Introduction: (Volume I)
Most [Western] nations that maintain representational government still have a monarch either recognized by the government, or by the people at large, and though essentially powerless, these monarchs maintain a symbolic link between a nation and its heritage – its most sacred, most ancient traditions. They also constitute a government-in-waiting [but a rightful government, whose sovereign legitimacy is of great import]. . . .
This book is about internal non-territorial sovereignty – the de jure sovereign rights of deposed monarchs and governments-in-exile – not the external sovereignty that international lawyers usually speak of it, meaning such varying concepts as independence or being free from the meddling of others, equality under the law, territorial integrity, the recognition of other states, and/or being an acknowledged member of the family of nations. Rather, we will discuss internal sovereignty, which is the exclusive right or supreme entitlement above all others to rule over the people within a given territory. This kind of sovereignty is the right, not the actual power, to hold the supreme or greatest legal authority within the boundaries of a specific territory. Doubtless, this quality, in both its internal and external dimensions, is the crown jewel or greatest and most priceless possession of a nation, or to a regal and crowned monarch and his royal house.
“The sovereign states system is the only [truly] global system of authority that has ever existed.” It is the universal law of all nations:
[It] extends across all religions, civilizations, languages, cultures, ethnic and racial groupings, and other communities and collectives into which humanity is divided.
It is so important and of such great magnitude to the future that it is called by various titles or names reflecting its unique significance in the world. The following are some of them:
The defining doctrine, the primary cause, the central organizing principle, the defining feature of statehood, the glue or cement that holds all society together, the one and only true stabilizing principle, bedrock, the foundation stone, the most sacred of international law principles, the indispensable concept, of cardinal importance, the heart and soul of civilized society, the reference point, the central concept for the preservation of world peace, the most basic principle in international affairs, the dominant world order framework, doubtlessly the most precious of all governmental rights, the guiding principle, the key constitutional safeguard, the final and ultimate matrix of a stable society, the pinnacle, the ark of the covenant, the holy grail, the Alpha and Omega, the first principle, the sine qua non of international law, that is, the indispensable condition that cannot be done without, for it is the building block, the principle of solidarity – safeguarding humanity.
Algerian President Boueteflika, while addressing the UN General Assembly in 1999, said, sovereignty is “our final defense against the rules of an unjust [and often unfair] world.” “Sovereignty is the immediate jewel of a nation’s soul . . . the great vital right of a State.” It is its glory and its independence, the most precious thing it has, the greatest secular right on earth.
Everything of real importance in government revolves around this chief ingredient or governing principle. “Sovereignty” is “. . . the fundamental authority which controls, restrains and protects man as a member of society.” Finally, a violation of this backbone of independence and freedom is considered to be not merely a breach of protocol, but an atrocity – a crime against humanity and against the standard of international peace and order. Even the enemies of sovereignty, such as, the globalists, who want a coercive world government, recognize sovereignty must remain a strong feature in the various states, even if their dream of world dominance comes true. Emerich de Vattel (1714-1767), one of the most important fathers of international law, made it clear that, “Of all the rights possessed by a nation, that of sovereignty is doubtless the most important.” It is “. . . the most important topic to be discussed in political science.” “Sovereignty is the vital principle in the life of a State. The vitality of all law is dependent on it. . . .” In fact, “. . . the very existence of international law would not be possible [without sovereignty].” It is the legal foundation of all law.
“. . . Sovereignty is not of like character with other things, rather, in its exalted rank, it far exceeds other things.” There is a grandeur and magnificence about it, which is above most matters in life. That is, not many things can hold a candle to the enormous importance of this towering quality.
In order to properly address a subject of such great import, it will first be necessary to examine the concept of sovereignty itself and establish its theoretical basis. The different attributes of sovereignty possess common elements, but they differ significantly enough from each other in both theory and function as to require a separate theoretical examination of each. Finally, this study will draw conclusions and demonstrate how sovereignty, especially deposed sovereignty, is implicit in the principles of international law and has far-reaching potential if preserved and safeguarded from its enemies, who do not understand its ramifications and its legal immutable rights.
“A de jure government (deposed) is one that has been, and still claims to be, lawfully possessed of sovereignty.” This kind of sovereignty “. . . has the legal right [but not the actual power] to command obedience.” This book will focus almost exclusively, on the de jure non-territorial prerogatives of both deposed monarchs and governments-in-exile. Sovereignty in a dispossessed royal house is held exclusively by the head and chief of the house or former ruling dynasty. It is held by one person, which is the rightful monarch of the former kingdom or sovereign principality. Sovereignty in an exiled government, on the other hand, is legally held by the entity itself as a whole and is represented by its officers.
