responsible for the Declaration of Independence, believed in monarchy. He wrote A Defense of the Constitutions of Governments of the United States of America (consisting of three volumes, written in 1787-1788) and Discourses on Davila (1805), both of which profoundly influenced the thinking of his countrymen. But few people know that the famous John Adams believed that limited monarchy, that is, a constitutional monarchy, was the best kind of government form on earth. He declared, “. . . All well-regulated governments are monarchic.” His ideas were “. . . favorable to monarchy and to an order of nobility. . . .”
In the Constitutional Convention, James Wilson, one of the delegates, declared, “The People of America did not oppose the King, but the Parliament – our opposition was not against a Unity [that is, the king], but a corrupt Multitude [the Parliament].” So, John Adams, James Wilson and other prominent men built the country in the image of Great Britain; it did not have a king, but the young United States created the office of president to have more power than most constitutional monarchs ever had.
Alexander Hamilton, another one of the well-known founding fathers, made it obvious to those who knew him that he believed that “. . . the British government forms the best model [example] the world ever produced. . . .” This idea is evidenced by the following observation:
England [a country with a long standing constitutional monarchy] is the only country in the world that has for the past three hundred years not had a revolution, a civil war, a military dictatorship, a foreign invasion, or any other serious breakdown of constitutional order. It has throughout this time maintained high levels of political and economic freedom. There is no other country in all history that has been so reliably free and stable for so long.
We have been slowly and deliberately taught that monarchies and kings are bad things. . . .
Scarcely anyone is ever told any more that France, Spain and Portugal, Poland and Hungary, England and Sweden, all had kings and queens who ruled their lands gloriously and brought untold happiness and well-being to their subjects.
In the hands of man, monarchy is the most useful form of government in promoting the proper end of government, which is the true and permanent good of the whole community. Monarchy also has the smallest number of defects. Such is the pragmatic value analysis of monarchy under the natural law by the modern moral theologian Fr. Michael Cronin in The Science of Ethics. In the analysis where he weighs monarchy against republicanism and finds it to be “better fitted as an instrument for obtaining the proper ends of government” containing as it does the values of (1) continuity of government, (2) continuity of policy, (3) impartial rule, (4) promotion of the best interest of the people, and (5) prestige and superiority to party intrigue:
(1) Under the hereditary monarchy there are no breaks in government, such as occur on the occasion of an election to the presidential chair, and it is those breaks in government that are chiefly availed of by revolutionaries and malcontents for spreading discontent and inciting the mob to rebellion against the constitution [historically speaking].
(2) An hereditary monarchy offers a better and surer guarantee of continuity of policy, particularly in regard to foreign affairs, than government under a president; and without a tolerable degree of continuity of policy it is impossible for any State to enter into permanent agreements with other States or to enjoy their confidence.
(3) The rule of the hereditary monarch is likely to be more disinterested and impartial than that of the president. The monarch is above all party interest. The monarch can, therefore, act, as no other ruler can, unmoved by any kind of current faction [or special interest group]. Compare this mark of the monarchy in England with the temptations inseparable from the position of president in America. “In a country,” writes Bryce, “where there is no hereditary throne nor hereditary aristocracy—an office raised far above all other offices offers too great a stimulus to ambition. This glittering prize always dangling before the eyes of prominent statesmen has a power stronger than any dignity under a European crown to allure them (as it a lured Clay and Webster) from the path of straightforward consistency. One who aims at the presidency, and all prominent politicians do aim at it, has the strongest possible motives to avoid making enemies. Now a great statesman ought to be prepared to make enemies. It is one thing to try to be popular an unpopular man will never be influential – it is another to seek popularity by courting every section of your party. This is the temptation of presidential aspirants.”
(4) It is only through the rule of one who is above all party interest that the people can retain their hold on legislation. The majority in every legislature has its own proper interests and ambitions, interests often distinct from those of the people whom it represents. And, even where the two sets of interests are identical, the representatives of the people may mistake the mind of the people, or act without due consideration for their opinions. In either case it is only one who is above all party interest, one who has nothing to gain or lose by the incidents of politics, who can be trusted to delay the proposed measure until the populace can have an opportunity of pronouncing upon it. Constitutional monarchy, therefore, is the best guarantee a people can have of their continued effective control over parliament, and, in a country like England, over government also. We may add also that in a constitutional monarchy the permanent interests of the people are likely to receive very special consideration over and above their passing superficial interests. In regard to both, the people may be mistaken, and where passion runs high the permanent interests are often little heeded. It is the monarch, who will still be present, bearing the brunt of office, when present deputies and ministers have passed away, who has most reason for seeing that the permanent and substantial interests of the people shall not be sacrificed to what is only of temporary and superficial importance, and therefore, it is to the hereditary monarch that we may most confidently look for protection of the popular interests, not only against betrayal by the popular representatives, but against error and impetuosity on the part of the people themselves.
(5) The monarch enjoys a personal influence in politics not possible in the case of the president, a personal influence which is mainly based upon the monarch’s independence of parties and his superiority to party intrigue. It is for this reason that the intervention of the monarch in the various difficulties and impasses to which States are subject is so often attended with fortunate and far-reaching results. We may mention three instances. First, in the case of inter-party deadlock, the king is always a welcome mediator, and for the simple reason that he is above all party [interests]. Secondly, in the case of intercameral deadlock (and in England until recently such deadlock was possible as it is still possible in most other countries) the point at issue is generally a point of party interest, and again it is the king who will make the most successful mediator. Thirdly, even where international difficulties arise, the efforts of the monarch at reconciliation are more likely to prove successful than the efforts of minister or cabinet, not only on account of the prestige attaching to the position of the monarch and his personal relationships with other rulers, but also because he is supposed to be less keen upon immediate advantages and triumphs than cabinets are. In the relations of kings the human element and, therefore the element of generosity and of compromise can always operate to some extent. As between cabinets and chancellories the human element simply does not exist. It is of cabinets and not so much of kings that Hobbes’ description of sovereigns is true – that they are ever in a state of potential warfare, “their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another.” For this reason it is kings rather than presidents that can best exercise modifying influence in the relations of States to one another. (emphasis added)
All of the above is true even in the modern constitutional monarchies of Europe where certain of the monarch’s powers are not normally used. Nevertheless, it is exceedingly difficult to know in certain cases what powers of the monarch have really lapsed from want of use and what remains in spite of being unused. A power might remain unused because there was no need for its exercise, but, with the reappearance of the need for its renewed exercise, the power might even be regarded by the nation not only as a right but as a duty. Hence, there are powers long unused that the monarch has been able to vindicate as still a part of his or her living sovereign prerogative, simply by acting on the supposition that they still remain. Indeed, with respect to the king’s most formidable power that of vetoing legislation, it is observed that it still survives:
The royal veto is by no means obsolete; only the reasonable working of the constitution has assured that in the last two hundred years no bill is taken before the Crown in such a form as would involve a refusal of assent.
In contradiction to the theories propagandized by Marxists and devotees of the social contract theory of proletarian or popular sovereignty, St. Robert Cardinal Bellarmine specifically declares that it is not against the value of human dignity to be ruled by a king. Monarchy appears to be in keeping with a divinely-arranged hierarchy of order:
To be ruled by a superior is not contrary, however, to human liberty, dignity, and equality. Only the despot offends thus. God did not create many men at once but only one, and from this one descended others, to indicate what kind of order and precedence He expected. Political power would be necessary even if man had not sinned; for even then he would have been a social and civil animal and would have needed leadership. Even in the state of innocence, there would have been political subjection, there would have been a difference of sexes, faculties, and power; therefore, an order of precedence and subjection. Among the angels there is a hierarchy of the order with precedence and succession; why not among men? Therefore, it is not contrary to the liberty, nor humiliating to the dignity of man to be ruled by legitimate superiors. (emphasis added)
In reality the king is simply the first or highest servant of the people:
There is a difference between political subjection and servile subjection. In servile subjection one works for another; in political subjection one works for himself. The servant is ruled for the benefit of the master; the citizen for his own benefit. A political head seeks not his own but the people’s good; otherwise, he is a tyrant. If, then, there be a question of servitude in the matter of political organization, the presiding officer is more servant than the subject. Thus St. Gregory the Great called himself the servant of servants. Succeeding pontiffs imitated him and bishops call themselves the servants of the people.
As in constitutional theory, the king is the representative of the eponymous or first founder of the nation. It is no more humiliating to be ruled by a king than to obey one’s father. Both situations acquire authority from the Fourth Commandment (Fifth in the King James Version): “Honor thy father and thy mother so that thy days will be long on the land that the Lord, thy God giveth thee.” (Deuteronomy 5:16)
Cardinal Bellarmine also made an analysis of the values necessary in a Christian monarch if his rule is to be successful. These values, although specifically relating to a Christian monarchy, would, nevertheless, be valuable to all states, irrespective of their form of government. Cardinal Bellarmine finds the values to be exercised by the king in ruling his nation to be (1) paternal charity, (2) prudence, (3) justice, (4) fortitude, and (5) temperance:
Charity marks the difference between a regent and a tyrant. A good ruler will regard his subjects as children, not as servants; as brethren, not as strangers. He will not burden them with exorbitant taxes. The poor should engage a king’s special care. He should be interested in the spiritual, intellectual, and physical welfare of his people.
The virtue of prudence in a king will give the proper direction to his efforts and will apply the best means of obtaining results.
Justice in a ruler is that virtue which observes all laws and constitutions of the land. Alongside it, iniquity cannot abide. Unless they possess these virtues, how will they correct others? Justice is also that virtue which distributes the rewards and honors according to merit and capacity without respect of person.
Fortitude is that cardinal virtue which resists pain and overcomes all obstacles impeding the accomplishment of a certain good work. It is a virtue that is necessary in every patriotic and loyal citizen in time of peace and in the trials of war, but especially in the ruler.