Without the priceless rights of real sovereignty, their claims become empty – merely make-believe, pretense, or fantasy. For a government-in-exile, no sovereignty means that they are not a government at all. Sovereignty is also the heart and soul of a dethroned monarchy. No sovereign right means there is no “fons honorum” (fountain of honor) or right to honor others, which means no authentic or genuine orders of chivalry are possible. The validity or legitimacy of an order of chivalry depends entirely on its possession of a sovereign (not ecclesiastical or self-styled) fons honorum or the right to honor others in the name of the former kingdom or princely state. In other words, no sovereignty means there is no legal right or entitlement to use the royal prerogative, because no royal prerogative exists if genuine sovereignty is not held by the head and chief of house.
The word “royal” began in the 13th century and meant “on a grand scale.” It is now generally used to describe monarchs of large territories and their close family members, but in the past, it always revolved around “the office, state or right of a king,” which is sovereignty. “. . . The nation has plainly and simply invested him with [all the glory of] sovereignty . . . invested with all the prerogatives. . . . These are called regal prerogatives, or the prerogatives of majesty.” Thus, a king or sovereign prince has “. . . in his own person all the rights to sovereignty and royalty. . . .” No one else in the kingdom has all these rights in all their fullness other than the king or ruling prince. This right does not belong to distant relatives, collateral lines or offshoot princes, who are not dynasts or have no succession rights.
The president of a reigning republic, especially in modern times may actually be more powerful than any king that ever lived, yet he is not a sovereign, nor does he hold any kind of regal or royal status. A president is merely a representative of his nation or country and nothing more. “For monarchs are sovereigns, but heads of republics are not.” A true monarch is a royal or legally “grand” in every sense of the word, because he is the personification of all the glory of sovereignty over the people and land of his forefathers. This is to be the embodiment of something grand and exalted. As such:
. . . The honor of the sovereign ought to be greater than that of any or all the subjects. For in the sovereignty is the fountain of honor. The dignities of lord, earl, duke, and prince are his creatures. . . . And though they shine some more, some less, when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the stars in the presence of the sun.
. . . The ruler or sovereign of a State is, in international law, . . . considered as representing, in his person, its sovereign dignity [which is to bear its high honor]. . . .
“The royal prerogative was the pre-eminence which the king, by virtue of his office, enjoyed over his subjects.” This supreme right grows out and is an appendage to the sovereign right (the highest secular right on earth) that the monarch holds exclusively above all others. Royal status is “the [exclusive] prerogatives of sovereignty,” not the other way around. To hold this greatest of all rank is the “embodiment of sovereignty,” and all the “emblems [or symbols] of [that] sovereignty,”  Sovereignty is, therefore, a central concern or core issue – crucial to all the high privileges and honors that go with it.
“. . . Royalty is not equivalent to monarchy or sovereignty.” It is a lesser constituent part of the highest secular right on earth. There is no genuine royalty, or true grandeur, without the possession of sovereignty. Sovereignty, either reigning or deposed, is absolutely essential, totally indispensable and necessary to the possession of any portion of the quality of royalty. No sovereignty is the same thing as having no royalty rights to any degree whatsoever. Royalty ceases to exist with the loss of the supreme right.
All of the following regal rights are inseparably linked to both reigning and non-reigning sovereignty. Some of the qualities are inactive with monarchs who are constitutionally limited or dispossessed, but all true sovereigns hold the following rights either in an abeyant or active state:
(1) Jus Imperii, the right to command and legislate,
(2) Jus Gladii, the right to enforce ones commands,
(3) Jus Majestatis, the right to be honored, respected, and
(4) Jus Honorum is the right to honor and reward others.
The above rights are inseparably connected as fundamental attributes of true sovereignty. If legal internal sovereignty is lost or forfeited, there are no royal (grand, exalted, or special) rights left. There is no longer a legal and lawful right to legislate, a right to enforce, a right to be honored, or the right to honor. Every inch of the royal prerogative is gone if deposed sovereignty is lost or forfeited, which again is why it is such an important factor in identifying the rightful from the false claims that are made. “Royalty [which is inseparably connected to sovereignty] properly denotes the condition or status of a person of royal rank, such as a king or queen, or reigning prince or duke, or any of their [close and legally authorized] kindred.”