The virtue of temperance will restrain a ruler and moderate all his actions and activities, his rewards and his punishments, his laws and precepts. He will be patient and enduring in giving ear to the complaints and miseries of his subjects. He will listen to counsel though he reserves his judgment. He will cultivate a refinement of spirit and manner which bespeaks the self control and poise which so well adorns and becomes the dignity and majesty of the ruler. (emphasis added)
It is observed that even in modern times, these values are to be found more in Christian monarchs than in republican rulers. Consider the fine showing made against Nazi aggression in World War II by King Haakon VII of Norway, Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, Grand Duchess Charlotte of Luxembourg, and King Michael of Roumania, who dismissed the fascist government and switched sides as soon as he became of age; note also the successful efforts of young King Juan Carlos of Spain in restoring a balanced democracy to his nation. In contrast compare the predatory, self-seeking attitude of most Latin American, African, and Asian republican rulers. The contrast is very great.
Burlamaqui declared the following on elective monarchies compared to hereditary houses:
It may seem at first, that elective kingdoms have the advantage over those which are hereditary, because, in the former, the subjects may always choose a prince of merit, and capable of governing. However experience shows, that, taking all things into account, the way of [hereditary] succession is more conducive to the welfare of the state.
As one historian observed:
In looking back at this series of [elected] Caesars, we are horror-struck at the blood-stained picture. . . . From Commodus to Decius are sixteen names, which, spread through a space of 59 years, assign to each Caesar a reign of less than four years. And Casaubon remarks, that in one period of 160 years, there were 70 persons who assumed the Roman purple; which gives to each not much more than two years. [So much for elective monarchies]. On the other hand, [with hereditary monarchy] in the history of France, we find that, through a period of I200 years, there have been no more than 64 kings: upon an average, therefore, each king appears to have enjoyed a reign of nearly nineteen years. This vast difference in security is due to two great principles – that of primogeniture as between son and son, and of hereditary succession as between a son and every other pretender. . . . Since the contests for the rights of belligerent rivals . . . often spread ruin . . . , the principle of hereditary succession, says one writer, . . . would deserve to be considered as the very greatest [remedy] ever made. . . .
According to Burlamaqui, some important advantages of hereditary succession over elective are:
1. By this method we avoid the vast inconveniences, both foreign and domestic, which arise from frequent elections [enormous waste of money],
2. There is less contention and uncertainty with respect to the title of the successor [that is, who he might be],
3. A prince, whose crown is hereditary, all other circumstances being equal, will take greater care of his kingdom, and spare his subjects more, in hopes of leaving the crown to his children, than if he only possessed it for life. Textor explained further that primogeniture is even better than hereditary succession, when he wrote:
. . . If a Kingdom devolves . . . without the strict application of primogeniture [hereditary succession from father to firstborn son], a King will not devote the same pains [and energy and motivation] to the care of his Kingdom’s interests, seeing that after his death the throne may go, not to his children, but to his brothers or perhaps to collaterals of even remote degree.
Hereditary succession is a definite benefit to government.
4. A kingdom, where the succession is regulated, has greater stability and force. It can form mightier projects, and peruse them more vigorously, than if it were elective,
5. In a word, the person of the prince strikes the people with greater reverence, and they have reason to hop, that the splendor of his descent, and the impressions of his education, will inspire him with the necessary qualities for holding the reigns of government.
In addition, there are other reasons to look at monarchy as a superior form of government. Regardless of what some skeptics have said in the past, history shows that “. . . monarchy, combined with Christianity and Antiquity, was responsible for the rise and flowering of Western civilization. . . .” The question is why? First:
A politician in a populist democracy is elected for a short time, and only seeks to keep the people happy for as long as it serves [the furtherance of] his career. He is therefore more willing to run huge deficits, make unwise alliances, start “wars of distraction” and rob from future generations.
A president can be likened to a tenant [a renter] who strips the property bare when his lease expires, whereas a sovereign has to act as a responsible custodian [or steward] of the property in order to pass it on [undefiled] to the next generation. . . .
On the other hand:
From the viewpoint of those who prefer less exploitation over more and who value farsightedness and individual responsibility above shortsightedness and irresponsibility, the historic transition from monarchy to democracy represents not progress but civilizational decline.
Hereditary monarchs are typically on the throne for life, and thus can make real, meaningful changes to the long-term benefit of his people. He has a strong vested interest in leaving the nation in a better state than he received it, because his family’s name is synonymous with the nation.
This important principle of great care for a country and its people only applies to hereditary monarchs. The sad results of an elective throne are well-exemplified in history. Note the results that took place in one of the most prominent elective monarchies in history:
The power of the [imperial] crown was not moderated but destroyed [in the Holy Roman Empire]. Each successful candidate [for emperor] was forced to purchase his title by the sacrifice of rights which had belonged to his predecessors, and must repeat the same shameful policy later in his reign to procure the election of his son. Feeling at the same time that his family could not make sure of keeping the throne, he treated [his exalted position] as a life-tenant is apt to treat his estate, seeking only to make out of it, the largest present profit. And the electors, aware of the strength of their position, presumed upon it and abused it to assert an independence such as the nobles of other countries could never have aspire to.
“The Crown is too high a reward [too sacred, too magnificent, too glorious] to be given [by election]. . . .” It is the highest office and honor that any kingdom can give. As such, if it is elective rather than hereditary, it:
. . . will always induce the candidates to employ force [corruption] money or intrigue [or dirty politics] to procure the votes of the electors, so that such an election will give no better chance for superior merit in the prince than if the state had trusted to birth alone for determining the sovereign.
“Sooner will a camel pass through a needle’s eye than a great man be ‘discovered’ by an election.” John Adams concluded, “Mankind have not yet discovered any remedy against irresistible corruption in elections to offices of great power and profit but [by] making them hereditary.” Napoleon concluded, from his first-hand experience with politicians, that, “It is more likely to find a good ruler by heredity than by elections.” Looking at it from a different angle, Joseph-Marie, Count de Maistre (1753-1821), one of the most influential spokesmen against the French Revolution, declared:
Men never respect [or fully honor] what they have made. This is why an elective king never possesses the moral force of a hereditary sovereign because he is not sufficiently noble [or grand], that is to say, he does not possess that kind of grandeur [majesty and splendor] independent of men which is the work of [long tradition and] time. . . .
Some additional points to consider on the advantages and benefits of monarchy are as follows:
Monarchies tended to be smaller governments that taxed it citizens less than republics. Even if the monarch and his family were greedy, it doesn’t take nearly as much theft from the populous to satisfy his ambitions, compared to the ambitions of the president, his cabinet, 104 Senators, 500+ congresscritters, their staff, lobbyists, etc., etc., etc.
Monarchies tend to have very little control over the day-to-day lives of its citizens. Society was very tiered; a monarch didn’t directly tax his citizens, but instead demanded tribute from his dukes, who demand it from the tier under them. Life from one community to another could be vastly different; if one marquis was charging too much in taxes, they could move over to the next town.
Most monarchs actually have less real power than modern bureaucrats, even though they had real authority. To get anything big done, like a war, they would have to convince the nobles under them, who in turn would convince the peasants to follow them. Thus, the monarch needed a fair degree of consent to get anything really big done.
In hereditary monarchy, the most important unit of government is family. This communicates to society, by example, the importance of the nuclear and extended families, from the top down.
The late Otto von Habsburg (1912-2011), born heir to the Imperial and Royal House of Habsburg, declared that:
Experience shows that kings mostly rule better, not worse, than presidents. There is a practical reason for this. A king is born to his office. He grows up in it. He is, in the truest sense of the word, a “professional,” an expert in the field of statecraft. In all walks of life, the fully qualified expert is rated higher [valued more] than the [inexperienced] amateur, however brilliant. . . . [The point] knowledge and experience [which creates wisdom] outweigh sheer brilliance.
As noted in the past:
The typical monarch of Christendom could not rule arbitrarily, demanding by fiat whatever appealed to him. He was hemmed in by all kinds of traditions and intermediate structures, by the nobility, the church, the corps of military officers, the guilds, the towns and communes, etc. . . .
As Jacques Ellul, Bertrand de Jouvenel and others have pointed out, the monarchy of the kings of France, even that of le Roi-Soleil, the Sun King Louis XIV, [supposedly an absolute arbitary monarch] was tempered by the king’s duty to respect the rights of many intermediate structures [tradition, the nobility, the church, the military officers, the guilds, the towns, etc.]. The French Revolution wiped out all of them, giving absolute, unlimited sovereignty to la voilonté générale, the general will. Before the [American] Revolution broke out, our Founding Fathers [of the United States] had seen the danger inherent in absolute power in the hands of any one agent or agency, and had sought to avoid it by the system of checks and balance. Unfortunately, what we now have in the United States, because it is not acknowledged as a [limited] monarchy in the old sense, but in reality functions as one, is more absolute than the France of Louis XIV.
Monarchs can and should be above all the dirt of party politics because most people can’t get involved without getting dirty themselves. This kind of action generates ill feelings among some of the populace and, as such, would do damage to monarchs as being fully empowered to personify the highest ideals of the nation. Otto von Habsburg declared:
Even more important than the king’s “professional” qualifications [he is trained for the job since his youth] is the fact that he is not tied to any party. He does not owe his position to a body of voters or the support of powerful interests. A president, on the other hand, is always indebted to someone. . . . Such support is not . . . given for nothing. The head of State remains dependent on those who helped him into the saddle.
Being in a position to be separate from all party wranglings and chatter, owing no man anything, and being above it all, the king can be the leader and champion of the people including those who are looked down on. Otto von Habsburg wrote the following on the little person in society:
Particularly in a democracy, it is extremely difficult for the latter [the average man among so many] to make himself heard, since this section of the population cannot easily be organized and is of no great economic importance. If even the topmost pinnacle of the State is handed over to political parties, there will be no one to whom the weak can turn for help. A monarchical ruler, on the other hand . . . [can be] independent, and is there for all citizens equally. His hands are not tied in the face of the powerful, and he can protect the rights of the weak. Particularly in an age of profound economic and social transformations, it is of the highest importance that the head of State should stand above the parties.
One prominent monarchist added to this important hallmark of sovereign leadership by writing:
. . . It seems to me that it is not possible for an elected leader (i.e. a politician) to truly represent all the people of his or her country since inevitably a significant portion of them will have favored someone else and will be opposed to and angered by decisions he or she makes. This is why I think that the person who hosts visiting leaders, travels abroad to represent the country, cuts ribbons, honors distinguished citizens, and speaks at times of national concern and celebration, should not be the same person who has raised large sums of money for elections, is obliged to criticize other politicians, and by definition must make controversial decisions. (emphasis added)
Monarchs who have entered into the deadly fray of politics have all too often been opposed or lost popularity, and some have lost their thrones for it. The rightful place of a constitutional monarch in this day and age is to embody the highest good of the people of the country, personify its grand history and protect the sacred land of his forefathers. He or she should be a shining example worth following, and admired as an ideal. – the consummate person of that age and time. This kind of exemplary behavior and bearing creates a positive springboard for good at home and abroad. Kings aren’t perfect, but they can have an amazing power and influence for the good of their countries.
A cost analysis shows that monarchies are also less expensive to operate. When the cost of elections is added to this, the difference between a republic and a monarchy becomes enormous. Monarchy is the most cost-effective system on earth and, therefore, a great bargain to the people of any land worthy enough to operate such a valuable and worthwhile system. In the October 18, 2003 weekly newsletter of the online Almanach de Bruxelles, it stated:
Among the 10 richest countries (GDP per capita) of the world, 7 are monarchies, that among the 30 richest countries more than half (18) are monarchies: countries that have the British Queen as head of state, former dependencies or even colonies, are ranking very nicely 3rd (Bermuda), 5th (Cayman), 10th (Canada), etc. . . . The richest Asian country, Japan, is a monarchy, the two richest Middle East countries, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, are monarchies as in the Pacific continent: Australia and New Zealand.
In fact, statistically speaking, not only are monarchies generally representative of the richest nations on earth, but they are “the most stable and free countries in the world.” Experience with the Commonwealth nations has clearly shown that, “Decolonization has worked best when independent countries have adopted, retained or recognized monarchy.” In other words, political research has shown that constitutional monarchy shines bright and true as a great benefit.
Lee Sigelman of George Washington University and Jeremy Mayer of Kalamazoo College of Michigan analyzed royal rule from the data of two other political scientists. For a review of twenty-seven Western societies, including the United States, correlating such things as income inequality, interpersonal trust, support for revolutionary change, human rights, and political freedom, and it ended up being a powerful witness for the obvious benefit and advantages that the monarchy brings. Mayer and Sigelman found that:
. . . other factors being equal, in monarchies, public support for revolution was significantly less widespread, interpersonal trust was significantly higher, per capita wealth was considerably greater, income was significantly less concentrated, and the political system [was] significantly more democratic [than in non-monarchies].
A royal family generally brings an increase of “. . . $3619.43 per capita each year to a nation’s gross domestic product – many times the annual budget for the wages of liveried footmen, the purchase of new polo mallets, the dry-cleaning of ermine robes, and the other essentials of the royal lifestyle.” “. . . The enrichment of the national treasury is where kings and queens undeniably earn their pelf.” “. . . The intangible benefits of greater interpersonal trust, a more egalitarian income distribution, pan-ethnic unity, and stronger democracy [is easily demonstrated]. Their conclusion: monarchy represents a “royal road to prosperity, democracy and world peace.” As Heinrich Rommen observed, “Never has liberty existed more securely than under a pious king.”
The 2010 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) researched by Transparency International shows that constitutional monarchies dominate the top 10 least corrupt nations on earth. Within this group seven out of the first 10 are monarchies. Not only is crime lower in constitutional monarchies, but recent studies also demonstrate that constitutional monarchies generally do better in global competitiveness, economic freedom, human development, life expectancy, and the general perception of personal happiness. Republics generally fare far worse in every area. If we use the Lord’s rule, “By their fruits ye shall know them,” (Matthew 7:16) to accurately judge constitutional monarchy, we must conclude that it certainly represents a form of government that contributes to any country fortunate enough to maintain it as a solid and abiding part of their constitutional reality.
Looking to the past, we can find that:
Monarchs and royal princes of extraordinary intelligence or genius abound in history. Considering only those who lived since 1840 we could mention Archduke Francis Ferdinand, Alexander II of Russia, King Edward VI, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, Queen Maria Christina of Spain, King Leopold I (and II) of the Belgiums, Prince Consort Albert, and Don Pedro II of Brazil. Another list might be made of men and women who were no more – but no less – than hard working, first rate civil servants like Queen Victoria, Francis Joseph, Carol I, Queen Wilhelmina, King Gustov V, King Albert of the Belgiums and so on.
One extensive research project on heredity involving roughly three thousand royal and noble families of Europe covering 14 countries and 368 royal reigns from the 10th century to the French Revolution, after factoring out environmental causes as much as possible, concluded:
. . . there is no doubt but that modern royalty as a whole has been decidedly superior to the average European in capacity; and we may say without danger of refutation, that the royal breed, considered as a unit, is superior to any other one [interrelated group of persons], be it that of noble or commoner.
Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), esteemed by some as the world’s best-equipped historian, concluded that monarchy has done more good than we will ever know. What these men have done is one of the most important factors in raising Western civilization to a place of power in world affairs.
In conclusion, “. . . History, which is experimental politics, demonstrates that hereditary monarchy is the most stable, most happy, and most natural governments for man. . . .” This sub-section validates and affirms the moral, legal, and pragmatic position of sovereign royal houses, which grow out of the natural order of things. These royal houses demonstrate the wisdom of the heavens and right reasoning. His Majesty King Simeon II of Bulgaria summarized the great advantages of monarchy when he said:
. . . There is something mystic and dazzling [about the crown] which cannot be equaled! . . . Monarchy, even in chaotic times, guarantees objectivity, progress, social justice, and international respect!
It offers and provides something that no other institution can.
. . . The true and abiding function of monarchy . . . lay in the magical power of kings . . . to represent, express and effect the aspirations of the [people]. . . . A reminder of what was old, [glorious] and splendid, and also a fresh, imperative summons to make the present [equally] worthy of remembrance [as the past].
Limited constitutional monarchy is a bright and illuminating star that bears good fruit, and it could be a very important and obvious benefit to any people.
This chapter would not be complete without addressing the great obligation that presidents and kings have to be commendable and blameless in their personal lives.
The principle of heredity has a profound justification, but the intimate trust of a people in its rulers must constantly be earned afresh, and no dynasty can be certain that destiny does not reserve for it also the [same] fate which has befallen the [deposed] descendant of Hugh Capet in modern France.
No ruler, king, sovereign prince or president can feel too safe if he or she has not won the hearts of the people and maintained and preserved that great trust. Confucius wrote:
. . . By gaining the people, the kingdom is gained . . . On this account, the ruler will first take pains about his own virtue. Possessing virtue will give him the people. Possessing the people will give [him] the territory. Possessing the territory will give him its wealth. Possessing the wealth, he will have resources for [every] expenditure. Virtue is the root; wealth [or success] is the result [or outcome of virtue].
Thus we see that the sovereign has a great course to pursue. He must show entire self-devotion and sincerity to attain it, and by pride and extravagance he will fail of it. [For] . . . when the sovereign treats compassionately the young and helpless, the people do the same.
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), a very well-known and influential philosopher and theologian of the 13th century, wrote, “That the king should govern his subjects in such a way that they live according to virtue. . . King James I of England, in addressing the English Parliament, portrayed the right attitude when he said:
The righteous and just king . . . acknowledge[s] himself to be ordained for the procuring of the wealth and prosperity of his people, and that his greatest and principal worldly felicity must consist in their prosperity. If you be rich I cannot be poor: if you be happy I cannot but be fortunate: and I protest that your welfare shall ever be my greatest care and contentment: and that I am a servant it is most true. . . . As the head is ordained for the body, and not the body for the head; so must a righteous king know himself to be ordained for his people, and not his people for him.
Example is the way to do this. Edmund Burke wrote a great truth when he declared that, “Example is the school of mankind, and he will learn at no other.” It’s like the saying, “What you do speaks so loud that I cannot hear a word you are saying” or “Actions speak louder than words.” It is extremely hard to act in ways that are outside of our experience. Our metaphorical walk is, therefore, more important than our talk, because men and women, and especially children, are natural imitators. If the people we look up to behave in a certain way, it rubs off. This important principle has been recognized all over the world in different ages and in different cultures. Confucius admonished the following sovereigns:
Let your evinced [that is, deep] desires be for what is good, and the people will be good. The relation between superiors and inferiors is like that between the wind and the [tall] grass. The grass must bend, when the wind blows across it.
This principle is, likewise, a well-known principle in organizational psychology:
Organizational climate [the atmosphere felt and experienced in an organization] can account for 20-30 percent of business performance [and success]. Furthermore, 50-70 percent of how employees perceive their organization’s climate can be traced to the actions of the leader.
Only right actions results in good or wholesome outcomes. King Solomon, once considered to have greater wisdom than anyone else on earth, wrote, “The king that faithfully judgeth the poor, his throne shall be established for ever.” (Proverbs 29:14) He also wrote, “It is not for kings . . . to drink wine; nor for princes strong drink: Lest they drink, and forget the law, and pervert the judgment of any of the afflicted.” (Proverbs 31:4-5) Good choices result in a good and exemplary life. Bad choices result in a bad life for self and others. “Where the righteous are in authority, the people rejoice [on the other hand] . . . when the wicked beareth rule, the people mourn.” (Proverbs 29:2)
The most important action a leader can take is to provide a good example. However, to implement this does not happen without effort, including a deep and abiding commitment and determination, which must flow from an understanding heart. One must value people as the greatest thing under the whole heavens and more precious than treasures, lands, and gold.
The Mauryan Buddhist Emperor Asoka (270-230 BC) is considered to be India’s greatest ruler. However, he is most celebrated and remembered for his elevation of Buddhism from a simple Indian sect to a world religion. He wrote:
. . . Leaning on the Norm [the Law of truth and righteousness], honouring, respecting and revering it . . . being thyself a norm-banner [an example of great truth and righteousness]. . . [thou] shouldst provide the right [and the good for thy people and] let no wrongdoing prevail. . . . Ye shall not take that which has not been given. Ye shall not act wrongly touching bodily desires. Ye shall speak no lie. Ye shall drink no maddening drink. . . . [This emperor practiced what he preached and as a result] all the rival kings in the regions of the East came to the sovran king and said: “Come, O mighty king! . . . Teach us.”