It is to be hoped that this study, based on venerable legal and historic tradition, will provide the understanding to identify true and genuine claims as opposed to claims that have no authenticity. In this context, it is important to know how rights are both legally terminated and how they can be legally preserved indefinitely or never end if properly maintained. The whole future of nobility and royalty depends on this important legal knowledge. In order to determine with certainty what is genuine and true from what is false, the real under arching standards and foundations of sovereignty must be made eminently clear and unmistakable. The task is daunting, but the subject and principles espoused can be of great worth to future generations because of the value it holds for an ethical and moral life and a civil and productive society. It is also the unmitigated goal of this book to demonstrate the importance and potential of nobility and royalty not only to the past, but to the present and the future.
One of the chief and most important purposes of law is to create certainty, predictability and reliability in the legal world as it has profound effects on the quality of life we either enjoy or suffer in society. “. . . In the Civil law tradition [certainty has become so important that it] has come to be a kind of supreme value, an unquestionable dogma, a fundamental goal. . . .” “. . . The aim of international law is always stability and certainty. . . .” The purpose, therefore, of this book is to demonstrate that the law of nations and natural law are more clear, consistent and obvious than one would suspect in regard to the internal, non-territorial sovereignty, which is so vital to the future of deposed dynasties and legitimate governments-in-exile.
Since this book is about something rarely discussed or considered, it, of necessity, must be a book of evidences as well as content to show the implicit nature of de jure non-territorial sovereignty in natural as well as international law. Concepts will, therefore, be brought up several times and repeated here and there in different contexts in an effort to clarify and make certain and unmistakably clear the rights and status of true non-territorial sovereigns; and, in addition, demonstrate how claims that are counterfeit or fictitious can be identified. The foundation and structure that supports these principles of law will be discussed and supported in order to substantiate the important concepts which are elaborated. It is hoped that this book will be enlightening and add new understandings to the field of justice and equity in a much forgotten area and ensure greater emphasis on the seminal idea that “might does not make right.”
Because there is some confusion in regard to sovereignty and other important words in society in general, definitions are supplied throughout the text in various places. Some words that are particularly important to the understanding of this work are internal or domestic sovereignty, external sovereignty, the de facto and de jure right to rule, perfect society, natural law, and different manifestations of prescription. Concepts and principles surrounding these words are of critical importance and should be noted as they are described in context.
Except in citations or quotes, the term claimant will be used rather than the word pretender for a legitimate deposed house that retained their rights, because:
The term pretender is incorrectly used to describe a former monarch or descendant of a dethroned house who seeks to be restored the crown. The proper term for such a person, however, is claimant, not pretender. The individual is asserting old rights [which have never been forfeited], not making a pretense of something to which he is not entitled. Pretender is rightly applied to such people as Perkin Warbeck or the False Dimitry who were imposters.
The word pretender, for a valid claimant to the rights of a throne, was first introduced and used against the Stuart claimants to the crown of England as a way of attempting to discredit them by applying a false label, which insinuated that they had no genuine right, and the claim was make-believe. The word pretender means by definition a person who makes false claims. This word, therefore, seems out of place even though it can now be used to include both authentic and counterfeit claims. When the word is used, it will be connected to a fictitious, made-up or pretended claim. True and rightful holders of deposed sovereignty will be referred to as claimants.
Instead of using all the possible synonyms and various monarchical titles, such as, maharajah, emir, emperor, sultan, grand duke, czar, shah, etc., king and/or sovereign prince will generally be used throughout this study, except in specific cases. Brackets are used with many of the quotes in order to enhance understanding and correct tense problems in accord with grammatical rules. They are also utilized in some cases as a reminder of missing qualifiers and exceptions, which if ignored, tend to distort rather than promote the understanding of important legal realities. Additional citations and explanations have been added to a number of footnotes in order to provide greater substantiation or validation to the concepts and principles taught.
As shall be seen, this book is based on the natural law principles upon which all valid law and sovereignty is rooted and grounded. The legal rules of prescription, as it relates to nobility and royalty, is particularly addressed, because this important natural law principle is a key component, which is extremely pertinent to the future of deposed sovereignty. First of all, “In International Law: The doctrine of Immemorial Prescription is indispensable in public law.” Indispensable means it cannot be ignored or neglected – it is too important. “Prescriptive title is a phenomenon in every legal system, municipal or international. . . .” It concerns “. . . disputes about kingdom[s, not just territories]. . . .”