Values are a matter of the heart or what one treasures deep inside. These values must live within us and must be fed and nourished. The modern monarch’s greatest asset is his or her example and the example of the royal family. People want to believe in greatness and nobility. It brings strength and comfort. The following is a story about a great and unusual hero who had the vision of who he was and what he must and could do for his people. This divine purpose was so strongly riveted within him that he withstood great temptation. The story is about the exceptional son of King Louis XVI of France:
King Louis had been taken from his throne and imprisoned. His young son, the prince, was taken by those who dethroned the king. They thought that inasmuch as the king’s son was heir to the throne, if they could destroy him morally, he would never realize the great and grand destiny that life had bestowed upon him.
They took him to a community far away, and there they exposed the lad to every filthy and vile thing that life could offer. They exposed him to foods the richness of which would quickly make him a slave to appetite. They used vile language around him constantly. They exposed him to lewd and lusting women. They exposed him to dishonor and distrust. He was surrounded 24 hours a day by everything that could drag the soul of a man as low as one could slip. For over six months he had this treatment – but not once did the young lad buckle under pressure. Finally, after intensive temptation, they questioned him. Why had he not submitted himself to these things – why had he not partaken? These things would provide pleasure, satisfy his lusts, and were desirable; they were all his. The boy said, ‘I cannot do what you ask for I was born to be a king.’ What a heroic [noble] response! The prince would not give in to all the pressures because he knew he had been born to be king! [And he had a sacred responsibility to do what is right].
People are disappointed when a royal or high leader stoops to behavior unbecoming his or her exalted status as part of the highest nobility of the land. During World War II, a Canadian Colonel, Hugh B. Brown, while stationed in Great Britain, tells the story of how the soldiers would go out and carouse, drink, fight, and cause trouble – something that he did not approve of. During one of these occasions, while spot-checking to ensure that his men did not create problems for the brigade command, he met a very intelligent and personable British soldier who stood alone, outside, and merely waiting for his fellow soldiers. He also had observed this soldier a number of times refraining from the debauchery and tumult. Instead he stood aloof. The Colonel asked him why he did not join in on the so-called fun, and he relayed that he admired this young man’s resolve and commitment. The soldier declared that he was a member of the royal house of the United Kingdom, and he would not tarnish their name by lowering himself. This very behavior, the Colonel declared, was true greatness and would result in an exemplary life worthy of the name of royalty – a word that means grandeur, dignity, and nobility.
The world scrutinizes royal families and makes note of everything – especially anything that can be made fun of or could raise an eyebrow. Interestingly, this special, or, in some cases, bothersome attention, actually gives the nobility and royalty of the earth an enormous power, if used properly, to profoundly influence others. This is because royalty, in most cases, will not be ignored – they will be heard, considered, and noted, whether they like it or not. This example is powerful. Example speaks louder and more eloquently than words could ever express. It provides a message that is both loud and clear and will be remembered for many generations to come. Therefore, the nobles and royals of this world have a great opportunity living as they do in high public visibility. They can choose to shine, be bright, and perform a tremendous amount of good.
The ideals of chivalry embody inner greatness and nobility. Oaths of chivalry place requirements upon its members that, if lived to the best of one’s ability, would make members of the noble and royal houses, or republican leaders, thought of as among the best specimens of the human race. Knights show their worthiness by deeds of courage, honor and heroism.
Barring a biochemical abnormality in brain functioning, we can develop and grow. We can immerse and drink in of what is noble, wholesome, right, and good.
Leaders need to diligently and vigorously avoid any situation that could be compromising or be misinterpreted to look like an act of misconduct. In this, the king or prince, queen or princess, or republican leader needs to excel. A king must especially avoid any kind of contaminating political involvements, entanglements, maneuverings, or scandals. Their stock and trade chiefly involves example, good public relations and charitable acts. Involvement in politics or being outspoken on any subject is often a death knoll for a royal family when the newspapers and internet gossip are ever eager for something to make fun of. Therefore, political involvement or an outspoken nature must be avoided.
Over a hundred years ago in a stirring appeal to France, Victor Hugo said: “Sovereignty is not in dynasties, it is not in princes, it is not even in the people. It is higher . . . Sovereignty is in truth!” François Guizot, a dominant figure in French politics before the 1848 revolution, explained:
. . . Reason, justice, and right: this is the legitimate sovereign that people search and will always search for, because reason, truth, and justice do not reside anywhere on Earth in a complete and infallible form. No man, no assembly of men can have them or possess them without failure or limits.
These are ideals that must be continually and diligently sought after, because “. . . ignorance, neglect, or contempt of the rights of man are the sole causes of public misfortunes and governmental corruption. . . .” The right of life, liberty, and property belong to all mankind and every soul that lives upon the earth. People, unless they are criminals with no conscience, are all entitled to these most sacred and transcendent rights. These correct and unfailing principles must be protected, and safeguarded above everything else for a government to be true to the standards of justice. Laws must not be allowed to contradict or encroach upon them:
A statute which is contrary to a precept of the natural law, has no moral force, however solemnly it may have been enacted, or formidably sanctioned, or vigorously enforced. Such an enactment is not law at all, but, as St. Thomas calls it, “a species of violence [forced upon people].”
Whenever rulers are unjust or support legalized plunder or redistribution schemes, they are involved in theft by force of law. The bottom line is that theft is a crime. It is wrong, whether it is done by individuals or by nations. Force, tranny, and oppression can never be right. “The end does not justify the means.” “Might does not make right.” Only good can create genuine and authentic good. As a U.S. Federal Court wisely once declared:
. . . The existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously [very carefully for its destiny and future is in great peril if it fails to follow valid laws conscientiously with precision and exactness]. . . . Government is the potent, [one of the most powerful and . . . influential examples – it is] the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. [Disease can infect others very quickly and snowball]. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law [and order]; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy [lawlessness and injustice].
Legitimacy revolves around right reason, truth, and justice. True sovereignty is the highest expression of these virtues. It must be manifest by following correct principles rather than legalizing or supporting ideas that promote corruption or wrongs upon a people. Confucius declared:
Never has there been a case where the people have loved righteousness, and the affairs of the sovereign have not been carried to completion. And never has there been a case where the wealth in such a state, collected in the treasuries and arsenals, did not continue in the sovereign’s possession.
What is in the heart of the people is a determining factor in the well-being of the country. Buddha once said, “Better than sovereignty over the earth, better than living in heaven, better than lordship over all the worlds, is the fruit of holiness.” This is because the outcome of holiness is integrity, fairness, and innumerable other humane actions that have benevolent results.
This is where example comes in. Nobility and royalty, by definition, mean the quality of having a grand or exalted character. Synonyms for nobility include brilliance, grandeur, grandness, majesty, magnificence, resplendence, splendor, stateliness, superbness, greatness, or being remarkable and extraordinary. This is the high duty and responsibility of the nobility and those who hold genuine royal titles and honors. These persons should exhibit such virtues as blamelessness, integrity, respectability and compassion. These ideals are not always manifest and obvious, but they should remain as guides to exemplify a noble life dedicated to all that is good and beautiful. This is one of the greatest contributions a national leader could make to future generations. After all, to bear a title such as, “His (or Her) Majesty” or “His (or Her) Serene (meaning majestic or grand) Highness” has lofty meanings and place upon its bearer an exalted responsibility and duty to God, family, and country that is in harmony with correct principles.
. . . From the moment of its existence, from the moment of its creation, [and ever afterwards a government] has duties to perform. Those duties are the advancement of the object of human society, the improvement and the happiness of the governed, their progress in virtue, in intelligence, in freedom. The accomplishment of these duties legitimatizes governments – it is their best title [and their greatest duty.]
For no king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure, whose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissension, to maintain a war against their enemies. . . .
 Sir Robert Filmer, The Free-Holders Grand Inquest, 1679, p. 159.
 Ibid., p. 158.
 Ibid., p. 156.
 Michael Canon Cronin, The Science of Ethics, vol. 2, 1929, p. 462.
 Msgr. Francis J. Haas, Man and Society 1930, p. 109.
 Fr. John A. Ryan, Catholic Principles of Politics, 1948, pp. 29-30.
 Heinrich A. Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought, 1945, pp. 376-377.
 Ibid., p. 378.
 Margaret L. Andersen and Howard Francis Taylor, Sociology: Understanding a Diverse Society, 2007, p. 488.
 Sir Thomas Innes of Learney, The Clans, Septs, and Regiments of the Scottish Highlands, 8th ed., 1970, p. 141.
 Joseph Rickaby, S. J., Political and Moral Essays, note 2, 1902, pp. 24-25.
 Sir Thomas of Learney, The Tartans of the Clans and Families of Scotland, 7th ed., 1964, p. 22.
 Sir Thomas Innes of Learney, The Clans, Septs, and Regiments of the Scottish Highlands, 8th ed., 1970, p. 144.
 Joseph Rickaby, S. J., Political and Moral Essays, note 2, 1902, pp. 24-25.
 Op.cit., Sir Thomas Innes of Leaney.
 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
 Op.cit., Sir Thomas Innes of Learney, p. 485.
 Sir Thomas Innes of Learney, Scots Heraldry, 2nd ed., 1956, p. 100, Plate XX.
 Op.cit., Sir Thomas Innes of Learney.
 Michael Canon Cronin, The Science of Ethics, vol. 2, 1929, p. 502.
 Sir Thomas of Learney, The Tartans of the Clans and Families of Scotland, 7th ed., 1964, pp. 35-36.
 Ibid., p. 26.
 Ibid., p. 36.
 Op.cit., Leaney, Clans.
 Op.cit., Leaney, Tartans.
 Op.cit., Leaney, Clans.
 Op.cit., Leaney, Tartans.
 Op.cit., Leaney, Clans.
 Ibid., p. 154.
 Ibid., p. 171.
 Sir Thomas of Learney, The Tartans of the Clans and Families of Scotland, 7th ed., note 9, 1964, p. 41.
 Sir Thomas Innes of Learney, The Clans, Septs, and Regiments of the Scottish Highlands, 8th ed., 1970, pp. 172-175.
 Ibid., p. 160.
 Ibid., p. 191.
 Ibid., pp. 179-180.
 Op.cit., Learney, Tartans., p. 33.
 Ibid., p. 13.
 Op.cit., Learney, Clans, p. 121.
 Ibid., pp. 126-12.
 Ibid., p. 126.
 Michael Canon Cronin, The Science of Ethics, vol. 2, 1929, pp. 463-464.
 Ibid., p. 466.
 Ibid., p. 507.
 Ibid., p. 508.
 Ibid., p. 509.
 Fr. John A. Ryan, Catholic Principles of Politics, 1948, p. 32.
 Op.cit., Michael Canon Cronin, pp. 466-467.
 Ibid., pp. 469-470.
 Ibid., p. 470.
 Op.cit., Fr. John A. Ryan, p. 41.
 Op.cit., Michael Canon Cronin, p. 471.
 Gerry T. Neal, “The Divine Right of Kings Versus the Tyranny of the People,” 2011: http://thronealtarliberty.blogspot.com/2010/05/divine-right-of-kings-versus-tyranny-of.html.
 Op.cit., Michael Canon Cronin, pp. 491-492.
 Ibid., p. 493.
 Op.cit., Fr. John A. Ryan, p. 34.
 Op.cit., Michael Canon Cronin, p. 493.
 Rev. John Clement Rager, Political Philosophy of Blessed Cardinal Bellarmine, 1926, p. 106.
 Ibid., p. 50.
 Op.cit., Fr. John A. Ryan, p. 35.
 Gerry T. Neal, “The Divine Right of Kings Versus the Tyranny of the People,” 2011: http://thronealtarliberty.blogspot.com/2010/05/divine-right-of-kings-versus-tyranny-of.html.
 Op.cit., Michael Canon Cronin, pp. 95-96.
 Op.cit., Fr. John A. Ryan, p. 36.
 Op.cit., Michael Canon Cronin, pp. 497-498.
 John William Allen, English Political Thought, 1603-1660, vol. 1, 1938, p. 499.
 Rev. John Clement Rager, Political Philosophy of Blessed Cardinal Bellarmine, 1926, p. 51.
 Op.cit., Michael Canon Cronin, pp. 498-499; A review of the important works of Sir Robert Filmer (1588-1653) on the natural creation of government and monarchy has been demonstrated in the history of a number of nations. Note: “[Filmer] started by denying the doctrine that mankind is naturally endowed and born with freedom from all subjection, and at liberty to choose what form of government it pleased; and [he also rejected the idea] that the power which any one man hath over others was at first bestowed according to the discretion of the multitude. He went on to derive regal authority from the [natural] authority of a father over his family, as it was exercised by the patriarchs. From the patriarchs, by hereditary descent, this authority was transmitted to different royal houses [throughout the earth]. The royal authority, therefore, resembled the natural authority of a father over his children. The kingdom and its head, like the family and its head, existed by divine ordinance. The king received from God ‘his royal charter of a universal father,’ and ruled, therefore, by divine right [through natural means, not by direct revelation]. The subject was, in consequence, bound to absolute obedience, and had no right to depose a king or alter the line of succession.” (Frederick Sanders Pulling, The Dictionary of English History, Sidney J. Low and F. S. Pulling, eds., “FILMER,” 1884, p. 457).
 Heinrich A. Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought, 1945, p. 441.
 Ibid., p. 442.
 Ibid., p. 470.
 C. Muequardt, “The Congress of Vienna,” The Church of England Quarterly Review, vol. 18, 1845, pp. 447-448.
 M. O. Dickerson & Thomas Flanagan, An Introduction to Government & Politics: a Conceptual Approach, 2001, p. 169.
 Jean-François Lyotard, “Discussion Lyotard-Rorty” Critique, May 1986, p. 583.
 Susan Dunn, “From Burke to Camus: Reconceiving the Revolution,” Salmagundi, vol. 84, Fall 1989, p. 140.
 Peter James Stanlis, Edmund Burke and the Natural Law, 2003, p. 80.
 Michael E. DeGruccio, Unmade: American Manhood in the Civil War Era, p. 327.
 Charles Mcllwain, “Sovereignty in the World Today,” Measure, vol. 2, 1950, p. 111.
 Bo Li, “Perspectives,” Overseas Young Chinese Forum, vol. 1, no. 5, April 30, 2000.
 Juliet Williams, “Constitutional Moments,” After National Democracy: Rights, Law and Power in America and the New Europe, Lars Trägårdh, ed., 2004, p. 106.
 János Kis, “Poplular Sovereignty: The Classical Doctrine and Its Criticism: 2011: http://www.poltudszemle.hu/abstract-2006-1,83.html.
 Pope Pius VI, Pourquoi Notre Voix, 17th June 1793.
 Jean J. Burlamaqui, The Principles of Political Law, 5th ed., Mr. Nugent, trans., vol. 2, part 2, chapter 6, no. 7-8, 1806.
 Hsin-Hua Fan, On Popular Sovereignty, 2009, p. 1.
 Michael C. Gizzi, Tracey Gladstone-Sovell and Willliam R. Wilkerson, The Web of Democracy: An Introduction to American Politics, 2nd ed., 2008, p. 32.
 Jean J. Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, vol. 2, part 2, chapter 2, no. 6.
 Jean J. Burlamaqui, The Principles of Politic Law, vol. 2, part 1, chap. 7, no. 12, 1748.
 West Publishing Company, The Pacific Reporter, vol. 212, 1923, p. 973.
 Thomas Hobbes, Hobbes’s Leviathan, Harrington’s Oceana, Famous Pamphlets, [A.D. 1644 to A.D 1785, 1889], chapter XVIII, p. 85; Note: Baldus De Ubaldis (1327-1400), a prominent legal scholar of 14th century declared: “A king [even] . . . if his people were to withdraw their obedience . . . retains, however, the hierarchical principle [of sovereignty] – that a subject even when he removes his obedience cannot thereby derogate [detract] from his superior’s jurisdiction [even though the monarchy has been exiled and dethroned].” (Joseph Canning, The Political Thought of Baldus De Ubaldis, 1987, p. 218) A monarchy wrongfully removed and no longer in control of the land or the people still holds the highest right to rule and reign over the territory.
 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 17, no. 17.
 John A. Ryan, “Catholic Doctrine on the Right of Self-Government,” Catholic World, vol. 108, January 1919, p. 443; Note: “[In the 19th century,] the insistence on these [the sovereign] rights [of deposed monarchs in international law] despite changes in effective statehood [internal regimes changes] . . . could not, by itself, establish legitimate title [to the usuper].” (Milkulas Fabry, Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States since 1776, 2010, p. 41) The sovereign still holds the internal lawful rights.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 1, chapter 5, no. 66; Note: “. . . The people’s authority was given over to the emperor. . . . It is one thing when the people entrust its jurisdiction [to someone as in a republic], but another when it transfers and abdicates it. If, therefore, someone who could do so sets up a superior for himself, he remains the inferior and the subject and loses sovereign authority. . . . [From this point on] sovereignty does not lie in the hands of the . . . people.” (Joseph Canning, The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis, 2003, p. 59).
 Peter Wentworth (1529-1596), a prominent member of the Parliament of England, as quoted in J. W. Allen, A History of Political Thought in the 16th Century, 2013, p. 267.
 H. W. Blom and Laurens C. Winkel, Grotius and the Stoa, 2004, pp. 198-199; Note: “Grotius [the father of international law] is . . . clear that individuals, having the natural right of liberty, can use that liberty to place themselves in slavery or perpetual servitude. . . . The rights of [a] master over slaves are analogous to those of a sovereign over subjects.” (H. W. Blom and Laurens C. Winkel, Grotius and the Stoa, 2004, pp. 198-199).
 Joseph Canning, The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis, 2003, p. 59.
 “General View of the State of France and of the Government of Louis XVIII,” The Antijacobin Review, vol. 50, January 1816, p. 3.
 Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty, 2008, p. 72; Note: “To every man it is permitted to enslave himself to anyone he pleases for private ownership. . . .Why, then, would it not be permitted to a people having legal competence to submit itself some one person, or to several persons, retaining no vestige of that right for itself?” (Durward V. Sandifer, “Rereading Grotius in the Year 1940,” The American Journal of International Law, vol. 34, no. 3, July 1940, p. 467).
 Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, 1680, John Pawley Bate, trans., chapter 10, no. 11, 1916, p. 88.
 Jean J. Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, vol. 2, part 1, chapter 4, no. 11(5).
 Michael Cronin, The Science of Ethics, vol. 2, 1917, p. 533; Note: “If, however, the majority made a monarch, they could not depose him of their own will. While his authority was subject to the law of God and must not be used justly, he was not subject to arbitrary removal, but could be deposed only when there was a reasonable cause for such action. That is, while the monarch might not legislate on the basis of arbitrary whims, the people could not depose in terms of selfish and particular desires: both alike were subject to principle, to a higher and universal law.” (Thomas Ira Cook, History of Political Philosophy from Plato to Burke, 1936, p. 415).
 Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, 1680, John Pawley Bate, trans., chapter 10, no. 11, 1916, p. 88; Note: “To vindicate the right of the deposed sovereign [through his former subjects] against [a usurper who is in de facto or actual control of the nation] is a legal impossibility. . . .” (The Law Times: The Journal and Record of the Law and the Lawyers, vol. 46, November 8, 1868, p. 65) This is because the people are under the obvious control of the usurper, which creates a conflict of interests and all the moral and ethical distortions that go with it. This ethical dilemma is avoided by the fact that popular sovereignty does not exist in reality. The people, therefore, have no legal right to legitimize the usurper or his government.
 Note: “Prescription” is established “. . . only in cases of long-continued, undisputed, and uninterrupted possession. . . .” (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 149).
 Jean Bodin, Bodin on Sovereignty, Julian H. Franklin, ed., 1992, p. 112; Note: The idea is “. . . that the rule of the usurper cannot become morally [ethically or legally] legitimate before the end of two or three generations. After a period of that length, the new government will possess [all rights and] authority by the title of prescription. . . .” (John A. Ryan, “Catholic Doctrine of the Right of Self-Government,” Catholic World, vol. 108, p. 444) Prescription requires that the unjustly deposed monarch gives up, and because of his silence, which is implied consent or acquiescence to rights of the usurper to legitimately rule, he, and/or his successors, in the eyes of the law and all people, legally and lawfully abandons and discards his claim by sheer neglect, which cannot then later be retrieved. That is, all royal and therefore sovereign rights become forever forfeit or lost.
 “An Essay on the principle and Origin of Sovereign Power,” The Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine, vol. 22, 1806, p. 161.