In fact, the root of title to every nation on earth, in some way or another, owes its legitimacy to the principle of prescription, which is another word for historical rights made valid through time-honored custom and usage. Prescription both preserves and destroys the internal de jure right to rule under certain conditions. It has supported and sustained all rightful and just law and order from time immemorial and has no known beginning.
It is obvious that thousands of deposed monarchies have lost their deposed sovereign rights by prescription and therefore all the rights of royalty that go with it throughout human history. They and their once-royal houses have for the most part disappeared into obscurity. It is only “. . . in certain rare [and unusual] cases . . . [that there is actually] an adverse claimant [a deposed monarch, or his rightful successors, still maintaining the right to rule under the protective hand of prescription], who . . . [in their history] have been unjustly and sinfully deposed. . . .” In other words, very few maintained their rights, so they lost their rights. There were no tribunals for sovereign entities in those days. Their legal forfeiture took place outside of court as a natural process of neglect. Emerich de Vattel identified an important defense against the prescriptive termination of rights. He wrote that it “. . . has been often employed . . . ,” showing that often took place. (emphasis added) The fact that this defense was used often demonstrates that prescriptive loss of all royal rights was feared and was not an uncommon experience. One typical example of thousands all over the world and throughout history is that:
The Ancient States of that Kingdom [meaning the Kingdom of Portugal, which included the ancient Visigothic Kingdom and the several Kingdoms including Al-Garb Al-Andalus, Leon, Galicia and Portugal, and Galacia] . . . had been abolished [terminated] by virtue of long prescription. . . .
This doctrine [the doctrine of prescription] legalizes de jure the de facto transfer of sovereignty caused in part by the original [deposed] sovereign’s extended negligence and/or neglect of the area in question.
A right, as of sovereignty, which, barred by prescription [lost or forfeited] to the one abandoning [such as a neglectful dispossessed royal house], is acquired for the possessor [the ruling country]. . . .
An excellent definition of prescription and its broad application to both domestic and international issues are well-stated in the following two quotes:
Prescription is a mode of acquiring or losing the right of ownership [such as the supreme right to rule over a territory] or any other right [such as every royal, regal and grand entitlement once owned by a neglectful and indifferent deposed hereditary house] by the effect of time.
When a person’s [sovereign and/or royal right] is extinguished by prescription, he cannot assert it. . . . It ceases to exist so far as he is concerned. But as a mode of losing [sovereign and dynastic] rights is generally a mode of acquiring them, the [regal] right is virtually. . . transferred to the person [the possessor] claiming it by prescription. When the claimants in the contest are A and B, and A’s [sovereign] right is extinguished by prescription, the [royal] right itself is not forfeited. . . or rendered ownerless. It vests in B, who is A’s opponent in the contest.
The loss of royal sovereignty was a fairly common experience throughout history. Of the thousands of ancient dethroned royal houses today, few are intact or visible in any shape or form. If the families survived the violent overthrow of their nations, the ones who were left over lost all hope, gave up and disappeared from history either through exile, regicide or indifference. Prescription is validated or made permanent by a period of 50 to 100 years and by “. . . the [very real] impression that the affected right no longer exists. . . .” That is, all that is needed for such a house to forfeit all its royalty and all its sovereignty is the failure to publicly maintain those rights publicly on a consistent basis. In other words, prescription ends the internal legal right to rule for the former sovereign and his family and transfers all royal rights and privileges automatically in their entirety to the possessor. B, in the above quote, maybe a usurping monarchy (a new royal house) having deposed the former dynasty, or B may be a newly formed republic. If a republic, all the royal rights are lost to A by prescription. They are subsumed or incorporated into the new republican government in a dormant state as the State is no longer organized to have a king, or sovereign prince, holding the right to hold exalted titles, recognize worthy merit through orders of chivalry, etc. However, holding sovereignty, the supreme power, a republican government could institute such.
As a natural law principle of justice and equity, prescription is recognized as having power, dominion and authority over the sovereignty or supreme rights of deposed dynasties and governments-in-exile. This universal-timeless principle is considered to be much older than its mention in the Old Testament history. It is thought to have originated with man himself from the very beginning. It either preserves or transfers rights.
There is, in fact, no other law on earth that can support the idea that either sovereignty or royalty could go on indefinitely, or without end, for a deposed entity. Prescription is the only law can preserve non-territorial sovereignty or end it. The rights of the dispossessed to sovereign supremacy are entirely dependent on carefully applying the rules of this law, or it terminates those rights on a permanent and unalterable basis and transfers them.
The jurisdiction of prescription is binding on whole kingdoms, nations and principalities as well as territorial disputes. It determines whether sovereign rights and royal entitlements continue to live on or cease to exist. It therefore cannot help but have a profound and far-reaching impact on what will become of dispossessed nobility and royalty, both in the present and in the future. As such, it must of necessity be a major, even central, part of this book detailing the various rules and principles involved.
The legal verities and certainties of natural law, as explained and elaborated hereafter, are not to be mixed up with the requirements for reigning houses that possess de facto rule, although many of the same basic fundamentals apply to both. This study will focus chiefly on the sovereignty of deposed monarchs, governments-in-exile, and other non-territorial sovereignties. Their sovereignty is legal, rightful and de jure without any actual rule over a territory. Sometimes this kind of sovereignty is called “titular sovereignty,” which describes the legal right without the power or ability to apply them in the government of a nation. It is defined as follows:
Titular Sovereignty refers to the sovereign authority not exercised by its holder. . . . The monarch enjoys all powers in the eye of the law. . . . But, in actual practice, the monarch is a symbol only without any real power of administration. (emphasis added)
Even though legitimate deposed monarchs, or their rightful successors, are labeled as “non-territorial,” this is only because they presently do not preside or rule over any territory; nevertheless, they still hold all the rights of internal or territorial sovereignty on a de jure legal basis over their former kingdoms or principalities.
Sovereignty, even curtailed or deposed sovereignty, is cherished as the highest secular right, entitlement, or honor that exists on earth. “. . . It is not a matter of mere authority, but of supreme authority” – authority that is far above all others. Whether reigning or non-reigning, sovereignty is critically important to safeguard the world and protect the liberty of all people. It is the most important principle in international law. It is crucial and necessary to protect what is most valuable and precious to human life and freedom. This imperative, which will be explained, is part the core essence and underlying purpose of this book.
Last of all, consider the venerable old analogy of four blind men in India who had never seen an elephant before. The first felt only the trunk and thought an elephant was like a large snake or worm. Another only touched a foot, so he described an elephant as being a lot like the trunk of a tree. The one that felt only the tail thought an elephant was like a living stick. The last felt only the ear, so he thought an elephant was like a living carpet or leaf. They were all right to a certain degree, but they were all wrong, dead wrong, as each perceived the elephant in a radically different way. They argued loud and long as each was sure about his assessment, and each felt he was right, but none of them were accurate or even close to what is real. The moral of the story, as far as this book is concerned, is that in order to get the whole complete truth about dynastic law, the entire book must be read from cover to cover. By reading only small parts of the book, one can get a distorted lopsided elephant that appears to be like a small living stick, rather than a big and powerful animal that can be a wonderful friend to mankind if properly understood, accepted and applied.
 Tracy R. Twyman, “Monarchy: The Primordial Form of Government,” 2011: http://quintessentialpublications.com/twyman/?page_id=48.
 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: The Evolution of an Idea, 2007, p. x.
 Gleaned from hundreds of books and articles.
 Andrew Natsios, “Illusions of Influence: The CNN Effect in Complex Emergencies,” in Rotberg and Weiss, eds., From Massacres to Genocide: The Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises, Robert I. Rotberg and Thomas G. Weiss, eds., 1996, pp. 149–168.
 Elihu Burritt, Thoughts and Notes at Home and Abroad, 1868, p. 266.
 Op.cit., Natsios.
 “On the Soverignty of all Countries,” 2011: http://www.anti-imperialist.org/spvereign-rights_1-18-04/htm.
 Richard N. Haass, “Sovereignty and Globalism,” February 17, 2006, 2011: www.cfr.org/publication/9903/sovereignty_and_globalisation.html.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 4, no. 54.
 Westel Woodury Willoughby, An Examination of the Nature of the State: A Study in Political Philosophy, 1922, p. 185.
 Kwiecie Roman, State Sovereignty. The Reconstruction and Meaning of the Notion in International Law, 2005, p. 205.
 Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, , book 2, chapter 12, no. 1.
 Herbert Wolcott Bowen, International Law: A Simple Statement of its Principles, no. 202, 1897, p. 131.
 Raj Kumar Pruthi, The Political Theory, 2005, p. 72.
 Dictionary.com, 2011: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/royal#wordorgtop.