 Orestes A. Brownson, The Works of Orestes A. Brownson: Containing the First Part of the Political Writings, vol. 15, Henry F. Brownson, ed., 2006, p. 277
 Ibid., p. 276
 Ibid., pp. 276-277.
 Martin Griffiths, Fifty Thinker in International Relations, 1999, p. 274.
 Orestes A. Brownson, The Works of Orestes A. Brownson: Containing the First Part of the Political Writings, vol. 15, Henry F. Brownson, ed., 2006, p. 276.
 Ibid., p. 277.
 Herbert David Croly, Progressive Democracy, vol. 3, 1915, p. 227.
 Ibid.; Note: “Popular sovereignty . . . could only be a fictitious [or false] idea [because] sovereignty meant supreme power [and] since that power was incapable of being exercised by ‘the people,’ it had to be delegated by them to some authority.” (The Duke of Würtemberg (1771-1833) as paraphrased in Robert A. Klein, Sovereign Equality among States: the History of an Idea, 1974, p. 36) (sentence restructured).
 Paul W. Kahn, Legitimacy and History: Self-Government in American Constitutional Theory, 1992, p. 64.
 Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Versions of Citizenship in U. S. History, 1953, p. 36.
 Michael P. Zuchert, “Lincoln and the Problem of Civil Religion,” Lincoln’s American Dream: Clashing Political Perspectives, Kenneth L. Deutsch and Joseph R. Fernieri, eds., chapter 6, no. 1, 2007.
 Ibid., p. 409.
 Ibid., p. 411.
 Robert W. Johannsen, Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858, 1965, pp. 309-310.
 Shi Yung Lu, The Political Philosophy of P. J. Proudhon, 1922, p. 82.
 “Debate in the Lords on the Resolutions relative to a Union with Ireland,” The Parliamentary History of England, vol. 34, 1819, p. 668)
 Durga Kanta Sarmah, Political Science, vol. 1, 2nd ed., 1997, p. 67.
 Heinrich A. Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought, 1945, p. 442.
 Ibid., p. 424.
 Ibid., p. 426.
 Ibid., p. 421.
 Thomas John Capel, Great Britain and Rome, 1882, p.12.
 Fr. John A. Ryan, Catholic Principles of Politics, 1948, p. 49-50.
 Ibid., p. 51.
 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the laws of England, 2nd edition, vol. 1, Thomas M Cooley, ed., 1872, p. 31.
 Michael Canon Cronin, The Science of Ethics, vol. 2, 1929, pp. 503.
 Ibid., p. 501.
 Ibid., p. 19-21.
 Ibid., pp. 519-521.
 Article 1 of the 1880 Meiji Constitution of the Japanese Empire.
 William Oldys and Thomas Park, The Harleian Miscellany, vol. 8, 1811, p. 165.
 Sir Thomas Craig, The Right of Succession to the Kingdom of England, Book 1, 1703, p. 218.
 “View of the Political State of France,” The Antijacobin Review, issue 212, no. 50, January 1815, p. 3.
 Vincent Coussirat-Coustère and Pierre Michel Eisemann, eds., Répertoire de la Jurisprudence Arbitrale International, vol. 2, 1989, p. 79.
 Joseph Gander, The Glory of Her Sacred Majesty Queen Anne: in the Royal Navy, and her Absolute Sovereignty as Empress of the Sea, 1703, p. 19.
 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
 Sir Thomas Innes of Learney, The Clans, Septs, and Regiments of the Scottish Highlands, 8th ed., 1970, p. 105.
 Ibid., p. 143.
 The Dublin Literary Gazette, or Weekly Chronicle of Criticism, Belles Lettres and Fine Arts, no. 2, January 2, 1830, p. 20.
 Victor Ca threin, Moral Philosophie, vol. 2, 1893, p. 51.0
 Michael Canon Cronin, The Science of Ethics, vol. 2, 1929, pp. 503.
 Ibid., p. 502.
 Joseph Marie, Count de Maistre, Essay on the Generative Principle of Political Constitutions, 1847, pp. 31-41.
 Michael Canon Cronin, The Science of Ethics, vol. 2, 1929, pp. 518-519.
 Count de Maistre, Generative Principle of Political Constitution, pp.81-85.
 Fr. Theodore Meyer, Institutions Juris Naturalis, vol. 2, 1906, p. 375.
 Ibid., pp. 434-435.
 James Tyrrell, Bibliotheca Politica, 1694, p. 127.
 David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., Book 3, part 2, section 10, 1888, p. 556.
 John Lynch, Cambrensis Eversus, vol. 3, part 1,  1851, p. 43.
 The Popular Encyclopedia, vol. 4, part 1, 1836, “Legitimacy,” p. 429.
 John Lynch, Cambrensis Eversus, vol. 3, part 1,  1851, p. 45; Note: “[T]here is what might be called prescription strictly so-called, where the actual exercise of sovereign rights over a period of time is allowed to cure a defect in title; the case, that is to say, where the exercise of sovereign rights either rests upon a demonstrably defective title or is even in origin wrongful. In this kind of case, therefore, the title is acquired by means of an ‘adverse’ possession.” (Robert Yewdall Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 21).
 Ibid., p. 255.
 F. M. Brookfied, Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law, and Legalization, 1999, pp. 39-40; Note: “Prescription does not cure the original vice of a bad title; but, after all memory of the good title, which had been supplanted by the usurped one, has been lost and buried under the oblivion of time, prescription (that is to say, the lapse of time within which legal memory can survive) determines the expiration of the old title, and gives effect, not to the bad one which first superseded it, but to a new title arising out of possession, and consummated in this manner by the completion of prescriptive time.” (Charles Coote, History of the Union of the Kingdoms of Great-Britain and Ireland, 1802, pp. 251-252).
 Simon Patrick, Richard Arnald, William Lowth, Moses Lowman, Daniel Whitby, John Rogers Pitman, A Critical Commentary and Paraphrase on the Old and New Testament and the Apocrypha, vol. 2, John. Rogers Pittman, ed., 1822, p. 178.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 149.
 Joaquin Varela Suanzes, “Sovereignty in British Legal Doctrine,” Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, vol. 6, no. 3, September 1999, #100; Note: “. . . [The status of] a usurper according to the international law and the law of nations . . . is not altered by a subsequent renunciation on the part of the former legitimate ruler, which only removes the claim to the restoration of his possession, but cannot convert the usurpation into a succession, in accordance with public law.” (“Prussian State Trials,” The Law Times, the Journal of the Law and Lawyers, vol. 46, November 28, 1868, p. 65) (emphasis added) Nevertheless, in time the usurpation is healed and legitimized by long-uncontested possession and the conqueror becomes the rightful ruler.
 Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman and Alvin Saunders Johnson, Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 14, 1957, p. 429.
 Frederick Edwin Smith, Earl of Birkenhead, International Law, 2009, p. 63.
 Nathan Tarcov, Locke’s Education for Liberty, 1999, p. 30.
 Register of Debates in Congress: comprising the Leading Debates and Incidents of the First Session of the 21st Congress, vol. 6, “The Indians,” April 21, 1830, p. 375; Note: “If the crown were to be claimed and settled in a given [new] dynasty by right of prescription, it would be because for a sufficient time the right had continued undisturbed.” (Howard Nenner, The Right to be King: the Succession to the Crown of England, 1603-1714, 1995, p. 51).
 Andrés Bello, Derecho Internacional, 4th ed., 1886, pp. 42- 43.
 John Lynch and Matthew Kelly, Cambrensis Eversus, Seu Potius Historica Fides in Rebus Hibernicis Geraldo Cambrensi Abrogota, Matthew Kelly, trans. & ed., vol. 3, 1852, p. 49.
 (George Crabb, Universal Technological Dictionary, vol. 2, “Prescription,” 1823.
 Edward Smedley and Hugh James Rose, Encyclopaedia Metropolitana; or, Universal Dictionary of Knowledge, vol. 2, 1845, p. 713.
 Henry Brougham , Political Philosophy, 3rd ed., 1853. pp. 47-48.
 W. S. Shears, The King: The Story and Splendour of British Monarchy, 1937, pp. 139-151.
 J. B. Thayer, “Legal Essays,” The American Judiciary, S. E. Baldwin, ed., sec. 325, 1904.
 Udegraph v. Commonwealth, II S. & R. (Penn.), p. 394.
 Strauss v. Strauss, 3 So. 2d 727,148 Fla. 23.
 Snavely v. Booth, 176 A. (De.), 649. Commonwealth v. American Baseball Club of Philadelphia, 138 A. 497, 290 Pa. 136, 53 ALR 1027.
 Wylly v. Collins, 9 Ga. 223.
 U.S. vs. Laws, 163 U.S. 263, 16 S. Ct. 998, 41 L. ed. 151.
 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 2nd ed., Introduction, section 2, 1872, p. 21 (38).
 Ibid., p. 22 (39).
 Ibid., p. 23 (41).
 Adams v. Peo., 1 N. Y. 173, 175. (William Mack and William Benjamin Hale, Corpus Juris, “Allegiance,” note 41[e], 1915, p. 1150.
 Fr. Francisco Suarez, S. J., Defensio-fidei Catholicae, 1613, pp. 33-34; and Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Legibus, 1727, pp. 3, 7; 9.
 St. Robert Cardinal Bellarmine, Apologia, chap. 12, 1609.
 Heinrich A. Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought, 1945, p. 466.
 Ludwig von Mises Institute of Auburn University, The Free Market, vol. 18-19, 2000, p. 99.
 Hans-Hermann Hoppe as quoted in Robert M. Wallace, I Write What I See: Rantings and Ravings, 2003, p. 34.
 Dr. Orly Taitz, Esq., Citizen Wells News, Stephen Pidgeon Report, 2013: http://citizenwells.wordpress.com/2009/01/15/stephen-pidgeon-update-january-15-2009-plains-radio-therightsideoflifecom-broe-v-reed-attorney-press-release-eligibility-issue-will-not-go-away-obama-not-qualified.
 Wilber W. Caldwell, 1968 Dreams of Revolution, 2009, p. 173.
 Anthony St. Peter, The Greatest Quotations of All Time, 2010, p. 138.
 Michael Reagan and Jim Denney, The New Reagan Revolution: How Ronald Reagan’s Principles Can Restore America’s Greatness Today, 2010, p. 129.
 Erik von Kuehnelt- Leddihn as quoted in Michael David Warren, Into the Rabbit Hole, 2005, p. 252.