 A Compendious Dictionary of the English Language, “Royalty” & “Royalties,” 1806.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 1, chapter 4, no. 45.
 William Rae Wilson, Esq., Travels in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Hanover, Germany, Netherlands, &c., Constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark (1826 time frame), appendix no. 16, article 6, 1826, p. 72.
 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, 1905, p. 406.
 Thomas Hobbs, Leviathan, or, The Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, Michael Joseph Oakeshott, ed., 1997, p. 114.
 William Teulon Swan Stallybrass, A Society of States, Sovereignty, 1919, p. 32.
 George Lachmann Mosse, The Struggle for Sovereignty in England, 1968, p. 55.
 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, Philip Babcock Gove, ed., “royalty,” 1961, p. 1982
 The Penny Cyclopaedia of the Society for the Diffussion of Useful Knowledge, vol. 20, “Royalty,” 1841, p. 211.
 “It is also an established fact that [deposed] sovereignty [persists even though] . . . they lack territorial power. . . . [These] sovereign rights are honored in perpetuity by international law, according to Hobbs [who declared]:
‘It is certain that sovereignty comprehends the exercise of four fundamental rights: the JUS IMPERII,which is the right of command, the JUS MAJESTATIS, which is the right to be honored, respected and protected; and the Jus Honorum, which is the right to reward merit and virtue.’
‘When the sovereign loses the territory on which he used to exercise the JUS IMPERII and the JUS GLADII [the right to enforce ones commands or laws], he does not lose the sovereign rights. He still conserves IN PECTORE and IN POTENTIA the above-mentioned rights, of which the effective exercise is practically suspended, only the pretention, from which derives the title of pretender [or rightful claimant] remains.’” (Charles Louis Thourot Pichel, Samogitia: the Unknown in History, 1975, p. 307).
 The Penny Cyclopædia, vol. 20, George Long, ed., “royalty,” 1841, p. 211.
 John Henry Merryman and Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Europe and Latin America, 3rd ed., 2007, p. 48.
 Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law, 2nd ed., 2010, p. 38.
 Doug Lennox, Now You Know Royalty, 2009, p. 30.
 John Bouvier and Francis Rawle, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary: A Concise Encyclopedia of the Law, vol. 3, 8th ed., third revision, 1914, p. 2673.
 Daniel Patrick O’Connell, International Law, vol. 1, 1965, p. 487; Note: “Prescription is . . . the acquisition of lordship [in other words, sovereignty or full regalia rights, not just property rights]. . . .” (Colin Forbes Wilder, “Property, Possession and Prescription: The Rule of Law in the Hessian and Rhine – Main Region of Germany, 1648-1776,” Dissertation, University of Chicago, note 31, August 2010, p. 415).
 Hugo Grotius as quoted in the Chamizal Arbitration, 1911, p. 113.; Note: “According to Grotius, immemorial prescription has the advantage of extinguishing controversies concerning Kingdoms and the boundaries [or borders] of Kingdoms. . . .”. (International Law Association, Revue de droit international, de sciences diplomatiques, politiques, et socials, vol. 72, 1994, p. 14)
 “Article 2 – A Reply to Two Criticisms – Civil Sovereignty, and Necessary Truth,” The Dublin Review, vol. 25, Nicholas Patrick Wiseman, ed., July 1875, p. 44.
 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 144.
 Marquis de Resende and Viscount de Itabayana, “Supplemental Intelligence: Portuguese State Paper,” The Atlas: Literary, Historical and Commercial Reporter, vol. 1, 1828, p. 12.
 K. L. Bhatia, Textbook on Legal Language and Legal Writing, 2010, p. 313.
 Freiherr von Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, issue 13, vol. 1, no. 358-359, p. 185.
 Gabriel Baudry-Lacantinerie, Albert Tissier, Charles Aubry, and Jean Carbonnier, Prescription, Traité théorique et pratique de droit civil, 4th ed., chapter 4, vol. 28, nos. 1-815, 1924, Louisiana State Law Institute, trans., 1972, p. 14.
 Upendra Nath Mitra, The Indian Law of Prescription and Easements, 1907, p. 2.
 Georg Potyka, English Summary Law – Making and Decision-Making in International Law, 2000, p. 104.
 Durga K. Sharma, Political Science, vol. 1, 1997, 2004, pp. 66-67.
 Dan Philpott as quoted in Theodore Caplow, Armageddon Postponed: A Different View of Nuclear Weapons, 2010, pp. 74-75.
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