 Anuradha Kataria, Democracy on Trial, All Rise!, 2011, p. 85.
 John M. Murrin, Paul E. Johnson, James M. McPherson, Alice Gerstle, Gary Gerstle, Emily S. Rosenberg and Norman L. Rosenberg, Liberty, Equality, Power, vol. 2, 2011, p. 836.
 (Paul Eidelberg, The Future belongs to Israel, 2012: http://www.newswithviews.com/Eidelberg/paul109.htm.
 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, 2007, p. 95.
 Tony Abbott , How to Win the Constitutional War, 1997, pp. 2-3.
 Reference unknown.
 Thomas Sowell quoted in John M. Cobin, A Primer on Modern Themes in Free Market Economics and Policy, 2nd ed., 2009, p. iii.
 Harry Browne quoted in Michael David Warren, Into the Rabbit Hole, 2005, p. 252.
 Elliot D. Cohen, Critical Thinking Unleashed, 2009, p. 100.
 Rick Gaber as quoted in Michael David Warren, Into the Rabbit Hole, 2005, p. 253.
 Benjamin Constant, Constand: Political Writings, Biancamaria Fontana, ed., 1988, p. 195.
 Benjamin Constant, Political Writings, Biancamaria Fontana, trans. & ed., 1814, pp. 194–196, 271–272.
 Eternal Vigilance is the Price of Freedom, Donald J. Boudreaux: 2013: http://freedomkeys.com/vigil.htm.
 Hebert Spencer as quoted in Robert Andrews, The Columbia Dictionary of Quotations, 1993, p. 340.
 Thomas Sowell quoted in Michael David Warren, Into the Rabbit Hole, 2005, p. 253.
 Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., Why Hate Monarchs?, 2012: http://www.mises.org/freemarket_detail.aspx?control=366.
 Charles A. Coulombe, Monarchy FAQ, 2012: http://www.angelfire.com/in3/theodore/opinion/articles/coulombe/monfaq.html.
 New York Universtity Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 35, 2002, p. 326.
 Stephen Paine, Common Sense Revised, 2005, p. 42.
 John Patrick Diggins, John Adams: The American Presidents Series: The 2nd President, 1797-1801, 2003, p. 9.
 Lorne Strider in Michael David Warren, Into the Rabbit Hole, 2005, p. 271.
 Collins & Aikmann, Pork Barrel Spending – the Absurd, 2013: http://www.areddy.net/mscott/porkabs.html.
 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1, 2nd ed., Thomas M. Cooley, ed., 1879, p. 153.
 David Hume, David Hume’s Political Essays, Charles William Hendel, ed., 1953, p. 15.
 Gideon J. Tucker (1826-1829) as quoted in David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom, 1989, p. 146.
 Leland B. Yeager, Is the Market a Test of Truth and Beauty?: Essays in Political Economy, 2011, p. 379.
 Does the royal family of Britain have any actual political power?, 2012:
 Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, vol. 2, part 2, chapter 2, no. 35.
 Australians for Constitutional Monarchy, 2012: http://www.norepublic.com.au.
 Churchill by Himself: The Definitive Collection of Quotations, Richard Langworth ed., 2008, p. 291.
 HRH Prince Osman Ibrahim quotied in Mark Watson, Royal Families Worldwide, 2004, pp. vii-viii.
 Almanach de Bruzelles, December 2006 Newsletter, 2012: http://www.almanach.be/about/index.
 (Harold Brooks-Baker, “Why the monarchy must stay,” Newsweek, March 11, 1996, 2012: www.mgimo.ru/files/640/UK_STUDENTS_FILE_2010.doc.
 Reference unknown.
 Oleg Gordievsky in a letter to The Independent on July 21, 1998 as cited in The Constitutional Monarchy Associations, Quotations, 2012: http://www.monarchy.net/quotations.htm.
 Reference unknown.
 R. J. Rummel, Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence, 1997, p. 24.
 James Ostrowski, The Myth of Democratic Peace: Why Democracy Cannot Deliver Peace in the 21st Century, 2012: http://www.lewrockwell.com/ostrowski/ostrowski72.html.
 James Ostrowski, Does Democarcy Promote Peace?, 2012: http://mises.org/pdf/asc/2002/asc8-ostrowski.pdf.
 Hans-Hermann Hoppe as quoted in Leland B. Yeager, Is the Market a Test of Truth and Beauty?: Essays in Political Economy, 2011, p. 377.
 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, 2007, p. 18.
 Murray N. Rothbard, Economic Controversies, 2011, p. 656.
 Chuck Baldwin, Hataree Militiamen Cleared in Court, 2012: http://chuckbaldwinlive.com/home/archives/4760.
 Thomas Jefferson, The Political Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Merrill D. Peterson, ed., 1993, p. 44.
 Thomas Jefferson quoted in James B. Conant, Thomas Jefferson and the Development of American Public Education, 1962, p. 118.
 Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Book I, Chapter 3, No. 16.
 Quincy Wright, “National Sovereignty and Collective Security,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 186, The Attainment and Maintenance of World Peace, July 1936, p. 94.
 Jack Donnelly, “State Sovereignty and Human Rights,” 2011: http://mysite.du.edu/~jdonnell/papers/hrsov%20v4a.htm.
 Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty, 2001, p. 19.
 Marek Stanislaw Korowicz, Some Present Aspects of Sovereignty in International Law, 1961, p. 108.
 William Rae Wilson, Esq., Travels in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Hanover, Germany, Netherlands, &c., Constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark (1826 time frame), appendix no. 16, article 6, 1826, p. 72.
 Jack Donnelly, “State Sovereignty and Human Rights,” 2011: http://mysite.du.edu/~jdonnell/papers/hrsov%20v4a.htm.
 Adrián Tokár, “Something Happened. Sovereignty and European Integration.” In: Extraordinary Times, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences, vol. 11: Vienna, 2001, p. 3.
 Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, , 1955, p. 28.
 Emerich de Vattel, Six Books of the Commonwealth, , 1955, p. 28.
 Jean J. Burlamaqui, The Principles of Politic Law, vol. 2, part 2, chapter 8, no. 11.
 Ibid., Part 2, chapter 7, no. 10(4).
 John Clement Rager, Political Philosophy of Blessed Cardinal Bellarmine, 1926, p. 36.
 John Milton, Selected Prose Writings of John Milton, Ernest Myers, ed., 1884, p. 181.
 R. Travers Herford, “Pirke Aboth: The Sayings of the Fathers,” The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English, vol. 2, R. H. Charles, ed., 1913 p. 705.
 Truman G. Madsen, ed., The Temple in Antiquity: Ancient Records and Modern Perspectives, 1984, p. 132.
 Flavius Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews, Book 4, Chapter 8:17.
 Vernon Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought: The Colonial Mind, 1620-1800, vol. 1, 1927, p. 31.
 F. K. Prochaska, The Republic of Britain 1760-2000, 2000, p. 24.
 Dr. Adam Clark, Adam Clarke’s Bible Commentary, 1 Samuel 8.
 Thomas Jefferson, The Jeffersonian Cyclopedia: a Comprehensive Collection of the Views of Thomas Jefferson, John P. Foley, ed, 1900, p. 980 (First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801).
 Murray N. Rothbard, Economic Controversies, 2011, p. 656.
 Sotirios A. Barber and James E. Fleming, Constitutional Interpretation: the Basic Questions, 2007, pp. 48-49.
 J. Plamenatz, Man and Society, vol. 1, 1963, p. 194.
 Will Durant, The Story of Civilization, vol. 3, 1944, p. 165.
 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 2004, p. 4.
 William V. Wells, The Life and Public Services of Samuel Adams, 1865, p. 22.
 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, vol 3, 1836, pp. 536-537.
 Edward T. Imparato, General MacArthur Speeches and Reports 1908-1964, 2000, p. 198.
 Charles T. Tart, “An (In-Depth) Enlightenment Interview with Professor Charles T. Tart.” 2011: www.enlightenment.com/media/intervies/tart.html.
 Dr. Joseph R. Sizoc (1919-2004), a U.S. diplomat, reference unknown.
 John Neville Figgis, The Theory of the Divine Right of Kings, 1896, p. 263.
 Paul Carus, The Gospel of Buddha, 1917, pp. 197-198.
 Sir Winston Churchill, History of the English Speaking People, vol. 4, 1970, p. 1934.
 Alabama State Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 35.
 Melville W. Fuller, “The Presidents Vetoes,” The Chicago Law Times, Catharine V. Waite, ed., Vol. 1, 1887, p. 233.
 Frederic Bastiat, The Law, 1974, pp. 21, 26.
 Ibid., p. 12.
 William J. Bennett, The Book of Man: Readings on the Path to Manhood, 2013, pp. 256-257.
 Quote by Henry Grady Weaver in Michael David Warren’s, Into the Rabbit Hole, 2005, p. 245.
 Ibid., p. 268 (Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.).
 Benjamin Franklin, Writings of Benjamin Franklin, Albert Henry Smyth, ed., vol. 10, 1906, p. 64.
 W. Cleon Skousen, The Five Thousand Year Leap: 28 Great Ideas that Changed the World, 2009, p. 90.
 Ronald Reagan, “A Time for Choosing,” Classics of American Political and Constitutional Thought, vol. 2, Scott J. Hammond, Kevin R. Hardwick & Howard Leslie Lubert, eds., 2007, p. 675.
 Laurie Roth, “Government has never been the answer, nor is Obama,” October 8, 2009: www.newswithviews.com/Roth/laurie184.htm.
 G. Edward Griffin, The Fearful Master, p. 128; Note: The following is a parable that illustrates the need for an incentives: An economics professor at Texas Tech said he had never failed a single student, but had once failed an entire class. The class (students) insisted that socialism worked since no one would be poor and no one would be rich, a great equalizer. The professor than said, “Ok, we will have an experiment in this class on socialism. “All grades will be averaged and everyone will receive the same grade so no one will fail and no one will receive an A,” said the professor. (He was substituting grades for dollars – something the students could understand). After the first test the grades were averaged and everyone got a B. The students who had studied hard were upset while the students who had studied very little were happy. But, as the second test rolled around, the students who had studied little studied even less and the ones who had studied hard decided that since they couldn’t make an A, they also studied less. The second Test average was a D. No one was happy. When the 3rd test rolled around the average grade was an F. The sores never increased as bickering, blame, name calling, all resulted in hard feelings and no one would study for anyone else. To their great surprise they all failed. The professor told them that socialism, too, would ultimately fail because of the same basic human principles of incentive. The harder people try to succeed the greater their reward, but when a government takes all the reward away no one will try or succeed. (reference unknown)
 Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement, 1990, p. 24.
 Milton Friedman as quoted in Erin Gruwell, The Gigantic Book of Teachers' Wisdom, 2007, p. 426.
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 reference unkown.
 Sydney Williams, Thought of the Day: The Pope v. Capitalism, 16 Jul 2015; 2015: http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/07/16/thought-of-the-day-the-pope-v-capitalism.
 Frederic Bastiat, The Law, 1974, p. 6.
 Henry Francis Brownson, Orestes A. Brownson’s early Life: from 1893-1844, 1898, p. 261.
 Ibid., p. 262.
 Edward S. Corwin, “The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law,” Michigan Law Review, vol. 12, no. 4, February 1914, p. 262.
 Op.cit., Brownson, p. 262.
 Henry, Lord Broughham, “Principles of Government. Monarchial Government,” Principles of Philosophy, Part 1, 1848, p. 49.
 George Sutherland, “Principle or Expediency?,” Annual Address to the New York State Bar Association, January 21, 1921, p. 18.
 F. P. Lock, Edmund Burke, vol. 2, 1784-1797, 2006, p. 321.
 Ibid., p. 406.
 Charles I. Lugosi, “Conforming to the Rule of Law: When Person and Human Being Finally Mean the Same Thing in Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence,” Issues in Law & Medicine, vol. 22, 2006, p. 41.
 Edmund Burke, The Works of the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke, vol. 1, Integrationist eds., 1884, p. 403.
 Anne Husted Burleigh, John Adams, 1969, p. 245.
 Brownson’s Quarterly Review, vol 2, Orestes Augustus Brownson, ed., 1854, pp. 4-9.
 James Madison, Letters and Other Writings of James Madison: 1829-1836, vol. 4, 1884, p. 478.
 Erica-Irene A. Daes, “Indigenous Peoples Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources,” Lecture at the National Native Title Conference, Adelaide, Australia, June 3, 2004.
 Curt Lader, Painless American History, 2nd ed., 2009, p. 6.
 Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society, 1950, p. 16; and Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality, 1948, p. 16.
 Myres S. McDougal, “International Law, Power and Policy,” Recueil des Cours, vol. 82, no. 137, 1953 p. 168.
 Robert Cardinal Bellarmine, S. J., De Romani Pontificis ecclesiastica monarchia, vol. 1, 1872, chap. 2.
 F. B. Sanborn, “Social Science in The Nineteenth Century, “ Journal of Social Science, No. 26, 1890, pp. 4-5.
 Charles C. Tansill, Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States Part Two, 2005, p. 846.
 John Torrey Morse, The Life of Alexander Hamilton, 3rd. ed., vol. 1, 1882, p. 233.
 Sean Gabb, “In Defense of the Monarchy,” Free Life Commentary, Issue 83, December 2002: http://%20www.seangabb.co.uk/?q=node/166.
 Catherine Goddard Clarke, Our Glorious Popes, 2000, p. 59.
 Michael Canon Cronin, The Science of Ethics, vol. 2, 1929, pp. 588-591.
 Ibid., pp. 594-595.
 William Sydney Shears, The King, 1937, p. 50.
 Robert Cardinal Bellarmine, S. J., De laicis VII quoted in Erik Ritter von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, The Menace of the Herd or Procrustes at Large, Appendix 1, 2007, p. 365.
 Robert Cardinal Bellarmine, S. j. as quoted in American Catholic Historical Association, The Catholic Historical Review, vol. 4, 1925, p. 512.
 reference unknown.
 Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Political Law, Book 2, part 2, chapter 3, no. 22.
 “The Caesars, Chapter 5,” Blackwood’s Magazine, vol. 36, July 1834, p. 81.
 Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, John Pawley Bate, trans. , Ludwig von Bar, ed., 1916.
 Ibid., no. 23; Note: “. . . A strictly hereditary monarchy has the great advantage of a clear, legal, and orderly succession procedure, thereby avoiding the ‘perpetual convulsions’ seen in the Roman empire and the ‘Eastern nations’, where titles of sovereigns are subject to the ‘caprice . . . of the populace or soldiery’”. (Frederick G. Whelan, “Time, Revolution, and Prescriptive Right in Hume’s Theory of Government,” Utilitas, vol. 7, no. 1, May 1995, p. 117)
 Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, “Monarchy and War,” The Myth of National Defense: Essays on the Theory and History of Security Production, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, ed., 2003, p. 83.
 “What advantages does monarchy have over democracy?,” 2011: http://www.youdebateit.com/score.php?score=288.
 HRH Prince Osman Ibrahim as quoted in Mark Watson, Royal Families Worldwide, 1999, p. viii.
 Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Democracy: The God that Failed, 2009, p. 69.
 “Aaron’s Argument for the Monarchy,” 2011: http://atomsandideas.thefriars.net/?author=25.
 Jamrd Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire, 1904, p.247.
 David Hume, Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, 1758, p. 13.
 Wolfgang Mieder, The Politics of Proverbs: From Traditional Wisdom to Proverbial Stereotypes, 1997, p. 25.
 Webster’s Guide to American History, Charles Lincoln Van Doren and Robert McHenry, eds., 1971, p. 113.
 Reference unknown.
 Joseph Marie Maistre, The Works of Joseph de Maistre, Jack Lively, ed., 1965, p. 105.
 Op.cit., Jamrd Bryce.
 Otto Habsburg, The Social Order of Tommorrow, Ivo Jarosy, trans., 1959, p. 121.
 A Judge which Feared not God, neither regard Man,” 2011: http://www.profam.org/pub/rs/rs_1708.htm.
 Otto von Habsburg, The Social Order of Tomorrow: State and Society in the Atomic Age, 1959, p. 122.
 Otto von Habsburg, Monarchy vs Republic, 2012: http://www.freedominion.com.pa/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?nomobile=1&f=71&t=101620.
 Theodore Harvey, Why I am a Monarchist, 2012: http://www.angelfire.com/in3/theodore/opinion/whymon.html.
 Almanach de Bruxelles, 18 October 2003 weekly newsletter: 2012: www.almanach.be/search/n/news_newsletter1.html.
 “Zog for Albania, Edward for Estonia, and Monarchs for All the Rest? The Royal Road to Prosperity, Democracy, and World Peace,” PS: Political Science & Politics, vol. 31, no. 4, December 1998, p. 772
 Ibid., p. 774.
 Heinrich A. Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought, 1945, p. 495.
 Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 Results, 2011: www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results.
 Corruption Perception Index 2011, Global Competitiveness Index 2007, A. G. White World Happiness Scale.
 Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Liberty or Equality: the Challenge of our Time, James P. Hughes, ed., 2007, p. 153.
 Frederick Adams Woods, MD, The Influence of Monarchs, 1913, p. 257; Note: “. . . There have been proportionately more great men among kings than among commoners [and this is not] because of the environment of kingship. . . . The differences of environment have had absolutely nothing to do with it.” (Frederick Adams Woods, “Sovereigns and the Supposed Influence of Opportunity,” Science New Series, vol. 39, no. 1016, June 19, 1914, p. 905).
 Reference unknown.
 John Herman Randall, The Making of the Modern Mind, 1976, p. 432.
 James Page, King Simeon II of the Bulgarians, 1969, p. 45.
 “Queen Elizabeth II,” 1952 Cover Story, Time Magazine Archives, January 5, 1953.
373] Heinrich von Treitschke, Politics, vol. 2, Authur James Balfour, trans., 1916, p. 75.
 James Legge, The Chinese Classics, 1890, p. 120.
 Ibid., p. 122.
 Saint Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas: Political Writings, R. W. Dyson, ed., and trans., 2002, p. 42: Note: ". . . The maxims of the law of nations have an equal authority with those of the law of nature, and are equally respectable and sacred, because they have God alike for their author. In short, there is only one sole and the same rule of justice for all mankind. Princes who infringe the law of nations, commit as great a crime as private people, who violate the law of nature; and if there be any difference in the two cases it must be charged to the prince's account, whose unjust actions are always attended with more dreadful consequences than those of private people." (Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, Burlemaqui's Principles of Natural Law, Nugent, trans., 1838, p. 124)
 William Cobbett, Cobbett’s Parliamentary History of England, vol. 1, 1806, p. 986.
 Great Thoughts from Master Minds, vol. 1, 4th series, 1898, p. 382.
 Reference unknown.
 James Legge, The Chinese Classics, 1890, p. 66.
 Manya Arond-Thomas, MD, “Resilient Leadership for Challenging Times,” The Physician Executive, July-August 2004, p. 18
 Buddha, Dialogues of the Buddha [Digha Nikaya, Part I I I, Volume IV], T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, trans., 1965, Dialogue, vol. 26, pp. 62, 63-4.
 Randal A. Wright, Why Say No When the World Says Yes?: Resisting Temptation in an Immoral World, 1993, p. 98-99.
 Reference unkown.
 David Josiah Brewer, Crowned Masterpieces of Eloquence Representing the Advance of Civilization, vol. 7, 1914, p. 102.
 François Guizot, Du gouvernement de la France, depuis la restauration, et du ministère actuel, 1820, p. 201.
 Lynn Hunt, The French Revolution and Human Rights: A Brief Documentary History, 1996, p.77.
 John A. Ryan, “The Moral Obligation of Civil Law,” The Catholic World: A Monthly Magazine of Literature and Science, vol. 114, no. 68, March 1922, p. 74.
 Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1929) as quoted in Ademola Abassp, Complete International Law, 2011, p. 551.
 Charles F. Horne, Sacred Books and Early Literature of the East: Ancient China, 1997, p. 368.
 Paul Carus, The Gospel of Buddha according to Old Records, 1915, p. 21.
 M. Sismondi, “Review of the Efforts and Progress of Nations during the Last Five and Twenty Years,” The Literary Gazette: a Weekly Journal of Belles Letters, Acts, Science, etc., vol. 9, no. 451, September 10. 1825, p. 589.
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan,  1976, p. 129.
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